Keywords: Africa, national liberation struggle, Namibia, SWAPO
Four national liberation movements - the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO), the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and the South African African National Congress (ANC) - were forced to resort to armed struggle as an effective method of achieving their goals by the violent repressive measures of colonial racist regimes. releases.
The article below explores how SWAPO and the people of Namibia achieved their country's independence after many years of long armed liberation struggle.
South-West Africa (SWA), or Namibia, became a German colony following the 1884 Berlin Conference on the Division of Africa. In 1915, during World War I, the country was invaded by British South African forces after Great Britain declared war on Germany in August 1914. By the Treaty of Versailles, which ended the First World War, South Africa became a League of Nations mandated territory under the administration of South Africa on behalf of Great Britain.
On October 27, 1966, after an unsuccessful attempt to reach an understanding with South Africa, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2145 on the termination of the mandate and confirmed the international status of SWA1. Thus, the presence of South Africa in this territory has become an illegal occupation.
BEGINNING OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT
The political resistance movement in SWA emerged in the early 1960s, when "on April 19, 1960, the Ovamboland People's Organization (OPO), created on ethnic grounds, was transformed into SWAPO" 2-with the same leadership and with the same charter as the OPO. Sam Nujoma (who left the country earlier that year) soon became president of the new organization.
The creation of SWAPO was dictated by the need to give the organization a national character, in contrast to the Ovambo-dominated OPO*, as in its predecessor, the Ovambo People's Congress (OPC), whose main goal was to campaign against the cruel exploitation and inhumane treatment of Ovambo workers.
Almost at the same time, other political organizations were formed, such as the National Union of South-West Africa (SWANU), established on September 27, 1959, and five years later, on September 25, 1964, the Democratic Organization of National Unity (NUDO). These two organizations also had roots in the same ethnic group - the Herero. The NUDO was created by the Herero Council of Chiefs after the latter fell out with SVANU "over the latter's more radical agenda".3
For some time after its creation, it seemed to SWANN that he would become a leading force in the anti-colonial movement. However,"its star soon began to fade due to internal strife," 4 and SWAPO rose to prominence with wider support and finally led the country-wide struggle for independence.
The SWAPO clearly became the leading political force in Namibia and the only one "nationally organized and representative" 5, while the SWANU and NUDO were either inactive or "wrapped" in ethnic cocoons, pursuing narrow tribal policies, and later even became collaborators of the colonial regime.
As domestic resistance grew, the South African colonial regime stepped up its crackdown on the people of Namibia and began arresting leaders and activists in an attempt to nip the fledgling movement in the bud. On the night of December 10, 1959, South-
* Ovambo-an ethnic group living in Ovamboland - this was the name of the northern regions of the country. The Ovambo make up more than 50% of the population of Namibia.
North African paramilitary and police forces opened indiscriminate fire on Africans who were peacefully protesting their forced eviction from Windhoek to the Katuturu slum village on the outskirts of the city, killing 12 and injuring 50 others. This event became known as the "Windhoek Massacre".
Speaking about the December 10 massacre, Sam Nujoma (SWAPO President /1960 - 2007/ and the President of the Republic of Namibia /1990 - 2007/) wrote: "The idea of our liberation struggle was born on the day when everyone was convinced that, in the end, the only effective way to resist the power of the enemy can be the same firepower. It was these events that inspired me and others [...] to prepare for a long armed liberation struggle."6
As a result of increased colonial repression, many of the organization's leaders (including S. Nujoma) were forced to leave the country. They were adopted in countries such as Tanganyika, Egypt, and later Algeria and Zambia, when they achieved independence in 1962 and 1964, respectively. The first foreign representative offices of SWAPO were opened there.
The external leadership of SWAPO "intensified international diplomatic lobbying to support the cause of Namibia, especially at the United Nations"7. Disappointed by the intransigence and procrastination of the South African colonial regime and outraged by the suppression of any legal political activity of the movement within the country, SWAPO realized the inevitability of armed struggle.
