Mali Keywords:, Tuareg, coup in Mali, Azawad

When I was working on the article "Elections in Mali: what to hope for and what to fear?" (see: Asia and Africa Today, 2012, No. 3), the Republic of Mali was almost a model of democracy on the African continent. Indeed, it is one of the few African countries in which power has been transferred legitimately, without bloodshed, for two decades. For half a century of post-colonial history, Malians have managed, despite enormous difficulties, to create a fairly effective statehood and even come close to forming a civil society. Only the endless skirmishes between government forces and Tuaregs in the north of the country have been a tragic backdrop to the recent political process in Mali.

The situation changed radically in the spring of this year. The destabilization of the situation in Libya led to an influx of well-armed and well-trained Tuareg combatants who previously served in the elite troops of the Libyan Jamahiriya to the Sahel zone. Separate clashes between the regular army of Mali and Tuareg separatists have escalated into a full-scale war in this country.

The failures of the government forces, in turn, provoked a military coup in Bamako and became the reason for the removal of President A. T. Toure from power. Mali is tightening a tight knot of intractable contradictions that could lead to a serious political crisis in West Africa.

The article is devoted to the problem of Tuareg separatism and the attempt of disparate Berber-speaking tribes to unite within their own state of Azawad.

The population of Mali, as of 2010, reached approximately 14 million people. The annual population growth rate is 2.6%, the birth rate is 46.1 per 1000 people, and the death rate is 14.6 per 1000 people. Emigration is 5.4 per 1,000 people per year.

The ratio of sociolinguistic groups in the population of Mali (as of 2010) is as follows: native speakers of Mande languages - 51% (including Bambara - 37%, Soninke-8%, Malinke-6%); native speakers of Voltian languages (Gur languages) - 20% (including Senufo - 12%, Dogoni-6%). 8%); 14% of the country's residents speak Fulbe dialects, and 7% speak Songhai. Tuaregs, or Udalans, - 3% of the country's population - speak the Tamashek language, the Moors of the Sahara (2%) - in a special Maghreb dialect of Arabic. Europeans make up only 1% of the population of Mali, while the rest together make up 3%¹. However, these data are very approximate; other sources indicate a slightly different ratio of speakers of certain languages and cultures in the population ^of Mali2.

Settled farmers and fishermen, native speakers of the Mande and Songhai languages, who make up the majority of the population of Mali, live mainly on the banks of the Niger, in the south-east of the country. Since ancient times, the Fulbe have been engaged in cattle breeding mainly on the south-western outskirts of the country, although their nomads can be found in different provinces. The sands of the Sahara are inhabited by Tuaregs, Arabs and Moors, known in the Sahel zone as warriors, traders and pastoralists. ³ These "white people of Mali" ⁴ live mainly in the areas of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. They have long raised and sold cattle, goats, sheep and camels. The area of settlement of the Tuareg extends to many countries: Algeria, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso.⁵

On the map - Azawad, the territory of the original residence of the Tuaregs.

Mali is an agricultural country with a low level of urbanization: just over a quarter of its citizens live in cities.

About 85% of Malians are Muslims (all Manda-speaking and Voltian groups profess Sunni Islam, which was brought here by the Berbers in the XVII century), 1% are Christians (mostly Europeans), the rest are animists (mainly Senufo and Dogoni, who remain faithful to traditional beliefs).⁶.

Such a complex composition of languages, cultures, religions, and traditions is in itself fraught with the danger of conflicts. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the historical memory of Malians preserves images of enemies who threatened the life and peace of their distant ancestors.

The territory of modern Mali was inhabited in the 5th-4th millennium BC. e. In the pre-colonial period, there were successive states here: Ghana (IX-XIII centuries), Mali (XIII - XV centuries) and Songhai (XV-XVI centuries)⁷. Ghana, created by the distant ancestors of the Soninke tribes, survived the invasion of Berber tribes and fell under the blows of the king of Mali. Founded by the ancestors of the modern Malinke, the state of Mali suppressed the Soninke and Sousse tribes. Two centuries later, the Malinke themselves were defeated and driven out of the fertile lands of the middle Niger by the Songhai tribes, who created their own state here. The expansion of the Songhai tribes led to wars with the Hausa and Gourma tribes. Rich cities were attacked by warlike Fulbe and Tuareg nomads.

The fall of the Songhai State ushered in a new stage in the region's history: since the 16th century, the Fulbe tribes have been increasingly dominant here. In the Ahmadu State formation they created, members of the Fulbe clan nobility become owners of large latifundia, and the local population-Wolofs, Serers, and Mandingos - are forced to work on these lands.⁸

A brief historical digression shows that there were wars of all against all in the region at certain times. Oral folklore tradition still preserves the memory of heroes and those who in different periods of the country's history became a source of misery and suffering of the population. The historical memory of Malians remains one of the major conflict-causing factors.

The situation is complicated by the fact that the country's borders were drawn during the collapse of the colonial system without taking into account the socio-cultural and linguistic characteristics of its inhabitants, and representatives of related tribes often live on the territory of neighboring states. For example, the Soninke, in addition to Mali, also settled in Mauritania and Senegal, the Senufo in Ivory Coast, the Songhai in Niger, the Tuareg in Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, etc. Transparency and conditionality of borders in this situation favor cross-border pendulum migrations. The low standard of living of Malians forces them to look for work in neighboring countries: Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, etc.

Currently, according to various sources, between 2 and 4 million Malians live outside the country. On the territories of a number of neighboring countries, bloody conflicts do not subside, and migrants become witnesses, and often participants in armed clashes.

BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT

The conflict situation in Mali has its own specifics. It is largely determined by the formation on the territory of this state of various economic traditions, various "cultures of life support". Quite peaceful farmers, hunters and fishermen live in the movement zone of free and aggressive nomads-pastoralists, traders, a kind of"desert corsairs". Economic specialization should promote mutually beneficial exchange and peaceful coexistence of representatives of different cultures, but history shows that nomads have always been a threat to the settled agricultural population.

As already noted, in the pre-colonial period, the early feudal states suffered from Tuareg raids. But the colonization of the territory by France did not change the situation much and, oddly enough, even increased the aggression of the nomads against the farmers.

The Tuaregs have long resisted

Their resistance to the French conquest was finally broken only in 1914. (Recall that the beginning of colonization of the territory of Mali dates back to 1855) And even after the pacification of the Tuaregs, their situation was noticeably different from that of the majority of the population. In an effort to neutralize the influence of traditional leaders and priests, who often led resistance to colonizers, the French appointed those aborigines who did not belong to the tribal "nobility"as cantonal leaders. The only exceptions were the nomads of the Sahara-the Tuaregs and Moors, whose tribal leaders were used by the French to control the territory. Of course, this was a forced concession, aimed at appeasing the warlike pastoralists.

Moreover, the French sought to preserve tribal relations among the Tuaregs and actually legalized slavery on their lands. With the sanction of the French administration, the nomadic tribal nobility collected special rents from the peasants (descendants of their slaves) who worked on their lands - from 50 to 80% of the crop. The proportion of dependent peasants in Mali reached 25%⁹. Only in 1945, after Sudan was granted the status of an overseas territory of France, was forced labor legally prohibited throughout Mali. However, the fact that dark-skinned Africans were actually slaves to the Tuareg nobility until the beginning of the twentieth century remains a source of hostility to the Tuaregs today.¹⁰

SEPARATISM OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES. THE FIRST TUAREG REVOLT

Almost immediately after independence, conflicts between the North and South of the country, between the central government and the tribal elite of the Sahel tribes, between pastoralists and farmers became apparent. And, as always in Africa, conflicts soon became tribal and tribalistic.

The socialist quest of the first President of Mali, Modiba Keita (1960-1968.¹¹), despite its "Islamic flavor", quite naturally caused acute discontent among the most archaic, purely traditionalist semi-feudal nomadic communities of the Sahel. The prospect of socializing the herds and lands, as well as freeing the peasants who worked on these lands from dependence, did not please the Tuareg tribal nobility at all. In turn, the nomads themselves, who inhabited the periphery of the state, did not fit well into the concept of" socialist " transformations and therefore did not care much about the central government.

The reason for open clashes was ill-considered administrative decisions of the government of M. Keita. In an effort to replenish the treasury and streamline the taxation of citizens, the authorities started organizing a strict accounting of livestock among the nomads of the Sahel. Finally, the land reform project developed by the authorities called into question the very existence of pastoralists. These initiatives resulted in a guerrilla war in the north of ^the country12.

In 1962, the Tuareg tribes broke out of obedience. (The most formidable thing for the central authorities was the uprising of the Kel-effel tribe on the Adrar plateau.) On the orders of M. Keita, army units were thrown against the rebellious nomads. Tuareg nomads were bombed from the air, wells were poisoned. The Northerners ' revolt was finally suppressed only in 1964 (However, minor tribal clashes occurred in the Sahel and adjacent territories constantly throughout the 1960s). The result of these events was a wave of xenophobia: the Tuaregs went to the Sahara sands with thoughts of revenge, and the army firmly established its rejection of obstinate nomads.

The second exodus of Tuaregs to neighboring countries was associated with a terrible drought that lasted from 1968 to 1974 and covered the entire Sahel zone. Hundreds of thousands of cattle fell, rivers became shallow, wells dried up. People were dying of hunger and thirst, and many Tuareg tribes migrated to neighboring countries-Algeria and Libya.¹³ To top it all off, the socialist-obsessed government of M. Keita ¹⁴ decided in May 1968 "to eliminate the remnants of feudal exploitation and strengthen the leading role of the party (Sudan Union - African Democratic Association - AF) in the countryside"¹⁵. The traditional foundations of life of nomadic tribes were being destroyed, and the rejection of the presidential power policy by the Tuareg tribal elite became more and more obvious.

In addition, relations between the Government and the Muslim clergy have sharply worsened amid the socio-economic and political crisis in ^the country16. There is no need to say specifically what position the Muslim nomads took in this confrontation. Tuaregs also rebelled under the slogans of "restoring Islam", especially after the authorities introduced a new family code in 1962, which, according to devout Muslims, was "even worse than the French"¹⁷. However, there is an opinion that most of the Tuaregs are not among the strict guardians of Islamic customs.¹⁸

After the overthrow of the regime of M. Keita and the establishment of the military regime of Moussa Traore in November 1968, the population of the north of the country was completely marginalized. Tuareg communities were not represented at any level of government, and Tuaregs were not allowed to hold officer positions in the security forces. Bambara and Songhai^.19 The Government of M. Traore ignored the problems of the inhabitants of the northern regions, in particular, the development of the infrastructure of education, health and communications. (However, "nomadic schools"were organized for nomadic Tuaregs.)

Drought of 1983-1985 again on-

it put the people of the North on the edge of survival. There was a massive loss of livestock, and the nomads lost their ability to sustain themselves. With the support of the United Nations, the Government hastily set up three hundred camps for drought-stricken pastoralists in an effort to avoid new social disasters. But these camps were organized on the territory of rural communities, which themselves suffered both from natural disasters and from the invasion of foreign migrants. ²⁰

The Tuaregs were not ready to move to a sedentary lifestyle. The authorities 'efforts to" put nomads on the ground" were not successful: the "cultural distance" between the desert herders and the sedentary farmers of Mande and Songhai was so difficult to overcome that nomads left for the desert immediately after they managed to acquire (most often-steal or win back)land. a few head of cattle. And the tribes, on the ancestral lands of which the authorities tried to settle pastoralists, were hostile to them.

As a result, many Tuareg and Moor tribes once again migrated to neighboring countries, mainly to Algeria and Libya. A significant part of them joined the Libyan Islamic Legion, received military training and combat experience in Chad and Lebanon. Some, having received an education, found work in the oil industry. But the Tuaregs were not able to adapt to these countries: in the late 1980s, Libya disbanded the battalions in which Tuaregs served, and the fall in oil prices led to a sharp reduction in jobs. In 1986, almost 10,000 Tuaregs were forcibly expelled from Algeria. When they returned to Mali, they found songhai farms on "their" pastures. Government support was clearly insufficient, and humanitarian aid from Western funds was stolen by corrupt officials, and often by Tuareg tribal leaders.²¹

Gradually, the idea that the problems of the nomads of Mali can be solved by force prevailed in the minds of not only the tribal elite of the Tuaregs, but also in the minds of the younger generation of desert residents. Newfound confidence in their ability to fight, long-standing resentment, and a lack of visible alternatives led to a well-organized armed mutiny. ²²

In June 1990, violent clashes between Tuareg rebels and Government forces resumed. The latest round of tension was sparked by a Tuareg attack on a police station near the Niger border, where several of their tribesmen were being held in custody. The nomads inflicted a number of serious attacks on military garrisons and facilities.

The political leadership of the rebels was carried out by the Azawad People's Movement (formed in 1988 in Libya, founded by Ayad Ag Gali), whose members were mainly Tuaregs. Soon, the rebels were joined by Arabs who organized their own Arab Islamic Front, Azawad. (Azawad is the original Tuareg territory; it includes part of Algeria, Libya, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.) Local leaders, as well as Libya and private individuals from abroad, provided financial support to the rebels. The central government responded by intensifying military operations.

The brutality of the punitive operations provoked a new wave of violence and provided support for the uprising from all Berber-speaking tribal groups living in the north of the country. On the Government side, farmers in the Sahel zone, mostly belonging to the Songhai ^{tribes, participated in the conflict. 23} The Songhai combatants received weapons and food from the Government. (A little later, in 1994, these scattered detachments merged into a large military-political organization with the remarkable name "Ganda-Koi" ("masters of the earth").

Some Western researchers note the old "ethnic enmity" as the main reason for the confrontation in this conflict. However, a more well-reasoned view is that the conflict was caused by the Tuaregs returning from Libya and Algeria demanding the return of land that they considered their ancestral pastures. In this context, the nature of land ownership has become particularly relevant: Songhai farmers defended private ownership, while Tuaregs advocated the preservation of ancestral, communal ownership ^of pasture24.

Fighting unfolded not only in the Sahel, but also on the banks of the Niger: in Menaki, Anson-

guo and Gao. By this time, the Tuaregs were armed with automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank missiles. From camels, the "blue ghosts of the desert" were transferred to armored vehicles and off-road vehicles ²⁵. The army units sent to suppress the uprising suffered one defeat after another. And in the south of the country, demands for the democratization of the political regime were increasingly insistent. In addition, the Algerian authorities, concerned about the uncontrolled situation on the border with Mali, began to exert political pressure on the Malian government and support peace initiatives.

M. Traore realized that a quick victory over the rebels was unrealistic, and in the current situation, he preferred to conclude an agreement with the rebels on the cessation of hostilities and the implementation of a program for the development of Tuareg-populated regions. The peace agreement signed in Tamanrasset on January 6, 1991 provided for the allocation of a significant share of the development budget to the north, and also allowed nomads to hold responsible positions in the administration and serve in the army and other security structures. Northerners were granted autonomy in the sphere of culture and socionormative traditions.²⁶

Realizing that he had gone too far, M. Traore did not dare to publish all the provisions of the Tamanrasset Agreement. The opposition was outraged by the defeat of the army and the government's consent to the autonomy of the northern territories. In addition, the Songhai communities did not participate in the negotiations, and their representatives feared that Tuareg dominance would be legitimized in the north. European experts then considered the Tamanrasset Agreement a "dead letter" and declared that it had virtually no impact on the situation in northern Mali and did not open up any new opportunities for establishing a dialogue between the Malian government and the rebel Tuaregs.²⁷

And in March 1991, Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Toure led a military coup and arrested M. Traore. "The fall of Moussa Traore gave hope for a quick resolution of the Tuareg problem. But that didn't happen. " ²⁸

The new regime did not recognize the legitimacy of the Treaty of Tamanrasset. Under pressure from civil society* in August 1991, the new Government held a National Conference in Bamako to discuss the country's future and write a new constitution. On the second day of the conference, 192 delegates from the northern communities called for the formation of a commission to continue working on the points of the Tamanrasset Agreement.

However, at that stage of the situation, they were not able to resist the escalation of the conflict. The violence not only continued, but was compounded by the inability of the Transitional Government to take control of the troops, who were trying to demonstrate their willingness to seize the strategic initiative. In August 1991, the Government made public the losses that the army had suffered during the fighting during the year. According to the Ministry of Defense and Security, the number of military personnel killed that year reached 150 people. In Bamako, the insurgency in the Gao and Timbuktu regions was described as "chronic armed banditry" ^.29 The situation was further complicated by the fact that on September 18, 1991, the Libyan authorities expelled about 200 Malian migrants from their country.³⁰

At the end of 1991, A. T. Toure called on Algeria to participate in the negotiation process. In addition, this time the negotiations were preceded by a series of preparatory meetings to clarify the positions of the parties and develop a common negotiation concept. In November, the first meeting was held in Segou, which was attended by representatives of the Government, armed rebel movements and several Government-selected civil society leaders. They agreed on the main points of the negotiation process and the agenda.

This was followed in December by a meeting of representatives of all armed movements in El Golea (Algeria), at which the Association of Movements and Fronts of Azawad (ODFA) was formed. A few days later, the government and ODFA agreed on a cease-fire. It is important to note that this meeting brought together both representatives of the Governments of neighboring States and leaders of the emerging civil society who enjoyed influence in Mali. The main result of the meeting was the agreement of the ODFA to resolve the conflict within the existing state of Mali.

From December 1991 to March 1992, four negotiating sessions were held in Algeria, and the Algerian Government played a key role in negotiating and reaching agreements. The outcome of this process was the National Pact signed in Bamako on 11 April 1992 between ODFA and the Transitional Government of Mali.³¹

The Pact is based on four points: peace and security in the north of the country; national reconciliation; special initiatives for the socio-economic development of the north; granting special status to the northern territories as part of the reform of the decentralization of power in Mali. The post of "Commissioner for the Northern Territories" was also provided for overseeing the implementation of the agreement: the commissioner was appointed for five years with the right to extend the term and was accountable personally to the President. The Pact provided for "the integration of former fighters into the Malian army and their representation in the Government, the creation of local and regional councils with a real transfer of power to them, the redistribution of State resources for the development of the North, and the establishment of various commissions to oversee the implementation of the treaty"^.32

It would seem that the conflict was successfully resolved. However, it soon became clear that the National Pact would be just as difficult to implement in practice,

* On the formation of civil society in Mali, see: Filippov V. R. Elections in Mali: what to hope for and what to fear? // Asia and Africa today. 2012, N 3.

just like the previously signed Tamanrasset Agreement. (Note that, according to Tuareg ideologists, the Pact still represents a declaration of intent rather than a real program of action. In 2007, Abdoulahi Attayoub, president of the Tuareg association Temoust (established in France in 1991), defended another Tuareg attack on government forces and said that "The National Pact signed in 1992 has not yet been fully implemented." ³³)

In April 1992, a new President of Mali, Alpha Oumar Konare, was elected. It was important for the new president to change the mood in the army. Most of the soldiers and officers believed that the government had capitulated to the demands of the rebels, and the defeat was due to the poor armament of the army. Soldiers stationed in the north sometimes refused to take orders from their senior officers. And individual units continued to conduct combat operations.

