The round-table addressed the question of research methodologies for those trends now observable in the Islamic world, as well as conceptual approaches for understanding current developments there. Such frameworks as Islamic reformation, a neo-modern age, and the search for a political Islamic identity were proposed. Participants did not agree about the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and modernity. Some of them considered fundamentalism as potentially a modernist movement, and others saw it only as antimodernist and archaic. In this respect, the question of balance between declared goals and real impact on social development was raised, in other words, can those groups that call for a return to the past in reality facilitate movement forward? Much attention was paid to terminology. There was also an active discussion on the issue of language for scientific analysis and the language of self-presentation of different Islamic movements, and whether they should be interconnected or could be fully autonomous.

Keywords: Islam, Islamic world, Islamism, Martin Luther, fundamentalism, Reformation, modernity.

Participants of the round table: Irina Starodubrovskaya (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy), Orkhan Dzhemal, Emil Pain (Higher School of Economics), Vasily Kuznetsov (Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences), Dmitry Uzlaner (RANEPA), Akhmet Yarlykapov (RSUH).

Irina Starodubrovskaya: Dear colleagues, We all notice that there is an increased interest in the Islamic world right now. "

Round table discussion: "What is happening in the modern Islamic world: an attempt at conceptualization" (Irina Starodubrovskaya, Orhan Dzhemal, Emil Pain, Vasily Kuznetsov, Dmitry Uzlaner, Akhmet Yarlykapov) // State, Religion, Church in Russia and abroad. 2017. N 3. pp. 265-299.

"Round-table: What Is Happening in the Islamic World? An Attempt at a Conceptualization (Irina Starodubrovskaya,

Orkhan Jemal, Emil Pain, Vasily Kuznetsov, Dmitry Uzlaner, Akhmet Yarlykapov)" (2017), Gosudarstvo, religiia, tserkov' v Rossii i za rubezhom 35(3): 265-299.

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clearly something is going on. Such processes as religious revival, increased conflict, and a sharp increase in the political role of fundamentalist views calling for a return to the roots and the revival of the Islamic caliphate. We have gathered here to discuss how to analyze these processes, and what conceptual framework best allows us to understand their essence and prospects. This is the main issue that the round table is devoted to. With your permission, I will begin our discussion.

I would like to talk about Islamic fundamentalism and modernity. At the same time, I will not dwell on whether it is even worth considering these issues within the framework of large narratives. Yes, when we say Islamic fundamentalism, when we say modern, we can always say that these are some constructs that do not have a clear, real content, and it is not worth using them. This is a topic that we can discuss, but I don't want to start with it, because here you can go far from the subject of our conversation.

So, I will talk about how Islamic fundamentalism relates to modernity. And in order to talk about this topic, we first need to define not even what Islamic fundamentalism is, but what modernity is. Because here we can distinguish two fundamentally different understandings. One understanding is linear. The era of modernity is an era of progress, an era of movement from the cursed past to a bright future, within which the system of values developed during the Enlightenment is being implemented more and more fully. This is a very beautiful model, but it has one problem. It is completely untrue. Because if we look at the modern era as it really was, we will see that it is a chain of crises. Starting from the crisis of early modernization with its urbanization, workhouses, monstrous crowding in cities, repressive legislation against vagrancy. Further, the light of the Enlightenment, even if we are prepared to consider the guillotine on Place de Greve as light, ends quite quickly. The economy is changing, the era of coal and steel begins, and the active monopolization of production begins. Instead of competition, we see regulation by large economic agents of both economic and all other life, as well as interaction with the state on this basis. The enlighteners ' idea of freedom-

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The idea of increasing rationalism and subordinating nature is transformed into the idea of unlimited strengthening of rational or non-rational control of the state, as Michel Foucault very vividly wrote, when institutions of forced detention, madhouses and prisons resemble barracks, factories, schools, which in turn resemble madhouses and prisons. Then, after the Second World War, for some time the ideas of modernization as a recipe for all mankind flourish, and then the 60s come, which, in fact, is a crisis of High Modernity, the ideology of which was formed in the previous period.

Finally, we can characterize the current situation as a challenge to globalization, a crisis of globalization. The essence of this crisis is that the world has become very small, the world has become very transport-connected, and we are forced to live next to a cultural stranger. Not just next to a person we don't know personally, as for example it was in the era of urbanization and as it is described by the founders of sociology, but with people of a different way of life, other values, other norms. And now is the time when we are learning to live with these cultured outsiders. So far, we are probably not very successful in studying.

If we talk about modernity as a chain of crises, then we can probably try to look at the Islamic renaissance, which is associated with a fairly wide spread of fundamentalist theories, as a search for an answer in a crisis situation. Because the situation here turned out to be quite difficult. Actually, several crises coincided. In many countries, the crisis of early modernization associated with intensive urbanization and the erosion of traditional society coincided or almost coincided with the crisis of High Art Nouveau. And if we perceive the modern era not as a smooth movement along pre-designed patterns, but as a kind of search for answers to more and more new challenges, searching often in the dark, searching often by touch, then it seems to me quite possible and legitimate to consider what is happening in the Islamic world as one of the directions of this search. This is, in fact, the first idea that I wanted to tell you about.

Now about Islamic fundamentalism. This movement is called differently. Someone calls it Wahhabism, Salafism, Islamism-unfortunately, the terminology is absolutely not established. I will call it either Islamic fundamentalism or non-traditional Islam as the broadest generalizing concept.-

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a type that somehow includes all the others. Ideas about this movement are also very often simplified: that it is a kind of unified movement based on a single ideology, adhering to common principles and rejecting modernization as a direction of development. I think that if we try to look at it outside of the fears, myths, and stereotypes that are usually associated with it, we will see the following picture.

First, large groups of people begin to think independently and differently about the world in religious categories. They read the primary sources themselves and try to understand these issues themselves. Religion for them becomes not just a set of rites and rituals, but a tool for understanding the surrounding reality. The second thing we will see is that people tend to change their lives in accordance with the norms prescribed in religion. The third is that under the slogan of going back to their roots, people oppose themselves not only to Western models, but also to established traditions. And this point is very often misinterpreted: it is believed that a return to the roots is a return to traditions. As far as I understand, this is far from the case. Because when we talk about the origins, we need to understand what kind of origins we are talking about. We are talking about the period of the emergence of religion, the charismatic period, the heroic period, the period when the existing structures and relationships were broken, when a new ideology won supporters. That is, we are talking about a period of very active withdrawal. And then this new ideology adapts to the routines of ordinary life, to the established system of interests, to ordinary practices. That is, in fact, a return to the roots is not a return to tradition. This is very much a rejection of tradition. At the same time, we see that there is quite a lot of violence in all this. This is the violence of those people who try to force others to live according to the norms that seem right to them, and those who do not want to live according to these norms or do not know how. This is violence against each other by adherents of different versions of Islamic ideology. In other words, it is actually an environment that is saturated with conflicts, confrontation and violence.

Well, actually, when I list all these signs, almost one to one we get a picture of the Protestant Reformation. Hence the idea of the Islamic Reformation. In fact, from my point of view, the methodology for assessing the consequences of the reformation that has developed in science due to

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To Max Weber and other researchers of the modernization potential of the Reformation, it is very well applied in the current situation in Islam. Because, on the one hand, the reformation and modernization effect is connected precisely with the destruction of traditional norms and relations. That is, the field is being cleared for something new. Until it is cleared, it is hardly possible to talk about any major changes. Further, certain values that are proclaimed by fundamentalist Islamic movements have a truly modernizing character. And if in the Reformation it was primarily the values of conscientious work, then here we can say about the values of education, which are very highly valued by some of these trends. Here we can talk about the values of a healthy lifestyle, quite modern and modern. Here we can talk about the values of conscientious performance of contracts. Well, about a number of such frankly modernizing values.

