Galina Vdovina

The Two Modes of Life in the "Science of the Soul" in the Seventeenth Century

Galina Vdovina - Leading Research Fellow, Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russia). galvdi@yandex.ru

The paper deals with reformatting Aristotelian "science of the soul" in the beginning of the 17th century. The major change was the transformation of the concept of "life" which has been reconsidered to include not only the created nature but also the divine one. Aligning with the theological requirements, the scholastic philosophers of the early modern period postulated two different modes of life: physical and intentional, which allowed uniting all forms of life, from plants to God, within one univocal and disjunctive concept.

Keywords: science of the soul, scholasticism, univocality, physical and intentional life, Roderico de Arriaga, Petro Hurtado de Mendoza.

The second half of the sixteenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries is the period of the last flowering of the continuous scholastic tradition, which is centered on the Iberian Peninsula. Scholasticism of this time, on the one hand, continues to develop large cross-cutting themes of previous centuries (divine omnipotence and free will, various concepts of being, the problem of the unity of the soul and body in man, the problem of the relationship of the intellect to the sensory" part " of the soul, etc.). On the other hand, the scholastic tradition at this last stage of development acquires new features. distinctive features, both institutional and social

Vdovina G. Two modes of life in the "science of the soul" of the 17th century // State, religion, and Church in Russia and abroad. 2015. N 1 (33). pp. 311-328.

Vdovina, G. (2015) "The Two Modes of Life in the 'Science of the Soul' in the Seventeenth Century", Gosudarstvo, religiia. tserkov' v Rossii i za rubezhom 33 (1): 311 - 328.

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and meaningful ones. First, the entire body of traditional university sciences is strictly systematized, undergoing restructuring and rethinking in view of the single and main goal - to prepare young people for a deep assimilation of revealed theology, and through it - to serve the cause of the Catholic Church in the face of new challenges from the Reformation and extra-scholastic thought. Behind these changes was a strategy approved by the Council of Trent (1545-1563), designed to ensure that the Catholic Church emerged from a deep systemic crisis and succeeded in the battle for the minds and souls of its flock in the face of the Protestant threat. Naturally, one of the most important battlegrounds of this battle was the university and university sciences. A decisive step towards university reform was the new educational charter of the Jesuit Order-Ratio studiorum, which clearly defined the tasks of university education and university sciences, their structure and teaching methods. A unified curriculum based on years of study, well-thought-out universal methods and techniques for presenting material, and most importantly-the initial and consistent orientation of any knowledge, even the most technical and rational, to the highest divine truth: this is the context in which the scholastic tradition lives in these last century and a half.

Secondly, the systematization and restructuring of university disciplines was not limited to the ordering of already existing elements of tradition, as is commonly believed, but went hand in hand with meaningful transformations. At this time, many new ideas are emerging, sometimes very influential (the most famous example is the concept of "average knowledge" in Jesuit theology), and even new areas of knowledge (for example, systematically constructed scholastic semiotics). Despite the general extremely weak knowledge of post-trident scholasticism, 1 some of these problems are still being studied.

1. The most famous author of this tradition is Francisco Suarez (1548-1617). As for Catholic scholasticism in the seventeenth century, serious research on it (apart from a few early articles) has only been published in the last decade and a half. For example, monographs: Knebel, S. К. (2000) Wille, Wurfel und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Das System der moralischen Notwendigkeit in der Jesuitenscholastik 1550 - 1700. Hamburg; Heider, D. (2014) Universals in Second Scholasticism: A comparative study with focus on the theories of Francisco Suarez S.J. (1548 - 1617), Joao Poinsot O.P. (1589 - 1644) and Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola O.F.M. Conv. (1602 - 1673) / Bonaventura Belluto O. F. M. Conv. (1600 - 1676). John Benjamins Publishing Company. Amsterdam-Philadelphia. General introductions to post-medieval Scholasticism of the 16th and early 17th centuries. in Russian: Shmonin D. V. In the Shadow of the Renaissance: the Second Scholasticism in Spain. SPb.:

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some ideas and areas have already found their own thoughtful and deep researchers, 2 while others - the vast majority of them-remain almost or even completely ignored by historians of philosophy. The latter include many innovative elements of the philosophical and theological teaching about life and the living, presented in the university courses "On the Soul", and, in particular, the idea of two modes of life - intentional and physical, which has no analogues in the previous tradition. 3
Indeed, during the long centuries of the Christian Middle Ages, there were two radically different concepts of life that were almost never found in the same texts and contexts. One concept of life went back to Aristotle, to his" Small works on nature "(Parva naturalia) and the treatise "On the soul". In the Aristotelian sense, living beings were those beings who

Publishing House of St. Petersburg University, 2006 (monograph), and a good conceptual article Ivanov V. L. Philosophy of the Jesuits as a lost key element of the scientific landscape of the XVII century. On the incompleteness of the traditional image of the history of Philosophy and the History of Sciences of early Modern Times / Ed. by E. V. Malyshkin. Filosofiya istorii filosofii: obyazatelnost ' i obshchivost istoricheskogo [Philosophy of the History of Philosophy: Obligation and Obsession of the Historical]. State University Press, 2012, pp. 120-142.

2. This applies primarily to theology and metaphysics. 1 monograph by S. Knebel, as well as articles by J. Schmutz, for example: Schmutz, J. (2009)" Les innovations conceptuelles de la metaphysique espagnole post-suarezienne: les status rerum selon Antonio Perez et Sebastian Izquierdo", Quaestio. Annuario di storia della metafisica 9: 61 - 99; Schmutz, J. (2010) "Les normes theologiques de l'enseignement philosophique dans le catholicisme romain moderne (1500 - 1650)", in J. -C. Bardout (ed.) Philosophie et theologie a l'epoque moderne, pp. 129 - 150. Paris, Editions du Cerf (Philosophie & Theologie).

3. As for the treatises "On the Soul", today the situation is as follows. There is one large monograph devoted to the scientia de anima by Jesuit authors of the second half of the 16th and first half of the 17th centuries: De Chene, D. (2000) Life's form: Late Aristotelian Concepts of the Soul. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. It is devoted to the analysis of the traditional topic of commentaries on Aristotle-the ontology of the soul and its connection with the body, as well as the question of the ontological status and structure of cognitive abilities. The author confines himself to the consideration of a small number of early texts of the post-Trident tradition, and touches on this distinction between the two modes of life in passing, without attaching any special significance to it, and without seeing any fundamental gaps between the Medieval-Renaissance and post-Trident approaches to the science of the living. In addition, there are very few monographs devoted to the seventeenth century with at most one chapter, and the authors are usually interested in some particular aspect of the philosophical psychology of the early Modern scholastics. Spruit, L. (2005) Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge. Vol. II: Renaissance Controversies, Later Scholasticism, and the Elimination of the Intelligible Species. (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History). Brill; Edwards, M. (2013) Time and the Science of the Soul in Early Modern Philosophy. Brill. There is no research literature on the topic of this article yet, except for a brief mention in the book by D. Deschamps, mentioned above.

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they have a soul-a special form that allows a living being to perform special, vital operations: nutrition, growth, reproduction, and at a higher level - feeling and thinking.4 Accordingly, life is nothing but the possession of the soul and the performance of vital operations.5 All these operations are united by the concept of self-movement, that is, movement coming from within the living being itself. This is how life was understood in the medieval science of the soul, which was presented in the commentaries on Aristotle's treatise. Another concept of life was associated with theology, which claimed that God is alive and, according to the testimony of Scripture, is life itself. The divine life is imitated to the best of their ability by intelligent creatures-angels and people: it is a spiritual life, a life in a completely different register and mode than the realization of the natural capabilities of the body, endowed with organs and formed by the soul. The cardinal difference between these two types and understandings of life was well expressed by Hugh Victorinec (1097-1141) in his essay "On the Sacraments": "There are two lives: one earthly, the other heavenly; one corporeal, the other spiritual. One is that by which the body lives thanks to the soul, the other is that by which the soul lives thanks to God. Both have their own good, from which they grow and feed in order to exist"6. The first type of life was explored in numerous commentaries on the works of Aristotle, the second was conceptualized in theological works, in manuals on the exercise of piety, in monastic practice.

This ambivalence in the understanding of life persisted until the beginning of Modern times, until the era of those profound transformations in traditional university sciences, which were discussed above. The turning point was the turn of the XVI-XVII centuries. and especially at the beginning of the seventeenth century, when two concepts of life, which had hitherto practically never intersected, were united

4. Aristotle. About the soul. Book 2, ch. 2, 413 a 21-25: "Something lives even when it has at least one of the following attributes: mind, sensation, movement and rest in space, as well as movement in the sense of nutrition, decline and growth."

5. Aristotle. About the soul. Book 2, ch. 1, 412 a 13-16: "Of the natural bodies, some are endowed with life, others are not. We call life every nourishment, growth, and decline of the body that has its foundation in itself." Book 2, ch. 2, 413 b 10-12: "The soul is the beginning of these faculties and is distinguished by its vegetative faculty, the faculty of sensation, the faculty of reflection, and movement."

6. Hugo de S. Victore. De sacramentis. Lib. II, pars 2, cap.4. PL 176, col. 417D-418A: "Duae quippe vitae sunt: una terrena, altera coelestis; una corporea, altera spiritualis. Una qua corpus vivit ex anima, altera qua anima vivit ex Deo. Utraque bonum suum habet quo vegetatur et nutritur ut possit subsistere".

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within the framework of one science: the reformed theological science of the living, which still bore the old name of scientia de anima [science of the soul]. What was the reason for such a merger? If you need to specify an external reason, then this reason is the logic of the most theologically oriented restructuring of the entire system of sciences, including the science of living things. Indeed, the scientia de anima, among other philosophical disciplines, is intended to serve as a preparation for the assimilation of the main, theological knowledge. But it is clear that the Aristotelian understanding of life cannot be applied to God if His living nature is taken seriously. Human thinking and volition, despite their fundamental difference from the lower functions of the soul, can still be interpreted as movement and physical change and left to the domain of natural science, but not the volition and thinking of God. But if the study of philosophy is a preparation for the study of theology, then the university cannot teach about life as a concept devoid of internal unity: in the course of the science of the soul - in one way, in the course of theology - in another. Hence the task: so rethink the concept of life and the living, so that it will work in the transition to the study of theology. However, in addition to this external, disciplinary reason, there was, of course, an internal reason, which was actually substantial: science, which included the study of the higher vital functions of thinking and will, and at the same time was placed by post-Trident Catholic philosophers in the light of the truth about God, could not but turn to the One Who is thinking and will by its very nature entities. Therefore, the scholastic authors of this time, and especially the Jesuit authors (the authors of the university reform and the main intellectual force of the Catholic Church in the post-Trident period), of course, use all the vast array of traditional material accumulated in the tradition of medieval and Renaissance scholastic commentaries on De anima, but they introduce the question of God to the very core of the science of the soul This changes its entire structure, effectively turning it into a semi-theological discipline.

So, the question is formulated as follows. The Aristotelian science of the living believed that living beings, as already mentioned, are alive by virtue of the fact that they have a special form of body-the soul, and thanks to this special form, these beings can grow, feed, reproduce, feel, and the most perfect of them can also think and will. But what does it mean

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life and the living, if God and the angels-simple beings who have neither body nor soul as a form of body-nevertheless live? Under this initial condition, what is the property of being alive? Is there a concept of life that embraces all living beings, from the blade of grass to God? "It is obvious that the concept of life is broader than the name of the soul," writes the French Jesuit Georges de Rhode in 1671, " for there is no soul that is not alive and does not form a living being; but there are many living beings who are not souls and have no souls."7. Georges de Rhode is referring to the very beings that theology speaks of, i.e., angels and God.

In this way of putting the question, it is natural first of all to refer to the already established criteria of the living. The criterion of self-movement known since antiquity is too broad: already Aristotle, in book IX of the Metaphysics, was forced to introduce an internal distinction and speak of two types of movement coming from within: one begins in one entity and ends in another, for example, the construction of a house; the other both begins and ends inside the same thing In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas developed this idea of Aristotle into a more or less detailed teaching about two types of operations: transitive, which pass to other entities, and immanent, which both begin and end in the same individual. 9 Only those operations that are performed immanently were considered vital, and not only are they actually performed in this way, but they cannot be performed otherwise. A living being is naturally capable of performing many transitive operations, but it does not live through them, but only through immanent operations, the performance (or ability to perform) of which serves as the first criterion of life. This criterion makes it possible to clearly draw the lower limit of life in conditions when cell theory did not yet exist in sight. So, the vegetative functions of plants and the burning of fire are very similar in appearance, but plants feed and grow immanently, taking in food and making it themselves, delivering it to their own

7. Georges de Rhodes. Philosophia peripatetica. Lib. II. Tract. V: De anima. Disp. I, q. 1, sect. I, p. 402.

8. Aristotle. "Metaphysics", ch. IX, 8, 1050 a 30-36.

9. Thomas Aquinas. De potentia, q. 10, a. 1 co; Contra Gentiles, lib. 2, cap. 1, n. 3; Summa theologiae, pars I, q. 18, a. 3, etc.

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to different organs in different places of their own body and growing evenly in all their parts, that is, they feed and grow through intus-sumptio ("taking in", assimilation), in the" living way " (modo vivo), while the nourishment and growth of fire is carried out entirely from the outside and mechanically - in the "dead way" (modo mortuo), as the scholastics said, through the simple juxtapositio of fire and combustible matter.

The second criterion of the living specifies the conditions for performing vital operations. If the criterion of immanence is carried out rigidly, then it turns out that it is not enough for the vital operation to begin and end within the same individual being. After all, in this way, any essential properties derive from the proper essence of things, even in inanimate things. For example, in the framework of Aristotelian physics, with its concept of the natural place of fire from the moment of its origin, by virtue of its essence, it is characteristic to strive up, and stone-to fall down. But if certain properties belong to a thing from the moment of its origin (as the scholastics used to say, from the moment of its constitution in the natural status), then their production will have to be attributed not to the thing itself, but to the cause that produced this thing as a whole; therefore, in a certain extreme sense, they will not meet the criterion of immanence. Hence the additional requirement: only those operations can be alive, vital, which begin and end within the same individual, and in addition are performed after the thing has been constituted in its natural status.

The third criterion is based on the fact that the vital operation always involves direct or indirect interaction with the environment: without this, a living being does not live. Therefore, in addition to the corresponding potency of the soul, which serves as the beginning of a particular operation, a so-called co-principle (combinipium operationis vitalis) is also required, which is an inert ("dead") external factor, a kind of catalyst for the vital operation, supplied from outside: for digestion, it will be food taken from outside, for the faculty of sensation, it is a material object acting on it, for thinking, it is the form of a thing abstracted from sensory images, and so on, and in most cases this external factor cannot be filled even by the absolute power of God. Thus, in the end, we get a threefold general criterion of the living: immanence of vital operations, plus the commission of

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operations after the thing is constituted in its natural status, plus the participation of the" dead " co-beginning of the operation, directly or indirectly supplied by the environment.

All three criteria work perfectly as long as we are concerned with the vital operations of the soul shaping the matter of the body, that is, as long as we remain within the framework of the traditional Aristotelian scientia de anima. But these general considerations meet with perplexing obstacles as soon as the eye turns from the material created living thing to the other pole of life. Is it possible to speak of movement (even if it is an immanent self-movement) in relation to God? Is it possible to speak of vital acts in God as subsequent to the status naturale, and in general of the divine status naturale? Is it possible to say that divine knowledge, which is the divine life, depends on principles that are in any way external to God himself? The criteria for distinguishing vital acts from non-vital ones, which seemed so reliable at the pole of vegetative life, turn out to be invalid at the pole of divine life and the life of spiritual creatures. The screen of traditional Aristotelian knowledge about animate beings and their natural operations begins to sparkle, hiss, and become covered with flickering bands of static as soon as the thought turns to the living God.

Thus the scholastic philosophers of the seventeenth century came to the necessity of postulating, at least on a phenomenal level, two different kinds or modes of life, each with its own conditions and characteristics of vitality. One kind of life is physical life, to which most scholastic philosophers who recognize this distinction refer the functions of nutrition, growth, reproduction, and (questionably) feeling. Another type is intentional life, which includes acts of thinking and will, and many authors also refer to acts of sensual aspiration. Only after considering the basic conditions and characteristics of these two different types of life can the question be raised whether a concept of life that is common to creatures and to God is possible.

I will give two examples, in some ways opposed to each other, which show how these two concepts of life are introduced into the reformed science of the living. Examples are taken from university philosophy courses written by two 17th-century Spanish Jesuit philosophers: Rodrigo de Arriaga

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(Philosophical Course, 1632)10 and Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (Universal Philosophy, 1624) 11. Both philosophers and theologians were very popular and highly respected in university circles throughout the seventeenth century, not only in Catholic countries, but also in Protestant Germany. References to their writings abound in philosophical treatises written by both Jesuits and authors belonging to other order traditions. Thus, we have truly representative figures and texts.

Arriaga's position in this discussion was universally recognized as radical and in some ways exemplary, and although Arriaga had followers, everyone who shared or criticized it in one way or another, including those outside the Society of Jesus, turned to him first and referred to him. So Arriaga distinguishes "two lives: one physical, the other intentional. Intentional life is the same as cognitio and appetitio, and so are we... we do not require it to be produced [producatur] a thing already constituted in its natural being; moreover, that it should be produced in any way, as is evident in God, whose thought and will are not produced [sunt improductae]. The other life is physical... which we intend to attribute to plants. " 12
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza expressed in the most complete form another position, which we have called in a sense the opposite of Arriaga's position. Hurtado is willing to "readily recognize" the difference between a purely physical life, such as nutrition, and an intentional life as object orientation, but only if this distinction is "correctly understood". And what is the correct understanding? According to Hurtado, at the level of sensory and intellectual created life, intentional life does not manifest itself as

10. Cursus Philosophicus auctore R. P. Roderico de Arriaga, hispano lycronensi e Societate Jesu. Antverpiae, ex Officina Plantiniana Balthasaris Moreti, 1632. Further denoted: Arriaga [1632].

11. Universa Philosophia, a P. P. Petro Hurtado de Mendoza Valmasedano e Societate Jesu, apud fidei Quaesitores Censore, et in Salmanticensi Academia sanctae Theologiae Professore, in unum corpus redacta. Nova editio, Lugduni, Sumptibus Ludovici Prost. Haeredis Roville, 1624. (First edition: Lyon, typ. Antoine Pillehotte, 1617; in comparison with it, the 1624 edition, according to the author's own admission, has undergone significant revision). Further denoted: Hurtado de Mendoza [1624].

12. Arriaga [1632]. De anima, disp. II, sect. I, subsect. I, § 6, p. 562.

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a real kind of life, but only as a semantic (we would say, ideal) side of physical acts. In reality, these acts are manifestations of physical life. Therefore, the physical life in a created being capable of cognition and aspiration is really identical with the intentional life, and the distinction between these two sides in the same vital operations is made and exists only in the mind. In God, however, there is a purely intentional life, but in Him it is radically different from the intentional life in the creatures.

Let's take a closer look at how both authors formulate their views and what arguments they give in their defense. After that, we will be able to explain why we consider these two positions to be in a certain sense extreme and opposite.

Rodrigo de Arriaga expresses his point of view on two types of life in five theses, in which he defines the characteristics of the physical and intentional living and the relationship of both its poles to the sought general criterion of life. Thesis one states: "The life common to plants and animate beings is in no way peculiar to God. Proof: God is in no way nourished by the assimilation of food (intus-sumptio); therefore, He does not possess such a life in any way. I will add that there is no formulation explaining plant life in which this life can be attributed to God. " 13 None of the criteria of physical life, not only Arriaga's own criterion, but also others adopted by his contemporaries, does not work: "God does not move physically, neither being constituted in his being, nor even before being constituted, nor in the act of thinking, nor in the act of will. Consequently, it does not live any physical life consisting in an immanent operation, which alone can be attributed to plants. " 14
Thesis two defines, in Arriaga's conception, the characteristics of a purely intentional life: it is a life of "knowing and willing," and it is the only life that God lives. If what is intentionally alive is nothing but a knowing and striving substance, and God does not simply have intelligence and will, but is intelligence and will in its essence, then he truly intentionally lives. "Note," says Arriaga, " that this life is on the-

13. Arriaga [1632]. De anima, disp. II, sect. I, subsect. V, § 59, p. 568.

14. Arriaga [1632]. De anima, disp. II, sect. I, subsect. V, § 60, p.568.

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It is considered intentional not because it is not life from the point of view of reality and nature, but only from our point of view (for from the point of view of reality, naturally and independently of our intellect, God truly lives, as He truly thinks and loves). Hence, it is called intentional because it consists in acts of the intellect and will, of cognition and aspiration, which are called intentional. " 15 This remark by Arriaga is intended to emphasize the fact that the intentional life in God is not something derived from our way of thinking about God, but is quite real.

The third thesis of Rodrigo de Arriaga: God and the knowing creatures, from angels and men to the higher animals, agree on a common concept of intentional life. In relation to God and creatures, this general concept of life as knowledge and aspiration is defined ("contracted", contrahitur) in different ways, just as the concept of being, which is indistinguishably common to God and creatures, is further defined to the concepts of divine and created beings by" constricting " differences.16 In this case, these differences consist in the fact that God knows and loves the objects of his knowledge and love by their own essence, without the participation of any additional formal co-principles (such as the abstracted forms of material things), whereas creatures know and strive through additional forms produced from themselves or taken into themselves, in accordance with the laws of nature. the way Aristotle speaks about the cognitive grasp of the form of a cognizable thing without matter.

In the fourth thesis, Arriaga establishes the distribution of living beings in two modes of life. Plants and lower animals live only and exclusively physical life; angels and God live only and exclusively intentional life; men and higher animals live both kinds of life, but in different ways: as a being that feeds, grows, and reproduces, man lives a physical life; as a thinking and volitional being, he lives an intentional life. A sentient life in this sense will also belong to the realm of intentional life, since it is realized by a thinking and aching being. It is only necessary to note that intentional life is present for the second time in a person-

15. Arriaga [1632]. De anima, disp. II, sect. I, subsect. V, § 71, p. 570.

16. Arriaga [1632]. De anima, disp. II, sect. I, subsect. V, § 72, p.570.

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in the higher animals it is scanty because of the insufficiency of their intelligence.

Finally, the fifth thesis states that although we equally call by the name of "life" the life that exists in God, and the life that (at the opposite pole)is called "life", plants live, in fact, they denote two different concepts. "The a priori basis of this is evident from what has been said, for the physical life consists in growth through the assimilation of food, and the intentional life consists in knowledge of the object and love for it, and these two lives do not agree with each other in anything but the concept of being." Consequently, the two modes of life have nothing in common except the bare name.

The radical nature of Arriaga's position lies in two points. The first is that it refuses to recognize any commonality between the two kinds of life other than a common name. In other words, he does not see any common feature, properties, characteristics that would be common to physical life and intentional life. Accordingly, he sees no general criterion by which to distinguish living things from non - living things: for beings living a physical life, this will be one criterion (the ability to feed); for beings living an intentional life, another criterion (the ability to think and will). In this, Arriaga was followed by the Jesuits Richard Lynch, Jose de Aguilar, the Franciscan and Scotist John Punch. Second, Arriaga is radical in that his understanding of physical life is extremely restrictive: as a nutrition operation that ensures the growth of living organisms. According to Arriaga, it is impossible to speak of immanent operations "in general", because immanent operations of different levels are incompatible within the same concept, and the term " immanent operation "is as ambiguous as the term" life " itself in relation to its two modes.

Now let's look at how Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza taught about the two modes of life and the living (among the later philosophers who were closest to him, first of all, we should mention Thomas Compton Carleton, the author of a philosophical course published in 1649). As already mentioned, he was willing to recognize the distinction between two kinds of life - physical and intentional. But how exactly did Hurtado separate these two types of life, according to what criteria, and how did he distribute living things according to them? That's the question.

Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza's own understanding of created life rests on two fundamental principles for his concept

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living in physical concepts - the concepts of productivity and immanence. Hurtado proceeds from the Aristotelian-Thomist idea that the more perfect a thing is, the more active and productive it is: it tends to go beyond its own limits, to expand its being, to extend it, and this activity of being manifests itself primarily in the fact that the more perfect a thing is, the more effects it is capable of producing, and the more it is capable of producing. all the more perfect are the consequences themselves. This is true even for inanimate, inert things that can affect other things, and affect them all the more actively, the more perfect the source of action. But any living creation is more perfect than an inanimate one; therefore, everything that we call living, whether it is a living individual or some property, operation, function of a living individual, must all the more have a pronounced productivity, must produce something. This is the first point. The second point is that production within oneself, that is, production immanent, is more perfect than production without. In fact, inanimate beings are also capable of external action: a fallen rock can shatter another rock, lightning can split a tree, a wave can erode a rock, and so on. But only a living being can have inner activity directed at itself, unlike things that are inanimate and inert. Therefore, the second point is that everything that claims to be alive must have just such-immanent-real productivity. The general conclusion is that every created living thing, before any possible differences between the types of living things, necessarily has this basic property: real immanent productivity.

But it follows that this requirement also applies to the distinction between the two kinds of life. According to Hurtado, they cannot really be distinguished as two independent and independent modes of life, because for intentional life, that is, the life of knowledge and aspiration (if it really and literally is life), you need a carrier capable of performing productive immanent acts. Thought or volitional aspiration are not independent entities, they do not produce anything by themselves, because they do not possess reality by themselves, as pure intentions. Therefore, they must have a real carrier in the created being. Such carriers are quite physical qualities of the soul as an immaterial, but real substance. Hurtado shows this on the pri-

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at least the act that most claims to be called an act of intentional life: the act of thinking, intellectio. If the physical quality serves as a carrier of intentional content, then they are inseparable from each other: the physical act of the intellect without intentional content is empty; the intentional content without a physical carrier is not able to exist and immanently produce other contents, other thoughts. Therefore, the physical life and the intentional life in the creations are distinguishable only in our mind, but not in reality itself.

Hurtado elaborates on this train of thought in detail, following the general logic of Aristotle's science of nature. In fact, when an act of thinking or intellectual comprehension is performed, there is a change in the substance of the soul: some new quality appears in the intellect, a new form is taken - the form of the object being comprehended. The change is real, and the accepted form is also real. But the acquisition of a new real quality by the soul substance is nothing more than a physical change and, consequently, a manifestation of physical life. Thus, from the side of the real process that takes place in the intellect, the act of thinking or comprehending is an act of physical life. On the other hand, from the side of the objective content, this new quality, new form is a manifestation of intentional life, that is, cognitive focus on the external object and its grasping in the act of comprehension. It is impossible to really separate them; this is why, Hurtado again emphasizes, in creation, intentional life is always realized as the semantic side of the acts of physical life, and not as an independent, self-existing life. This is Hurtado's first radical thesis.

The second radical thesis is that intentional life in God has nothing to do with how intentional life is accomplished in creatures. Indeed, in God, first of all, there are no immanent changes: after all, any change, according to the basic position of Aristotelian physics, is motion, and motion always implies potentiality, that is, imperfection and non-existence, unthinkable in God. Therefore, in God, unlike the creatures, there is no real inner production, but in Him it is not a sign of imperfection, but on the contrary, a sign of the fullness of perfection. There is no production, not out of an inability to produce it, but out of a lack of need for it.

