L. V. IVANOVA

Candidate of Historical Sciences Center for African Studies IVI RAS

Somalia Keywords:. Al-Shabaab. Islamic Courts Union, conflict in Somalia, terrorism, Somali diaspora

In today's media, Somalia is traditionally presented as "a paradise for Al-Qaeda" and "the country with the worst reputation in the world." The capital city of Mogadishu is called "the most dangerous place on earth", and its name has become a household name.

In 2011, the play "Mogadishu"was staged in London. The story was not about Somalia at all, but about riots in a provincial British school. That same year, in August, during the Tottenham riots, the media compared this area of London to the Somali capital.

Modern Somalia, according to the observations of many researchers, is an ideal illustration of a dysfunctional state in all respects-droughts, famine, endless internecine war, religious extremism, piracy.

The terrorist attack in late September 2013 at the Westgate Mall in the Kenyan capital Nairobi, which killed 67 people, including 18 foreigners, including citizens of Great Britain, Canada, France and Australia1, was the bloodiest in Kenya since the 1998 bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi, which killed more than 200 people. The Somali organization Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for it. The seizure of the shopping center was a kind of response to the military operations of African Union peacekeepers, in particular, the military contingent (as part of AMISOM*) of Kenya, in Somalia, directed against Islamists.

This fact shows that the Al-Shabaab movement must not only be reckoned with, but also studied, the origins of its origin and the purpose of its existence identified.

Unfortunately, Russian researchers find it difficult to study this phenomenon in the course of field observations, as do, for example, British and American researchers and journalists (often under the cover of AMISOM armored personnel carriers and protected by international organizations working in Somalia).

Over the past 20 years, Somalia has become something of a platform for international experiments in peacemaking, nation-building and disaster management. One of the responses to attempts from outside to resolve the situation in Somalia (through the deployment of peacekeeping troops, assistance to the local population by international humanitarian organizations, etc.), as well as an attempt to independently solve their own problems, was the appearance of the Al-Shabaab organization in Somalia.

On the one hand, Al-Shabaab controls the situation in the central regions of Somalia, ensures the development of local businesses, and ensures the safety of movement at any time of the day, but on the other hand, this organization is a growing terrorist threat in Somalia itself and beyond, involving representatives of the large Somali diaspora in the ranks of its supporters.

THE BIRTH OF AL-SHABAAB

Al-Shabaab* * is one of the local Somali organizations inspired by the ideas of U. bin Laden on jihad. It was originally the military wing of the Somali Islamic Courts Union, which came to power in the second half ^{of 2006.2}

Al-Shabaab is not a monolithic movement, it includes numerous members of the diaspora, whose main goal is to fight against the Provisional Fede-

* AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) is an African Union-mandated regional peacekeeping mission with the approval of the United Nations. AMISOM is authorized to support the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, train government troops, and help create a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid.

** Full name-Mujahideen al-Shabaab ("Mujahideen Youth Movement"). According to the rules of the Arabic language, instead of the traditional Russian media spelling "Al-Shabab", you should use"Al-Shabab".

rather than the idea of global jihad, which is typical of radical Islamists. The leaders of this organization do not share common ideas about the principles and ideas of their own movement, each speaking on their own behalf.

The link between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda is clear, as its veterans participate in Al-Shabaab and express their willingness to support Al-Qaeda, although the Somali organization is in no hurry to declare official membership in Al-Qaeda. In 1992, when bin Laden went to Sudan, his associates began to establish contacts with Islamists in Somalia, and in 1993 the first Al-Qaeda training camps were established there. The Al-Qaeda leadership expected to find cheap recruits ready for anything in the devastated Somalia, as it once did in Afghanistan, but the local traditional social structure and the priority of clan affiliation among Somalis did not allow Al-Qaeda to create a strong and unified coalition with Al-Shabab.