But it seems to me that it is much more interesting to talk in this context about the phenomenon that Max Weber actually wrote about, which I think is most interesting in his approach. That certain modernization values were formed not at all due to Protestant ideology, but as unpredictable and often undesirable consequences of the implementation of certain religious norms. The situation here is also quite similar. We can talk, for example, about the values of individualism. Again, in much the same way as in the Reformation era, people choose their own religious direction, have this choice. They don't do this because they are embedded in traditional hierarchies, generational hierarchies, or hierarchies of seniority. They do this directly thanks to individual solutions. In many cases, a horizontal community of like-minded people becomes more important than vertical hierarchies. And, in fact, in its purest form, ideology assumes that a person should obey the Almighty, and not other people.

We can talk about the education of law-abiding, since this ideology includes the unconditional implementation of Sharia law. Both the composition of a crime or misdemeanor, and the punishment in this system can not be determined by an elder or head of the family, but only by a judge according to clearly fixed laws. And again, we can still talk quite a lot about what completely modernizing values are indirectly formed in this way.

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At the same time, we can see a lot of anti-modernization values in this movement. And, in addition, not in all cases such a religious split is connected with the modernization agenda, since quite often quite traditional conflicts between clans, tribes, villages, etc. mimic this religious framework. That is, we have a similar very complex ambiguous picture.

I would say that the result is actually unpredictable. As in general, the result of the Reformation was unpredictable. Because it is unlikely that when Cromwell's" saints " cut off the head of the English king, someone assumed that England would become the most advanced industrial power for a long time. Or when Protestants immigrated to America to build a City on a hill, practically the kingdom of God on earth, someone could imagine that the United States would be the most advanced democratic state that would be the first to include in the Constitution the separation of religion from the state. So in fact, my idea is that the process is very complex, is ambiguous, and cannot be considered either unambiguously modernizing or unambiguously anti-modernizing. And it is very important to understand how very different processes, very different ideologies, and very different groups actually co-exist within this seemingly unified movement and process. And how much all this can affect the final result in different ways. I'll leave it at that. Which one has questions or comments?

Vasily Kuznetsov: I absolutely agree with the last paragraph of your speech.

Irina Starodubrovskaya: Is that the only thing you agree with?

Vasily Kuznetsov: No, not only that. I will try to offer two perspectives. I have two ideas about how to conceptualize and analyze current processes. I won't use the term "Islamic world" because I don't like it. And I don't like the term "Islamic fundamentalism." I don't think they are correct. For many different reasons. You can still argue about the "Islamic world", but" Islamic fundamentalism " - I often don't really understand what it is.

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One perspective that I propose is related to the concept of modernity. It seems to me that we can consider the Art Nouveau era by offering it at least two chronologies. You can talk about a short Art Nouveau, starting with, say, the French Revolution, plus or minus, and you can talk about a long Art Nouveau, which seems to start with three important things: Guttenberg, firearms, and Cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I exist). These three things shaped the Western world and modern civilization. What was fundamental here was that printing and firearms made it possible to create stable hierarchies: stable hierarchies of power, stable hierarchies of knowledge - more stable than they were before. They made it possible to create a modern society and a modern institutionalized state, the state of institutions. The Art Nouveau era, it seems to me, ends with the well-known phrase that after Auschwitz you can not write poetry.

And then we have the era of postmodernity, the erosion of all these ideas of progress, development, endless movement for the better. We all know this very well. And this is a process that affects, of course, not only culture, not only architecture, literature or philosophy. It also affects international relations and politics. The regimes that were overthrown in the Middle East in 2011 were absolutely postmodern. With the rejection of ideology, with the absolute rejection of ideas about some truth, about development. More often than Hosni Mubarak or Ben Ali, no one spoke about human rights at all. It was in every speech they made. Gaddafi is a perfect example: the third world theory explained everything and always, including the introduction of the principles of new liberalism in the economy.

But what is more important is, of course, the postmodern crisis that was marked in the Middle East by the events of 2011, and what happened after that. This crisis was not just in the Middle East; it is, I think, a much broader crisis. Postmodernism thus becomes the highest stage of the negation of the modern era, and it ends with the fact that we move from Guttenberg's book to a more or less absolute such information communism. And the monopoly on firearms also ceases to be a guarantee of the stability of the state. Changes in the nature of state structures are beginning. And it seems to me that this transition - someone suggests calling this new period neomodernom-it will begin-

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It takes a long time. Yes, at the first stage it shows signs of a crisis of globalization. But the "crisis of globalization" is a stupid expression, because globalization is an objective process that is connected with the scientific and technological development of mankind. There are some people, some social forces, who don't like it. People who have never seen migrants in their lives voted for Trump and his migration policy. Brexit was voted for by people who had never seen a Muslim in their life: what did he see there, sitting in an English village? This is a fear of the future, and this fear is natural.

In this neomodern offensive, I think the two trends observed today are important. The first is the emergence of the need for a new statement, for the creation of a new narrative, because postmodernism has led to the rejection of any development strategy, the rejection of the future. There was no prospect of development, no idea of what we want. Now there is a need for such a representation, but this need often manifests itself in archaic forms, it is associated with a return to some more or less wild forms of social relations, to xenophobia, etc., etc. This kind of archaization can be considered the second trend. The appeal to antiquity in search of a new utterance, I think, is explained by the fact that the information stage is actually a stage of political explosion, a very rapid expansion of the political space, when the dictate of elites that existed earlier becomes impossible. As a result, while invariably archaic, the new message takes on different forms - the most radical when DAESH is 1, and the less radical when Trump is. But in general, these are all things of the same order. This is the first perspective I wanted to talk about, and it is not directly related to Islam.

The second perspective is actually Islamic. When the Prophet Muhammad came to preach, he proposed a certain concept of the historical worldview. A concept that is fundamentally different from the Judeo-Christian one, because it presupposes cyclicity. There are prophets who periodically come, then these prophets die, the community goes astray, the next prophet comes, etc. And each ummah has its own prophet,

1. Prohibited in the Russian Federation by decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. AKPI 14-1424 P of 29.12.2014.

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so? Thus, the world evolves along a sinusoid, which implies cyclicity. I think that in connection with this view, Islam in general is characterized to a greater extent than the Judeo-Christian tradition by modernization through a return to its roots, through Salafism. In general, the history of Islam can be described as the history of Salafism. Every or almost every empire that arose in the Middle East, it began with the fact that someone came and called to return to the true purity of faith, to be cleansed of bid (innovations). How this purity of faith was understood is another matter.

The Islamic renaissance, of course, did not begin in the twentieth century, but in the nineteenth, when the problem of facing colonialism arose. And when the problem arose that if we have the right religion and we are the most wonderful, why do we always fail? And we know that very different answers were given to this. Some said that the problem is in Islam, there is also such a line. We must not forget that it exists. Atheistic or at least radically secular ideas are very common. Were and are. And there was a Salafi question. When we talk about Salafism, the question is what kind of true purity of faith we are returning to; what exactly underlies this purity. A reconstruction of the past, of course. Of course, this is not the return of traditions, but the breaking of traditions. Question-withdrawal in the name of what? In general, what is called Euro-Islam today is also Salafism. Because this is also a call to return to true purity, because true Islam and the essence of early Islam is ijtihad, it is dynamic, it is openness. That's why I don't like the term "fundamentalism."

