In 2006, the first national elections were held in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire). The country received a legitimate president, a new legislature and the basic law-the Constitution of the Third Republic. The official heraldry of the DRC was replaced: a leopard took the place of the lion on the coat of arms, and the flag returned to its denunciation of the times of 1963-1971. However, little has changed in the intervening period.

According to the development indices, the DRC, as before, appears among the crisis states, "where the modernization process is stalling or even going backwards"¹. The interest of Western Powers in this country rich in natural resources also remains stable. At the same time, foreign "guardians" - according to the Belgian researcher Ludo de Witt, author of the acclaimed book "The Murder of Lumumba" (1999) - look at the official Congolese government "with the same "imperial" contempt as in the 60s"². In this connection, let us return to the origins of the Congolese crisis in the early 1960s, and also recall the history of the colonization of the Congo.

FIGHT FOR THE CONGO

At the end of the 19th century, King Leopold II of Belgium appears on the "battlefield" of European states for spheres of influence on the African continent, who, since his ascension to the throne in 1865, has been hatching plans to annex vast colonial possessions to Belgium. His initiatives in Asia, such as acquiring the Philippines or building a railway in China, fail, and Leopold II tries to take over terra incognita in Central Africa. Inspired by the travels of G. Stanley (1841-1904) and D. Livingstone (1813-1873) in Africa, he convened an International Geographical Conference in Brussels in 1876. Soon he organized the International African Association, which in 1883 was renamed the International Association of the Congo. In 1878, the Belgian company "Committee for the Study of the Upper Congo" was established. On the left bank of the Congo River, a network of trading posts emerged, which marked the beginning of the development of the lands of the modern DRC, and subsequently the establishment of control over a large territory of the Congo. Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 It recognized Leopold II as the sovereign of the occupied territory, which was almost 80 times larger in area than Belgium and was called the Independent State of the Congo. In 1905, the country passed from the hands of the King to the Kingdom of Belgium.

Belgium, while proud to have acquired such a large property in Africa, did not care much about its future.³ The mining industry developed mainly. Valuable strategic raw materials (copper, manganese, uranium, rare earth metals, as well as gold and diamonds) worked for one of the largest Belgian companies, Societe Generale de Belgique, which owned 70% of all capital in the Congo. In addition to Belgian companies, British, French, German, and Dutch companies were also present on the Congolese market. Later, the American industrial and financial companies of the Morgans, Hochschilds, and Guggenheims emerged as a strong competitor. The interweaving of their interests related to the extraction and processing of mineral raw materials led to contradictions, and behind-the-scenes diplomacy often resulted in international scandals.⁴

Before the declaration of independence of the Congo on June 30, 1960, the Belgian Congo was in a state of deep political, economic and ethno-social crisis. The European model of statehood did not fit well into the traditional institutions of power, which at that time had not lost their strength. In addition to Africans (11,803 people), numerous Belgian employees (9,801)occupied "chairs" in the state apparatus⁵. Moreover, almost all Congolese officials were barely literate. Separatist tendencies were growing among the provincial authorities. The leaders of tribalist and regional organizations sought to strengthen their positions in local administrations and spoke out under the slogan of protecting the interests of individual clans from the central government. Some ethnic groups complained about the "oppressors of the Congolese" and turned to the Belgian administration in this regard.⁶

The problem of forming national army cadres also remained acute. The basis of the army was made up of colonial troops - " Fors pyublik "(People's Army). By 1960, it consisted of 24 thousand military personnel, including about 2 thousand Belgian officers, it was well equipped with military equipment (artillery, tanks, aircraft). Belgian army units (approximately 700 people) remained in the territory of the Congo, stationed mainly at two military bases: in the west of the country - in Keaton, in the east-at the Kamina air base. In the event of mass riots, foreign contingents were expected to intervene in the internal affairs of the Congo.⁷ The Americans then sought to compete with the Belgians.