According to local Somalis, Al-Shabaab members are mostly foreigners (although in reality this is not the case), because Somalis themselves cannot treat local shrines and customs with disrespect. For example, Al-Shabaab members have destroyed places of worship for Sufis and graves of prominent Somalis, forced not only their supporters, but also local residents to wear Afghan-Pakistani clothing, robbed defenseless populations, embezzled humanitarian aid, allowed violence against women, etc. In reality, foreigners (Arabs, Chechens, Kenyans, Afghans, etc.) occupy mainly senior positions in Al-Shabaab. ³

Imams attached to mosques and prominent members of Al-Shabaab recruit local young Somalis, as well as representatives of the diaspora. This organization annually organizes competitions among young reciters of the Koran, and the winner receives weapons and grenades as a reward. One of the award winners in 2011 explained that young people should flip through the Koran with one hand to gain knowledge, and hold weapons with the other to defend Islam.⁴

In most cases, ordinary Al-Shabaab fighters are young men who have lost their parents and, as a result, their life guidance, hope for education and a decent life. Some people join Al-Shabaab simply for food and a small amount of money, but this is usually just a ruse. Such fighters become easy prey for religious terrorist groups.

It is almost impossible to escape from the ranks of Al-Shabaab: the penalty is the death penalty. In the process of preparing suicide bombers, young people are often shown Bollywood (Indian) films about a beautiful life as an illustration of what awaits them in paradise, pornography is actively used.

A significant number of Somalis in the diaspora do not share the ideology of Al-Shabaab, but still recognize the principles of this movement as partially correct. British journalist J. R. R. Tolkien Fergusson calls them "armchair nationalists": they have never been to Somalia, receive second-hand news about the country, and prefer to talk in the traditional Somali spirit of" eternal "religious and territorial hostility with neighboring Ethiopia -" any means is good, if only against Ethiopia. " ⁵

Foreign observers differ in their assessment of al-Shabaab's activities. Thus, J. Ferguson believes that Al-Shabaab is only trying to control and keep the residents in fear, without providing them with anything. This organization, he claims, denies the need for humanitarian aid in Somalia, and does everything possible to prevent its delivery, considering humanitarian aid "politically motivated propaganda".⁶.At the same time, the authorities do not properly control the use of wells and maintain irrigation channels in working order, do not regulate water supplies, and deny the existence of this problem*.

As an example for understanding the conflict, Ferguson, in his book The World's Most Dangerous Place: Inside Somali Lawlessness, cites the story of the Somali youth Aden as "a summary of the Somali catastrophe."

...The boy's family was almost completely killed during the shelling of their home, and his younger brother managed to reach Yemen. The rise to power of the Union of Islamic Courts, he said, made Mogadishu a safe place for a while. ...But children and adults were banned from playing soccer, mosques were beaten for being late for prayers, and street patrols checked for music or movies on their mobile phones. If something in the phone did not suit the inspectors, it was broken and forced to swallow the SIM card. ...On buses, young people were forced to take off their trousers to check if they were cut off. If not, circumcision was performed right on the spot with an ordinary kitchen knife, and the procedure was paid - $3. ...For a young Somali in this country, Aden argued, there are three options: join Al-Shabaab, be killed by Al-Shabaab members,or flee the country. Those caught were beheaded. Sick Somalis who applied for help in hospitals under international organizations could also be executed.The presence of gold dental crowns was regarded as a desire for luxury, and therefore Al-Shabaab fighters looked at the teeth of Somalis during inspections and removed the gold crowns and teeth on the spot... School teachers were beaten if they taught girls ... ⁷

British journalist and editor of the Africa Division of the BBC Broadcasting Corporation-

* One of the most unpopular measures was the introduction of a ban by Al-Shabaab leadership on the movement of residents in areas affected by drought. Such a ban completely contradicts the basic psychology of nomadic Somalis, who do not recognize restrictions for their main occupation - cattle breeding.

The BBC's Mary Harper, author of Misunderstood Somalia: Faith, War, and Hope in a Shattered Country, ⁸ does not hide her sympathy for the work of the Union of Islamic Courts in Somalia. "The rise to power of Islamic courts is the answer of Allah to the pleas of Somalis for salvation," she writes optimistically. There are, of course, negative aspects, which, according to Harper, are inevitable in the process of struggle for the establishment of order and stability.

In her book, she describes what she saw in Mogadishu: school students were forced to attend public executions of those who violated the country's new laws. Among those executed were pirates who were declared criminals by the Government of Islamic Courts. Music programs on the radio were banned*. Mobile phone ringtones were banned, and school break calls were replaced by the sound of a teacher clapping at the end of class**. The only thing that Somalis got in return was free and safe movement around the city at any time.