Emil Pain: What about him? Salafism? Just to understand.

Vasily Kuznetsov: We can say "salafism", but we must always understand what we are talking about. I am not at all sure that we can generalize these movements. I'm not at all sure that conceptualization is possible today. There is an idea that the term "salafism" should also be abandoned, because in the end we understand Salafist movements as completely different things. You have Muhamad Abdo Salafi and Caliph al Baghdadi Salafi, I'm sorry.

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Irina Starodubrovskaya: At the same time, you have Hizb-ut-Tahrir2 and the Muslim Brotherhood3, who are also Salafists, but do not always consider themselves Sallafists.

Vasily Kuznetsov: So, when we talk about Islamic societies, we have, first of all, the general modernization process that we talked about. We have a crisis of statehood associated with archaization. These are all things that have nothing to do with Islam, in my opinion, nothing. And the violence in this case also has nothing to do with Islam. This is not because I want any political correctness. I really think so. 50 years ago, the same violence was under socialist or nationalist slogans, and in 20 years it will be under some other slogans. It's only a matter of time. But there is a process of ideological search within the framework of a single Islamic intellectual space. It certainly exists. How does this process relate to social reality? It is far from linear and does not always correlate with it.

And back to where I started. Why do I dislike the term "Islamic world"? Because the Islamic world is also our fantasy. It exists most in the minds of Muslim immigrant communities in Europe, and it exists among Muslim minorities. There, this identity is very large. But you will come to any Muslim country. What is the number of liberals, atheists, say, in Saudi Arabia? You see, I don't know. What percentage of people do not observe Ramadan? Do people who do not observe Ramadan and do not believe in Allah belong to the Islamic world? I do not know, I do not have an answer to this question. Well, you can give other examples. I'll probably leave it at that.

Orhan Cemal: I have some questions. First, what do you mean by the phrase "Islamic world", which you deny exists? Because, based on your context, and based on what you said, by the Islamic world, you mean a certain community with which you identify

2. Prohibited in the Russian Federation by the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, dated 14.02.2003 N GKPI 03 116, entered into force on 04.03.2003.

3. Prohibited in the Russian Federation by the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, dated 14.02.2003 N GKPI 03 116, entered into force on 04.03.2003.

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someone. While it is absolutely obvious that the Islamic world is an absolutely real objective thing. You do not abandon the category of the Christian world, which over time has evolved into the concept of the West. If we are talking about the Islamic world, specifically about the Islamic world as a geographical concept, then political subjectivity has even taken place here for a very long time. A caliphate that existed in various forms, both as a globalist entity and as more local, regional entities. So the Islamic world is certainly at least a historical reality.

Second. I just wanted to draw your attention to the fact that the discrepancy between Islamic fundamentalism and Salafism is also a rather arbitrary thing. As Martin Heidegger wrote, no term has more content than the meaning of the words it consists of. Actually, Salafism from Salaf al-Salih, a return to the righteous ancestors, i.e. this is the restoration of the foundation, this is the very fundamentalism that it is. Another thing is that salafism has a certain tinted politicized content, in contrast to Islamic fundamentalism. Islamic fundamentalism can have an archaic content, i.e. the opposition of bid. When we talk about Salafism, let's remember that in principle it is, of course, Islamic fundamentalism, but it was implemented and manifested as a protest ideology, which is a response to an external threat. Starting with Ibn Taymiyyah, who opposed the Hulaguids ideologically, and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who opposed Turkish hegemony in the Hejaz. We can talk about modern Salafism or Ikhwan 4 Salafism of the XX century, which is also a reaction to the results of the First World War. And in this sense, of course, Salafism is an Islamic fundamentalism that has some protest and political connotations. I'm just pointing out that this term is absolutely correct.

Vasily Kuznetsov: Thank you. About the Islamic world. Why I don't like this concept, why I try not to use it when we talk about modernity. We can talk, I think, about the three foundations of the "Islamic world". About the creature-

4. The word "Ikhwan" refers to the word Ikhwan (brothers) and the concept of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin - "Muslim brothers".

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There is a certain idea of Dar al-Islam in the tradition, both political and intellectual. About identity, first of all about the deterritorial community of Muslims, about which Olivier Roy wrote. And the third thing we are talking about, and I think this is most important, is the image that is being formed by the West at seminars like ours. And on larger sites, too. I think that when we analyze a certain reality, we do not have a single geographical area of the Islamic world from Indonesia to Senegal. These are completely different societies. There is no single political space here. Despite the existence of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, we have more wars than between Islamic states within the Islamic world in the 20th century, there were no wars between anyone. There is no single economy, no single economic system. And if we talk not only about state subjectivity, but also about societies, then within these societies, I think, in a significant part of them, religious identity is not at all decisive. For large segments of the population, religious identity does not play a fundamental role. It is not the leading one. So I don't like the term "Islamic world", because it is a generalization of completely different things on a not very clear basis, from which very large conclusions are then drawn. Yes, in some limited discursive practices, you can use this somewhere.

As for fundamentalism, of course, yes, this is a direct translation - fundamentalism and Salafism. As a rule, when people talk about Islamic fundamentalism, at least often, it is not only the concept of certain ideological trends that is embedded in it. If we limit ourselves to the fact that this is a certain method of thinking, then yes, but if we start comparing it with Christian fundamentalism, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, with some modern socio-political practices, then we fall into the trap of analogies, which allows us to put an equal sign between the modern Middle East and medieval Europe. To avoid this temptation, it is better to avoid the term fundamentalism.

Orhan Cemal: But Ms. Starodubrovskaya tried to apply the Christian concept of fundamentalism to Islam and came to the conclusion that it is very similar to the Protestant Reformation. Because Luther's 95 theses nailed to the door

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Russia is fundamentalism in its purest form, refined, without the slightest admixture.

Vasily Kuznetsov: You can't argue with that.

Irina Starodubrovskaya: I have one more question for Vasily about the cyclical nature and the return to some new version of fundamentalism or Puritanism on each cycle. In fact, there are two points of view in science, at least from what I know on this topic. One of them is that since everything goes around in circles, nothing really changes. That is, there is a cycle: fundamentalists, then everything returns to popular beliefs, then on the next cycle fundamentalist ideas appear again, they again land on the level of popular prejudices and ideas, etc. This is one position. Another position: all this was something like this, as long as the society was quite traditional. And then urbanization begins, citizens see the appeal of fundamentalist ideas not only as elitist, but as quite massive for the city, and this creates some prerequisites for fundamentalism to lay new foundations, which then may or may not grow into modernization. Ernst Gellner, in fact, wrote quite a lot about this. What is it really? How do you see it?

Vasily Kuznetsov: The first version is much closer to me. As for urbanization: the process of urbanization in the Middle East and the process of urbanization in Europe are fundamentally different. In the Middle East, the growth factor of cities, which in Europe since the XIII century appeared with their special status, was not present. Islam itself was originally an urban culture. How did the Arab peasantry live in any century? God only knows. Well, there are no sources from which one can normally speak about the way of life of the peasantry. Or at the very least, their circle is extremely limited. All that we call Islamic culture is all urban culture. If we are talking about the Middle East. Probably in South-East Asia, where the situation is basically quite different, it's somehow different, I have no idea. And so it seems to me that this antithesis of a modern and traditional city is largely removed here, because all the processes that took place in cities took place. And there was Salafism in the cities

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Irina Starodubrovskaya: Well, we probably won't go into details now, because we will have to discuss in great detail the difference between traditional and modern cities, the phenomenon of a city and a big city. Who's next? Orhan?

