Foreign policy of the USSR Keywords:, cold war, history of Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Democratic Republic of the Congo has a grim reputation as a "country that knows no peace." Just a month after declaring independence from Belgium, it became the first "hot spot" of the Cold War in sub-Saharan Africa. During the Congolese crisis, the USSR provided direct assistance to left-wing nationalist forces and faced powerful, coordinated opposition from leading Western countries. The battle for the Congo proved to be a serious test for Soviet African policy.

In Western historiography, the actions of the Soviet leadership are evaluated from two opposite positions. Some authors call them "adventurous", the result of the predominance of ideological principles over pragmatic reasons1. Others believe that the USSR was too cautious, did not dare to give a serious fight to the West in the name of developing the revolutionary process in Africa, "fought with one hand", and treated the Congolese national-oriented forces as "throwaway things"².

The documents examined by the author from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, the Russian State Archive of Modern History, the National Archives of Great Britain, and the Archives of the Unitedgive grounds to challenge both estimates.

The Congo was destined to be the site of the first major Cold War battle in sub-Saharan Africa. This huge Belgian colony in the "heart of Africa", fabulously rich in minerals, was called the "key" to the entire continent.

ON THE EVE OF INDEPENDENCE

In January 1960, negotiations in Brussels reached an agreement on granting independence to the Congo on June 30 of the same year. The Belgians hoped to transfer power to "reliable" Congolese who would cooperate constructively with the former metropolis. The political elites of other Western countries, especially the United States, believed that Belgium would not be able to stay in the Congo after the declaration of independence, the country would be in chaos, and the" key " to Africa might be abandoned, or even fall into the hands of the communists.

As independence approached, tensions between Africans and Europeans increased. ⁴ The prospect of a break-up of the Congo was real. The vast majority of Congolese people do not have a sense of belonging to a single community.

The political situation in the Congo was a direct reflection of the diverse ethnic composition. By the beginning of the election campaign, which ended with the first general election in May 1960, more than 40 parties had been formed. They were called differently-socialist, progressive, popular, democratic, national, African, but in fact they were ethno-regional. There were also different views on the future state structure of the independent Congo. Some parties (a smaller part) favored a unitary state with a strong central government, while others favored an amorphous federation whose subjects would enjoy almost unlimited rights.

The results of the May 1960 elections showed that there was no truly national party in the Congo. The self-described National Movement of the Congo (MDC) was ahead of other parties, winning 19 (out of 84) seats in the Senate and 41 (out of 137) in the National Assembly, the lower house of Parliament. However, the NDK had strong positions in only two of the 6 provinces - Eastern and Kasai, and it did not hold any representatives in Katanga.⁵ The formed government was notoriously dysfunctional: it included representatives of the main ethnic groups, who often had polar views on key issues of the Congo's state structure, domestic and foreign policy.

The contradictions in the Congolese leadership were personified by politicians who occupied two main State posts. The Prime Minister was 35-year-old NDK leader Patrice Lumumba, a batetela by ethnicity, of non-noble origin from Kasai province, who worked as a postal employee. He was a left-wing nationalist, whose speeches were filled with anti-colonial and anti-Western rhetoric. A brilliant speaker with

The study was supported by the Russian State Scientific Foundation. Project 09-01-00496a/r - " Promotion of decolonization and elimination of apartheid by the USSR/Russia as an important factor in shaping the image of our country-

With the charisma of the leader, he planned to create a strong unitary state, organize a large public sector in the economy, and pursue a foreign policy based on neutrality and pan-Africanism.

The complete opposite was the President of the Congo, Joseph Kasawubu. A 50-year-old native of a prominent Bakongo family, he received a solid Catholic education, worked as a teacher, serving the colonial administration and private firms. A conservative and nationalist, he advocated the preservation of traditions and strengthening the power of leaders, hatching plans to recreate the medieval state of the Congo, dominated by the Bakongo. He headed the "Alliance of the Bakongo People" (Abaco) created in 1950. He was allergic to communism and pan-Africanism, but unlike Lumumba, he was able to hide his emotions and true intentions. Losing out to the Prime Minister as a public politician in "image", the president surpassed Lumumba in the art of behind-the-scenes fighting.

SUPERPOWER BIDS

The main players in the upcoming international battle for Congo made their bets even before the elections. The United States began to strengthen its position in this strategically important area of Africa in advance and thoroughly, in order to prevent "communist penetration"there.

