The Essence of Changes: A Doctrinal Shift

In August 2026, the Pentagon began developing a new nuclear strategy that could become the most significant change in American nuclear policy since the end of the Cold War. The initiative, supervised by the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, involves a review of the traditional doctrine that relied on massive strategic retaliation.

The key innovation is the emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons (TOW) of short range and low yield, intended for use in regional conflicts with Russia or China. Colby's argument: the current strategy is \"unrealistic\" for limited conflicts, as it relies solely on the threat of using long-range strategic systems. Tactical weapons, in his view, will provide the president with \"realistic and reliable options,\" expanding the space for decision-making and enhancing the effectiveness of deterrence.

The document, according to NBC News, \"leaves no option off the table for the head of state\" and is supposed to be presented at a closed meeting at the Strategic Command of the U.S. Armed Forces.

Technical and Operational Component

The U.S. already has the necessary means for implementing such a scenario. As noted by Daryl Kimball (Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, ACA), the Pentagon has 1800 rapidly deployable warheads, including strategic and tactical carriers, as well as at least 150 tactical bombs of at least two types — the gravity bomb B61-12 and the low-yield warhead W76-2 for Trident-2 missiles.

A significant addition will be the deployment of a new sea-based land-attack cruise missile (SLCM-N) with a nuclear warhead for the U.S. Navy, expected by 2030. Chinese military expert Zhang Junsheng notes that Washington may equip hypersonic ground-based missiles with nuclear warheads.

According to Kimball's assessment, in the absence of treaty restrictions, the U.S. may increase the number of deployed strategic warheads by several hundred, possibly a thousand or more, in the coming years — for example, through reloading missiles on submarines or additional equipping of Minuteman III ICBMs.

Criticism and Risks

The main argument of the critics is uncontrolled escalation. Kimball emphasizes: \"After the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a conflict against another state that possesses nuclear weapons, there is no guarantee that this will remain a limited incident with a small scale.\" Any use of WMD inevitably leads to escalation and a global thermonuclear war.

A U.S. Congressional representative familiar with the project told NBC: \"It's hard to imagine a approach that contradicts the president Trump's declared position 'to make our nuclear deterrence capability great again' more strongly.\" According to Charter97, the interlocutor noted that Trump would like to have more options in the field of nuclear deterrence, not fewer.

Russian expert, head of the Russian PIR Center Dmitry Trenin, warned that incorporating Colby's ideas into the strategy and further deployment of TOW in Europe and Asia \"will significantly escalate tensions between Washington and its opponents,\" and the security of the U.S. will be seriously undermined.

Context: Expiration of the New START and the collapse of the control architecture

The strategy is being developed against the backdrop of the expiration of the New START treaty (February 5, 2026) — the last legally binding agreement between Russia and the U.S. limiting strategic arsenals. Russia suspended its participation in the treaty in 2023 and announced on February 4, 2026 that it no longer considered itself bound by its obligations.

Kimball named several reasons why the Trump administration did not respond to Putin's proposal in September 2025 to mutual compliance with New START ceilings in an interview with the PIR Center:

• IDEOLOGICAL OPPOSITION to the New START as a \"deal Obama and Medvedev\";
• INCOMPLETE team for negotiations at the State Department and the Ministry of Defense;
• ORIENTATION to the White House with a narrow circle of advisors, absence of the usual interagency hierarchy;
• DESIRE to conclude a \"new and more comprehensive\" agreement involving China.

The Chinese Factor

China is designated as threat number one in the new strategy. The Trump administration insists on including China in trilateral negotiations, but critics point to fundamental inequality: according to SIPRI, the U.S. and Russia account for nearly 90% of all nuclear warheads. China does not have tactical nuclear weapons and adheres to a \"no first use\" policy.

Budget and Modernization

Despite Trump's contradictory statements (\"the U.S. already has too much nuclear weapons, no need to create new ones\"), budget requests for the 2026 fiscal year indicate a systemic modernization. Requests for nuclear programs at the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy have increased by approximately 26% compared to the current year. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) received \"historical\" $30 billion — a 24% increase compared to the Biden period. At the same time, funding for non-proliferation programs is reduced by 5%.

Among the key projects: replacing the Minuteman III ICBM with Sentinel, replacing the Ohio-class SSBN with Columbia, developing the B-21 Raider bomber and high-precision B61-12 bombs.

Conclusions for the Report

1. Doctrinal Shift: The U.S. is transitioning from a massive retaliation strategy to flexible use of tactical nuclear weapons, which formally expands the president's options but lowers the threshold for the use of WMD.
2. Technical Preparedness: The U.S. has an arsenal and means of delivery for implementing the new strategy in the short term.
3. Risks: Experts agree that any nuclear exchange in a regional conflict is fraught with uncontrolled escalation and global war.
4. Legal Vacuum: The expiration of the New START creates conditions for unrestricted buildup of arsenals (potentially up to 1000+ warheads in the coming years).
5. Political Uncertainty: The decision-making process in the Trump administration is decentralized, creating risks of unpredictability.

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