Beginning in 1960, US intelligence launched a broad campaign to "Americanize" the Congolese army. To the capital city of Leopoldville (present-day Kinshasa) one by one direction-

American military missions were conducted to study the needs of the Congolese army, which also included CIA advisers.

In January 1960, the Belgian Government convened a so-called round Table conference in Brussels to discuss the issue of granting Congo independence. Leaders of the country's leading political parties, mostly loyal to Belgium, were invited. The Belgian authorities 'plan was to turn this conference into a" constitutional assembly " with the subsequent formation of a government based on it within the framework of a federal state.

The meaning of the policy of "federalism" was the dismemberment of a single centralized state into autonomous provinces or states created along tribal lines.

However, this plan did not materialize. The majority of Congolese representatives supported the holding of general elections. At the same time, Brussels managed to achieve the conclusion of the Belgian-Congolese treaty of Friendship, Assistance and cooperation, which provided for the preservation of Belgian military bases in the Congo.

The Americans, for their part, also sought to gain a foothold in the Congo. Shortly before independence, Congo was visited by David Rockefeller, the head of one of the largest US banks, Chase Manhattan. As a result of negotiations with representatives of the Belgian administration and local political leaders, he managed to create a consortium that allocated a loan of $ 325 million to" solve " the Congolese problems.⁸

On the eve of independence, elections to the Congolese Parliament were held in May 1960. The House of Representatives of the Parliament approved the composition of the first government headed by Patrice Lumumba, and Joseph Kasavubu was elected President. P. Lumumba set a course for creating a unitary state and restricting the activities of foreign monopolies, nationalizing air, sea and railway transport.⁹ This alarmed the owners of large companies, who were losing the country with the richest natural resources, which occupied an important strategic position in the center of Africa.

Due to economic "uncertainty", a massive outflow of capital from the Congo began, which exposed the position of foreign monopolies to the government of P. Lumumba. There were calls in the Western press for a "military occupation" of the country. The plan for armed intervention in the Congo was approved by Belgian Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens, as well as the US ruling circles. "We informed our allies to get their opinion on the issue, and our analysis of the situation was unanimously accepted. Belgium's position was well understood... We have gained their understanding, sympathy and support," said Belgian Foreign Minister ^{Pierre Vigny10.}

At that time, the leader of the pro-Belgian Konakot party, Moiz Tshombe, was hatching the idea of separating the most mineral-rich province of Katanga (in the east of the country) from the Congo. There are different opinions about Tshombe's separatism. For example, the Congolese historian Isidore Ndaivel e Nziem believes that the idea of secession of Katanga was initially only virtual in nature. According to him, M. Tshombe "went too far"¹¹. But whatever Tshombe's intentions, his idea was generally suitable for Belgium to weaken the government of P. Lumumba, who was determined to expel Belgians from the country. To implement the plan of armed intervention and support for M. Tshomba, a pretext was needed. This was done by the Belgian intelligence services, who patronized the Congolese army and easily inspired the" necessary "uprising of the soldiers of" Force Pyublik " in the province of Bas-Congo. Panic began among the population, and in the West they began to inflate the "threat" to the white population.

Further events developed rapidly, but without obvious logic, although for the Belgian military command the logic "on the contrary" was, as it turned out, only a tactical device. The fact is that the Belgian military contingent was transferred not to the western province of Bas-Congo, where the hotbed of tension actually arose, but to Katanga, in the east of the country: on July 9, 1960, ten Belgian planes arrived at the Kamina military base and landed troops in the amount of 300 people. They blocked Congolese military contingents stationed in the province, which could have prevented the proclamation of Katanga's secession. Thus, confident in his actions, M. Chombe declared independence of Katanga on July 11. Following the example of Katanga, the separation of other regions of the Congo began. Thus, in August 1960, the leader of the ethnic "Baluba Association" ¹² A. Kalonji announced the creation of a"mining state in Southern Kasai".