In the mid-1960s, the organization's leadership decided to prepare for the fight, "acquired its first weapon from the President of Algeria Ben Bella"8.A military wing, the South-West African Liberation Army (SWALA), was created. The movement sent SWAPO cadres to Tanzania, Egypt, Algeria, Ghana, and other friendly countries - Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and China-for military training.
On August 26, 1966, " SWALA fighters who had established a volunteer recruitment base in Omugulu-gombash (in northern Namibia) were attacked by colonial police units."9
This day marked the beginning of the armed liberation struggle in Namibia. SWAPO continued its military operations and in 1967 opened a front in the Caprivi area, where its fighters operated from western Zambia.
The United Nations General Assembly, by resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 196710, established the United Nations Council for South-West Africa, inter alia, to govern the Territory until independence, with the greatest possible participation of the South African people. In 1968, the UN General Assembly adopted the name "Namibia" for the Territory, and, accordingly, the Council was renamed the UN Council for Namibia. In its resolutions 264 (1969) and 269 (1969.11), the UN Security Council endorsed the above-mentioned actions of the General Assembly.
In 1970, UN Security Council Resolution 276 confirmed the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia.12 In the same year, the UN Security Council decided to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legal implications for the status of South Africa's continued presence in Namibia.
In its Opinion (dated June 1971), the Court confirmed the withdrawal of the mandate by the General Assembly. 13 The document stated: South Africa must immediately withdraw its administration and end its occupation of Namibia; UN Member States must recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its actions on behalf of or for Namibia; refrain from any transactions with the Government of South Africa that would imply recognition of the legality of such presence, support or assistance.14
In 1973, the General Assembly created the post of UN Commissioner for Namibia, to which Sean McBride (Ireland) was appointed. McBride was replaced by Martti Ahtisaari (Finland, 1977-1982), Brajesh Mishra (India, 1982-1987) and Bernt Karlsson (Sweden, 1987-1988).
Although the SWAPO was not officially banned in the country, its political activities in 1967 and 1970 were paralyzed, and its leaders were most of the time under arrest and other restrictions.
THE CATALYST FOR THE STRUGGLE IS A GENERAL STRIKE
The situation was partially reversed when, in 1971-1972, progressive youth and students joined with workers in organizing the first and "most successful nationwide general strike in the history of Namibia" .15
Prominent SWAPO Youth League leaders such as Kandy Nehova, Charles Dixon Namolo, Jerry Ekanjo, and Thomas Nalikutala Kamati (now Ndali Che Kamati, author of this article), who worked in Walvis Bay, were instrumental in organizing the strike at that time, in collaboration with the Walvis Bay Workers ' Committee, the initiator of the strike. These members of the SWAPO Youth League participated in strike planning committees and organized letters from workers to the colonial authorities explaining the aims and objectives of the strike.
Since this general strike was an important catalyst for the struggle in Namibia, I believe it is necessary to highlight some of its highlights in more detail.
For many years, the South African regime has used a system of "migrant labor contracts" for all indigenous people in the country. To get a job, Africans, especially those from Ovamboland, had to sign contracts for
a period of 12 to 18 months without interruptions and the opportunity to visit your family. Employers paid workers by category ("class"), not by type of work or qualification. Workers could not break the contract, and employers could-at will and at any time.
In early December 1971, the Commissioner-General of the Northern Indigenous Territories, Jan de Wet, stated that the system of migrant labor contracts was voluntary and that if Ovambo and other "natives" were opposed to this system, they would not have requested contracts. "The truth, however, is that there was no other way for them to earn a living, even with such meager funds." 16 On December 10, the Namib Times, a newspaper published in Walvis Bay, announced that " Ovambo workers are planning a strike in Walvis Bay in the next four days."17.
And "on December 13, the strike began - in Walvis Bay, and then in all the mines and industrial centers. Soon it even affected the work of administrative institutions throughout the country. " 18 By that time, letters had already been sent to John Forster, the Prime Minister of South Africa, and the Commissioner of Native Affairs in the north of the SW, giving them an ultimatum.