Orhan Cemal: I would now like to draw your attention to the historical circumstances within which the current Islamism was formed. I will use this term and first describe what it means. Islamism is called political Islam. This is a religious doctrine that requires the implementation of socio-political methods and requires the subordination of socio-political education to certain general religious principles. This is not a unique situation, because even in the twentieth century, within the framework of more decrepit Christianity, similar rather specific trends appeared - liberation theology in Latin America, Catholic-Protestant parties in Germany, a system of various types of concordats between the Vatican and states, between the Georgian Orthodox Church and states, That is, this occurs not only in Islam.

Vasily Kuznetsov: Can I clarify?

Orhan Cemal: Yes.

Vasily Kuznetsov: But Islamism is a religious trend?

Orhan Cemal: This is a religious movement that requires the implementation of its ideas in politics. This implies the entire body of the policy, including external contracts that should be subject to these principles, as well as internal ones. You said that goal-setting was lost in the regimes that were bursting at the seams in ' 11. But here there is just a goal setting. It is countercyclical in nature, since Islam is still an eschatological religion. The Prophet comes precisely to stop the cycle.

Now let's look at the context in which Islamism appeared. XIX century, the Art Nouveau era. This is the last century when the Caliphate still existed. Since the advent of Islam in fifteen hundred years, most centuries have passed under the Caliphate or under different caliphates, but there has always been some subjectivity.

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Moreover, the Abasid Caliphate is perhaps one of the most successful examples of medieval globalism in the world. Globalist European modernism received some prerequisites when Eastern globalism ran out of steam. And there, the discovery of America, the changing trade routes, the industrial revolution, etc., have already begun. But until the beginning of the 20th century, the world lived under a caliphate. That is, there has always been a caliphate in the world. Under him, there were wonderful, heroic times, there was expansion. There was a period of terrible decline when Ottoman Turkey was spoken of as the sick man of Europe. And they wondered when it would all end, when this nightmare would end.

But as soon as it's all over, after ten or fifteen years, the thirst for a caliphate renaissance begins to arise. The world of the East by the 30s of the XX century is a collapsed caliphate, the collapsed world of Islam, the arrangement of this defeated territory at the European discretion. In different epochs, this discretion was different: there was a period of monarchies, a period of mandated territories, a period of national socialist regimes. But in any case, this was not exactly an internal decision about the device, at best it was a compromise between the will of local and external players. And then not immediately: a compromise began to appear in the 50s. This enslaved territory experienced a state generally similar to the Europeans of the 50s and 60s. Such a kind of golism. It was impossible to say that it was good under the Turks. But it's bad now.

Interestingly, Islamism itself appeared in Egypt. I define it as an ideology based on Ikhwan ideas. Egypt was not defeated in World War I, but it was one of the first eastern Islamic States to face the challenge of European-style modernization. And not with the modernization, by which we primarily understand scientific and technological progress, but with geopolitical modernization, when Egypt was used as a springboard for suppressing Sudanese protest movements and for putting pressure on Ethiopia. Behind Islamism as a movement, as an ideology, is a longing for the restoration of political subjectivity among Muslims, which, no matter how much you want to deny it, still exists. This is what underlies the entire layer of these political ideas.

What's next to note. This ideology has extreme forms, there are soft forms. On the one hand, some people

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it cannot get rid of old stereotypes: we need a state where the caliph will sit, where he will have a vizier, naibs, governors, satraps and everything else. On the other hand, there are formats that are essentially of the same nature. Like neo-Ottomanism. Here, this subjectivity is not conceived in terms of an archaic state, such as the Caliphate. There are quite radical anarchist network projects. There is Al-Qaeda, 5 which relies not on top-level administration, but on Jamaat networks that are in certain framework agreements with each other. That is, the question of what should be restored subjectivity is hanging in the air. It doesn't have any answers, and at the moment it is rather poorly developed.

The third. The remarkable comparison with Protestants-paradoxical in its own way, provocative in its own way-has a very interesting aspect. The radicals, the Protestants, fled from their Anglican king, from their Spanish Catholics in Holland. They fled to America. They were taking some land from the Indians. Apparently, at first, it's not even very conflicting or not always conflicting. In this regard, America has long been an outlet for religious minorities. Before it's all over. By the end of the nineteenth century, America was over, and the very idea of escapism, including religious escapism, was in crisis. The whole background of Russian cosmism and science fiction: there, gardens on Mars, is just a psychological reaction of humanity to the fact that America is over. That's all, there's nowhere else to go. You can't escape. We're in a cage. And this longing for escape broke through in some people in this way.

The Islamic world is experiencing a similar process. But in a different era and in different circumstances. Muslims also decided to escape to their own America and win this piece of land from the Indians. But when we try to find the place of the Islamic State on the political scale, I do not presume to put it next to America. I can't say for sure, although I believe that America of the XVII century was quite a gloomy and ugly state. Let me remind you that for longer than in America, people were burned only in Spain. Rather, I would draw a parallel with Marxism. And in the framework of the Marxist project - with Cambodia and Kampuchea. Not the United States, not the Soviet Union, not China, not Vietnam, not Cuba.

5. Prohibited on the territory of the Russian Federation.

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Kampuchea. In this regard, I would like to note that the parallel itself, like any parallel, is lame, but as a method of research and a method of studying , it is a good technique. That is, to see how it went for others in slightly different circumstances, but to take into account that the entourage is different, and in general, comparative studies have their limits.

One more moment. I want to point out that the current Salafism, the current Islamism (I would still leave Salafism for the religious sphere) is a longing, a reaction to the loss of Islamic subjectivity, psychologically quite comparable to the longing of the British for the empire: for something big, important and significant, but lost. Of course, this is a modernization process, but modernization is not in the sense of progress. This is a modernization process, because this space is in search of new political and social technologies, new political and social relations.

And one last thing. When we give up big narratives, the end result is that all the conversations are reduced to the question: what to do? We need to give someone some advice: you'll do this and you'll be fine. We treat this process as if some mistakes were made that led to this situation, and they just need to be corrected, then everything will resolve. No, it won't resolve. What we call Islamism as an ideology; what we call Salafism as a politicized theological view; what we call jihadism, which is essentially the armed wing of this phenomenon , are certain macro-historical phenomena that are the consequence of other macro-historical phenomena. This is such a formidable step of history, which can neither be corrected nor corrected. Probably, it can change, as, for example, Marxism has run out of steam. But as Marxism formulated the end of the XIX-XX centuries, so the XXI century will be made Islamism, which, perhaps, will change, somehow evolve.

I think it can only be a long game. By analogy with Bolshevism. The Soviet Union, which was created by quite radical guys: Lenin, Trotsky, who considered the territory of the Russian Empire as a rear, a springboard that could be sacrificed, because they played the revolution in Germany, the revolution in Britain, the revolution in France, because there was a proletariat, there was industry-

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laziness. They didn't fight for these guys from the forest villages, whom Vladimir Ilyich himself called the petty bourgeoisie. But already in ' 27, the Soviet Union recognizes the United States. The concept of permanent revolution is being replaced by the concept of building socialism in one particular country. Then peaceful coexistence of systems, convergence, and then Gorbachev and the famous end.