In order to prevent the actions of the central government in the eastern part of the country, where M. Tshombe was operating, on the day of Katanga's separation, the Belgians, however, began military operations in the province of Bas-Congo under the pretext of protecting the white population. Although by that time all the "whites" had already been evacuated. Warships arriving from Belgium shelled the port cities of Matadi and Boma, while aircraft bombed them from the air. On this occasion, the USSR issued a statement stating that the Western Powers were seeking a "legal basis" to justify armed intervention against the Congo, citing the need to protect the lives and property of citizens of the United States, Britain, France and Belgium in the Congo.¹³

In the period from 10 to 13 July 1960, Belgian paratroopers also landed in the administrative center of Katanga province, Elisabethville (present-day). Lumumbashi), and Leopoldville, despite the protests of P. Lumumba.

The Belgian government, trying to justify its intervention,

It referred to the existing agreement between the two countries "On friendship, assistance and cooperation". However, it provided for the possibility of military intervention by Belgian troops stationed in the Congo only in the event of "a special request from the Congolese Minister of National Defense", as stated in article 6 of the document.

From July 8 to July 18, 10,000 Belgian troops were deployed to the Congo. Paris took part in the Tshombe Card game. The French, who were stationed in neighboring Congo-Brazzaville, assisted Chomba in recruiting mercenaries from France, and later-his escape from the country.

Congo faces a real danger of disintegration of the country into a number of independent states within the framework of the "federation" that was initially tried to impose on the Congo during the Round Table in Brussels. According to the Congolese scholar Kasumba K. Chiteya, this first intervention, which officially lasted 14 days, opened the way for the "Balkanization" of the Congo with external support and created problems for the central government in preserving the country's unity and territorial integrity. The current situation led to the need for P. Lumumba to appeal to neutral forces, which were expressed by the UN force ¹⁴.

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CONFLICT AND THE ROLE OF THE UN

By that time, government circles in Belgium and the United States were already discussing the use of UN forces to "restore" order in the country. Their calculations were limited to persuading P. Lumumba himself to appeal to the UN Security Council for help. Deputy Prime Minister of Belgium A. Lillard stated: "I would like Lumumba to apply to the UN, which could assign Belgian troops some tasks to preserve order and the territorial integrity of the Congo." ¹⁵ US Ambassador to the Congo K. Timberlake, as well as UN Under-Secretary-General R. Bunch, who arrived in the Congo, began to push the Congolese leadership to ask for" military support " to the UN forces. As the Associated Press noted, "this idea was expressed during Kasawubu and Lumumba's talks with U.S. Ambassador Timberlake." ¹⁶

Lumumba appealed to the UN Security Council with a request for military assistance to eliminate the Belgian aggression. He considered it the main destabilizing factor in the Congo, saying in a speech in New York on July 25, 1960: "The Katanga problem does not exist, there is only one problem: the withdrawal of Belgian troops."¹⁷ This did not mean that P. Lumumba downplayed the importance of the Katanga secession. On the contrary, it sought to overcome the crisis situation in this region of the Congo as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister saw the role of the UN only in "driving away the aggressor" in the person of Belgium. ¹⁸ Thus, by fully trusting the UN, the Congolese government "lost sight," according to political analyst K. Chiteya, " of the balance of power within the international community, which was dominated by colonial powers and their mutual sympathies."¹⁹.

On July 14, 1960, the UN Security Council decided to send 15,700 UN - ONUC troops to the Congo from 12 ²⁰ countries, including Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Tunisia, Guinea, Sudan, the Federation of Mali, Liberia, and the UAR. At the same time, at the request of the Government of the Congo, the resolution stipulated that the ONUC command should coordinate its actions with the Congolese Government.²¹ Later, in accordance with Security Council resolution No. 4531 of September 26, 1960, the contingent of the Blue Helmets was increased to 19.3 thousand people.

In connection with the Belgian intervention, P. Lumumba severed diplomatic relations with Belgium.

