Keywords: Sudan, South Sudan, conflict, separatism, self-determination, Abyei region

In January 2011, a referendum on self-determination was held in the southern region of the Republic of Sudan, where the overwhelming majority (over 98%) of the participants supported secession from Sudan and the creation of their own State. What do these numbers mean? That in the six years since the end of the civil war in the country between the forces of the central Government, which represents the interests of the Muslim North, and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SNM), which is mainly represented by Christians and animists in the South of the country, there has not been a serious social force supporting unity in the South.

Could the results of the referendum have been different? Yes and no. They might look different quantitatively, but hardly qualitatively. In any case, six years of transition were not enough to remove from the collective memory of Southerners the negative memories of the previous 50 years of North-South co-existence within the same State. A qualitative change in this historical reality would require breaking the entire system of socio-political relations that has developed in the Sudan, which in the conditions of 2005-2011 is not possible. it was practically impracticable. At the same time, it seems that if the relations between the ruling parties of the North and the South - the National Congress (NC) and the SND - had been more constructive during this period, the idea of unity of the country would have gained much more supporters among the southerners. There was little chance that Southerners would choose unity over independence, but the" defeat " of unity did not necessarily have to be crushing.

UNITY IN THEORY - DUALITY IN PRACTICE

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was a "road map" that could only have its maximum effect if the measures envisaged by it were consistently and timely implemented. The very creation of the road map became possible only thanks to the cooperation and mutual concessions of the signatories. The same was required for its implementation. Only in this case can the ruling parties expect that their cooperation within the framework of the National Unity Government will become effective. However, in reality, SNOD and NC did not strive to achieve this goal.

The Navy granted South Sudan de facto independence in internal affairs, and the peace agreement also stipulated the need for cooperation between the SND and the NK on all issues of national importance, especially in foreign policy and security. In practice, the parties cooperated only when they were forced to do so, and their relationship was never either deep or trusting.

The fact that prior to the 2010 elections, the foreign ministers of Sudan were representatives of the SND did not prompt the NK to seek mutual understanding with this party on foreign policy issues. The National Congress took a different path and began to build its relations with key foreign policy partners of Sudan, bypassing the Foreign Ministry-most often through the office of the second Vice-president or presidential advisers. The appointment of an NK representative as the head of the diplomatic department (spring 2010) did not change the established rules of the game: the ruling parties of the North and South continued to build relations with foreign countries without regard for the opinion of their partner in the coalition government.

The integration of the security forces of the North and South within the United Integrated Units (UIC) was also not the best. Formally, the OICH was formed, but no integration of the two power structures took place, since the southerners and northerners managed "their" units within these forces separately from each other. ¹

Neither Khartoum nor Juba in sa-

Ending. For the beginning, see: Asia and Africa Today, 2012, No. 3.

In fact, they did not want the war to resume, but they considered it their duty to demonstrate to the opposite side their readiness to defend their interests, including by force of arms. As a consequence, spending by the Government of National Unity (GNE) and the Government of South Sudan (PRS) on the security forces under their control has steadily increased throughout the transition period. ²

The main source of new weapons for the Armed Forces of Sudan and the SNOA were foreign countries. However, while Khartoum could legally import weapons, Juba was forced to hide its military contracts, since the Navy prohibited any security forces located in South Sudan from receiving new offensive weapons. For this purpose, the PRTR usually resorted to the mediation of third countries. For example, in 2007-2008. Juba has purchased over a hundred T-72B tanks, 18 multiple launch rocket systems, over 20 anti-aircraft guns, a large number of man-portable air defense systems and other small arms from Ukraine. Some of these weapons and military equipment came on board the cargo ship Faina, captured in 2008 by Somali pirates. According to the documents, however, the shipment was sold by a Ukrainian state arms exporter to the Kenyan government. Neither Juba, Nairobi, nor Kiev have ever acknowledged that the actual recipient was South Sudan, although there is ample evidence that this is where the military supplies ended up.³

Unity might become more attractive in the eyes of southerners than it really was, if the South established a positive image of the ruling party of the North.

However, the National Congress was practically absent from the information field of South Sudanese cities, did not work with regional media, and, in general, did not seek to improve the negative image of Khartoum, ingrained in the minds of Southerners during the years of civil war.

Even worse, the NC has withdrawn itself from addressing the social problems of the southern region, saying that this is the task of the PrUS, not the central government. Thus, the ruling party in the North itself provided the SND with another reason to accuse Khartoum of indifference to the economic hardships of the inhabitants of the South.

Far from calling on the people of the South to vote for unity, the SND leaders were unequivocal in favor of the independence of ^the region4. Thus, in October 2009, Salva Kiir stated that if southerners want to be "second-class citizens", they should vote for unity, and those who vote for secession should vote for freedom.⁵ The head of the PRJ and other leaders of the SND have repeatedly made similar statements in ^the press6. The same members of the party's leadership who openly expressed support for unity - mainly the leaders of the northern branch of the SND-were severely criticized by their fellow party members and, as a result, distanced themselves from Juba.

Another factor contributing to the huge popularity of separatist sentiments in South Sudan was the fact that the authorities of the autonomous region did not allow representatives of the opposition to freely conduct agitation work among the population of the South against independence. We are talking, first of all, about the party "SND for Democratic Change" (SND-DP), led by a veteran Sudanese politician Lam Akol, who accused the SND of separatism and purposeful collapse of the country. Lama Akol's associates have repeatedly complained about harassment by the SND-controlled law enforcement agencies.⁷

In an effort to secure maximum support for Southern residents in the elections, as well as support for their pro - secession position in the referendum, the SND relied on the media (in the cities), Christian church leaders, and funded Zapas.-

This is the home of civil society organizations, whose number in South Sudan increased several dozen-fold in 2005-2011. Both of them were called upon to become a kind of "mouthpiece" for the party's propaganda, including on the issue of self-determination. Pro-unity parties, such as the Lama Akola Party, did not have such leverage over public opinion in the province: of the ten Southern states, the SND-DP had broad popular support in only one - Upper Nile, and even then only in some of its districts.

The armed conflict in Darfur was a factor that complicated relations between the SND and the NK (and, consequently, "worked" against the preservation of the unity of the Sudan). SNOD has occasionally tried to play the "Darfur card" and has periodically provided assistance to some of the anti-Government groups in Darfur. In turn, NK supported non-SNOA armed groups in the South.

ABYEI IS A STUMBLING BLOCK

The importance of this territory for the North and South of Sudan is due not so much to concern for the interests of the inhabitants of this area, but rather to the presence of large oil fields on its territory. Although the share of Abyei oil in Sudan's total exports has declined markedly over the past few years(from 25% in 2007 to 9% in 2009), Abyei's raw material potential remains significant.

To understand the essence of the Abyei problem, it is necessary to take into account the ethnic composition of the population of this territory during the period under review. It is not known exactly how many people lived there before the referendum in the South. According to the 2008 census, there are 53 thousand people, but there is no doubt that these figures are greatly underestimated. The actual population could be 2.5-3 times larger.

Until mid-2011, the majority of the district's population was made up of the Dinka Ngok, historically drawn to South Sudan. These are farmers who lived in Abyei permanently. In addition, for several months of the year, it is home to the Misseriyya, Muslim nomads who migrate with their herds between the North and South. The nomads feared that if Abyei seceded with South Sudan, Juba would prevent their free passage across the border.

As for Khartoum, this is not only a financial issue, but also a political one. NK is extremely interested in the loyalty of the Misseriyya, given the strategic position of South Kordofan on the outskirts of Darfur and South Sudan. Not surprisingly, under these circumstances, the positions of Khartoum and Juba on the question of whether nomads should be considered full residents of Abyei are radically different. President Al-Bashir has repeatedly stated that the referendum will not take place without Misseriyah, while the SND has not accepted any of the options proposed by Khartoum and international mediators to include nomads in the voting lists. Misseriya leaders themselves have repeatedly threatened to disrupt the referendum if SNOD and Dinka Ngoc attempt to hold it without the nomads ' participation.

The situation in the area was seriously aggravated on the eve of the referendum in the South and continued to worsen after the announcement of its results.

Despite all the agreements previously signed by the Navy parties, the Abyei referendum never took place. The question of self-determination of this Territory is still open. The crisis reached its peak in May 2011, when President Al-Bashir ordered the deployment of the North Sudanese army to Abyei. On 21 May, the Sudanese Armed Forces occupied the disputed territory, inflicting heavy losses on the SNOA units in Abyei and forcing them to retreat south. As a result of the military operation, the city of Abyei and many Dinka Ngoc villages were looted and burned. According to UN estimates, about 3 thousand residents of District ⁸ who have become refugees in South Sudan have left their homes. The Misseriyas and their herds, which at the time of writing were still in Abyei ⁹, moved to the deserted territories.

On 20 June 2011, three weeks before the secession of South Sudan, the Central Government and the Government of the South, with the mediation of the African Union, signed the Abyei Demilitarization Agreement. Temporary forces were deployed to the area

The United Nations Office for Abyei Security (UNISFA), which was supported by units of the Ethiopian Army. Most of the North Sudanese military has left Abyei.

At the end of January 2012, the issue of returning refugees to Abyei remained open. Most of the Dinka Ngok were still in South Sudan and were afraid to return to Abyei, where they would not feel safe, because, according to the South Sudanese side, up to 400 North Sudanese military personnel and up to 7,000 Misseriya remained in the disputed territory, many of whom were also armed.¹⁰

In the light of the radical change in the ethno-demographic situation in Abyei, the prospects for a referendum are not visible here. It can be expected that in the future, the Government of Southern Sudan will deliberately exaggerate the number of Dinka refugees, and the Government of Sudan will encourage the settlement of the territory by Northerners. In such circumstances, the parties have little chance to agree on the start of registration of participants in the plebiscite.

OTHER RELEVANT ISSUES

A key issue that will determine the future of relations between Sudan and South Sudan is the terms of use of the Sudan pipeline for the transportation of South Sudanese oil. After the collapse of the country, at least 70% of all proven reserves of "black gold"went to South Sudan. However, Juba has no other way to export this oil, except through the territory of Sudan to the oil loading terminal on the Red Sea. Khartoum has lost most of its former oil revenues as a result of the secession of the South, but it has a good bargaining chip with Juba, since it controls both oil pipelines and the seaport.

In the first six months after the split, Juba and Khartoum continued to export oil under the old scheme, but the order of mutual settlements between suppliers and consumers changed. Juba now received 100% of the state's revenue from the sale of oil produced in the South, after which Khartoum paid for the transit and processing of raw materials. The problem, however, was that the parties did not agree on the cost of these services.

The Government of Sudan expected to receive $32-34 for each barrel of transit oil, while the authorities of South Sudan transferred money at the rate of $ 1 per barrel.

The discrepancy in the calculations of both sides increased. Accordingly, the price of this issue has increased - primarily for Khartoum. The moment of truth came in mid-January 2012, following the collapse of another round of oil negotiations, when the Government of Sudan announced the confiscation of some of the oil coming from the South as compensation for "unpaid transit" ^.11

Juba accused the neighboring Government of theft, and on January ²⁰, 2012, the Council of Ministers of South Sudan decided to completely stop oil production in the country and the transportation of already produced oil to the north12. By the end of the month, this resolution was implemented. According to President Kiir, such a measure was caused not only by cases of unauthorized selection of South Sudanese oil in Sudan, but also by the introduction to the parliament of this country of a draft law that determines the amount of transit fees at $32.2 per barrel.

Attempts by international mediators-first of all, the African Union Implementation Commission headed by former South African President Thabo Mbeki-to bring the parties to a compromise agreement have failed. The issue of transit conditions and processing of hydrocarbons from South Sudan remained a stumbling block.

A new round of crisis in relations between Juba and Khartoum creates the risk of a clash between the armies of the two countries in the area of the common border. On February 3, 2012, speaking live on State television, President Al-Bashir of Sudan said that his country was closer to war than peace with South Sudan, and that the people of Sudan should be prepared for a military confrontation with a neighboring country.¹³

It seems, however, that both sides are aware of the futility of such a scenario, so sooner or later they will come to a compromise on this key issue. Juba is completely dependent on the use of Sudan's oil transportation system, and Khartoum is not interested in either losing foreign exchange earnings from South Sudan (in the form of oil transit fees) or in a new military clash.

Many questions are raised about the fate of the two North Sudanese states that were considered "special status territories" until July 2011, as well as Abyei. We are talking about the Blue Nile and South Kordofan. The CPA provided for public consultations in both states, which were supposed to determine the nature of the future relations of these regions with the central government of the country. In Blue Nile, the consultation process was launched, but not brought to its logical conclusion, while in South Kordofan, the matter did not move forward.

The situation in South Kordofan has sharply worsened since regional elections were held in this state in April this year. The incumbent head of the regional Government, Ahmed Haroon, was elected to the post of governor by the National Congress, defeating his rival from the North Sudan branch of the SND (SND-North) by a narrow margin. It is also important that the International Criminal Court has previously issued an arrest warrant for A. Harun on charges of war crimes in Darfur.

SND-Sever did not recognize the election results and refused to participate in the new government.

The NDS supporters in South Kordofan and Blue Nile were confident in their abilities - in 2005-2011, they were controlled by several large armed groups in both North Sudanese states.

After the secession of the South, SND-North lost its formal connection with the South Sudanese SND, becoming an independent political party. Thus, NK now had a free hand to eliminate this competitor from the political scene and at the same time avoid being accused of aggression against Juba. In August 2011, the Sudanese Government army began forcibly disarming militia members in South Kordofan, and in September 2011, a similar operation began in Blue Nile. SNOD-North was outlawed in Sudan. Khartoum demanded that the party's supporters hand over their weapons or withdraw to the South, but they considered both demands unacceptable. As a result, the operation to disarm the militias in South Kordofan and Blue Nile developed into a small civilian war, which at the time of writing (January 2012) was still ongoing in these states. Aircraft and artillery were deployed against the rebels, and a massive famine began in areas not controlled by government forces.

In Juba, it was officially stated that the problems of the northern neighbors no longer concern the Republic of South Sudan. Unofficially, the Government of South Sudan began to shelter the SND-North militants on its territory and provide them with logistical support. It can be expected that if the conflict in these two northern states is not resolved very soon, relations between Sudan and South Sudan will continue to deteriorate.

To make matters worse, South Sudan is experiencing its own internal conflicts, with some of the South's anti-Government groups operating near the border with Sudan. In these circumstances, the interference of two states in each other's internal conflicts threatens to become a "vicious circle" that will make it impossible to build new, good-neighborly relations.

* * *

Thus, the" problem of the South", which has complicated relations between the regions of Sudan for almost half a century, was solved by granting independence to the southern region of the country. However, the division of Sudan into two parts did not lead to a complete settlement of the political conflict between the North and South. The parties changed the form and status of their relationship, but were unable to fill it with new content. These relations remain tense and unstable, due to numerous mutual claims, historical contradictions, territorial disputes and disputes over natural resources. The presence of internal conflicts in both countries creates prerequisites for their interference in each other's internal affairs, which is a long-term risk.

^{Nichols Ryan.} 1 DDR in Sudan: Too Little, Too Late? (Report of The Small Arms Survey (Geneva, Switzerland) series "The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HBSA)", N 24), February 2011, p. 20 - http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SWP-24-DDR JS in-Sudan. pdf

^{Zhukov A. E.} 2 Characteristics of the arms market of the Republic of Sudan. Journal of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies. 2009, No. 6 (November/December), p. 19.

³ Ibid., p. 20.

^{Kudrov E. A.} 4 Politicheskie protsessy v Sudanii posle gosudarstvennogo perevorota 1989 g. Dis. ... kand. polit. nauk [Political processes in Sudan after the coup d'etat of 1989]. Moscow, Institute of Asian and African Countries, Moscow State University, 2009, pp. 75-79.

^VieiraJ.S. 5 Sudan President Makes First Call for Independence // Reuters, October 31, 2009 - http://www.rcuters.com/article/id USTRE59U1FT20091031

^{Amum Pagan.} 6 Why Sudan is a Failed State // Southern Eye, 29 September - 4 October, 2008.

⁷ SPLM-DC Accuses Blue Nile State of Arresting its Members // Sudan Tribune, 21.08.2009 - http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article32196

⁸ Sudan's Abyei Clashes Displace 113,000 People // UN Reports. Bloomberg, 17.06.2011 - http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-06-17/sudan-s-abyei-clashes-displace-113-000-peo ple-un-reports.html

⁹ Abyei joint committee appeals for increased humanitarian aid // Sudan Tribune. 7 February 2012 - http://www.sudantribune.com/Abyei-joint-corn mittee-appeals-for,41537

¹⁰ Ibidem.

¹¹ Sudan says taking some South Sudan oil but won't close pipe // Reuters News. 15 January 2012. - http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/01/15/uk-sudan-south-oil-idUKTR E80E0KQ20120115

¹² South Sudan shuts down its oil production countrywide // Sudan Tribube. 20 January 2012 - http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-shuts-down-its-oil,41353

¹³ Sudan closer to war than peace with south: Bashir // AFP, 3 February 2012 - http://news.yahoo.com/sudan-closer-war-peace-south-bashir-185951317.html

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