AL-SHABAAB'S IDEOLOGY

The ideology of al-Shabaab is described in detail and without the emotions that distinguish the monographs of journalists M. Harper and J. Smith. Ferguson was studied by Norwegian researcher Stig Jarle Hansen in his book "Al-Shabaab in Somalia: the History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012" ⁹. In addition to his personal impressions of 14 years of work in the region, Hansen * * * analyzes the activities of this organization.

A Norwegian researcher was optimistic about the emergence of Al-Shabaab in 2006, as one of the divisions of the Union of Islamic Courts. Despite the obvious infringement of the rights of local residents, this organization managed to ensure the long-awaited stability and, as Hansen notes, fill the ideological vacuum created in Somalia after unsuccessful attempts to implement the ideas of Marxism and nationalism during the dictatorship of M. Siad Barre (b. 1919, President of Somalia in 1969-1995), and rally everyone around the religious idea****.

The economic policies of the Al-Shabaab leadership have also been controversial among both the local population and foreign observers. For example, Somalis were subject to a 5% payroll tax, and businessmen were required to donate 10 to 15% of their income to the Al - Shabaab foundation. The introduction of taxes, however, led to the growth and expansion of local businesses. In areas controlled by "Al-Shabaab rebels", tolls were collected for passing through checkpoints: the money was used to fix the road surface. Hansen notes that the roads controlled by the federal government were in a more deplorable state.

Hansen refutes the claims of some journalists that Al-Shabaab did not allow international organizations to provide assistance to local residents during droughts. UNICEF, the Red Cross, the Norwegian Refugee Council, and the local charity Zamzam continued to work in the region and met no opposition from al-Shabaab. Relations did not develop with representatives from the World Food Programme (WFP). The leadership of Al-Shabaab banned the organization from importing humanitarian aid, as the presence of foreign products worsened the conditions for local business development in the country's markets.

However, the ambivalence of Al-Shabaab soon became apparent: the organization was declared a terrorist organization in the United States in 2008, in 2009 in Australia, and in 2010 in the United Kingdom and Canada.

For Hansen, Al-Shabaab is a "child of the war on terror", born out of the presence of foreign peacekeepers fighting terrorism in the region. He also points to a large role in the emergence of this movement of corruption and misuse of funds by the Government of Somalia, which is supported by the West. Hansen draws attention to the attempts of UN development organizations to train future police personnel for Somalia, without thinking about their guaranteed employment in the profession and providing them with a decent salary.

Thus, Hansen concludes, the Somali government and the UN have been the best allies of Al-Shabaab. Graduates of UN training centers joined Al-Qaeda training camps, became suicide bombers or joined the ranks of Al-Shabaab after completing their courses. Their work was paid at the following rate: $20 - for a successful attack using a grenade, $30 - for killing an "enemy" soldier, $100 - for a successful roadside bombing, etc. Money was not always paid, but at least the militants were promised payments, which pushed them to join the armed forces. Al-Shabaab ¹⁰.

Hansen analyzes in detail the recruitment process for terrorists. In particular, he investigated Internet sites that appeared by 2007, when Al-Shabaab finally left the Union of Islamic Courts and increased radicalization of this youth organization.

Sites in English, Arabic, and Somali were targeted at three different audiences. Their content was different. So, in English, to attract funds from foreign Islamist organizations-

* M. Harper says that after the introduction of this law, the next day on the local radio instead of music included the sounds of shooting and croaking frogs.

** The bell, according to Islamists, sounds similar to the ringing of bells in Christian churches.

*** S. J. Hansen is the author of numerous articles and analytical reviews on security issues in the Horn of Africa, the ideology of religious movements in this region and the Middle East, and Islamic political philosophy.

**** Even the introduction of the mandatory hijab for Somali women was viewed with optimism by both local residents and foreign observers - women who are dressed according to strict Muslim rules, they believe, are more reliably protected from violence.

For example, pan-Islamic symbols were used, calls for global jihad were heard, while Somali websites were dominated by nationalist ideas and calls to fight the Ethiopian invasion. Arab websites preached the ideology of Al-Qaeda, disrespected Somali cultural values (initiated persecution of followers of Sufism, etc.) in the name of the ideas of global jihad.