The strike paralyzed all major sectors of the country's economy and even the work of the Windhoek city administration. "On January 3, 1972, all the mines went on strike, and 13,000 strikers were relocated to Ovamboland. Overall, more than 30,000 workers were on strike across the country. " 19
The strikers elected a representative committee to negotiate with the South African Government. Their main goal was "to reform the system of migrant labor contracts, including the right to choose and change jobs at any time, to increase wages based on the type of work rather than job classification, and to allow families to move freely to their place of work"20.
On January 12, 1972, South Africans sent additional police forces to Namibia "to prevent uprisings". After two days of negotiations with the Government in Hrutfontein, the South African regime officially abolished the system of employment contracts.
The new rules allowed workers to apply for jobs at labor offices in Ovamboland. Workers were now able to choose their own jobs, and although wages were still meager, they were now paid based on the type of work and on individual contracts. 21 Both workers and employers could now terminate the contract at any time. Employers were required to provide free medical care for their employees. However, there was no provision for families to come to their place of work22.
Many workers felt that working conditions were still poor under this new system and continued to strike.
On January 26, the South African regime sent paramilitary units to Ovamboland "to maintain order." Police and troops dispersed rallies with violence, and 10 people were killed in the village of Epinga in Ovamboland. "On 4 February, South Africa enacted a state of emergency law prohibiting rallies and gatherings involving more than five people in Ovamboland."23
Although Namibian workers ended the inhumane system of labor contracts with their general strike, " poor working conditions still persisted, and workers were still separated from their families. However, the strike has expanded their rights, " including the right to form trade unions.24
As a result of the strike creating a revolutionary atmosphere, thousands of people joined the SWAPO or became its supporters, and open political activity was also possible.
In addition to the positive achievements of Namibian workers, the strike had a revolutionizing effect on workers in neighboring countries. Following Namibia, on January 9, 1973, a workers ' strike began in Durban, South Africa. "By March 1973, almost 100,000 workers, mostly Africans, were on strike. These Durban strikes marked a new stage of mass action; the growth of the militant non-racial trade union movement; the evolution of the workers 'alliance; and the creation of a broad united front of progressive and liberation organizations operating underground." 25
The general strike of Namibian workers was an indirect response to the" loud call " of the SWAPO Consultative Congress held in Tanga, Tanzania, from December 26, 1969 to January 2, 1970.
"The Congress called for the mobilization of workers and young people within Namibia, for the creation of effective structures that unite Namibian workers." 26 It reviewed the course of the struggle, made changes in policy and organizational issues, and re-elected the SWAPO leadership. Structures have been established or activated to coordinate the implementation of the Namibia liberation strategy - the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUW) affiliated with SWAPO, the SWAPO Women's Council and the Council of Elders. SWALA, the military wing of SWAPO, was reorganized and renamed the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN).
With the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in Angola and Mozambique in 1975, the "triangle of evil" of the colonial regimes in Southern Africa was eliminated. This radically changed the balance of power in the subcontinent. "Not only have Angola and Mozambique ceased to be a bulwark for the apartheid regimes in Pretoria and Rhodesia, but they have also become IS-
a source of important support and a strong home front for national liberation movements in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. " 27
The first President of Angola, Agostinho Neto (1922-1979), immediately after his country achieved independence, stated:: "Angola is a firm stronghold of the revolution in Southern Africa. Thus, in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, our struggle continues. " 28
These positive developments resulted in the exodus of thousands of young Namibians who left Namibia between April and December 1974 and crossed through Angola to Zambia to join the external wing of SWAPO. Thousands more continued to arrive in Zambia in the following years.
The vast majority of young people were ready to participate in the armed struggle for the liberation of their country. It turned out, however, that the external leadership of SWAPO was not prepared for the arrival of this huge number of people. For many years, it was responsible for only a few hundred fighters and a small civilian component.
Some of the external leadership, including some members of the Executive Committee, supported the idea of holding a SWAPO Congress to review the situation and develop a new course of action, as many of the most important developments occurred after the Tanga Consultative Congress.
