Keywords: Namibia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, national reconciliation, democracy

When Zimbabwe and Namibia achieved independence and a new, democratic government was established in South Africa, these countries inherited systems of acute inequality. This inequality permeated all structures of the social, economic, cultural, administrative and political spheres, and thus all structures of power. An extremely difficult and huge task for the leadership of the national liberation movements (NL), which had just emerged from the situation of the liberation war, was to correct and change the inhumane systems of legalized violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

One of the most difficult aspects that required immediate political intervention was ensuring the unity of the people and preserving the territorial integrity of these young States. This was due to the fact that the colonial and apartheid regimes, especially in Namibia and South Africa, deliberately institutionalized the bantustan system on the principle of "Divide and rule", where people were forcibly divided into different races, ethnic groups and tribes, and lived separately, with differently graded social, economic, educational and cultural values. cultural benefits.

The philosophy of racial segregation and the separate development of these colonial and apartheid regimes had as its main goal to sow and incite hatred between racial and ethnic groups. During the War of independence in these three countries, the warring parties recruited supporters from every population group.

According to the Prime Minister of Namibia and Vice-President of SWAPO, Hage Geingob*, " when SWAPO decided to promote reconciliation, its main goal was to carry out preparatory work for establishing peace and harmony in a country that was ravaged by long years of war. It was an attempt to heal the wounds caused by hatred between blacks and whites, between father and son, and between families.

Many people remember that it was not unusual for one member of the family to be a member of Kufut** and another to be a freedom and independence fighter in the SWAPO ranks... Only an attempt at reconciliation could restore peace and harmony at various levels of our society. We didn't see any other alternative."¹

In order to succeed in healing wounds and create an atmosphere of unity, stability and socio-economic development, this situation required a constructive conciliatory approach after independence and majority rule.

Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) immediately saw the danger posed by the colonial legacy and the urgent need to address it after the country's independence in 1980. He proclaimed national reconciliation with whites and all former enemies.

He stated: "If yesterday I fought with you as an enemy, today you have become a friend and ally, with the same national interests, loyalty, rights and responsibilities as I have. ...Let us do our best to learn the lesson that history teaches us, namely that oppression and racism are inequalities that should never occur in our political and social system. This approach can never be correct: whites oppressed us yesterday when they had power, and today blacks should oppress them because now they have power. Evil

For article 1, "Namibia: SWAPO in the struggle for independence", see: Asia and Africa Today. 2014, N 5.

* He has been nominated as a candidate for the presidency of Namibia, with elections to be held in November 2014.

** Then the most famous special paramilitary group, officially called the colonial regime as a counterinsurgency unit of the South-West African police.

evil remains, whether it is practiced by white against black or by black against white. " ²

Mugabe assured the white community that there would be no reprisals or revenge, and that reconciliation would be the guiding principle of State policy from now on.

In his inaugural address on April 18, 1980, Mugabe promised reconciliation between blacks and whites. It also reflected the desire of all black communities to participate fully in the new structure of the country. Independence meant the end of all forms of discrimination based on race, tribe, gender, and religion.

When Namibia achieved independence a decade later, SWAPO also proclaimed national reconciliation. In his inaugural address on March 21, 1990, President Sam Nujoma noted that " the independence of Namibia was achieved with national consensus and international unanimity. Now that the country is in our own hands, this means, among other things, greater efforts to shape national identity, reconciliation and unity. Our collective security and prosperity depend on our unity of purpose, action and reconciliation... Unity is a precondition for peace and development. " ³

The same policy of reconciliation was announced in South Africa when apartheid was dismantled in 1994 and a new democratic system emerged under the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC). The first president of democratic South Africa, Nelson Mandela, speaking at the inauguration, said:"...The moment has come to bridge the chasm that divides us. It's time for the wounds to heal. We are entering into a pact to build a society in which all South Africans, black and white alike, will be able to walk with their heads held high without fear in their hearts, confident of their inalienable right to human dignity. " ⁴

I believe, however, that national reconciliation is not sufficient, and even meaningless, if it is not carried out in an inclusive and result-oriented democratic space. Although it requires that all citizens should enjoy equality, protection and security before the law. It is also necessary for everyone to demonstrate honesty, loyalty, patriotism and a willingness to contribute to building a common national state.