O. I. Najestkin, a veteran of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service who worked in the Congo at that time, recalls: "The Americans cleverly used the UN administration apparatus and its military contingents to get their hands on the country. The United States sought to eliminate local political figures who hindered them, including Lumumba himself."²². Nor was the then UN Secretary-General, Daag Hammarskjold, a Swedish national who, according to some sources, had a personal interest in a stable US presence in the Congo. "Hammarskjold and Kennedy were involved in the Katanga secession war," wrote I. Ndayvel, " because of their family interests."²³.Let's take a closer look at this topic.

At that time, the world leaders in copper production were mainly three countries: Chile, Sweden and the Congo. The exploitation of Chilean copper was carried out by the Anaconda company, in which Joseph Kennedy, the father of US President John F. Kennedy, played an important role, and in Sweden, control over copper production was in the hands of D. Hammarskjold's brother. In addition, this relative was a member of the board of directors of the American-Belgian company Lamco, which mines minerals in Katanga and Rhodesia. Thus, there was a direct connection between the family clans of foreign corporations. Copper mining in Katanga was cheaper than in the mines of American companies, which made it possible for the largest Union Miner in the Congo to successfully compete with the American business. Le Monde reported that the Congo was "fighting for control of the world's copper production... and in particular, American copper producers are trying to displace Union Minier or at least paralyze its operations." ²⁴

The US offensive against Belgian corporations in the Congo was met with resistance from Belgium's allies, the UK financial groups-

and France, which had their own interests in the Congo.

The events in the Congo were followed not only from the continents of Europe and America, but also from Afro-Asian countries. They all agreed that the Congo was the linchpin of the entire African decolonization policy.

At the same time, their points of view differed on certain issues. One group of African countries, including Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the SAR, Morocco and Algeria, supported the Government of P. Lumumba. They decided to withdraw their troops from the Congo, which were part of ONUC. In their opinion, the Katanga regime was twice "guilty" of the tragic events in the Congo. Firstly, because it was used as an instrument of European economic imperialism, and, secondly, with the cutting off of Katanga, the stability of the political structures of the new state was shaken, which posed a danger to other African states.

A different position was taken by the countries of the former French Community, or the so-called Brazzaville Group, which opposed the legitimate Congolese Government. It was joined by: Senegal, Ivory Coast (BSK), Upper Volta, Dahomey, Togo, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo (Brazzaville), Central African Republic, Madagascar and Mauritania. They believed that the crisis was becoming protracted and difficult to resolve, and the presence of ONUC in the Congo would help counter foreign interference.

Speaking at a meeting of the UN Security Council on July 22, 1960, regarding the presence of Belgian troops on the territory of the Congo, Tunisian representative M. Slim noted the seriousness of the current situation and in this regard gave two reasons: the presence of Belgian troops and the threat of dismemberment of the republic. Representatives of Italy and Great Britain spoke in favor of Belgium's armed intervention in the Congo. Belgian and UN troops were not supposed to withdraw from the territory of the Congo. Moreover, D. Hammarskjold arbitrarily gave instructions not to send troops to Katanga, thereby allowing M. Chomba to take advantage of the situation to proclaim the constitution of Katanga and create his own armed forces under the command of a Belgian officer, which went down in the history of the Congo as the "Katanga gendarmerie". The peculiarity of this military formation was that its ranks were replenished by mercenaries-Belgians, French, other Europeans, as well as recruits from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe).

In response to these developments, the UN Security Council adopted a new resolution (S/4426/1960), which again called on Belgium to immediately withdraw its troops from Katanga Province. It also provided for the entry of the UN armed forces into Katanga to implement the resolution. At the same time, it was indicated that the UN forces would not participate in internal conflicts. On August 15, 1960, the Swedish contingent of troops under the ONUC entered Katanga. However, instead of helping the legitimate government of the Congo to eliminate the separatist Tshombe regime, UN units actually began to protect it. Moreover, the UN military command has denied the central Government of the Congo vehicles to transfer the national security forces of the Congo to eliminate the separatist forces.