It was absolutely necessary to develop a new political program to guide the struggle in the new conditions. Many SWAPO leaders, and in particular its Youth League, who came to Zambia shared this approach.
At the same time, the external management was apparently unable to cope with the new situation. Theo Ben Gurirab (now a member of the SWAPO Politburo and Speaker of the National Assembly) admitted: "The Party was not ready for the influx of members, and was not at the forefront of ideological leadership issues. It did not have the reliable mechanisms necessary to lead a modern revolutionary movement. This situation is usually reinforced by dedicated leadership, a clear political program, and ideological clarity that the movement lacked." "In this state of affairs," he concluded, "a mutiny was inevitable." 29
Some members of the leadership, led by the late Andreas Shipanga, who was SWAPO's Secretary for Information and Propaganda at the time, tried to use the situation to seize the leadership of the movement, and their actions contributed to the mutiny. Theo Ben Gurirab adds: "The legacy of all this still haunts SWAPO today. The movement did not understand that (when the influx of young people from Namibia began. The call of the Consultative Congress in Tanga for mass mobilization became a huge force and shocked us. This was an important turn in the course of the armed struggle. Mutual distrust and hostility began at the top level and spread throughout the system like a bleeding cancer. " 30
Indiscipline, which was growing especially among the leadership of the SWAPO Youth League in Lusaka, Zambia, led by its then President Keshia Pelao Nathaniel and General Secretary Sheeli Shangula, turned into a serious full-scale mutiny on March 15, 1976, among fighters who demanded weapons to go to the front. The outbreak occurred at a central base in the Western Province of Zambia, near the border with Namibia.
This mutiny, which involved several hundred trained but unarmed fighters, created great difficulties, since most of its participants were among the best soldiers and commanders who had recently been trained in the Soviet Union. Although initially, their main requirement was to get a weapon to go fight. Those who mutinied prevented others, especially commanders, from going to the front in Angola.
As the situation continued to spiral out of control in May and June 1976, political leaders involved in the Lusaka mutiny (Shipangi group) were arrested by the Zambian authorities and then handed over to Tanzania. When this group was released in 1978, most of the former leaders of the Youth League found refuge in the Nordic countries.31
By then, political developments in Angola continued to turn in the MPLA's favor. The colonial regime of South Africa was seriously concerned about the prospect of this revolutionary Marxist organization coming to power in Angola. He was particularly concerned that Angola could become a base of support for SWAPO, from which it would conduct military operations in Namibia.
Indeed, hundreds of young people who left Namibia to join the People's Liberation Army in Zambia completed a crash course and returned to Angola on their way to Namibia in December 1974. "In January 1975, the PLAN's advanced units, led by Army Commander Dimo Amaambo, opened a front that became known as the North, along the entire length of the border for more than a thousand kilometers-from Zambia to the Atlantic Ocean." 32
The independence of Angola in 1975 opened a new chapter in the struggle of the people of Namibia. At this stage, with the key assistance of Homateni Kaluenii, who was the most ideologically close to the MPLA in the SWAPO leadership, an official agreement was reached.-
* That morning, the author arrived from the Northern Front in Angola with the late Peter Nanyemba, SWAPO's Secretary of Defense, to arrange for a large number of fighters to be sent to Angola.
an interim agreement between SWAPO and the MPLA to open a front for the fight against Angolan territory and an office of SWAPO in Luanda. By the end of 1977, SWAPO's temporary headquarters had been moved from Lusaka to Luanda, along with Sam Nujoma and most of the organization's leaders.
SWAPO ON THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE
As the armed liberation war intensified, SWAPO also continued to increase its diplomatic campaign and political mobilization activities in Namibia. This growing pressure threatened not only the colonial regime of South Africa, but also the interests of its Western allies.
With the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 385/76 in 1976, a new process towards independence for Namibia began. The resolution demanded that South Africa end its bantustan program; release all Namibian political prisoners; repeal discriminatory legislation; allow the return of Namibian emigrants; withdraw its illegal administration from the Territory; and allow free elections to be held in the Territory under the supervision and control of UNOH.