In this regard, Thabo Mbeki, the former President of South Africa, quite correctly stated that "in each of our nation-states, we must work to educate and cultivate common sense of statehood and common patriotism. Our nation-states are formed as societies of diversity. It is therefore important to make conscious and sustained interventions to give practical expression to the principle and concept of achieving unity in diversity. " ⁵

In my opinion, however, it is fundamental that national reconciliation should not only mean efforts to create harmony between races, blacks and whites, ethnic groups, etc. and end there, but most importantly-it should also extend to economic resources, to material well-being, especially for the previously disadvantaged majority of the African masses.

Equity in access to social, economic and cultural resources, including social security and employment, should therefore be the guiding principle of reconciliation.

All citizens, including former enemies, should be free to participate in governance processes, as well as in political activities that affect their lives and the lives of their children and future generations.

Suffice it to emphasize that the achievement of independence or majority rule and democracy in these three countries was made possible not only by armed struggle and political pressure from the masses, but also by settlement negotiations.

At a critical moment when the ANC was discussing constitutional principles and various scenarios before entering into direct negotiations with the apartheid regime in the framework of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), the late Kader Asmal noted that "in the event of a violent overthrow or popular uprising, a new constitution would be imposed on the winner's terms. However, if the constitution is created through negotiations, it will obviously contain mutual concessions and compromises, which are an integral part of negotiations. " ⁶

CHALLENGES OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND BROAD DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION

Henning Melber, a political analyst and researcher in Southern Africa, correctly notes when it comes to Namibia that when independence was achieved under a negotiated settlement, where mutual concessions were more often than not the main criterion, "the structural legacy of settler colonialism remained alive." ⁷ This observation also applies to the process of achieving independence in Zimbabwe and the new democratic structure in South Africa. This has created one of the main obstacles to the implementation of deep structural changes in political culture, which are necessary for radical socio-economic transformations.

Obviously, given these circumstances, these multi-faceted and complex interrelated processes often recreate vested interests. The original goals of the NOD, formulated during the years of the liberation struggle and requiring radical social transformations, are either discredited or completely removed after independence as a result of neoliberal influences. This development of events plays in favor of the newly emerging various class interests in the ranks of former revolutionaries-fighters for national liberation.

These circumstances, rather,

sooner rather than later, they create fertile ground for the emergence of a nationalist political elite, whose class interests correspond and merge with the interests of former colonial rulers. These new nationalist elites seek to protect their new class interests through the tools and laws that until recently were resorted to by colonial regimes.

President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF leadership have been particularly blamed and sharply criticized for initiating and implementing some very restrictive laws. Two of them caused widespread indignation among the population, especially "civil society" - the Law on Public Order and Security (POSA)* and the Law on Access to Information and Protection of Privacy (AIP-PA)**.

Since its adoption in 2002, the CPA has been perceived as a tool used by the Government to detain, intimidate, and harass pro-democracy activists, such as trade union leaders, students, and civil society activists.

Critics argue that the government hastily passed these two bills, which significantly restricted civil liberties: "The PCA expanded the government's remand powers. All this was done on the eve of the 2002 presidential election. " ⁸

Civil society leaders, who have consistently called for the repeal of the decree, claimed that in just one year after it came into force, several thousand citizens were illegally arrested and detained. They argued that this number was significantly higher than the number of arrests made under the Law and Order Act, a precursor to the POSA used by the colonial regime of Ian Smith in the late 1970s, at a time when the country was at war.⁹

These legislative acts have caused great disappointment and discontent in the ranks of the former liberation movement, which may negatively affect the confidence of the broad masses in the party and its leadership. Welshman Nkube of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), who now heads the splinter faction - MDC-N, even said that "these two bills, taken together, complete the transition from a form of democracy to a total dictatorship and a fascist state."¹⁰

Some leaders, in an attempt to prevent open discussion of policies and critical issues and to prevent broad majority participation in the governance process, develop tendencies to suppress the will of the people.

In November 2004, this trend was reflected in ZANU-PF when President Mugabe decided to block the candidacy of Emmerson Mnangagwa, who was running for the position of Vice President of ZANU-PF and the country.

Although Mnangagwa received the support of 6 out of 10 ZANU-PF provincial organizations, Mugabe promptly took action against those members of the leadership who tried to exercise their right to democratically nominate a candidate of their choice. He suspended the duties of all six ZANU-PF provincial organization chairs who attended the meeting in Tsholotsho township, where Mnangagwa's support was confirmed. Mnangagwa was also removed as the party's administrative secretary-effectively the party's general Secretary. The Tsholot Sho Saga continues to affect ZANU-PF's succession and internal policies today.

The main political rivals in Zimbabwe's elections since 2000 are ZANU-PF and the opposition MDC party, which split into two factions in 2005. Among other reasons, there were disputes over whether to run for the Senate by splitting into the Movement for Democratic Change - Tsvangi-Rai (MDC-T), a larger faction still led by Morgan Tsvangirai, and

Movement for Democratic Change-Mutambara (MDC-M) led by Arthur Mutambara, who was then replaced by Welshman Nkube, and it became known as MDC-N.

Opponents of President Mugabe argue that although in 2008, for the first time since its emergence as a new opposition party, the MDC, in terms of both its formations, officially managed to win more votes than the ruling ZANU-PF, the election results were not sufficient to bring about the change of power that the MDC and its allies had hoped for external patrons. One of the examples cited is the unclear outcome of the first round of presidential elections in March 2008, in which no candidate managed to achieve an undisputed victory.

During the 2008 elections, when both the President and Parliament were elected simultaneously, President Mugabe lost control of Parliament for the first time since independence in 1980. MDC-T won 99 seats, while ZANU-PF won 97. The MDC-M splinter faction won 10 seats, and an independent candidate won 1 place.

It was alleged that the electoral campaign leading up to the second round of presidential elections scheduled for June 2008 was characterized by unprecedented violence, which forced M. Tsvangirai to withdraw his candidacy. Violence was also noted during the elections, but they "took place anyway-with one candidate, the incumbent president, who was declared the winner" ¹¹.

It is important to note that prior to March 2008, South African President T. Mbeki, the facilitator for the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and his team helped create the conditions for holding parliamentary and presidential elections in Zimbabwe, which were agreed upon by all parties. Thus, the second round of elections was held under new conditions. This in itself was the first real step towards a political settlement after years of harsh criticism of the Government and ZANU-PF over electoral violence.

* Public Order and Security Act [POSA] of 2002.

** Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act [AIPPA] of 2002.

*** The author witnessed this while serving as the Namibian Ambassador to Zimbabwe.

Thabo Mbeki and his colleagues in the Government have worked quietly but persistently on behalf of SADC for a political solution to the crisis in Zimbabwe. Although Mbeki faced a barrage of criticism for being "too soft" on Mugabe, he often expressed a willingness to promote a compromise between the government and opposition in Zimbabwe, but did not allow himself to be convinced of the need to seek regime change. Mbeki "strongly demanded that the MDC agree to recognize Robert Mugabe as President of Zimbabwe and recognize the results of the 2002 presidential election, which has been one of the most important outstanding issues all along." ¹²

Mbeki's mediation led to the signing of a document known as the Global Political Agreement (GPA) on 15 September 2008 by ZANU-PF, IBC-T and IBC-M leaders in the presence of SADC leaders.

The main goal of the negotiations between these parties and the signing of the GPA was to try to solve the problems that the country was facing. After many months of difficult negotiations and delays, the parties reached an agreement on the formation of an"inclusive government".

It is important to note that in this Agreement, the parties, among other things, "declared their commitment and determination to build a society free from violence, fear, intimidation, hatred, patronage, corruption and based on justice, honesty, dignity and equality. They recognized and agreed that the land issue was at the center of the struggle in Zimbabwe, and in this regard, while differing views on the methodology of land acquisition and redistribution, they recognized that the mandatory acquisition and redistribution of land took place in accordance with the land reform program adopted starting in 2000."¹³

In addition, the parties acknowledged that, pursuant to the resolution of the SADC Emergency Summit in Dar es Salaam ¹⁴ 28-29 March 2007, which called for a dialogue between the Government and the opposition and instructed T. Mbeki to facilitate this dialogue, they discussed and agreed on Draft Law No. 18 to the Constitution of Zimbabwe, amendments to the laws - on elections, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, public order and security, access to information and privacy, and broadcasting services.

The GPA stipulated that executive power in an inclusive Government would be delegated and shared between the President, Prime Minister and Cabinet, as stipulated in the new amendments to the Constitution and legislation. The GPA included as one of its most important provisions a joint demand that "all measures and sanctions against Zimbabwe be lifted to facilitate a sustainable solution to the problems facing Zimbabwe" ^.15

Returning to the 2008 elections, it is enough to recall that repeated threats on the eve of the elections by ZANU-PF and statements by the security forces that "the results not in favor of ZANU-PF will be set aside, led to a further escalation of tension before the elections" ¹⁶.

According to Sue Onslow, senior researcher at the University of London's Commonwealth Studies Institute, ZANU-PF's actions offer important parallels and insights into the challenges facing the three former Southern African liberation movements as ruling parties in these three countries. "These general aspects include the importance of the individual, and the ethnic and tribal politics that helped shape liberation movements during the struggle for independence." ¹⁷

It is also necessary to point out the important legacy of the emphasis on solidarity, which sometimes replaces and conceals the need for internal discussion and open discussion, a trend that is rooted in ZANU-PF and SWAPO. In addition, the role of armed struggle and the culture of life in exile continues to have a lasting impact.

These relationships and experiences have shaped a political culture that continues to play out in the domestic political arena even after independence. "Since 2000

The struggle in Zimbabwe is a "battle for the state," and this battle continues in present-day Zimbabwe. Onslow ¹⁸.

He identifies several stages of the country's political development since independence in 1980 and states that the process of centralization of power took place in "stop-start" phases: "First, the period of 1980-1987, which led to the unity agreement in 1987, after which the PF-ZAPU was absorbed by ZANU-PF.PF. This period of an almost one-party state dominated the political scene until 1999 and ended with the emergence of the MDC. In the third phase after 2000, ZANU-PF maintained its dominance by reorganizing State power and attempting to manipulate the Constitution and electoral process until the signing of the GPA in September 2008. " ¹⁹

The Inclusive Government was finally formed in February 2009. And the economy has been growing steadily for four years: in 2009 GDP grew by 5.8%, 8.1% in 2010, 9.3% ⁱⁿ 2011,20 and 4.4% ^{in 2012,21}

Positive developments were also demonstrated on 31 July 2013 in the country's presidential and parliamentary elections, which were variously described by African regional observers as "fairly fair" (the representative of the African Union), "generally reliable" and "the will of the people was sufficiently expressed" (SADC observers).

The election was clearly won by President Mugabe, who received 61% of the vote, compared to 33.94% for Tsvangirai of the MDC-T. Welshman Nkube of MDC-N received 2.68%. "In the parliamentary elections, ZANU-PF won 197 seats out of 270, MDC-T-70 and MDC-N - 2 seats, one member of Parliament - independent"²². Only three parties are represented in the current Parliament. The results of the July 2013 elections put an end to the joint rule of ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations.

ZANU-PF effectively used the period of joint rule to consolidate its party structures and systems. He also took advantage of

disagreements between and within opposition parties. On the other hand, the MDC-T has allowed its party structures to degenerate, while at the same time ignoring work in electoral districts. In particular, local self-government bodies headed by the Minister from MDS-T were tainted by corruption and characterized by poor provision of goods and services. These are some of the factors that led to the defeat of the opposition. In the MDC-T, disagreements between Tsvangirai and the party's Secretary-General Tendai Biti have intensified, which have already led to their mutual removal from office.

Even though these elections in Zimbabwe were declared free and fair by African observers, the European Union and other Western countries were still reluctant to accept the reality. They continued to show bias and double standards, and hesitated to lift the sanctions they had imposed on Zimbabwe.

ZANU-PF and the Government have clearly regained ground lost after the adoption of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) ' s disruptive neoliberal macroeconomic policies in the form of the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) in 1996, which was later complicated by the accelerated land reform initiated by the Government in 2000.

Often, political processes and changes in these countries are hindered by the tendency of leaders of former liberation movements, who believe that their coming to power is an indisputable sacred right. They try to convince the public that their legitimacy to rule without competition with limited or controlled democratic participation "stems from their emergence in the decolonization process as democratically elected representatives of the majority of the people" ^.23

Such political developments have also led to claims that some leaders of former liberation movements have developed a " militant notion of inclusion or exclusion as factors in shaping their post-colonial national identities."²⁴. It is argued that under such circumstances, "the concept of national reconciliation, which was first used after independence, and slogans such as 'unity in diversity', give way to a 'politically correct' form of identity defined by those in power along the narrow lines of 'we-they' or 'with us-against us' ^.25

These tendencies are particularly evident through political sycophancy and nepotism, which often go hand in hand with covering up widespread corrupt deals, sometimes involving those in power.

Recognizing the intoxicating influence of the surrounding sycophants, Hage Geingob noted that " there may be attempts by the presidential entourage to call the president to be a super-president."²⁶. Cringing may be reflected in their desire to promote the omnipotence of the presidency.

There is no doubt that many forces then engaged in the struggle on the side of the liberation movement in these three countries rightly "expected that the end result of the struggle would require democracy as the foundation of a solid political system"²⁷, a process that would bring about genuine socio-economic development and participatory democracy. But it is also clear that this may not have been the conviction of some high-ranking NOD leaders.

For most of the leading figures in the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and Namibia, it was not participatory democracy that was the priority agenda, but independence and majority rule. Although it should be noted that some undemocratic tendencies and practices come from the culture and traditions that were objectively acquired by the liberation movements during the long war of liberation.

At that time, the leadership of these movements had to operate within the framework of military command structures, and the direction of the liberation struggle was based on military discipline and unquestionable respect for the orders of the leader. This was an objective necessity, otherwise the liberation struggle cannot be crowned with success.

That is why there is a growing recognition that the struggle for liberation, conducted by armed means and in underground conditions, was not suitable for the spread of Western-style liberal democracy. The forms of resistance in the struggle were themselves organized along hierarchical and authoritarian lines, and such conditions were not suitable for the creation of democratic systems of government in the post-independence period.

In this sense, the new societies carried with them the basic elements of the old system. Therefore, it is not surprising that aspects of the colonial system reproduced themselves in the struggle for its abolition and subsequently in the concept of governance applied in postcolonial conditions.

The traditions and practices of emigration were preserved in the Government when these liberation movements became the ruling parties. It is clear that the former leaders of the SPLM-ZANU-PF, SWAPO, and ANC-in-exile sometimes found it difficult to switch to open democratic practices in accordance with the requirements of constitutions that they adopted under conditions of compromise. It is not in the tradition of the revolutionary movement, which waged a brutal and prolonged war of liberation, to establish and be guided by the Western liberal system of checks and balances, since it is the antithesis of this struggle.

In this regard, Edgar Thekere * noted: "By praising Mugabe as we did at the time of independence, we forgot to create institutional mechanisms that would ensure that the party was strengthened by collective leadership, democratic discourse, commitment to the principles that fueled our struggle for independence, and accountability. In the absence of such data,

* E. Tekere was one of the leaders of ZANU-PF, but was expelled and formed the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZOOM) party.

"any of us, not just Mugabe, could lose course and become a virtual dictator, supported by the current combination of political and economic patronage, and the threat of state brutality, if anyone dares to challenge the powers that be." ²⁸

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, PROBLEMS OF RACE RELATIONS

Some leaders of former liberation movements continue to pursue imaginary threats of white conspiracies, the possibility of a return to colonialism, apartheid, and threats from mysterious but ubiquitous third forces.

Despite noble statements about the strategic policy of national reconciliation and unity in diversity, some leaders of former NODS are still reluctant to include qualified members of previously prosperous groups of society in the processes of socio-economic development. Such attitudes and practices are rooted in the legacy of racial and ethnic divisions and hatred during colonialism and apartheid.

But not all former NODE leaders have become vulnerable to this hate syndrome. Fully aware of the importance of unity, peace and stability in the country after many years of the apartheid regime, which arrogantly separated blacks from whites, and aware of the qualifications needed to transform and rebuild the country in a democratic way with the participation of all, T. Mbeki said:: "White people in this country have a specific commitment. You have the knowledge and experience. We cannot build this country without this knowledge, without these skills, without this experience. And we want you to take the lead in creating a new South Africa. We do not think it is right that the majority should oppress the minority. " ²⁹

Khalema Motlante, then deputy president of the ANC, complained and reprimanded Julius Malema, then president of the ANC Youth League, for criticizing the dominance of certain racial minorities in a number of ministries. Motlante said: "If we raise issues crudely, we ourselves reinforce conservative and even racist views among people. If you say that we cannot include people of color, whites, Indians, or other people who have the necessary qualifications and experience in the government, then you are sending us back many years. " ³⁰

Under normal circumstances, the successful implementation of transformation and development programs will require the retention of old and experienced, of course, patriotic civil servants. This is necessary, especially where there are not enough qualified black people to fill the gap.

In this regard, Motlante stated: "It's important that the country understands that we need the best available talent to come forward, because many people don't even apply for jobs because they are members of other political parties,"he said.³¹. But this state-building, transformation and development processes are not only a problem of the APK. All citizens should know that they have an equal chance of being appointed to a position that requires the skills and experience they possess, and they should also commit to serving to the best of their abilities, regardless of who the political leader is.

Motlante stressed: "The ANC (this also applies to ZANU-PF and SWAPO. - Ed.) must know and understand that the transformation of the apartheid state must soon reach the point where we seek out and reach out to professionals independently, and without a doubt this merit-based approach must go beyond the professional classes and include all other skilled workers. " ³²

Inclusive reconstruction, transformation and development programmes in these countries can only be implemented in conditions of genuine national reconciliation, peace and stability.

^{Geingob H.G.} 1 Цит. по: Re-examining Liberation in Namibia: Political Culture Since Independence / Ed. Henning Melber. Nordiska Africainstitutet. 2003, p. 70 - 71.

^{Mugabe R.} 2 Statement at independence in 1980. Address to the Nation, 4 March 1980. Zimbabwe Department of Information.

^{Nujoma S.} 3 Inaugural Statement, 21 March 1990.

^{Mandela N.} 4 Inaugural Statement, 27 April 1994.

^{Mbeki T.} 5 Tasks of the African Progressive Movement // The Thinker Magazine, South Africa. January 2014.

^{Asmal K.} 6 Politics in My Blood. Jacana Media, 2011, p. 108 - 109. The late K. Asmal was a prominent leader of the anti-apartheid movement, a member of the ANC and a minister in the ANC Government.

^{Melber H.} 7 Re-examining Liberation in Namibia.., p. 13 - 14.

⁸ Limits to Liberation in Southern Africa: The Unfinished Business of Democratic Consolidation. HSRC Press [JCRS], 2003, p. 40.

⁹ Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, a Memorandum presented to the Zimbabwe Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs on 25th February 2003.

^{Ncube W.} 10 Limits to Liberation in Southern Africa.., p. 40.

¹¹ EISA Observer Report, 2008, p. XIII.

^{Mbeki T.} 12 Dialogue between ZANU-PF and MDC - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Thabo

¹³ Global Political Agreement [GPA] for Zimbabwe 2008.

¹⁴ См.: SADC Extra-Ordinary Summit. Dar es Salaam, 28 - 29 March 2007.

¹⁵ GPA 2008.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. XIV.

^{Onlslow S.} 17 Zimbabwe and the Political Transition. March 2001, p. 1.

¹⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 1 - 2.

²⁰ See: Global Finance, 2012.

²¹ Zimbabwe GDP Annual Growth Rate, 2012.

²² See: My Zimbabwe, 2013.

²³ Cit. по: Re-examining Liberation in Namibia.., p. 10.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 10 - 11.

²⁵ Ibidem.

^{Geingob H.G.} 26 Constitutional Democracy in Namibia: A Critical Analysis after Two Decades. Macmillan Education Namibia, 2010, p. 105.

²⁷ Re-examining Liberation in Namibia.., p. 14.

^{Tekere E.} 28 "2 Boy" Z. A Lifetime of Struggle. SAPES Books. 2006, p. 179.

²⁹ The Sunday Times [London] Rich List, 2008.

^{Motlanthe K.A.} 30 Political Biography. Jacana Media [Pty] Ltd. 2012, p. 314.

³¹ Ibid., p. 335.

³² Ibid., p. 239.

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