Sudan Keywords:, South Sudan, conflict, separatism, self-determination, Abyei region

The problem of South Sudan has long historical roots. The Sudanese state of the period 1956-2011 became the successor of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (1899-1955), a territorial entity created as a result of the colonial campaigns of the Turkish-Egyptian troops in the first half of the XIX century, and then the British-in the first third of the XX century. As a result, by the time Sudan declared its independence (January 1956), the country had two distinct regions in terms of history, culture, and economic development: the predominantly Muslim North, populated by Arab and non-Arab African peoples, and the South, whose majority population was made up of animists and Christians of non-Arab origin (Nilotes and Bantu). There have been periods of armed conflict and relative stability in the southern region in the recent history of Sudan, but the "problem of the South" has never left the political agenda in ^this country1, remaining a very complex issue until the last moment of the existence of Sudan as a single State of the North and South.

July 9, 2011 Sudan - at that time the largest state on the territory of the African continent-was officially divided into two: The Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan. South Sudan, which became the 193rd member of the United Nations and the 54th member of the African Union, received universal international recognition, and one of the first countries to recognize the independence of the former southern region of Sudan was the Russian Federation.

The division of the Sudanese state became possible after six months earlier, residents of the South overwhelmingly voted for independence in a national referendum. This right was granted to them by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, which ended the more than 20-year-old armed conflict between the forces of the central Government in Khartoum, representing the interests of the North of the country, and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SNM), consisting mainly of southerners.

This conflict, better known as the second civil war (1983-2005) in Sudan, was preceded by the first civil war (1963-1972), in which the Government army was opposed by the South Sudanese Anya - Nya movement, which advocated the independence of the province. In 1972, the parties reached a compromise: the southerners refused to demand independence in exchange for granting the South an autonomous status and other political and economic preferences. Signed in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, the Agreement (AAC) ensured a fragile peace in the southern region for 11 years. When Khartoum violated several key provisions of the AAS in the early 1980s, the South responded with a new anti-Government uprising.

Thus, in the half-century that elapsed from the moment of independence of Sudan to the signing of the Navy in 2005, the armed forces of the North and South fought each other - under different slogans and banners - for more than 30 years.

The exact number of victims of both conflicts is incalculable. According to some estimates, the second civil war alone claimed the lives of more than 2 million people. About 4 million people became internally displaced persons, and another 600 thousand people became refugees in neighboring countries2.

The end of the most recent armed conflict was preceded by a long process of peaceful settlement, which was actively supported by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)* , the African Union, the United Nations and other members of the international community.

In the autumn of 1993, after a series of unsuccessful attempts by foreign mediators to bring the parties to the conflict to an agreement, the initiative in the Sudanese peace settlement passed to IGAD. However, it took about 10 more years of negotiations, including long breaks, before IGAD's efforts began to produce tangible results. During the final phase of the peace process (2002-2004), the SND and the Government of the Sudan signed a series of protocols and separate agreements on the most pressing issues of North-South relations, which together formed the CPA.

On January 9, 2005, in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi, NDS leader John Garang and Sudanese Vice-President Ali Osman Mohammed Taha signed the framework agreement. The second civil War ended and a new period in the history of relations between the North and the South began.

KEY POINTS OF THE AGREEMENT

The key provision of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is the commitment of the parties to grant the people of South Sudan the right to self-determination. It was documented that at the end of the six-year transition period (i.e., no later than January 2011), Sudanese citizens permanently residing in the South, as well as those from the southern region living in the North of the country and abroad, will be able to participate in the referendum, where they will have to answer a single question: should I Should the South remain part of Sudan or form an independent state? The agreement guaranteed Southerners the freedom to choose between these two options, but under its terms, future leaders of the North and South were required to make efforts to make unity attractive, i.e., to pursue policies that would persuade South Sudanese to vote against secession. ³

The Navy provided for a return to the original version of the administrative border between the two regions, which existed at the time of the country's declaration of independence. At the same time, it was necessary to accurately delineate this border before the end of the transition period.

The problem, however, was that over half a century of conflicts and intensive migration processes, not only the administrative boundaries have changed, but also the composition of the population in the border zone ⁴. Thus, one of the main difficulties of implementing this agreement was already laid down in the very provision of the Navy on the border.

After the ratification of the Navy by the country's parliament, the South received the status of autonomy within Sudan, with the guarantee of preserving autonomous rights after a referendum if the southerners chose unity. The city of Juba was declared the capital of South Sudan. The region became completely self-governing in internal affairs and gained broad powers to develop relations with foreign states. To do this, the South had to have its own authorities: the Government of South Sudan (PRS), the Parliament (Legislative Assembly), and an independent court.

The Sudan People's Liberation Army ( SNOA), the military wing of the SNOD, received the status of the official armed forces of the South. The SNOA was subordinate only to Juba and operated independently of the Khartoum-controlled Sudan Armed Forces. It also provided for the creation of Joint Integrated Units (JITs) consisting of military personnel of both armies. It was assumed that if the people of South Sudan voted for unity, the PLO would become the basis of the future national armed forces.

The agreement called for national elections to be held in Sudan no later than July 2009. The country's residents were to elect the head of State and members of the national Parliament, as well as governors and members of legislative assemblies in 15 states of the North and 10 states of the South. In addition, elections of the head of the autonomous region (chairman of the PRUS) and deputies of the regional parliament were planned in the South. Until then, a "power-sharing" agreement was supposed to be in effect in Sudan between the SND and the ruling Khartoum-based National Congress (NK) party.

The highest executive authority of the country for the entire transition period was declared the presidency as part of the president.-

* Initially, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGAD) was composed of six States: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. In 1993, Eritrea, which separated from Ethiopia, became the seventh member of the Intergovernmental Body to remove the word "drought" from its name.

On the left: the administrative border between North and South Sudan, after July 9, 2011 - the state border. Right: disputed Abyei region; major oil production areas in Sudan and South Sudan, pipeline routes.

Source: The New Times (Moscow).

dent and two vice-presidents. The powers of the head of state and the second vice-president were transferred to the representatives of the NK, while the first vice-president and, accordingly, the second person in the state became the leader of the SND. The Presidency was based on the Government of National Unity (PNE), in which the NK and SND were assigned, respectively, 52% and 28% of the ministerial portfolios. The remaining part of the portfolios was transferred to the opposition parties of the North and South. Both parties received the same quotas for filling seats in the new National Parliament (National Assembly). In the government and Parliament of the southern autonomy, the SND took the leading positions, receiving 70% of the ministerial portfolios and deputy seats in these authorities, respectively. The remaining 30 % was to be divided between the NK and the opposition parties of the South.

One of the key components of the CPA was an agreement between the parties to share State revenues from Sudanese oil exports. Under its terms, 98% of the proceeds from the sale of oil produced in the North of the country went to the national budget of Sudan - in fact, to the budget of the North. The South could not claim any of this money. At the same time, the proceeds from the sale of South Sudanese oil were to be divided between the North and the South. This provision laid a " time bomb "under the relations of the CPA signatories, as opponents of unity in the southern region were given a reason to accuse the North of" appropriating " the resources of the South.

Another important agreement reached within the framework of the Navy concerned the role of religion in the post-war Sudanese State. It was agreed that Sharia law would remain the basis of legislation and legal proceedings in the North, while the South would not be required to follow these laws for at least the entire transition period.⁵

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement also provided for a compromise solution to the problem of disputed territories. Prior to its conclusion, the SND required self-determination not only for South Sudan, but also for the three territories of the North bordering the South: Abyei ⁶ and the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan State, and Blue Nile State. As a result, it was agreed that only Abyei residents would have the right to self-determination. If they were in favor of joining the South, they would have the right to secede with it or become part of the South Sudan Autonomous Region, depending on the outcome of the referendum in that region.

The Blue Nile and the Nubian Mountains were to remain part of the North in any case. However, it was agreed that at the end of the transition period, members of the regional parliaments would consult with the local population. Depending on the outcome of the consultations, the legislative assemblies could ask Khartoum to raise the level of autonomy of these states.

PERMANENT CRISIS OF THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT

At the beginning of July 2005, an important step was taken in the implementation of the CPA: the SND and NC formed the presidency and appointed the heads of the PNE and PrUS. The post of head of state was retained by the current president of the country Omar Hassan al-Bashir (NK), who headed the PNE, and his party colleague Ali Osman Muhammad Taha became the second vice-president. The posts of Chairman of the PRUC and First Vice-President of Sudan were taken by the leader of the SND, John Garang.

The latter's reign did not last long, however. On July 30, 2005, the founder and permanent leader of SNOD was killed in a plane crash, the circumstances of which are not fully clear.

His death radically changed the balance of power within the SND and the nature of the party's relationship with NK.

This charismatic leader was neither a consistent unionist nor a staunch separatist. The interests of the South were more important to him than the territorial integrity of Sudan, but under certain conditions he was ready to call on his supporters to vote for unity. It seems that the founder of the SND could, relying on the support of forces close to him in NK, achieve greater constructiveness in relations between the two parties, which would help to improve the image of the central government in the South and, accordingly, increase the attractiveness of unity in the eyes of residents of this region. However, without Garang's support, none of the northern politicians could do this - they had no one to rely on in the leadership of the southern autonomy. ⁷

The signing of the Navy became possible only thanks to mutual concessions of the signatories - the same was required for the implementation of this agreement. However, without Garang, who was bound to the leaders of the NK not only by written obligations, but also by their word to each other, the opportunities and desires to find compromise solutions for both parties noticeably decreased.

Meanwhile, the political transformation in post-war Sudan continued. Garang was succeeded as PRUC Chairman and Vice-President of Sudan by his closest associate, Salva Kiir Mayardit , a consistent separatist who never shared Garang's vision of a "New Sudan" in the early 1980s, i.e., a State of social harmony in which the people of the North and South would enjoy equal rights.⁸ As a result, those of Garang's party members who were supporters of unity, after his death, were in the second place in the SND*.

Against this background, the SND and the NC started forming the PNE, which was mostly completed in September 2005. The following month, the PrUS was formed, and the deployment of the JCS to their permanent locations began. In November 2005, the Interim Constitution (CC) of the Republic of Sudan was adopted, incorporating the main provisions of the CPA9.

Around the same time, the PNE and PrUS established the National Petroleum Commission to regulate North-South mutual payments of oil revenues, but this body turned out to be incompetent. NK fully controlled all financial flows related to oil production and export, and resisted attempts by the SND to make the settlement process more transparent.

During the entire transition period, but especially in 2005 - 2007, the agreement on the withdrawal of units of the SNOA and the Sudanese Armed Forces from the North and South of the country, respectively, was extremely slow to be implemented. Under the terms of the Navy, this process was supposed to be completed by July 9, 2007, but in fact by that time only about 66% of the Northern military personnel who were in the South at the time of the peace, and only about a quarter of the SNOA personnel stationed in the North, had been withdrawn. Both sides, as usual, blamed each other for non-compliance with the agreement.

The agreement on the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DRR) of members of illegal armed groups who were not part of the official security structures of the North and South was also implemented significantly behind the agreed schedule. It was only in September 2007 that the SND and NC agreed on a National DRR Plan, although under the terms of the peace agreement, this was to take place no later than ^{July 2005.10}

Dissatisfied with the NC's position on the implementation of key aspects of the CPA, in October 2007 the SND announced a boycott of the Government of National Unity. 16 southern ministers resigned their positions. Only pressure from the United States and the European Union, which threatened Juba with the termination of donor aid in the event of a failure in the preparation for the referendum, forced the SND to back down. On December 20, 2007, the Southerners announced their return to PNE.

* Supporters of unity were such respected SND functionaries as former PNE Ministers Nyal Deng Nyal and Deng Alor, head of the northern branch of the SND Yasser Arman, and others.

The West's interest in South Sudan stems from the region's significant oil reserves, as well as the desire to use the "problem of the South" to put pressure on Khartoum and weaken the government of al-Bashir, who was openly hostile in Washington and European capitals. Although in the first four years after the conclusion of the Navy, the main focus of the United States and the European Union was not on South Sudan, but on neighboring Darfur11, by the spring of 2009, the emphasis in their relations with Sudan had shifted again towards the South and the implementation of the Navy 12. Especially great was the influence of the US administration. In the last two years of the transition period, not a single meaningful round of negotiations between Juba and Khartoum on naval issues was complete without the participation of representatives of Washington, who often offered the parties their own options for resolving disputes.

In September 2009, Global Witness, an American non-governmental organization, published an analytical report entitled " Catalysts of Distrust: The Need for Transparency in the Sudanese Oil Industry." Its authors argued that official figures for state revenues from oil exports do not fit in with the reports of foreign participants in oil production in Sudan, primarily the China National Petroleum Corporation. ¹³ The report was a bombshell.

In Juba, it was claimed that only in 2009. PNE has underpaid the South several million dollars. In this situation, PrUE requested an independent investigation into possible violations committed by the central Government. Faced with serious internal and external pressure, the central Government began to provide the autonomous authorities with more information about Sudan's oil revenues, which helped to somewhat reduce the tension of contradictions.

In December 2009, through the efforts of the US President's Special Representative for the Sudan, Scott Greishen, SNOD and NK came close to a compromise on the main controversial issues of the Navy: self-determination in the South and in Abyei. Two laws on referendums were adopted, but only the first one proved viable. As for Abyei, Juba and Khartoum have not been able to agree on the terms of holding a plebiscite in the area.

In April 2010, the country held its first democratic general election in more than two decades, with the participation of residents of all 10 southern states and 14 of the 15 Northern states (up from 17 in January 2012). The elections were held nine months later than scheduled, mainly due to the delay in the announcement of the results of the Sudan-wide census. According to official figures released in April 2009, the population of Sudan was 39.15 million, of which 8.2 million people lived in the South of ^the country. These figures were rejected by the SND, which accused NK of deliberately underestimating the share of Southerners and residents of territories adjacent to the South in the total population of ^the country15. According to Preuss, there were actually at least 11 to 12 million people living in South Sudan. The greatest controversy over the results of the census reached in South Kordofan, so it was decided to postpone the elections in this state indefinitely ¹⁶.

Following the results of the national elections, the current President of the country, al-Bashir, won 68% of the vote and was re-elected for a new five-year term. The SND, which initially intended to fight for the post of head of state, at the very last moment went to meet the NK halfway and withdrew its candidate.

The head of the Southern Autonomous Region was elected the current chairman of the PrUS S. Kiir, who gained

93% of the votes. NK did not participate in elections of this level.

In 13 states of the North, representatives of the NC became governors, while in Blue Nile, a candidate from the SND was elected to this post. In 9 out of 10 states in the South, the victory was celebrated by representatives of the ruling party in the region, and only in one state did the SND candidate get ahead of an independent candidate.

Despite the statements of international observers that there were no serious violations, the SND accused the NC of rigging the results of voting at the national level.

Among the most important consequences of the elections are the further separation between the PNE partners and the completion of the process of self-removal of the SND from the national political scene. Disagreements within the party have also escalated, especially between its central office and the North Sudan branch. In South Sudan itself, the regional government was opposed by several influential army commanders who were dissatisfied with the results of the elections in the southern states. Under these circumstances, the PrUS began to resort more often to populist slogans and almost did not hesitate to agitate its fellow citizens to vote in a referendum for secession from the North.

And yet, despite the lack of normal relations between Khartoum and Juba, the referendum in South Sudan took place at the appointed time and passed in a calm atmosphere, without serious violations. According to the official results announced in February 2011, almost 99% of the participants in the plebiscite voted for secession from the North, or 3.85 million people out of the 3.94 million southerners who received the right to vote according to the results of the population census.¹⁷

* * *

Could the outcome of the referendum in South Sudan have been different? Why was the "make unity more attractive" policy not implemented in practice? How did relations between the North and South develop after the referendum? This will be discussed in the final part of the article.

(The ending follows)

^{Deng Francis M.} 1 War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Southern Sudan. Washington, DC, 1995, p. 484.

² United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan. 31.01.2005 - http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbo!=S/2005/57

³ The Machakos Protocol. Chapter I of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Sudan People's Liberation Army. Signed at Nairobi, Kenya on January 9, 2005, p. 8 -http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-en.pdf

⁴ During the half - century of Sudan's independence, the administrative border between the northern and southern regions has been repeatedly changed, but the 2005 peace agreement was based on the original version of this border, as of January 1, 1956.

^{Tikhomirov N. K.} 5 Regional conflicts. The problem of Southern Sudan. Moscow: Institute of Africa, 2006, p. 165.

⁶ The Abyei territorial conflict began during the Anglo-Egyptian condominium period in Sudan, when in 1905 the British Governor-General transferred the territories of nine Dinka Ngok chiefdoms, which were part of the cultural area of the non-Arab South, to the administrative jurisdiction of the northern province of Kordofan. Since Sudan's independence, Southerners have repeatedly raised the issue of including the territory of the chiefdoms (collectively known as "Abyei") in the southern province of Bahrel Ghazal. In the early 1970s, the Government of the Sudan agreed to grant Abyei and other areas bordering the South in the North the right to self-determination, as reflected in the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. Subsequently, however, the Government's position once again became uncompromising and was that Abyei would not secede from the North under any circumstances. It was only in the spring of 2004, less than a year before the signing of the CPA, that Khartoum agreed to the SND requirement and confirmed the right of Abyei residents to choose between belonging to the North or South of Sudan.

⁷ Garang's Death: Implications for Peace in Sudan. International Crisis Group. Africa Briefing N 30. August 9, 2005, p. 3 -http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/B030-garangs-death-impli cations-for-peace-in-sudan.aspx

⁸ For Garant's political views and his concept of a "New Sudan", see Gibia Roba. John Garang and the Vision of New Sudan. The Key Publishing House, 2010, p. 32 - 64.

^{Grawert Elke.} 9 Introduction. In: After the comprehensive peace

agreement in Sudan. Ed. by Elke Grawert. James Currey: Woodbridge, 2010, p. 5.

^{Nichols Ryan.} 10 DDR in Sudan: Too Little, Too Late? (Report of The Small Arms Survey (Geneva, Switzerland) series "The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HBSA)", N 24), February 2011, p. 24 - http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SWP-24-DDRJSin-Sudan.pdf

¹¹ The armed conflict in the West Sudanese region of Darfur escalated in late 2002 and early 2003, when a group representing the interests of local non-Arab African peoples rose up in an uprising in one of the vilayets (provinces) of Darfur. The conflict is characterized by a large number of parties involved in it: the forces of the central government, mainly Arab in their composition, pro-government militias (the so-called Janjaweed) and rebel groups consisting mainly of non-Arabs. The ongoing peace process since 2003 has not yet brought an end to violence. See: Kostelyanets S. V. Socio-political and humanitarian aspects of the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan. Dis.... Candidate of Political Sciences. Moscow, IAfr RAS Publ., 2011.

^{Morrison J. S., Cooke J. G.} 12 The Obama Administration's Sudan Strategy. The US Center of Pagan Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Washington, October 21, 2009 - http://csis.org/publication/obama-administrations-sudan-strategy

¹³ Fuelling Mistrust: The Need for Transparency in Sudan's Oil Industry. A Report by Global Witness. September 2009, p. 4 -http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/fuelling_mistrustenglish_without_pictur es.pdf

¹⁴ The Population Census Council of the Republic of Sudan: 5th Sudan Population and Housing Census 2008 Priority Results submitted to the Presidency. Khartoum, 26.04.2009 - http://southsudaninfo.net/wp-content/uploads/reference_library/reports/5th_sudan_census26_ april_2009.pdf

^{Ylonen Aleksi.} 15 The Failure of 'Making Unity Attractive'. The Uncertain Future of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement Implementation in Sudan. In: Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa - Monograph 178, Institute for Security Studies (South Africa), April 2011, p. 154 - http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/Monograph178.pdf

^{Ylonen Aleksi.} 16 Op. cit, p. 155.

¹⁷ Southern Sudan Referendum Commission/Southern Sudan Referendum Bureau - http://southernsudan2011.com/

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