Al-Shabaab does not have a unified leadership, and the leaders of its individual groups often speak exclusively on their own behalf, expressing their own opinions, and not the organization. They can't agree on many things: how to treat representatives of various Muslim persuasions, joining the ranks of Al-Qaeda, banning the use of kata-a plant whose leaves have narcotic properties, etc.

WAYS TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT IN SOMALIA

Most foreign observers attribute the strengthening of Somalia's stability to the elimination of Al-Shabaab as an organization with the involvement of foreign troops. Meanwhile, many researchers conclude that there is no need for foreign states to interfere in the internal affairs of Somalia; they point out the futility of convening numerous international conferences on the settlement of the situation in Somalia, held outside the country in comfortable expensive hotels, which only increases the gap between ordinary Somalis and the ruling elite (rather, that elite which seeks to create the impression among foreign observers that it has power and influence at home. - L. I.).

Many Somali leaders have learned to be persuasive in attracting foreign sponsors for discussions that last for years. At the same time, their participants live in hotels at the expense of sponsors, periodically meet with each other in conference halls, and do not seek to see Somalia with their own eyes.

The various Somali conflict resolution groups exist separately and do not interact with each other. For example, the Nairobi Bubble, a group of highly paid Somali officials based in Kenya, live in hotels in Kenya. Another independent group, Somalis working for the UN, is based in New York. These groups compete with each other to solve the problems of Somalia, which Somali politicians use to their advantage. Thus, a UN report (July 2012) stated that " $ 70 million allocated for the reconstruction of Somalia was unaccounted for and ended up in the pockets of Somali politicians."¹¹. Somalis, in turn, accuse the UN of over-funding UN officials stationed in Kenya who do not visit Somalia at all.¹²

Perhaps a partial solution to de-escalating tensions in central Somalia could be to hold a peace conference in Mogadishu. Undoubtedly, this will require funds from the Somali diaspora, its investment in the restoration of the destroyed infrastructure in the capital. In this case, the diaspora itself will act as an interested party in the effectiveness of the conference. The participation of foreign representatives (and not sponsors) should be minimized, limiting them only to the functions of observers.

* * *

Despite the well-established assessments of the situation in Somalia as hopeless, dead-end, recently there is a hope that, having "reached the bottom", the process of disintegration and degradation of this state, albeit slowly, is beginning to acquire some positive dynamics.

This is how one can interpret the fact that authoritative representatives of the Al-Shabaab leadership, who do not associate themselves with terrorist activities, became part of the next new transitional government of Somalia, established in 2012. Their authority is not linked to the ideas of radical Islamism, although it is precisely the authority of religious leaders who take into account local specifics and traditions.

It is also important to note that Somalis who are outside their "failed state" are acutely aware of its reputational losses. Today, they are trying to take a more active part in the restoration and unification of their historical homeland. Thus, the assumption is reinforced that the combination of external and internal factors can finally reverse the situation that seemed hopeless during the 20 years of powerlessness of the transitional governments that replaced the dictatorial rule of M. Siad Barre, which led Somalia to the inglorious results of development in the XX century.

¹ http://24smi.org/article/12056-opubli-kovany-pervyj-fotografii-razrushennogo-v-ken.html

² For more information, see: A. N. Bragin (Editor-in-chief of the journal in Addis Ababa). The Great Somali Offensive / / Asia and Africa Today, 2010, N 8.

^{Fergusson J.} 3 The World's Most Dangerous Place: Inside the Outlaw State of Somalia. Da Capo Press, 2013. Chapter 6. What Makes Al-Shabaab Tick? P. 13.

⁴ Ibid. Chapter 3. The Field Hospital: What Bombs and Bullets do to People? P. 41.

⁵ Ibid. Chapter 13. The Missing Minneapolis. P. 54.

⁶ See: Fergusson J. Op. cit.

⁷ Ibid. Chapter 4. Aden's Story. P. 4 - 20.

^{Harper M.} 8 Getting Somalia Wrong: Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State. Zed Books, 2012 (published in a series called - African arguments Series).

^{Hansen Stigjarle.} 9 Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005 - 2012. Oxford University Press, USA, 2013.

¹⁰ Ibid. Chapter 5. Leaving the Sharia Courts. P. 56.

^{Harper M.} 11 Somalia: Whose country is it, anyway? - http://waayeelnews.blogspot.ru/ 2013/01/somalia-whose-country-is-it-anyway-mary.html

¹² Ibidem.

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