Vasily Kuznetsov: I have a comment. I would like to draw Orhan's attention to a few points. That, speaking of the Islamic world, the geographical area of your story was limited to Iraq in the East and Egypt, possibly Libya, in the West. Everything else had nothing to do with the Ottoman Empire at the time of the war, so it was not about Indonesia, India, or Pakistan. This is the first point. The second point. It's not an objection, it's just a consideration. When you say that Islamism is a religious trend, I don't argue with that, but then we should analyze it as a religious trend, and not as a political trend in the future. The third point. I think it is very important that, say, when we talk about the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, it was a response not only to the West, but also to its own elite that betrayed the people. There was an element of struggle (which, by the way, is also present in DAESH), an element of struggle against internal colonial forces that are perceived as agents of the West. And the last point is when we talk about the current process here, when you compare Islamism and Marxism. It seems to me that there is a fundamentally important thing here: due to its genetic characteristics, the effect of Islamism is limited culturally, religiously, etc. It doesn't have universal content.

Orhan Cemal: This is a very valuable point. Although I would note that Marxism also has religious roots and they are Protestant. This is a certain tradition of Christian utopianism. This is not Jewish utopianism. Therefore, it is not obvious that it is necessary to strictly distinguish between the religious and political movement, maybe there is not such an impassable border between them. And what you said about being limited - yes, of course. Until Islamism puts forward a separate program for non-Muslims, it is doomed.

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Irina Starodubrovskaya: The Apostle Paul is missing.

Vasily Kuznetsov: I think when we talk about such an immense longing of Muslims for the Caliphate-well, it's very beautiful. It's very poetic. It's wonderful. But the immense melancholy, who measured it?

Orhan Cemal: You know, an immense longing for the vanished Soviet Union, an immense longing for Kipling.

Irina Starodubrovskaya: I have a feeling that this longing is actualized when it resonates with something personal. If things don't work out, we don't get any progress, we don't get a career, and everything is bad in general, and we don't have any money, and all because we are oppressed and we don't have political subjectivity, this is a clear story.

Orhan Cemal: I just want to draw your attention to the fact that the leaders of this movement, including middle-level leaders, are generally quite well-off people.

Well, about the Islamic world. I am saying that Islamism, the existence and some homogeneity of which is difficult to deny, cannot be understood by denying, like you, Vasily, the category of the Islamic world, even if this category is theoretical. Even if some dykhans say to the phrase "Islamic world": "Cho?". It is not the dykhans who determine this.

Vasily Kuznetsov: When I said that I would not use the "Islamic world" category, it was certainly a provocation. It was definitely a success. But the idea was that I didn't want to combine all this huge region in social or political analysis. I have already said that it is united in the minds of a significant part of Muslims.

Akhmet Yarlykapov: I'll just say two words. I would very much like to draw your attention to what has been said about the ideological search in the Islamic intellectual community. Without an analysis of what Kemper called Islamic discourse, it seems to me that it is impossible to do without it at all. In my opinion, this Islamic discourse and all these ideological searches in the Islamic intellectual community are very, very important. With

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In the 19th century, all discussions were conducted in Arabic. All kinds of Muslim intellectuals, and Muslim intellectuals understood each other perfectly, whether he was a Tatar or a Dagestani. At the same time, there was a serious participation of Muslims and Muslim leaders in the same State Duma. They not only actively debated, but also participated in political life. And we are now seeing a transition to the Russian language, i.e. practically moving away from the Arabic language. How many Muslims are now polemicizing with each other and discussing Muslim issues in Arabic in Russia? I mean, that's what I'm saying, that it's completely switched to Russian, this discourse is Islamic. And in this sense, I think there is a certain distance created with all these discussions that are taking place in Arabic. Despite the fact that, of course, everything is quickly translated into Russian. But still, this discourse itself is fragmented. It seems to me that without analyzing these very ideological searches in the Islamic intellectual community, without analyzing everything that is happening there, it is really difficult to talk about something and build some theories. This is the first one.

And the second. I would not put too much emphasis on Islamism, which is still more of a political doctrine, as it seems to me. It is Islamic, of course, but it is still more political. Or maybe, in order to avoid disputes about whether Salafism is or is not Salafism, fundamentalism is not fundamentalism, whether the term fundamentalism is appropriate or not, etc., maybe we should really talk about some kind of movement towards some kind of Islamic universalism. Because all these Salafists, they say that there are no different Islam, there is one Islam, and we should strive for it. And this search for a universal and unified Islam is expressed both in political and religious terms. And even the Shiites have joined in, because the Shiites have a movement to bring the madhhabs closer together. And culturally, because this whole Salafi brotherhood applies uniform cultural codes, you will agree. Government agencies often do this-they try to identify these people based on their characteristics.

Orhan Cemal: Ahmet, I'm sorry to interrupt. This is not an installation thing, but a generational one. Because young people who are trained in the universities of Riyadh, Cairo, and Damascus have learned this cultural code. And when you, for example, see people

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my age or even a little older, but who joined the movement, although they are from a different background: well, this is what happened with Muhamad Salih. This is a Sixties man, in manners he is no different from Fazil Iskander, but he is a Salafi.

Akhmet Yarlykapov: This universalism, I do not know, globalism - maybe we can think in this direction. Because again, I agree that these terms - fundamentalism, etc. - are often misleading when it comes to analyzing what is happening with Islam and with Muslims.

As for comparing the Islamic State with Protestants, there are also a lot of problems in this. There are a lot of problems with this, because it seems to me that IG is still evolving towards the development of some completely new online communities. They are already developing this, they are well aware that they will not be allowed to flourish on earth anyway. And now these online communities are actively developing. And when we talk about the analysis of what is happening with modern Islam, the analysis of network activities and network communities seems very promising to me. Because what is happening there is largely in step with modern times, in step with modern technologies, including the Internet.

Orhan Cemal: In general, I absolutely agree that this is such a universalist, globalist project. The transition from one language to another is precisely on the path of increasing such universality.

Irina Starodubrovskaya: But again, I have a question about terms. In general, if we make any progress on this, it would be very cool, because it is absolute chaos here. But it seems to me that it is impossible to construct terms out of connection with "land". That is, if people call themselves, they are comfortable being called Salafists or fundamentalists-this should be taken into account. For me, the term "fundamentalism" came not from scientific books, but from this reality connected with the "earth".

Dmitry Uzlaner: I just object to this. A classic problem that is considered in any science, including religious studies: there are languages of self-description, and there are languages of self-description.

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analysis languages. And at some point, we must definitely move from one to the other. That is, I understand that this sounds arrogant, even some discursive violence in this. But we can't always try to understand what people call themselves. At some point, we must switch to the language of analysis. And in this sense, I like what Irina is doing, because she is trying to move from the language of self-description to the language of analysis. And if we consider, for example, the Christian Reformation-you never know what Luther wrote about himself, as he called himself. If we use a scientific approach, we need to understand what it meant. Well, as Weber describes it - as a way of entering capitalist modernity. So I think if we don't commit this discursive violence, if we don't start coming up with some kind of conceptual framework, then we will completely drown: some people call themselves that, others call themselves that, but if we call them that, these people will be offended. Well, we're not getting anywhere.