Although the Western Powers supported resolution 385/76, they did not intend to force the apartheid regime to relinquish control of Namibia. "In fact, until 1978, the United States, France,and the United Kingdom, as permanent members of the UN Security Council, did not agree to a UN arms embargo on South Africa." 34
The three permanent members of the UN Security Council, as well as Canada and West Germany, created the so-called Western contact Group in 1977. "Their main concern was not to resolve the Namibian question, but to protect the interests of the apartheid regime"35 and, of course, their own. In early 1978, the contact group began negotiations to reach a compromise on the resolution of the Namibian crisis. To that end, it submitted new proposals on the independence of Namibia, which included significant concessions to South Africa. "The proposals undermined key aspects of resolution 385/76, including the fact that Bantustans were not to be eliminated until independence was achieved." 36
The efforts of the contact group led to the elaboration and adoption in September 1978 of resolution 435 on the settlement of the problem of Namibia. It was agreed that the transition to independence within one year would be led by the United Nations Transition Assistance Team (UNTAG).
The transition to independence, in accordance with these proposals, would have included: a ceasefire, partial demobilization of South African forces, restriction of SWAPO and South African military forces to their locations, repeal of all discriminatory and politically restrictive legislation, release of political prisoners and return of exiles and refugees; holding national elections for the Constituent Assembly; and This was followed by the adoption of the Constitution of Independence 37.
In parallel with the diplomatic negotiations, SWAPO intensified the armed struggle in northern Namibia, inflicting heavy human and material losses on the racist regime. This forced him to spend millions of rand a day on the war in Namibia, which South Africa could no longer afford.
The struggle for Namibian independence, which had intensified significantly by the late 1980s, reached a turning point in the Battle of Quito Cuanavale in Angola.
The Angolan army's offensive towards Mavinga began in September 1987, and the fighting ended in April 1988. "In fierce clashes, the South African army, which had committed a new aggression against Angola and occupied part of southern Angola, was defeated, along with its surrogate, UNITA, by the combined forces of the Angolan army and Cuban internationalists... the combined forces of the Angolan Army, the Cuban internationalists and the PLAN have begun advancing towards the Angolan-Namibian border."*
The battle of Kuito Kuanawale significantly changed the balance of power in favor of the Namibian liberation movement, in particular, and progressive forces in the South African region, in general. These events forced South Africa to agree to the implementation of the UN plan to achieve a peaceful settlement under the auspices of resolution 435 (1978) The UN Security Council, which defined the process of achieving independence for Namibia. They also contributed to the signing of agreements between representatives of the Governments of Angola and South Africa and Angola and Cuba at the UN headquarters in New York on December 22, 1988.
In 1989, the UN Security Council appointed Martti Ahtisaari as head of UNTAG, a body established by the Security Council to monitor and monitor elections in Namibia, in accordance with resolution 435 of 1978.38
On 1 April 1989, when the implementation of the UN independence plan began, some UN units in northern Namibia were moving to come under the control of the UN peacekeeping force, as stipulated in resolution 435/9/1978. South African forces attacked them, killing many. These irresponsible actions of the colonial regime are almost a torpedo-
* From an interview with Lieutenant General Martin Shali, former Chief of Operations of the PLAN, former Commander of the National Defence Force of the Republic of Namibia. October 25, 2013, Windhoek.
The UN Global Plan for Achieving Independence. It was suspected that the attack was carried out with the consent of Martti Ahtisaari, who was already in Windhoek.
However, the elections were held from 7 to 11 November 1989, after a very intense election campaign. SWAPO won with a majority of 56.9%, 41 out of 72 seats in Parliament. The main ally of the colonial regime, the Turnhalle Democratic Alliance (DTA), won 28%, or 21 seats. The remaining 10 seats were allocated to smaller parties.
The Constituent Assembly was formed from among the political parties that were to be represented in Parliament; it debated and adopted a Constitution for an independent country, and then elected Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, as President of the Republic of Namibia.
Namibia's independence was declared on March 21, 1990.