The US had something to defend in the Congo. The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had "stuffing" of Congolese origin - from the uranium mines in Shinkolobwe. By 1960, the total investment of American companies in the Congo, mainly in the mining industry, was over six hundred million dollars. On the eve of independence, delegations of American entrepreneurs visited the Congo frequently. American consulates, bank offices, representative offices of commercial firms, cultural centers, and post offices were established in all Congolese provincial centers and large cities, and missionaries were active in rural areas. At the invitation of the American authorities, many prominent Congolese politicians visited ^the United States6.

The Congo came to Moscow's attention in early January 1959, when police dispersed participants in an anti-colonial rally organized by Abaco in the capital, Leopoldville. In response, mass riots broke out, which the police and army suppressed by force of arms. On January 10, "Abaco members and sympathizers" sent a letter to the Belgian Minister for Congo and Rwandan Affairs, Urundi, demanding " immediate independence for the Belgian Congo." On January 20, the USSR Foreign Ministry received a copy of this letter with the seal of Abako and the following postscript: "A copy is sent for the information of His Excellency KHRUSHCHEV with a request to provide us with military assistance until 19/1 - 59 <...> in this hope, please accept our deepest thanks"⁷. In Moscow, the possibility of intervention, and even more so of providing military assistance, was not even considered. The Department of African Countries of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spent four weeks collecting information on the situation in the Congo, Congolese parties and movements. On February 19, it recommended "no response" to Abaco's letter and "leave it unanswered" ^.8

The Soviet Union was very particular and careful in choosing the Congolese partners to help. This is evidenced, in particular, by the history of contacts between Soviet officials and Lumumba. On April 15-17, 1959, he, then a little-known Congolese politician, participated in the work of the Standing Committee of the Conference of the Peoples of Africa in Conakry. On April 18, he was received by the USSR Ambassador to Guinea P. I. Gerasimov. Lumumba said his PDK party was demanding independence for the Congo by January 1960 and was ready to "form a future national Government". He promised: "We will immediately exchange diplomatic relations with the USSR" and " hinted at the desirability of providing financial assistance to his party." The ambassador did not promise anything, just a general phrase: "The Soviet people follow the national liberation struggle in Africa with great sympathy, and in their person the African peoples have a loyal friend." ⁹

On April 30, the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Ideology, Culture and International Party Relations granted the request of P. Lumumba, "a public figure of the Congo, to invite him to the USSR to get acquainted with the life of Soviet workers and the activities of trade unions." The mere fact of the invitation meant only that they wanted to get to know Lumumba better. The Foreign Ministry instructed the ambassador in Conakry to inform Lumumba that all specific issues "will be discussed after his arrival in Moscow."¹⁰ Lumumba did not come to Moscow, and the Kremlin did not make a final decision on the NDC's assistance.

In the archival documents available to the author, there is no evidence that the USSR allocated money for the election campaign.-

nij of the NDC. American intelligence did not reveal any evidence of Soviet involvement in financing Lumumba's party. According to the US National Security Council (NSC), he enjoyed "the support of the Belgian Communists, the UAR, Ghana, and certain interested financial circles."¹¹

On June 29, 1960, N. S. Khrushchev sent a congratulatory telegram to Lumumba, in which he announced the readiness of the USSR government to establish diplomatic relations with the Congo and exchange diplomatic missions. ¹² A 12-member Soviet government delegation headed by M. R. Rakhmatov, Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR, went to Leopoldville for the celebrations.

KATANGA SECESSION, INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE CRISIS

The Congo descended into chaos sooner than even the most hopeless pessimists expected. In early July, a week after the declaration of independence, soldiers ' riots and anti-white pogroms broke out in the country. The Soviet delegation that was in Leopoldville was not without its excesses.¹³

On July 10, Belgium sent troops to the Congo. On July 11, Katanga Province seceded from the Congo. Provincial government Chairman Moiz Tshombe called the main reason for this step "the desire to avoid the danger of being under the heel of the Communists"¹⁴. A statement issued by the Soviet Government on July 12 described Belgium's actions as an "act of aggression." Tshombe has been described as "a proxy for foreign monopolies", and the secession of Katanga as "an illegal and criminal act dictated by the vested interests of a handful of financial and industrial magnates of the colonial Powers" ^.15

Tshombe reacted wittily. On the evening of July 14, he sent a telegram to "Mr. Foreign Minister" in Moscow, which, in particular, said: "The people of Katanga, taking into account that the UN Charter solemnly proclaims the right of peoples to self-determination, ...appeal... to all the countries of the free world with a solemn appeal to immediately recognize the independence of its territory. " ¹⁶ The message went unanswered.