Vasily Kuznetsov: After all, there is a certain world Islamic studies that writes millions of books a year, where there is a fully accepted language of description. There is the concept of "Salafists", there is the concept of "Islamists", there is the concept of"jihadists". Honestly, I just hate arguments about terms, they often seem meaningless to me. I sincerely do not understand why it is impossible to accept the existing academic, scientific tradition. Since Islam is primarily concerned with Islamic studies, it would be logical to accept the Islamic tradition and work in it.

Irina Starodubrovskaya: You know, in fact, I can't find this common language. In the last few days, I needed to understand what is meant by Islamism in science. Even among key researchers: I read Olivier Roy and I read Azef Bayat and they are sure that they have the same concept. But I'm starting to compare and understand that they have completely different concepts. Different understanding of the term.

Vasily Kuznetsov: Naumkin has a thin little book called "Islamic Radicalism in the mirror of new concepts and approaches", where every term is analyzed in detail on 100 pages. It is very comfortable.

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Emil Pain: Ahmet and I are anthropologists, and we know that over the past century and a half there have been many attempts in this field to create not just a unified theory of this field, but at least a common terminology, and the result is about as insignificant as in Islamic studies. And the reasons for this similarity are probably of the same type - the task of developing a single concept is not feasible with obviously non-strict and value-based approaches and definitions. So in our conversation, everyone who mentioned modernization gave either a different interpretation of this concept, or a different list of signs of modernization. And the main subject of discussion - about the modernization potential of a certain religious phenomenon called fundamentalism, Salafism, or Islamism - is not defined. And not only because it is an extremely complex phenomenon. Even more important, we are different, and the famous parable of blind people who touch an elephant from different angles and describe it in different ways is true. We differ in education and profession; we are very different (at least some of us), in worldview, and most importantly-we differ in the scope of the phenomena that fall into our field of vision.

I am the only open opponent here (although not in everything) Irina, believing that her concept of Islamism (fundamentalism, Salafism) as a source of modernization by analogy with Protestant modernization, it can be considered as an interesting intellectual provocation, but at the same time as a perfect utopia in practical terms. Nevertheless, I also see some benefits from such interdisciplinary communication. For example, I agree with Irina that, first of all, learning to live with an "outsider" is a central task that is emerging today in the context of globalization at all levels: at the global, national and local level, so finding a solution to it is, in fact, one of the conditions for the survival of humanity; secondly, with the fact that it is possible and useful to compare the "Islamic reformation" (let's call it various changes in Islam, the content of which we have not yet agreed) with the reformations, which occurred in other religions, not only in Christian, but also in Judaism, and in many others.

If peaceful life with culturally "alien" people is considered an indicator of overcoming the crisis of globalization and a manifestation of modern modernization, then we get criteria for evaluating reformation options, and they have always been different. One thing -

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the evolution of Lutheranism and Calvinism, which fought their way through religious wars, and Anglicanism, which was imposed from above, is another matter. A curious example that will immediately explain my position is taken from the history of Judaism. In the 18th century, two trends emerged in this religion, among European Ashkenazi Jews: one was called Haskalah, and the other - Hasidism. Both movements were reformatory, and they can be called fundamentalism, because they refuted to a large extent the established traditional systems and appealed to some forgotten origins of Judaism. Only one movement - Haskalah - proclaimed the ideas of liberation from the total power of the rabbinate, the rationalization of Judaism and the rejection of excessive mysticism, the rapprochement of Jews with the local population and with Christian culture, and considered enlightenment the main goal, its credo. Hasidism, on the other hand, preached greater seclusion in the Cahala and greater mysticism. Some of the more radical branches of Hasidism even called on God to bring great calamities upon the Jewish people in order to force them to immerse themselves in religious spirituality and break away from worldly pleasures.

Haskala (Gaskala), initially a tiny movement that developed among highly religious Jews in cities in Germany, Austria, and later in Lithuania, eventually became the dominant trend in the Jewish world by the mid-19th century. It stimulated the emergence of reform Judaism, now more mainstream than Orthodox Judaism, as well as such personalities as Felix Mendelssohn (the great composer and grandson of the founder of the movement Haskal-Moses Mendelssohn), Heinrich Heine, Sigmund Freud, Albert Einstein and many others who are well associated in the mind with the concept of "modernization". At the same time, by the end of the 19th century, the Haskalic movement itself had largely lost its connection with religion and dissolved into secular ideologies, and now it is almost forgotten, and only occasionally this term is used in narrow meanings, for example, to contrast more rational reform Judaism with mystical Orthodox Judaism. But another trend-Hasidism, which developed in the small towns of Galicia, proclaimed the idea of the isolation of Jews, is still preserved, it is alive, but as a marginal phenomenon in Jewry and purely demodernizing.

So in fact, there are similar variations in Islam, as Vasily mentioned when talking about a small urban movement in size-

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In my opinion, it indicates a certain probability of modernization through religion. At the same time, many anti-modernizing protest movements have emerged in Islam, such as Boko Haram, which requires its supporters to be even more closed than Hasidism, and is much more aggressive towards culturally alien ones.

Here are my main points in our discussion.

1. There are various manifestations of the religious reformation.

2. Only those forms can lead to modernization that either initially proclaim enlightenment, modernization as a goal, or at least indirectly, in some of their manifestations, can instill in their adherents an interest in books, education and emancipation. As it happens in some cases in the North Caucasus, when certain trends or simply cases of Salafism are used by young people to free themselves from the total control of the elderly.

3. Historically, not all religious reformation in the Christian world was the basis of modernization. The Reformation of the sixteenth century was as deeply contradictory a socio-historical process as many others; it contributed to modernization in some aspects, but in others it restrained it, sometimes forming fanaticism and obscurantism. This was noted by Archpriest Alexander Men, explaining the fanaticism, intolerance and ideological dictates of religious movements not by the spirit of modernization and religion, but by the deep, ancient socio-biological aspects of human nature. He also rightly pointed out that not only the Protestant Reformation led to modernization, but also Catholicism, in periods when its highest hierarchs supported science and enlightenment, for example, when Pope Urban VIII supported Galileo and protected him from the Inquisition.

4. The influence of religion on modernization has been different in different epochs. During the Middle Ages, religion absolutely dominated the mass consciousness, and now it is strongly displaced not only by secularization, but also by the growing complexity and multiplicity of human identity. At the same time, in the era of globalization, such changes affect representatives of all religions.-

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Islam's penetration of the Christian reformation path is highly unlikely.

Today, religion is the least integrative form of consolidation of people within the national state, in comparison with statism, ethnic and civil consolidation. If we take for example only the countries of the Arab East, we will see where the least problems for culturally outsiders, the highest indicators of population consolidation and relatively high indicators of horizontal trust. First of all, it is Tunisia-the most ethnically homogeneous country with minimal manifestations of fundamentalism and the highest level of women's freedom. The worst conditions for the existence of both culturally alien and religiously native people are precisely where the highest manifestations of Islamic fundamentalism are found, for example, in Sudan, one of the poorest countries in the world with many cross-cultural problems. Religious mobilization nowhere in the modern world ensures integration within the borders of states that have preserved traces of tribalism. Such pre-national communities hold together only in the presence of a rigid authoritarian government and do not allow the possibility of political modernization.