* * *
There is no doubt that SWAPO's armed liberation struggle had an important, indeed decisive, influence on the process leading to the independence of Namibia. The SWAPO Government provided the previously destitute and impoverished masses with access to the country's economic resources, which were the prerogative of whites. Namibians have gained access to education and health care, increased wages, and improved working conditions.
Today, the country continues to make progress in the social and economic fields, despite the consequences of the international financial and economic crisis.
1 XXI General Assembly. Question of South-West Africa -http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/787/41/ IMG/NR078741. pdf?OpenElement
Nujoma S. 2 Where Others Wavered. Panaf Books, L., 2001, p. 69.
Hopwood Graham. 3 Guide to Namibian Politics, published by Namibian Institute for Democracy. Windhoek, 2006, p. 60.
4 Ibidem.
5 To be born a Nation. The Liberation Struggle for Namibia. Department of Information and Publicity, SWAPO of Namibia. Zed Press, L. 1981, p. 176.
Nujoma S. 6 Op.сit., p. 76.
7 Ibid., p. 113 - 114.
8 Ibid., p. 121 - 131.
9 Ibidem.
10 UN Resolution 2248 of 1967.
11 UN Resolution 264 (1969) and 269 (1969).
12 UN Security Council Resolution 276 of 1970.
13 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, 21 June 1971.
Nujoma S. 14 Op. cit., p. 220 - 221.
15 Interview with Kandy Nehova, former President of the National Council, the upper House of the Parliament of Namibia, former member of the SWAPO Central Committee, 30 November 2013, Windhoek.
16 Ibid.
Nujoma S. 17 Op. cit., p. 18 - 40.
18 The Namib Times, 10 December 1971.
19 Windhoek Advertiser, 15 December 1971.
20 See: Sharp Gene. Waging non-Violent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Centurv Potential. Boston Porter Argent Publishers, Inc. 2005, p. 205 - 215.
21 Ibidem.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Interviews with Kandy Nehova...
25 http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/173-durban-strikes
Nujoma S. 26 Op. cit., p. 194 - 195.
27 From the diary of Homateni Kalueni (late member of the SWAPO Politburo, former Secretary of the SWAPO Youth League and SWAPO Secretary for Information and Propaganda). These diaries are not available in the SWAPO archive or any other public archive, but the author had the opportunity to review them.
Roberto Leal Ramos Monteiro (Ngongo). 28 Closing remarks at the closing of the colloquium on the life and work of Agostinho Netto. Moscow, September 27, 2001
29 Interview with Theo Ben Gurirab, 5 April 2012, Windhoek.
30 Ibid.
31 After his release, Shiyanga sought asylum in the United Kingdom, of which his wife was a citizen. In the same year, the South African regime allowed him to return to Namibia and form the SWAPO Democrats, better known as SWAPO-D. She participated in the South African authorities ' "internal settlement" in Namibia. Shipanga served as "ministers" of Mines and Energy, Nature Conservation and Tourism, Trade and Industry, and in 1987 and 1988 was Chairman of the so-called Transitional Government of National Unity. When SWAPO-D failed to win any seats in the first democratic parliamentary elections in 1989, he retired from politics and his party disbanded in 1991.
32 From the diary of the late Lieutenant General Dimo Amaambo, former PLAN Commander and First Commander of the National Defence Forces of the Republic of Namibia. These diaries are not available in the SWAPO archive or any other public archive, but the author had the opportunity to review them.
Gurirab Т. В. 33 Constitutional Democracy in Namibia // A Critical analysis after two decades. Macmillan Education Namibia. 2010, p. 110 - 111.
34 See: Landis Elizabeth. Namibia in the International Context. The Frustration of Independence // Unfinished Business. The Land Crisis in Southern Africa. Africa Institute of South Africa. 2003, p. 27.
35 See: International Defense and Aid Fund, 91; see also: Unfinished Business...
36 Unfinished Business.., p. 27 - 28.
37 S/RES/435/1978 - http://www.un.org/ru/sc/documents/resolutions/1978.shtml
38 Ibidem.
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