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there is a pure fullness of actual existence. Consequently, God's thinking and volition are realized in a way that is incomprehensible to us, but in a completely different way from all that we can imagine as created thinking and volition, and cannot be combined with the thinking and volition of creatures in a single, internally integral concept of intentional life.

Does it follow that Hurtado should declare that life in creatures and in God do not coincide in any general concept or criterion? Not at all. Although God and creatures are completely different in their particular characteristics, there is one common property that allows them to be united in the concept of living things: the property of perfection, accepted from within and not able to be accepted from without. Inner perfection: this is the criterion that Hurtado believes makes it possible to clearly draw the lower boundary of life, separating plants from dead nature, and at the same time unite in a common concept of living creatures and God. No one can formulate this result better than Hurtado himself: "The plant and cognition are similar, for both have a perfection accepted from within. In fact, the plant possesses the perfection of nutrition from itself in such a way that, by its very nature, it could not adequately possess it from an external source: for it could not even possess the power of God in the action of nutrition if it did not actively contribute to it. So it has a vital action from itself; this action is the perfection of the plant; therefore the plant has a certain perfection from within that it could not have had it from the outside." On the other hand, "the knowledge of God so constitutes the inner perfection of God himself that He could not have possessed it from the external beginning. The stone does not coincide with God in this predicate, because it does not contradict the stone to accept its perfection from an entirely external source. This makes a clear difference between a stone and a plant: in fact, the stone does not coincide with God in this predicate, but the plant does. But the plant has its own perfection along with movement, in the absolute and proper sense; in this it differs from God, in whom there is no movement in the absolute sense. "17

Now the answers to both questions become obvious: why are these two positions radical and why do they somehow contradict each other?-

17. Hurtado de Mendoza [1624]. De anima, disp. III, sect. II, subsect. I, § 9, p. 509.

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zom are the opposite. Actually, we have already discussed these answers, but we will summarize them again. Arriaga thinks of the two modes of life as two separate, independent species, and distributes all living things into them, from God to plants. At the same time, each of these types of life is internally one: intentional life in both God and creature implies the same acts and processes in Arriaga, which differ only in the degree of perfection (finite in man and angel, infinite in God). If you compare the two modes of life with each other, they, according to Arriaga, have nothing in common, and there is no single criterion for living. Hurtado, on the other hand, thinks of the two modes of life in creation as two sides of the same acts, distinguishable only in our minds. On the other hand, he thinks of the intentional life in God quite differently from that in the creatures, and finds nothing in common between it and the intentional life of the creatures at the level of actual thought procedures. Nevertheless, Hurtado sees the general characteristic and common criterion of life in the inner perfection of all living things: a perfection that cannot be given from outside, but belongs to the innermost essence of a living being. So, in Rodrigo de Arriaga, there are two radically and really different, but internally integral modes of life and the absence of a common criterion of the living; in Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, there is a purely mental difference between the two modes of life in creatures and an internal split of the mode of intentional life into created and divine, but at the same time - recognition of a common all - encompassing criterion of all living things.

Between these two extreme positions lies a whole gamut of other, intermediate positions that can approach one or the other extreme point of view or combine their features in various combinations. But in any case, the distinction between the two modes of life serves as the starting point for the entire subsequent development of late-scholastic science of the living, and above all for the description and explanation of vital cognitive operations at all levels of cognition. Thus, the demand of revealed theology to rethink the Aristotelian concept of life and bring it into harmony with the theological interpretation of the living becomes an impulse for a profound transformation of the "science of the soul" at the beginning of Modern times. The productivity of these new ideas will manifest itself much later in the seventeenth century, after the chimerical unity of Aristotle's scientia de anima finally disintegrates. Modern braid Philosophy-

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in certain ways, he will assimilate the concept of intentional life, forgetting about its remote theological origins.

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