Katanga's secession put the federal government in a difficult position. Almost equal in area to France, the province with a population of 1.6 million people was called a "geological miracle", because its bowels were fabulously rich in minerals. Ranked 3rd in the capitalist world in copper production and 1st in cobalt mining, Katanga provided the Congolese treasury with almost half of its foreign exchange earnings.

Lumumba and Kasawubu decided to fly immediately to the Katanga capital of Elizabethville, but the plane was not given permission to land. ¹⁷ On July 12, Lumumba sent a telegram to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, which Kasawubu also signed. The Prime Minister and the President called for an urgent deployment of UN troops to "protect the Congo from external aggression that threatens international peace." ¹⁸

On July 14, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution, the draft of which was submitted by the representative of Tunisia on behalf of the Afro-Asian States to the UN. The resolution called on "the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo" and authorized the Secretary-General "to take the necessary measures, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide it with such military assistance as may be necessary"^.19

Soviet representative A. A. Sobolev made three amendments: "(1) insert a paragraph condemning Belgium's armed aggression against the Congo, (2) indicate the need for an immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo, and (3) add to paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, after the words 'military assistance', the words 'provided by African UN member States'. "²⁰

The vote showed that the idea of implementing a UN operation in the Congo by African forces is popular in Afro-Asian countries. Tunisia and Ceylon, elected members of the Security Council, voted against condemning Belgium's aggression, but supported the third Soviet amendment. Their votes were not enough, and all the Soviet amendments were rejected. The resolution introduced by the representative of Tunisia was adopted by 8 votes (the USSR and the USA voted "yes"), with 3 abstentions. The Soviet Union had no reason to vote against it. It was supported by Afro-Asian countries. In the event of rejection of the resolution, Hammarskjold had another, short one in reserve, which simply authorized the deployment of UN troops to the Congo.²¹

The resolution adopted by the Security Council gave Western countries important advantages. Belgium was not recognized as an aggressor, no measures were envisaged against it, and the timing of the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo was not set. The purpose of UN military assistance to Congo was not specified, but it was clear from the context that it was not to expel the Belgians, but to restore order in the country, which the Lumumba government could not restore. The national composition of the UN forces and their commanders was not determined, which gave Hammarskjold a free hand in this matter. Katanga was not even mentioned in the resolution.

Lumumba had good reason to believe that UN troops could turn into a tool

pressure from Western countries on his government. On July 14, he and Kasawubu sent a telegram to Khrushchev, in which they did not rule out the possibility of requesting "Soviet intervention" "if the Western camp does not stop its aggression against the sovereignty of the Republic of the Congo."²²

American analysts have calculated all the scenarios of Soviet actions in relation to the Congo. Thus, in a special memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the probability of armed intervention was assessed as very low due to the "enormous practical difficulties associated with the delivery of troops by sea or air" in the absence of aircraft carriers and the ability of the USSR to establish an air bridge.²³

Understanding the limitations of Soviet capabilities, Khrushchev, in a reply telegram to the Congolese leaders on July 15, made it clear that the USSR would not resort to unilateral measures and was ready to support UN actions in the Congo:"...The UN Security Council did a useful thing by passing a decision calling on the Belgian Government to withdraw Belgian troops from the territory of the Congo. " ²⁴

On July 15, the first contingents of the Blue Helmets landed in the Congo. The operation was planned in such a way that it gave a solid head start to the United States. The transfer of troops from neutral states to the Congo was carried out by American military transport aircraft, and inside the country-by aircraft and armored personnel carriers with American crews. The UN sent hundreds of civilian specialists to the Congo, including the vast majority of Americans. UN troops have become a tool for protecting US interests in the "heart of Africa".

Moscow tried to use the UN umbrella to strengthen its influence in the Congo. In response to Hammarskjold's call for food and transportation for the UN troops to be donated to the Congo, ²⁵ the Soviet government decided to send 10,000 tons of food, 100 trucks, and a "group of instructors" to the Congo to "provide technical assistance in the operation of motor vehicles."²⁶

The USSR assisted in the transfer of Ghanaian troops to the Congo to participate in the UN operation, which President Nkrumah did not inform the UN Secretariat about. This provoked Hammarskjold's sharp displeasure.²⁷ Soon, the Accra-Leopoldville air bridge was serviced by five IL-18 aircraft. [²⁸]

During a visit to the United States on July 22-29, Lumumba sought a promise from the Americans to put pressure on Belgium to immediately withdraw its troops from the Congo.²⁹ But in vain. To Washington, Lumumba was a political pariah, a figure who, in the words of CIA Director Alain Dulles, was "like Castro, if not worse." ³⁰

The Soviet representative to the UN, Vladimir Kuznetsov, whom Lumumba met in New York, was sympathetic to his requests.³¹ In the July 31 statement of the Soviet Government that followed this meeting, we note an important new point. If earlier trucks were intended for UN troops, now they, like Soviet aircraft, were to be used to deliver cargo "in order to assist the Congolese people and government in their just struggle against imperialist aggression"³². The U.S.S.R. publicly announced assistance to the Lumumba government, bypassing the United Nations.

The US State Department responded with a harsh statement: "Soviet leaders should be aware that such public statements can only add to the problems of those who are actually and seriously trying to restore peace and order in the Congo."³³ The Cold War has arrived in the Congo.

Katanga was the only Congolese province that did not receive UN troops. The central government in Leopoldville insisted on an early UN military operation in Katanga to restore the country's territorial integrity. ³⁴ Tshombe said he would never accept the deployment of UN troops: "We don't need them... If they land in Katanga, they will be met with an armed rebuff. " ³⁵ Chomba's threats were a bluff. In private conversations, UN unit officers said that it was possible to end the Katanga secession in ³⁶ days. Such an outcome would be Lumumba's triumph. However, UN Under-Secretary-General Ralph Bunch, who visited Elizabethville, reported to Hammarskjold that UN troops could meet "fanatical resistance" in Katanga and recommended suspending their transfer to the rebel province. Hammarskjold canceled operation ³⁷.

On August 6, the Soviet government issued a statement criticizing for the first time the UN troops that" ... ..Instead of ensuring the prompt removal of the Belgian interventionist troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo ... they are disarming the Congolese national armed forces and even engaging in clashes with them, following the instructions of the command." Moscow offered to "replace this command and appoint a new one that will honestly and steadily fulfill the duties assigned to it by the decision of the Security Council." ³⁸

The Soviet position was supported by Ghana and Guinea. On August 6, Ghanaian President K. Nkrumah " informed the Charge d'affaires of the USSR in Accra that the Ghanaian Government intended to act decisively on the Congo issue, including the formation of a joint command with the Congolese Government to conduct military operations against the Belgians in the Congo." The president asked directly: "In the event of military action, can it count on Soviet assistance that would not involve the USSR in open conflict with the great Powers?" ³⁹ On August 11, Khrushchev informed Nkrumah that the Soviet government was ready "to provide any possible assistance to the Ghanaian Government if necessary, in particular by: supply of weapons to the Ghanaian Government " ⁴⁰.

In the resolution of August 9, the UN Security Council, confirming "the powers granted to the Secretary-General by the Security Council resolutions of July 14 and July 22, 1960", stated that "the entry of the UN armed forces into the province of Katanga is necessary for the full implementation of this resolution". Paragraph 4 contained a crucial caveat: "Armed

UN forces will not participate in any internal conflict ... interfere in such a conflict and will not be used to influence its outcome. " ⁴¹ This guaranteed the Chombe regime immunity from UN troops, since Katanga's secession could be interpreted as an "internal conflict"if desired.

On August 12, Hammarskjold arrived in Elisabethville, where he agreed with the commander of the Belgian forces in the Congo on a timetable for their withdrawal from Katanga. A week later, it started. Hammarskjold considered the entry of UN troops into Katanga a diplomatic victory, a personal triumph. Lumumba was indignant. He feared that the large UN office in the Congo might become an analogue of the Belgian colonial administration. On August 13, Lumumba declared that "the Swedes are Belgians in disguise" and demanded that all white UN troops leave Congo.⁴²

SOVIET AID TO THE LUMUMBA GOVERNMENT

Soviet-Congolese relations became increasingly trusting. On August 6, the first Soviet Ambassador to the Congo, M. D. Yakovlev, who had previously served as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, arrived in Leopoldville. In addition to his credentials, he presented P. Lumumba with a personal message from N. S. Khrushchev. The Soviet leader compared the situation in the Congo to the first years of "the existence of our state, which immediately after the people took power into their own hands was subjected to a foreign invasion by the imperialist powers." The message confirmed the readiness of the USSR to fulfill its obligations to provide economic assistance to the Congo.⁴³

Paragraph 4 of the UN Security Council resolution inspired not only Tshombe. On August 9, the independence of the "Mining Republic" of Southern Kasai was proclaimed. Albert Calongi became the head of the self-proclaimed state.

The emergence of another hotbed of separatism significantly complicated the position of the central government. Kasai Province adjoined Katanga to the northwest and served as a buffer zone for the Chombe regime. Revenues from the export of industrial diamonds from Kasai after the separation of Katanga remained the last significant item of replenishment of the federal budget.

Lumumba found himself in a difficult position - the country was falling apart, and UN troops did not touch the separatists, but "continued to remain in the Congo, becoming a target for attacks by the Prime Minister, who himself invited them." ⁴⁴ Now he had only one option - to suppress separatism and restore order in the country on his own with the help of the Eastern bloc countries.

Help has arrived. On August 22, the Arkhangelsk motor ship delivered 100 GAZ-63 trucks with instructor mechanics, spare parts and a ⁴⁵-car repair shop to the Congo. The fleet of Soviet civil aircraft at Lumumba's disposal was replenished. On July 19, by decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the government of Ghana, and in fact for use in the Congo, was provided with five IL-18s. One IL-14 was "handed over on August 11 as a gift" to Lumumba. On August 28, 10 IL-14s flew from Moscow to Stanlyville, allocated to the government of the Congo "for a period of up to one year." ⁴⁶ While still in the United States, Lumumba agreed in principle with V. V. Kuznetsov on the use of Soviet vehicles in a military operation against the separatists, and later discussed the details with the USSR Ambassador to the Congo, M. V. D. Yakovlev ⁴⁷.

From Leopoldville, Soviet trucks were ferried on barges along the Kasai River to the Port of Franki, from where they reached Lulwabur, the capital of Kasai province. On August 24, units of the Congolese National Army (KPA) moved in two columns on Soviet trucks to Bakwangu, the capital of Southern Kasai, and occupied it on August 27.

ELIMINATE LUMUMBA

Washington "appreciated" Lumumba's military successes. On August 26, CIA Director A. Dulles telegraphed the resident in Leopoldville, Lawrence Devlin: "The highest echelons of power have come to a definite and unambiguous conclusion-if (Lumumba) remains in power, it will inevitably lead at best to chaos, and at worst to the establishment of communist control over the Congo... We believe that its elimination should be an urgent and primary goal, the highest priority of our covert operations in the current environment. " ⁴⁸ CIA and Pentagon specialists are preparing to-

Lee poisoning the prime minister ⁴⁹. Devlin thought Lumumba would be better dealt with by the Congolese.⁵⁰

Lumumba had many opponents inside the Congo, and the most influential of them was President Kasawubu. He was strongly urged to oppose Lumumba by Belgian advisers, Western diplomats, and intelligence officers. The CIA gave him, through an intermediary, a detailed plan describing "the sequence of actions that he should take to remove Lumumba and after that." ⁵¹

For the Katanga offensive, Lumumba deployed his last reserve-10 IL-14s, which were stationed at Stanlyville Airport in full readiness with Congolese markings. Each aircraft was manned by Soviet ⁵² crews and technicians. On September 5, reinforcements were delivered over the Stanlyville-Lulwaburg-Bakwanga air bridge. This could provide the federal forces with a decisive advantage in the battle for Katanga. However, this did not happen.

On the evening of September 5, Kasavubu went on the radio and announced that he was resigning Lumumba and appointing Joseph Ileo as head of the cabinet. The newly minted Prime Minister was a mediocre journalist and a weak politician with great personal ambitions. Kasavubu called on UN troops to take responsibility for maintaining law and order ⁵³.

Immediately after this statement, the representative of the UN Secretary-General in the Congo, E. Cordier, began to act according to the plan agreed with Hammarskjold and Kasavubu. On the morning of September 6, on his orders, UN forces secured the presidential residence and blocked the Leopoldville radio station. "Blue Helmets" occupied the airports.

Flights could take place only with the UN sanction. The approach was selective. The Soviet "Silts" were kept on the hook. At Leopoldville airport, the landing of a Soviet plane from Stanlyville, which was carrying the KPA commander Viktor Lundula, who was loyal to Lumumba, was prohibited. Vice-President of the Senate Joseph Okito was unable to fly to Moscow and inform the Soviet leadership about the events. However, from the capital's airport, a plane with Ileo, which tried to consolidate Lumumba's opponents around the figure of Kasavubu ⁵⁴, went on a tour of the country without hindrance.

Brian Urquhart, a high-ranking UN official and personal friend of Hammarskjold, went to Stanlyville with instructions to stop the transportation of troops to Kasai on Soviet planes. When Urquhart arrived in the Eastern Provincial capital on September 5, he found that the UN soldiers guarding the airfield from the Ethiopian contingent considered it "wrong" to prevent planes with troops loyal to Lumumba from taking off. Urquhart spent most of the next day trying to persuade the Ethiopian commander to block the airfield where 3,000 Congolese soldiers were waiting to be sent to Kasai. And he succeeded ⁵⁵.

KHRUSHCHEV AGAINST UN PRESENCE IN CONGO

The USSR demanded the evacuation of the UN armed forces from their occupied airfields, the removal of the command of the UN troops, and the opportunity for the Lumumba government to "exercise its sovereign rights and authority throughout the territory of the Congo without any interference or obstruction by UN representatives." In the event that " the Security Council... If the Soviet Government refuses to fulfill its duty," the Soviet Government will appeal to States that respect "the decisions already taken regarding assistance to the Congo" and "render all possible support to the legitimate Government of the Republic of the Congo in this difficult hour for the Congolese people."⁵⁶

According to archival materials, Moscow did not intend to provide military assistance to Lumumba under any circumstances, fearing the transition of confrontation with the West to a "hot phase". A draft statement of September 9 prepared by the Foreign Ministry referred to" direct military assistance " to the legitimate Government of the Congo, but this phrase was deleted.⁵⁷

What was meant by Lumumba's "full support" from other states becomes clear from Khrushchev's secret message to Nkrumah on September 9. The Soviet leader outlined his vision of the conflict that arose after the events of September 5, and the role that the UN troops played in them:"...In fact, the command entrusted to these troops has essentially become an accomplice of a coalition of colonial Powers hostile to the cause of freedom and independence of the Congo, which seeks to disrupt the implementation of the decisions of the Security Council. " ⁵⁸

For Nkrumah, this passage was salt in his wounds. When Lumumba arrived at the radio station on the morning of September 6, accompanied by a detachment of Congolese soldiers, and demanded to be let through, the Ghanaians did not comply. To avoid bloodshed, Lumumba gave the order to retreat ⁵⁹. An angry prime minister threatened to break off relations with Ghana if its troops did not leave radio station ⁶⁰.

Khrushchev made a bold offer to Nkrumah to transfer the troops "directly to the Government of the Congo."⁶¹ If this had happened, the situation in the Congo would have changed radically even without direct Soviet military assistance to Lumumba. It could be provided to those countries whose contingents refused to obey the command of the UN troops, first of all-Ghana. It would be possible to keep Lumumba in power through the hands of the Africans.

Accepting Khrushchev's proposal meant putting an end to Ghana's neutrality and losing the opportunity to play on the contradictions of the superpowers. On September 12, Nkrumah refused: "I still believe that this issue (of the Congo) should be resolved through the United Nations." 62

Averell Harriman, the personal representative of Democratic presidential candidate John F. Kennedy, arrived in Leopoldville on September 9. After talks with Kasawubu and Lumumba, ⁶³ he met with the Soviet Ambassador to the Congo, M. D. Yakovlev. O. I. Najestkin, a Soviet intelligence resident in Leopoldville, translated their conversations. He recalls: "The American diplomat tried to convince Yakovlev that it was necessary to build relations with the young Congolese government and provide it with assistance exclusively through the UN. "Why are you circumventing the UN?" asked Harriman. "Because UN assistance under the current conditions and under your command is a noose around the neck of the Congolese people!" Such was the rhetoric of the Cold War in those years, which was very far from diplomatic etiquette." Leaving the Soviet Embassy, Harriman "threw waiting journalists a phrase that flew around the world and became famous.": "Soviet military aircraft exhaust poisoned the political atmosphere in the Congo "" ⁶⁴.

The US response has led to a sharp escalation of the Congolese conflict.

(The ending follows)

^{Hoskyns C.} 1 The Congo Independence. January 1960 - December 1961. L" etc., 1965; Kalb M. The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy. N-Y., 1982; Mahoney R. JFK: Ordeal in Africa. N.Y., 1983.

^{De Witte L.} 2 The Assassination of Lumumba. L., N.Y., 2001. P. XVII.

³ American materials are collected in the collection - CWIHP Conference Reader Compiled for the International Conference. The Congo Crisis, 1960 - 1961. Washington, D.C. 23 - 24 September 2004. Edited by Lise Namikas and Sergey Mazov for The Cold War International History Project.

^{Merriam A.} 4 Congo: Background of Conflict. Evanston, 111., 1961. P. 196 - 201; Scott I. Tumbled House: The Congo at Independence. L., 1969. P. 10, 17 - 18, 22 - 23.

^{Hoskyns C.} 5 Op. cit. P. 72 - 73.

⁶ Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (WUA RF). F. 590. Op. 3. P. 3. D. 23. L. 13-15. Translator of the USSR Embassy in Belgium G. V. Uranov: About the American penetration in the Congo. (Help).

⁷ WUA RF. F. 590. Op. 2. P. 1. D. 5. L. 63.

⁸ Ibid., l. 60.

⁹ WUA RF. F. 0590. Op. 1. P. 1. D. 1. L. 5.

¹⁰ Russian State Archive of Modern History (RGANI). F. 4. Op. 1. d. 372. l. 30, 31.

¹¹ NSC Briefing, 13 April 1960 - in: CWIHP Conference Reader...

¹² USSR and African countries 1946-1962 Documents and materials. Volume I (1946-September 1960). Moscow, 1963. pp. 549-550.

^{Rakhmatov M.} 13 Africa goes to freedom. Moscow, 1961. pp. 72-73; Kapga T. The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba. Conflict in the Congo. L., 1978. P. 189-190.

¹⁴ Ibid. P. 199 - 200.

¹⁵ The USSR and the countries of Africa, vol. I. p. 557.

¹⁶ WUA RF. f. 590. Op. 3. P. 2. d. 9. L. 34.

^{Colvin I.} 17 The Rise and Fall of Moise Tshombe. L., 1968. P. 28.

^{Frank T., Carey J.} 18 The Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action in the Congo. Background Papers and Proceedings of the Second Hammarskjold Forum. New York, 1963. P. 14.

¹⁹ WUA RF. F. 590. Op. 36. P. 4. D. 1. L. 140. MFA OF THE USSR. Department of African Countries. Imperialist aggression against the Republic of the Congo and the position of the Soviet Union. Prepared by the Congo Reference Center. Moscow, 1960.

²⁰ WUA RF. F. 590. Op. 4. P. 6. D. 16. L. 10. First Secretary of the OMO of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs V. Polyakov. United Nations discussion on the situation in the Congo from July 1960 to April 1961, 25 April 1961

^{Urquhart B.} 21 Hammarskjold. A full account of Hammarskjold's years at the United Nations by a close associate who has been given complete access to his private papers. N.Y., 1972. P. 398.

²² The USSR and the countries of Africa, vol. I. pp. 562-563.

²³ Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1958 - 1960. Wash., 1992. Vol. XIV: Africa. P. 347 - 348.

²⁴ The USSR and the countries of Africa, vol. I. p. 562.

²⁵ WUA RF. F. 0590. Op. 2. P. 2. D. 17. L. 5.

²⁶ Izvestia. July 22, 1960

^{Thompson W.S.} 27 Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957 - 1966. Diplomacy, Ideology and the New State. Princeton, 1969. P. 131 - 132.

²⁸ WUA RF. F. 590. Op. 36. P. 4. D. 1. L. 23. Aid of the USSR to the Republic of the Congo. A TASS message.

²⁹ FRUS, 1958 - 1960. Vol. XIV. P. 358-365.

³⁰ Memorandum of Discussion at the 452d Meeting of the National Security Council - in: FRUS, 1958 - 1960. Vol. XIV. P. 338.

³¹ WUA RF. F. 0590. Op. 2. II. 1. D. Z. L. 4-6. Deputy Minister of Finance V. Kuznetsov. Transcript of a conversation with the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Guinea, Cuba, on August 1, 1960

³² The USSR and the countries of Africa, vol. I. p. 577.

³³ Cit. by: Merriam A. Op. cit. P. 233.

^{Urquhart B.} 34 Op. cit. P. 412.

^{Miller R.} 35 Dag Hammarskjold and Crisis Diplomacy. New York, 1962. P. 279.

^{Mayevsky Victor.} 36 Introductory article-see: O'Brien K. To Katanga and back. Moscow, 1963, p. 9.

^{Kata Vol} 37 Op. cit. P. 250-251.

³⁸ The USSR and the countries of Africa, vol. 1, pp. 590, 592.

³⁹ WUA RF. F. 0573. Op. 4. P. 2. D. 9. L. 1. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. A. Gromyko-Central Committee of the CPSU. On the possibility of Soviet assistance to Ghana in connection with the events in the Congo, August 9, 1960

⁴⁰ WUA RF. F. 0573. Op. 4. P. 2. D. 9. L. 3. MFA OF THE USSR-Central Committee of THE CPSU. Draft instructions to the Charge d'affaires a. i. of the USSR in Ghana, August 9, 1960

⁴¹ The USSR and the countries of Africa, vol. I. p. 706.

^{Urquhart B.} 42 Op. cit. P. 429.

⁴³ WUA RF. f. 590. Op. 36. P. 4. d. 1. L. 37-38, 39-40.

^{O'Brien K.} 44 Decree. Op. p. 144.

⁴⁵ Is true. 1960. August 23 and 27.

⁴⁶ WUA RF. F. 0601. Op. 1. P. 1. d. 6. L. 1. Reference of the Department of African Countries of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR "On the supply of Soviet aircraft to African countries in connection with assistance to the Republic of the Congo "(b. d). The United States used 90 aircraft to support the UN troops in the Congo and "a certain number of helicopters" - see: Kalb M. Op. cit. P. 19.

^{Kanza T.} 47 Op. cit. P. 273.

⁴⁸ FRUS. 1958 - 1960... P. 441.

^{Kalb M.} 49 Op. cit. P. 65 - 66.

^{Devlin I.} 50 Chief of Station, Congo. A Memoir of 1960 - 67. N.-Y., 2007. P. 94 - 96.

⁵¹ Ibid. P. 67.

^{Kalb M.} 52 Op. cit. P. 70.

^{Epstein H.} 53 (ed.). Revolt in the Congo 1960 - 1964. N.Y., 1965. P. 37.

^{Epstein H.} 54 Op. cit. P. 40; Weissman St. American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960 - 1964. Ithaca, 1974. P. 92.

^{Urquhart B.} 55 A Life in Peace and War. New York, 1987. P. 166 - 167.

⁵⁶ Statement of the Soviet Government on the situation in the Congo, September 9, 1960-see: USSR and the Countries of Africa ... pp. 634, 635.

⁵⁷ WUA RF. F. 0590. Op. 2. P. 1. D. 8. L. 56.

⁵⁸ WUA RF. f. 573. Op. 4. P. 2. d. 9. L. 21.

^{Dayal R.} 59 Mission for Hammarskjold. The Congo Crisis. Princeton, 1976. P. 38.

^{Nkrumah K.} 60 Challenge of the Congo. A Case Study of Foreign Pressures in an Independent State. L., N.Y., 1967. P. 52.

⁶¹ WUA RF. f. 573. Op. 4. P. 2. d. 9. L. 22.

⁶² WUA of the Russian Federation. f. 573. Op. 4. P. 4. D. 12. L. 14-15. Translated from English by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

^{Kalb M.} 63 Op. cit. P. 79.

^{Nazhestkin O. I.} 64 Gody kongol'skogo krizisa (1960 - 1963 gg.) [64 Years of the Congolese crisis (1960-1963). Notes of a scout]. Novaya i noveishe istoriya, 2003, N 6. pp. 156-157.

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