So there is a reformation and a reformation. As Vasily rightly pointed out, it is important to determine for what purpose the breaking of traditions in religion takes place, and in the name of what it is. This idea seems to me central to analyzing the current role of fundamentalism and predicting its consequences, because it makes no sense to limit yourself to the conclusion that everything is complicated and happens in different ways, you need to find a thread that allows you to move on to forecasting.

Vasily Kuznetsov: I am pleased that we agree in some opinions, but I have a comment on the thesis about religion as the least integrative form of consolidation of people in the national state. I will neither confirm this thesis nor deny it - it is too global for me. However, with regard to the Arab world, it is worth saying, first of all, that there is no need to talk about any nation-states in their classical sense. One can argue about whether we are dealing here with incomplete projects of building national states or simply with some other forms of statehood. In the first case, we will have to rank all the Arab countries according to the degree of their popularity.-

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approaches to some imaginary ideal European models-Egypt will be closer to them, Sudan will be further away. In the second case, it makes sense to talk simply about efficiency, and then it is necessary to somehow define its criteria.

Secondly, regarding the two examples given. As a specialist in Tunisia, I am happy to welcome any mention of it, but with all my love for this country, I cannot agree with the presented thesis. Yes, it has the highest level of protection for women (higher than in Russia) and an ethnically almost homogeneous population. However, it is also homogeneous in confessional terms. This means that all these wonderful things can equally be explained by ethnic and confessional homogeneity, and the long-term policy of building a civil nation from above. At the same time, I would not risk talking about a high level of horizontal trust, nor about a large degree of social consolidation, etc.About seven thousand Tunisian fighters are fighting in DAESH, according to various estimates, up to twelve thousand Tunisians are active in jihadist structures. Society is extremely polarized-check out the events of 2013. Pay attention to the level of racism in Tunisia - a little-studied problem, but very relevant. Things like the level of horizontal trust or attitudes toward cultural outsiders are difficult to measure, and if they are, they require a lot of work with specific data.

On the other hand, take Morocco and Algeria. Morocco is ethnically heterogeneous, but almost uniform in confessional terms, and it is the sacralization of the figure of the king that has long ensured the unity of this society, more than a third of which is still illiterate. Algeria is also ethnically heterogeneous. Indeed, it was not possible to consolidate this society on the basis of political Islam - everyone remembers the horror of the 1990s. However, tribalism has not prevented political modernization here, although a high level of authoritarianism remains. Note also the political modernization of Lebanese society. In general, the presented thesis seems to me hasty.

Irina Starodubrovskaya: I would like to ask a couple of questions, because Emil's speech, as I expected, was mostly a discussion with me. The reformation should proclaim a modernizing, positive orientation.

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some problem. If we take the Protestant Reformation, which I have actually discussed and written about, then Calvin executed Genevans en masse, and executed them on the basis of using Old Testament moral norms as legislation. By the way, if we take England, then the real Reformation is Cromwell's "saints", and there, too, everything was not very peaceful.

Orhan Cemal: And half the Protestant princes joined the Catholics in opposing Munzer.

Irina Starodubrovskaya: And to the question of trust. A huge number of religious wars preceded the development of the principles of religious tolerance. The destruction of monasteries and iconoclasm led to the loss of a significant number of valuable art monuments. And, by the way, Hobbes generally wrote that it would be good to kill all Protestant preachers before they started preaching, because then all the losses associated with the English Civil war could be avoided. For me, this does not fit well with the idea of putting modernization forward as a declarative goal.

Emil Pain: I have already said that, first of all, not the entire history of the Christian Reformation was modernizing, and secondly, the Islamic version of the Reformation will not be a complete copy of the Protestant one, therefore, it will not necessarily repeat the terror of Calvin. If I were in the place of the authorities of any country, I would try, and in my place I will try, to resist such experiments. Fortunately, I am sure that today they are unlikely-a different time.

First, in the 16th century, religious identity absolutely dominated most of the inhabited territory, and now (here are the data from last year's Pew Research Center studies) in most European countries, where the Catholic and Protestant religions have historically dominated, their role is noticeably declining, and the population's interest in them is weakening. It is unlikely that this trend will not affect representatives of other religions in the same countries. According to Olivier Roy, today in Western Europe, Islamic Protestants make up less than 10% of Muslims.

Second, even in traditionally Islamic countries, Salafis are usually not the majority, and their numbers are growing.-

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This situation will be complicated by the inevitable complication of the identities of a modern person, who is now not only a Muslim, but may also have dozens of new identities (a TV viewer and a football fan, a VISA card holder and a member of a social network). I really hope that today humanity will not allow this kind of experiment by trial and error. Today, the level of rationality is generally higher than it was in medieval times, and nonviolence is now normative. At least, this follows from widely known documents, even if sometimes declaratively, but condemning violence as unacceptable.

Irina Starodubrovskaya: We need to see how much violence is not normal in Syria.

Vasily Kuznetsov: It seems to me that the problem of normality of violence goes far beyond the scope of our topic. It is largely connected, on the one hand, with the local political culture, which is far from identical with the culture of religion. Compare Algeria, with its endless hundreds of thousands of victims, and Tunisia, which is historically, culturally, and geographically close to it, with four political assassinations in the last sixty years. On the other hand, a lot depends on the international environment. Yes, we have about 400,000 victims in Syria, up to 60,000 in Libya, and fewer in Yemen. The Syrian figures are comparable, adjusted for timing, to the figures of the Iran-Iraq war and much larger than the figures of the Algerian civil war. However, there is a general understanding of the unacceptability of this level of violence, and there are huge efforts to reduce it. Another issue is that these efforts are ineffective. In addition, in all cases, except for DAESH to some extent, this violence is not undertaken in the name of implementing some political project, as was the case in Nazi Germany or the Stalinist USSR. Here we are always talking about conflicts and the destruction of political mechanisms, almost always horizontal violence.

Emil Pain: I did not specifically study the question of mechanisms that will not allow experimenting with humanity just so that after 500 years, people, having drunk blood, can finally try to modernize. I hope that such mechanisms exist or will appear. I will only note that today

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no one has pointed out the motivations that drive the transition from bloodthirsty fanaticism to modernization, except for a rather controversial analogy with the times of the European Middle Ages. I do not yet lose hope that there will still be a demand for renovationist ideas that are opposed to fundamentalist ones, for ideas that will be considered as prerequisites for the growth of public trust and individual freedom.

Irina Starodubrovskaya: I would very much like to hope so. Only the objective laws of history, unfortunately, do not obey our hopes very well. And they quite clearly demonstrate that for the emergence of a new one, the very modernization in question, it is necessary to clear the soil from the remnants of the old one. Weber showed this very well in his work on Protestant ethics. And who will be willing to go against the flow, disrupt the existing formats of life, question the basic attitudes, creating problems for themselves and spoiling relationships with others? Probably, only a person who is rigidly ideologized. A fanatic, if you will. Not necessarily bloody, but a fanatic.

Here is my second question just related to this. In fact, in the era of the Protestant Reformation, there was quite a ready-made modernization, renovationist theory. It was called Renaissance, humanism. They stood for the freedom of the individual, for the elevation of man, for individualism. It didn't work out. It was not the Renaissance that became the basis for the development of new social relations, but the Reformation. And in fact, this question still remains, it, in fact, only slightly changes its form. Why? Why didn't the Renaissance become the foundation of social transformation?

Emil Pain: And who said that the Renaissance was not the basis of social transformation?

Irina Starodubrovskaya: Well, the same Weber wrote that after all, the Reformation, not the Renaissance.

Emil Pain: I think it was a synthesis. In the literature, it is suggested that the following factors served as a prerequisite for the Reformation: Renaissance humanism, which led to an interest in the individual and individual responsibility; criticism, which allowed us to take a fresh look at all cultural phenomena, including religion; and the fashion for searching for ancient manuscripts, images, etc.-

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it drew the attention of enlightened society to the discrepancy between the early Christian and modern state of the church. Before the Reformation became widespread, its ideas were nurtured by the enlightened part of society. This was undoubtedly a historical synthesis, and M. Weber was well aware of it. He did not even deduce Protestant ethics from the Reformation alone, considering changes in economic conditions, as well as the development of urban lifestyle, as factors in the formation of this ethics. And modernization, a much broader phenomenon than the development of ethics, Weber simply could not reduce only from the Reformation, being an apologist for rationalization and the idea of Disenchanting the world (Entzauberung der Welt) - that is, the process of secularization and demythologization of social life. The idea that the Reformation and the Renaissance are in many ways complementary rather than competing ideas is not new, but rather widespread.

Irina Starodubrovskaya: I will tell you my position on why the ideas of humanism and the Renaissance did not directly become the basis for social transformation, but rather partially influenced it through the Reformation. They are elitist and they are not inherently protestant. And the actual request was for mass ideology and the ideology of protest. And I think that these two factors continue to operate today. So alas.

Orhan Cemal: And one more thing: when we talk about the Reformation, we must understand that the Protestants had a very specific opponent. A specific, localized, distinct, understandable enemy, inside which they themselves were located. This is the mother Church, the Vatican, the Pope. Similarly, when we talk about Islamism, Islamism has a very specific opponent, within which Islamism develops. This is a process that takes place within the very Islamic world, the existence of which was denied here.

Irina Starodubrovskaya: This is very interesting! And who is the opponent? What should I call it?

Orhan Cemal: I think that the enemy is the world order, which at the moment can no longer be called Western, because it cannot be said that it is imposed by the West. He's holding up now

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mostly on internal frames, not external dictation. I think that this world order, which implies a secular model of the state, is the enemy.

Irina Starodubrovskaya: But the Reformation was also opposed by the world order, not just the church.

Dmitry Uzlaner: If the world order hadn't broken down, Luther would have been executed and that's it. There were so many reformers who failed. A system of sovereign states emerged.

Irina Starodubrovskaya: There was also the memory of Gus ' execution.

Emil Pain: The world order is generally incomprehensible, because every protest will be based on this: a bad, wrong world order. The same Roy, who speaks about the rapid growth of Islamism in Europe, formulates more specifically. This is a lack of integration into this very world, non-adaptation, non-inclusion. It's a way of identifying in this world where you are perceived as a stranger, despite the fact that you live in this country in the third generation.

Dmitry Uzlaner: Let me also make some comments. I want to return to my thesis about self-description languages and analysis languages. I still miss this transition to the language of analysis, to attempt some kind of conceptualization. We get caught up in specific details all the time. Well, for example, when we say fundamentalism, because fundamentalism is not only a concept that exists within Islam. In general, initially this concept is about Christianity, Protestantism. It meant a certain group within the Protestants, a position of people who did not accept any progress. They said: we will have our own schools, so that there is no Darwin there, we will have our own universities. These are people who do not accept modernization, do not accept any changes, and want to live as they used to. And in principle, in social theory, this position is understood as fundamentalism. There is religion, there is the coming modernization, there is a point of view that religion and modernization are not compatible, and, accordingly, hence fundamentalism as an attempt to protect oneself from modernization, to close oneself off from it.

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There are other positions, in particular the position that Irina defends, that this is not fundamentalism, but that it is an attempt, so to speak, to have a creative dialogue with modernity. An attempt to work out your own path, your own solution. And indeed, if you read Weber, then no matter what the Protestant Luther himself said about himself, there was in fact such a very successful entry into capitalism. And if you take today's discussion: for example, Peter Berger, such a sociologist. He was asked if Marx Weber was dead. No, he says Marx Weber is alive and well and living in Guatemala. This means that Pentecostalism in Latin America is the fastest growing religious movement in history. And this is also the way for these backward, I do not know, poor, uneducated masses in Latin America, for them this Pentecostalism is their entry into modernity, into modernity, into the new spirit of capitalism. And I really like Irina's thesis, because in some ways it fights with what was said. In other words, this is also a very strange and paradoxical way for the Islamic world to enter modernity on its own terms. Such conceptualization is possible.

And here I do not agree with the position that the reformation must necessarily have a goal. That the Reformation is necessarily a straight path, everything is wonderful, white clothes. After all, I was engaged in the process of secularization. There is a famous book by Charles Taylor "The Secular Era" which was recently translated into Russian. It is all based on the fact that secular modernity grew out of the attempts of Christians to reform. There were people who were dissatisfied with medieval religiosity with its carnivals, with its uneducated masses, with peasants who did not understand anything. They promised that now we will make all Christians, and they began to make all Christians. And as a result, as an unintended consequence, secularization and, in fact, what we have today turned out.

In addition, one of the most influential books for me is Herzen's "From the Other Shore", where he describes his horror at the perception of the revolution in Europe. He sees some dirty, ragged men with some clubs. And he is terrified that here he is - the opening of history - and in this opening of history there are not aristocrats in their beautiful doublets, but some of these half-people or half-I don't know what.

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Irina Starodubrovskaya: What about Luther and the Civil War? Same story.

Dmitry Uzlaner: That is, the mole of history, as Hegel said, it digs, and where it digs, we do not know. Therefore, I agree, indeed, that something is breaking down now, and what will happen is unclear. And I like Irina's thesis in this sense, because we cannot verify or qualify it, we will only be able to do so in 400 years. But as food for the mind, it seems very interesting. What I was missing was trying to conceptualize it. Perhaps the best way to summarize the processes in the Islamic world is for someone who is not an Islamic scholar.

Irina Starodubrovskaya: And in 400 years.

Dmitry Uzlaner: And in 400 years.

Irina Starodubrovskaya: If I may, I will literally say a few words as the host. First: I am very glad that the return to metanarratives did not cause rejection. What I would like to say in defense of this question is that when there is a serious crisis, there is still a demand for metanarratives. And if these metanarratives are not generated by specialists, they will be generated differently.

Emil Pain: By journalists.

Irina Starodubrovskaya: Not even just journalists. Here I have a feeling that the concept of a clash of civilizations is Huntington collected all the horror stories, all the stereotypes, all the horrors that the average person has, and digested them. And this idea has so fully expressed the spirit of perception of the layman that it will live and flourish completely regardless of how its authors, scientists, etc. treat it. And I have a feeling that if we can introduce metanarratives into this discussion, this is important.

And the second. Still, about the language of description, conceptualization, etc. In fact, indeed, Weber lived 400 years later. It's easier in 400 years. In this sense, we are forced to be in this environment and, at the same time, conceptualize this environment and, at the same time, receive some kind of response from this environment. In this situation-

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"we must speak the same language. We just have to speak the same language, because otherwise our conceptualization will hang in the air. In 400 years, yes, I think it will be easier. In the meantime, if we say salafiyya, we may be understood within the Islamic community, but we are unlikely to be understood from the outside. If we say universalism, then perhaps we will somehow be understood on the outside, but we will definitely not be understood on the inside, it does not fight with anything. It seems to me that this problem of a common language inside and outside is the main challenge.

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