During the entire period of the struggle against the armed intervention in the Congo, which began immediately after the country's independence, the USSR consistently advocated the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from the territory of the DRC. He opposed the use of the UN flag to cover up aggression against the young state. The Soviet Government's statement stated that the USSR "will not hesitate to take decisive measures aimed at repelling aggressors who, as has now become quite clear, are actually acting with the encouragement of all the colonial powers of NATO."²⁵

In turn, a conference of representatives of the communist and workers 'parties held in Moscow in November 1960 demanded" non-interference by the imperialist Powers in the sovereign rights of the peoples of the Congo."

(The ending follows)

^{Minaev M.} 1 Problematika "slabykh gosudarstv" v amerikanskoy analitike [Problems of "weak states" in American Analytics]. Mezhdunarodnye protsessy, 2007, No. 2 (14).

² Un complot des gouvernements americain et beige et de l'extreme droite. 17.02.2009 - www.ptb.be/scripts/article.phtml?lang=2&obid+6419

^{Hochschild A.} 3 King Leopold's Ghost. Boston-New York. 1999.

⁴ Cit. by: Subbotin V. A. Kongo v 1960 - 1965 gg. Vinokurov Yu. N., Orlova A. S., Subbotin V. A. Istoriya Zaire v novoe i sovremennoe vremya [The History of Zaire in Modern and Modern times]. Moscow, 1982, p. 201.

⁵ Cit. by: Ponamorenko L. V. Patrice Lumumba: the unfinished story of a short life - in the collection of articles: Africa: modeling the New World, Moscow, RUDN University, 2009, p. 225.

^{Khokhlov N.} 6 Patrice Lumumba. Moscow, Molodaya Gvardiya Publ., 1971, p. 163.

^{Ganshof van der Meersch W. J.} 7 Fin de la Souverenite Beige au Congo. Documents et Reflexions. Bruxelles, Martinus Nijhoff, 1963, p. 382.

^{Nazhestkin O. I.} 8 Gody kongol'skogo krizisa (1960 - 1963 gg.) [8 Years of the Congolese crisis (1960-1963). Zapiski razvedchika].

^{Kabatu-Suila B. E.} 9 Patrice Emery Lumumba, beatifle! Kinshasa, 2004, p. 134.

¹⁰ La libre Belgique. 01.08.1960.

^{Ndaywel e Nziem Isidore.} 11 Histoire general du Congo. Bruxelles, 1998, p. 606.

¹² Baluba, Luba-people in the DRC, live mainly in the province of Katanga and adjacent areas of Kasai province. Language-Kiluba (chiluba), one of the most widely spoken languages of Central Africa, belongs to the central group of Bantu languages, has a written language (based on Latin). In the Middle Ages, the Baluba created their own state of Baluba.

¹³ Pravda, 14.07.1960.

^{Tshiteya Kasumba K.} 14 Crise politique et interventions militaires etrangeres en Republique du Zaire. Kinshasa, CIEDOP, N 001/81. 1981, p. 15.

¹⁵ Le Peuple, 07.07.1960.

¹⁶ Cit. by: Gerard-Libois J., Verhaegen Benoit. Congo 1960. Bruxelles, 1961, p. 541.

^{Lumumba P.} 17 La pensee politique de Patrice Lumumba. Annales de la Chambre du Congo, 1960, p. 279.

^{Gendebien P. H.} 18 L'intervention des Nations Unies au Congo. 1960 - 1964. P., 1967, p. 31.

^{Tshiteya Kasumba K.} 19 Op. cit., p. 15.

²⁰ Ibidem.

²¹ UN Security Council Resolution S / 4387 (1960).

^{Nazhestkin O. I.} 22 Edict. soch., p. 156.

^{Ndaywel e Nziem Isidore.} 23 Op. cit., p. 609.

²⁴ Le Monde, 09.01.1962.

²⁵ Pravda, 1.08.1960.

Permanent link to this publication: