The article substantiates the thesis that the countries of East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) are currently in the Malthusian trap and should make some efforts to get out of it. Particular attention is paid to demographic indicators and the specifics of urban processes, in particular, to such risk factors as the "youth hillock" and the rapid growth of the urban population predicted by the UN.

Keywords: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, East Africa, demography, Malthusian trap, economy, socio-political instability.

EAST AFRICA AND THE MALTHUSIAN TRAP

The Malthusian trap is a fairly typical situation in pre-industrial societies, in which population growth outstrips the growth of subsistence production, making it impossible to increase per capita consumption (and improve living standards) in the long run. Accordingly, the majority of the population continues to exist at the level of starvation survival (Malthus, 1978 (1798); Artzrouni and Komlos, 1985; Steinmann, Prskawetz, Feichtinger, 1998; Wood, 1998). In complex pre-industrial societies, the Malthusian trap was one of the main generators of socio-political upheavals (see, for example, [Chu and Lee, 1994; Nefedov, 2004; Turchin, 2003; Turchin and Korotayev, 2006]). Sub-Saharan Africa is practically the only region in the world where "Malthusian traps" can still be observed, due to the extremely high population growth rates that persist in many countries of this region by world standards. Let's look at how relevant this situation is for East African countries.

In Tanzania, the population doubled from 7.9 million to 16.6 million in just 26 years, from 1950 to 1976. However, over the same period, the country's GDP has more than tripled. Thanks to economic growth that has consistently outpaced population growth, Tanzania's per capita GDP has grown almost 1.5 times over the years, from $ 424 to $ 625. 1 Moreover, in the last few years of this favorable period, Tanzania has managed to make a huge leap in the increase in per capita food consumption - if it was at the same level throughout the 1960s. at the level of approximately 1,700 kcal per person per day (the level of catastrophic malnutrition on the verge of starvation), then in 1970-1976 it was increased to more than 2,200 kcal, which was still lower than the WHO norm

1 International dollars of 1990 are used hereafter. Jiri-Hamisi at purchasing power parity.

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(2300-2400 kcal per person per day) [Naiken, 2002, p. 4], but indicated a radical improvement in the situation and an attempt by the country to get out of the Malthusian trap.

However, in the mid-1970s, Tanzanian economic growth passed the "inflection point"; the country's economy entered a period of crisis.2 In 1976-1985, GDP grew by only 10% 3, while the population grew by 30% over the same period; as a result, per capita GDP fell from $ 625 to $ 530, and food consumption stopped growing, never reaching the WHO norm. Some improvement in the economy was observed in 1985-1990, but then the rate of economic growth again fell below the rate of population growth. Against this background, Tanzania experienced a dramatic drop in per capita food consumption , from 2,240 kcal in 1989 to a catastrophic 1,900 kcal in 1997.

In the second half of the 1990s, the Tanzanian economy was able to achieve a steady growth trajectory - from 1995 to the present, the growth rate of Tanzanian GDP has never fallen below the rate of population growth; even in the crisis of 2009. they made up more than 6%. Moreover, by global standards, the average annual growth rate of Tanzanian GDP is very high (6-8% per year on average over the past 10 years). Factors of Tanzanian economic growth, such as international financial assistance, a marked increase in the flow of foreign direct investment, increased labor productivity (as well as increased investment in physical capital since the early 2000s), are discussed in detail in [Treichel, 2005; World Bank, 2007; Nord et al., 2009]. However, these outstanding economic achievements have so far failed to restore even the level of food consumption in 1976, let alone reach the WHO norm — since 1995, this figure has increased by only 150 kcal and in 2007 amounted to 2,030 kcal per person per day.

The dynamics of average per capita consumption in Tanzania during the period under review is generally a classic picture of an unsuccessful attempt to get out of the Malthusian trap. Until 1972, the population was on the verge of starvation due to the fact that the population growth rate was extremely high and outstripped the economic growth rate. In the early 1970s, Tanzania actually attempted to break out of the trap, and average per capita consumption began to increase, but since the mid-1970s, the population growth rate of Tanzania has again begun to overtake the economic growth rate, and the level of per capita consumption is falling, the country is "sliding" back into the Malthusian trap. Since 1997, Tanzania's second attempt to escape the Malthusian trap has been observed, but it is still difficult to call it successful: per capita consumption has not come close to the WHO norm, but has not even reached the level of 1976.

Kenya shows similar dynamics in many ways. As in Tanzania, between 1950 and 1976, the population doubled and GDP production tripled; consequently, per capita GDP increased by one and a half times, from $ 650 to $ 950. At the same time, it should be noted that per capita GDP in Kenya was generally higher than in Tanzania. This also affected food consumption in 1960. Kenya has already reached the WHO norm, and during the 1960s and 1980s, this figure, although not significantly increased, fluctuated at the level of 2,300 kcal per capita per day.

2 This crisis was caused by several factors of a different nature. Thus, the collapse of the East African Union had a significant negative impact on Tanzania's foreign trade [World Bank 2002, p. 12]. In addition, by the end of the 1970s, the value of Tanzania's oil imports had doubled compared to the value in the mid-1970s (although in 1974 the value of oil imports had already increased 3 times compared to the beginning of the 1970s). In 1979, the country's resources were also depleted by the war with Uganda. The country's agriculture sector suffered from several severe droughts during this period.

3, or $ 1 billion; for comparison, in the previous ten-year period, 1966-1975, when Tanzania experienced fairly steady economic growth, GDP increased by more than 56%, or $ 3 billion.

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Figure 1. Dynamics of per capita food consumption in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, 1961-2007, kcal per day

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization 2012

However, starting in the mid-1970s, Kenyan economic growth began to slow down more and more , largely for the same reasons as in Tanzania (see above). Over three decades (1980-2010), Kenya's GDP grew 2.7 times, and its growth was literally "eaten up" by population growth (2.5 times). GDP per capita actually stopped growing at that time and fluctuated between $ 1,000 and $ 1,100. This has also affected food consumption , falling from 2,380 kcal per person per day in 1978 to 1,900 kcal in 1993. In the future, this indicator increased slightly and throughout the 2000s fluctuated in the range of 2000-2100 kcal per person per day, which is a very low level. The dynamics of per capita food consumption in Kenya, as well as in Tanzania, also fully corresponds to the classical Malthusian scenario described above.

In Uganda, per capita consumption was the most prosperous of all the countries under consideration in the 1960s - it was 2,300 kcal in 1960 and rose to 2,400 kcal by the early 1970s, i.e. the country was quite successfully emerging from the Malthusian trap. However, the positive trend of steady growth in per capita consumption was interrupted by Idi Amin's coup d'etat in 1971. As a result of a sharp increase in government spending on the maintenance of the army and the purchase of weapons, social spending was cut. The surge in the cost of oil imports in the mid-1970s was a major blow. Political and economic instability have become a serious obstacle to the growth of labor productivity in agriculture. As a result of the combined impact of these factors, the per capita consumption of food products is-

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Food production in Uganda fell from 2,420 kcal in 1972 to 2,030 kcal in 1980. After Amin's ouster, Uganda's per capita food consumption began to rise again, but it was again interrupted by political instability (see Figure 1). The steady growth of this indicator resumed with the establishment of the Museveni regime in 1986 , from 2,060 kcal to 2,330 kcal per person per day in 1990. Thus, by the beginning of the 90s of the XX century. Uganda managed to confidently reach the level of 2250-2300 kcal, which corresponds to the WHO norm. Throughout the 1990s, the country maintained this level (but it was not able to restore the doamine level of 2,400 kcal per person per day). It is very worrying that since the early 2000s, despite steady growth in per capita GDP, per capita food consumption has been slowly but steadily declining, falling from 2,300 kcal in 2000 to 2,200 kcal in 2007.

Thus, it can be seen that all three countries considered already attempted to escape the Malthusian trap in the 1960s, but failed as a result of the deteriorating economic (in the case of Uganda - and internal political) conditions. Uganda emerged from a food consumption slump after Museveni came to power in 1986, but this figure stopped growing in the early 1990s. Kenya was able to stop the decline in per capita food consumption only in the mid-1990s, Tanzania - in the late 1990s.

On the whole, the situation cannot be called favorable - none of the three countries managed to restore their maximum values of this indicator, reached in the early 1970s. Kenya and Tanzania were able to achieve an increase in per capita food consumption only in the second half of the 2000s, but it increased by only 100 kcal, does not reach the WHO norm and leaves the situation with food supply in these countries very threatening. As for Uganda, which has made the most notable gains, there is concern about the downward trend in per capita consumption (already at the lower end of the WHO norm) that began in the 2000s.

Accordingly, it can be argued that Kenya and Tanzania, in the wake of the achieved sustainable economic growth, are now beginning to make a second attempt to get out of the Malthusian trap. Uganda, slightly ahead of its neighbors, made a second attempt quite successfully in the late 1980s, but now, if the decline in per capita food consumption cannot be stopped, the country is in danger of falling back into the trap.

Addressing this issue should be a priority for the Governments of these countries as part of ensuring socio-political stability, especially given the continued rapid population growth. According to the average UN forecast, the population of Kenya will grow from 40.5 million in 2010 to 97 million by 2050 (2.5 times), Tanzania-from 44.8 million to 138.3 million (three times), Uganda - from 33.4 million to 94.2 million (three times) [UN Population Division. World Population Prospects, 2012].

To successfully escape the Malthusian trap, Kenya and Tanzania need to increase their per capita food consumption to at least the WHO norm, and Uganda needs to stop the decline in consumption and return to the WHO norm (and even better, if all three countries can exceed it). The basis for improving the situation with per capita food consumption should be sustainable economic growth that consistently outstrips population growth. To do this, it is necessary to significantly reduce the birth rate and achieve sustained economic growth that outstrips population growth; otherwise, Kenya and Tanzania will probably not be able to get out of the Malthusian trap, and Uganda risks falling back into it, which will significantly increase the risks of socio-political instability in these countries.

Let's look at the current situation and prospects of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in this regard, and how they can achieve these goals most effectively.

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REDUCING THE BIRTH RATE AS THE MAIN CONDITION FOR GETTING OUT OF THE MALTHUSIAN TRAP

Let's look at the historical and forecast dynamics of the birth rate in the above-mentioned East African countries (see Figure 2). In all three countries, during the entire period under review (1960-2010), it was and remains very high at the global level, but its dynamics in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are very different. When studying the birth rate dynamics in these countries, it is necessary to pay attention to such an important factor as the distribution of primary education, especially among girls. There are numerous studies that prove the importance of increasing girls ' primary education coverage for reducing the birth rate in Tropical Africa (see, for example: [Korotaev, Malkov, and Khalturina, 2007; Korotaev and Khalturina, 2010; Cochrane, 1979; Wheeler, 1980; Hollingsworth, 1996; McMichael, 2001; Bongaarts, 2003; Hannum, Buchmann, 2003]).

From 1960 to 1975, the birth rate in Tanzania was 6.8 children per woman and remained virtually unchanged, beginning to decline only in the mid-1970s. Interestingly, the beginning of its decline coincided with the launch of the Universal Primary Education Movement in Tanzania in 1974, aimed at ensuring universal access to compulsory primary education. The movement has been very successful: overall primary school enrollment has increased from 48% in 1976 to 70% in 1980 (World Bank, 2012). It is safe to assume that the success of the movement for universal primary education largely triggered the decline in the birth rate (of course, with a corresponding time lag). The decline in the birth rate accelerated markedly after the introduction of the new law in 1987. Family planning programs aimed at increasing the use of contraception in Tanzanian families [World Bank, 1999, p. 142].

Figure 2. Dynamics of the total fertility rate in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, number of children per woman, 1960-2010

Source: World Bank 2012

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However, after the abolition of free primary education in 1995, the decline in the total birth rate in Tanzania slowed significantly (again with some delay), and even stopped for a while .4 The abolition of free primary education, which was initially intended to ease the situation of the Tanzanian economy, had extremely serious negative consequences for the Tanzanian demography and social sphere. By 1998, the overall primary school enrolment rate had fallen to 62%; the primary school enrolment rate of the relevant age cohort had fallen from 68% in 1991 to 46% (i.e., less than half of school-age children) in 1998 [Davidson, 2004, p.14]. By the end of the 1990s, more than 3 million Tanzanian primary school-age children were out of school. It can be assumed with a high degree of confidence that the increase in the birth rate in 1997-2002 is largely due to the fact that girls from poor families who studied in the upper grades of primary school did not have the opportunity to continue their education, dropped out of school, got married and had children [Alonso i Terme, 2002, p. 5]5.

The Government abolished primary school fees in 2001, which led to a sharp increase in the number of first-graders from 1.1 million in 2001 to 1.6 million in 2002 [Sumra, 2003, p. 10]. The level of primary education coverage for children of the appropriate age also increased extremely rapidly: in 2000 it was 53%, while in 2008 it was 98% [World Bank, 2012]. The proportion of female students who are forced to drop out of school before graduation has significantly decreased. Valid if in 2000 (during the period of paid primary education) Only 56% of girls reached the final grade, but after the abolition of tuition fees, this figure rose to 92% by 2010 [World Bank, 2012]. However, the birth rate has not yet resumed its rapid decline, almost freezing at an extremely high level of 5.5-5.6 children per woman by world standards (more precisely, the decline is proceeding, but at a dangerously slow pace, as shown by UN forecasts); this means that the government urgently needs to adopt a system of effective measures to reduce the birth rate. In particular, the further spread of modern family planning practices can have a significant effect; indeed, in 2010, only 34.4% of married Tanzanian women aged 15-49 used them [World Bank, 2012].

Uganda has made significantly less progress in reducing the birth rate. From the beginning of the 1960s until the end of the 1990s, the birth rate remained consistently at an extremely high level-7-7.1 children per woman. Since the late 1990s, the birth rate began to decline steadily, but not very rapidly, and by 2010 it was 6.1 children per woman , one of the highest rates in the world. This lag is explained by several factors : the extremely difficult domestic political situation of the 1970s and the long period of recovery after that; the lack of free primary education until 1997 and, consequently, the low coverage of school-age children (especially girls) primary education; a still high percentage of students dropping out of primary school (as of 2010, only 56% of girls were completing their studies before the last grade of primary school-according to this indicator, Uganda is one of the most backward countries in the world) [World Bank, 2012]; low prevalence of family planning practices - the proportion of married women aged 15-49 years The proportion of women using contraception in Uganda in 2006 was only 23.7% (World Bank, 2012).

It should be noted that the birth rate in Uganda has been accelerating over the past 20 years, while in the early 1990s it was decreasing by about

4 At the same time, against the background of the growing proportion of women of childbearing age in the Tanzanian population, this has even led to a slight increase in the overall birth rate.

5 The effect of this factor continued with quite a natural delay until 2006, when girls who had not received primary education reached childbearing age.

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0.01 children per woman per year, then by the end of the 2000s-by 0.08 - 0.09 children per woman per year. Currently, of all three countries under review, Uganda's birth rate is falling the fastest. It seems that the effect of the introduction of free primary education has begun to play a significant role here, which will continue to manifest itself more and more strongly in the future (as an increasing percentage of girls entering the reproductive age will have a full primary education). However, given the extremely high (even by the standards of Tropical Africa) birth rate, the achieved rate of decline is not enough, it is still necessary to accelerate the decline in the birth rate, making targeted efforts to do so. It seems that there will be significant potential to increase the coverage of full primary education (in particular, the Government should consider a system of measures to prevent girls from dropping out of the education system before completing primary school), as well as the spread of family planning practices. In particular, there is a comparative study, which shows, for example, that Uganda's lagging behind Kenya in reducing the birth rate in the 1980s-1990s was explained by a noticeably lower distribution of contraceptives in Ugandan families compared to Kenyan ones [Blacker et al., 2005, p. 355-373].

During its period of independent development, Kenya has had the greatest success in reducing the birth rate among East African countries. At the same time, the" starting " birth rate in the 1960s in Kenya was even higher than in Tanzania or Uganda - more than 8 children per woman (6.8 and 7.0, respectively). The decline in the birth rate in Kenya began in the first half of the 1970s, gradually accelerating. This was facilitated by the spread of modern family planning practices in the country; for example, the number of health professionals trained in family planning doubled in 1981-1988, and the number of residents who used these practices tripled (from 100 thousand to 300 thousand) in just 4 years (1984-1988) [Robinson, Harbison, 1995, p. 90]. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the birth rate in Kenya fell at a record pace for this country- by almost 0.2 children per year.

However, then the decline in the birth rate in Kenya gradually began to slow down. The prevalence of contraception 6 continued to grow steadily (from 17% in 1984 to 27% in 1989, 32.7% in 1993, and 39% in 1998) [World Bank, 2012]. However, there was no other important factor in the decline in the birth rate - universal coverage of full primary education. Indeed, in 1974, the Kenyan Ministry of Education abolished primary school fees; this caused a sharp spike (by 1-2 million people) the number of primary school applicants. Schools, not being prepared for such an influx of students and trying to compensate for financial losses from the abolition of tuition fees, introduced a "building levy" for students, which was often even higher than the previous tuition fee [Sifuna, 2005, p. 4]. As a result, many students from poor families were forced to drop out of school, and education remained de facto paid.

In the late 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, the decline in the birth rate in Kenya actually stopped (it is characteristic that almost simultaneously the birth rate stagnated in Tanzania). Moreover, among Kenyans and Tanzanians without education, the birth rate even increased significantly during this period (from 6.5 children per woman in 1999 to 6.9 in 2004 in Tanzania and from 5.8 in 1998 to 6.7 in 2003 in Kenya) [Ezeh et al., 2009, p. 291]. The reason for the simultaneous stopping of the decline in the birth rate was, in all likelihood, the HIV epidemic/AIDS, which by this time had spread across East Africa (the epidemic itself began somewhat earlier, but its impact on the birth rate began to affect with some delay). So, for example, if in 1991/1992 the HIV incidence rate among women of reproductive age living in Dar Es-

6 Among married women aged 15-49.

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Salaam was 11.5% [Kapiga et. al., 1994], whereas in 1994/1995 it was already 18% [Bakari, 2000, p. 11]. The impact of the spread of HIV on fertility growth is due to a decrease in the prevalence of breastfeeding (and the associated so-called "lactation infertility"), as well as the compensatory birth of more children due to increasing infant mortality [Magadi and Anwanda, 2010, p. 335].

The birth rate in Kenya began to decline again only in the mid-2000s due to several factors: first, it was possible to stop the growth, and then significantly reduce the level of HIV incidence (from 10% in the late 1990s to 6.3% in the late 2000s)7 [World Bank, 2012]; the stalled rate was resumed distribution of contraception (in 1998-2003, 39% of married Kenyans used contraception, and by 2009 their share had increased to 45.5%) [World Bank, 2012]. Moreover, universal free primary education was introduced in 2003, which increased girls ' enrolment in full primary education - as early as 2005, 90% of Kenyan primary school students were reaching the last grade [World Bank, 2012].

According to the UN forecast, the total birth rate should decrease in Kenya from the current value of 4.62 children per woman to 2.89 in 2050, in Uganda - from 5.9 to 3.19, in Tanzania - from 5.5 to 3.61,respectively (while in all three countries, even with such a noticeable decrease, the birth rate in 2050 will be significantly higher than in the than is necessary for simple reproduction of the population). Governments will have to make the most serious efforts to achieve this result, and Uganda, as the most backward country, will need to pay particular attention to improving the enrolment of school-age girls in full primary education and promoting family planning among married women. Tanzania also needs to significantly intensify its efforts in this direction, as it is the most backward country in terms of birth rate decline among the three countries.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC PREREQUISITES FOR GETTING OUT OF THE MALTHUSIAN TRAP

Modernization of the agricultural sector is a necessary condition for East African countries to get out of the Malthusian trap. In 2010, Uganda ranked third in the world in terms of agricultural productivity since the end of the World War II ($200). per employee), Tanzania - 13th ($289), Kenya-15th ($351.8). At the same time, this indicator in these countries has practically not increased over the past 30 years-in 1980 it was $ 396. for Kenya and $ 196. for Uganda; in Tanzania in 1990 - $ 219. per employee employed in the agricultural sector 9. At the same time, extremely low-productivity and low-income agriculture employs the majority of the country's population-61% of Kenyans, 76.5% of Tanzanians, 65.6% of Ugandans. On the one hand, such a large share of employment in the agricultural sector is a negative indicator, indicating that the economy is not sufficiently diversified. On the other hand, low productivity in agriculture is the main cause of low incomes and malnutrition among rural populations; consequently, its targeted significant increase is a prerequisite for the successful exit of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda from the Malthusian trap10.

7 HIV prevalence among the population aged 15-49 years.

8 In constant US dollars 2000

9 For comparison, in 2005 this figure was $ 1,200 in Equatorial Guinea, $ 1,340 in Swaziland, $ 1,660 in Gabon, $ 2,100 in Egypt, $ 2,200 in Algeria, $ 2,600 in Russia and Iran, $ 3,400 in Syria, $ 3,500 in Belarus, $ 5,300 in Romania, and $ 1,300 in Malaysia . 5400, in Saudi Arabia 16 650, in Lebanon - 32 500, in France - 47 000 dollars. [World Bank, 2012]

10 Detailed consideration of ways to increase productivity in East African agriculture-from the necessary socio-economic conditions and prerequisites (dissemination of higher education in relevant specialties, support for innovators, diffusion and adaptation

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Figure 3. Urban population share,%, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda compared to other countries of the world, 2008

Source: World Bank, 2012

If countries manage to move forward on the path of intensifying agricultural production, modernizing agriculture (and getting out of the Malthusian trap), a large amount of labor will be released in rural areas. It is logical to assume that this part of the population is highly likely to migrate to cities in search of employment. Indeed, at present, the urban potential of all three countries is virtually unaffected, and rapid urban growth is very likely in the coming decades.

According to the World Bank, Uganda is one of the three least urbanized countries in the world (along with Burundi and Papua New Guinea) - only 13.3% of Ugandans lived in cities in 2010. The share of urban dwellers in Kenya and Tanzania was higher (22.2% and 26.4%, respectively), but they are also among the least urbanized countries in the world (see Figure 3).
The rapid growth of East African cities in the next 30-40 years (compared to the previous period) is also predicted by experts of the UN Population Bureau. Thus, according to the UN, over the 30-year period, from 1980 to 2010, the share of urban population in Kenya increased from 15.7% to 22.2% (i.e., by 7 percentage points), and in the next three decades it is projected to grow from 22.2% to 40.4% by 2040, i.e., by 18.2 percentage points. A similar pattern is observed in Uganda, where the share of the urban population increased from 7.5% to 15.2% (by 7.7 percentage points) in 1980-2010, and by 2040 it is projected that-

tsh technologies) up to specific innovations and technological findings deserve a separate detailed study, being a key area for the successful exit of East African countries from the Malthusian trap, their modernization and development in the coming decades.

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It is expected to grow to 30.5%, i.e. by 15.3 percentage points. Since Tanzania has had the highest rate of urbanization out of the three countries, the acceleration will be less significant, but still noticeable: in 1980-2010, the share of urban population increased from 14.6% to 26.3% (by 12 percentage points), and by 2040 it is projected to grow to 43.4%, or by 17 percentage points [UN Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects, 2012].

However, getting out of the Malthusian trap also carries significant risks of socio-political destabilization. At first glance, this seems paradoxical: getting out of the trap is usually the result of successful economic policies, modernization of the economy (including agriculture) and growth in labor productivity, increased food consumption per capita, elimination of the threat of hunger, and a decrease in the birth rate - all of this indicates a prosperous country. Nevertheless, the combination of these factors regularly generates cases of socio-political instability.

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