Anarchy and division also reigned in the Tuareg ranks. Despite the existence of a unifying structure - the ODFA, they were still divided into tribes that remained loyal to their leaders, and the latter relied on their own tribal clientele. If at the beginning of the war the fighters were driven by certain ideological and idealistic motives, then over the years they began to pay less attention to the orders of formal leaders and were guided by the completely mercantile interests of their tribal structures and notables. Among them were armed gangs that did not depend on anyone and were not interested in a peaceful settlement. In addition, many agricultural communities living in the territory bordering the Sahara did not agree with the National Pact. Their interests were not represented at the negotiating table, and they increasingly suffered from the actions of armed nomads.

Finally, there was a lack of resources in the country to implement the agreement reached on the socio-economic development of the north. The population of the northern territories practically did not receive the promised resources.

Nevertheless, the signing of the National Pact in 1992 led to important long-term results. First, it became clear that neighboring countries are interested in stabilizing the situation in Mali and are ready to support peace initiatives. This destroyed the illusions about the financing of the conflict from external sources. Secondly, all participants realized that their opponents are ready for a peaceful end to the conflict only if their strategic interests are taken into account. Third, through negotiations, the parties agreed on the main parameters and conditions for a political settlement that can become the basis for long-term peace in the country. Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, although the Government was supposed to play a major role in the negotiation process, representatives of non-governmental organizations managed to take an active part in it. From this point on, the balance of power began to change, and the emerging civil society began to show more initiative, involving various groups of the population in the negotiation process.

The year 1993 turned out to be relatively calm. However, the specifics of the conflict situation gradually changed. By 1994, armed clashes broke out between rebel groups. The army failed to prevent violence. Despite the agreements reached in Algeria and Tamanrasset, radical Tuareg factions launched a new attack on government forces on June 19, 1994. As a result of this action, more than 20 people were killed.³⁴

It has become clear that the Government is not capable of unilaterally ending the violence. In June 1994, bowing to serious pressure from domestic forces, President A. U. Conare announced the launch of a series of regional consultations designed to engage civil society in debates about the country's future. The Government has launched an unprecedented information campaign about events in the north.

By this time, the civilian authorities had managed to normalize the situation in the army. The radical military has come to understand that there is no military solution to the problem or that it is impossible at this stage.

As a result, A. U. Konare's appeal to the national public opinion played a decisive role in improving the situation. In November 1994, new meetings were organized in the north between Government officials and rebel leaders. It is important to note that at that time in northern Mali, the State administration was not functioning, and the army practically did not control even key areas of the territory. The President realized that ordinary citizens themselves took the initiative to end the ceasefire, and decided to transfer the negotiation process to their competence. In November 1994, the President visited the northern districts of Gao and Kidal, where he stated that rebel attacks cannot justify the army's punitive actions against civilians.³⁵

At the end of 1994, A. U. Konare announced a temporary cessation of hostilities "to allow time for civil society to work out a solution."³⁶ He ordered the withdrawal of military units from the north of the country that caused particular discontent among the civilian population, and forbade other army units to leave their places of deployment. Regional authorities were encouraged to support the work of various civil society structures, but not to interfere in it.

The President made it clear that he was putting the initiative to find a solution to the devastating conflict in the hands of the citizens of the republic. Despite its brief history, Malian civil society has been able to realize the opportunities offered to it. Various political structures and public organizations joined the process

organizing and holding meetings and negotiations in the north. These activities have resulted in local peace agreements, direct interaction between communities, voluntary disbanding of paramilitary movements, dispute resolution and social reconciliation.

The Government, with the support of the United Nations and international NGOs, has begun developing a concept for the disarmament and demobilization of rebel fighters. The United Nations Development Programme then played an important role in supporting the peace process. Two international conferences were held, where representatives of donor States and NGOs discussed the financing conditions for the demilitarization program and major investments in the development of the northern regions. The leaders of the rebel movements saw these conferences as a kind of guarantee for the continuation of the peace process, giving them the opportunity to announce the disbanding of their armed groups. These efforts resulted in the signing of a peace agreement in 1995.

On March 27, 1996, A. U. Konare initiated a symbolic event that was supposed to mark the end of the national reconciliation process. In Timbuktu, 3 thousand barrels of firearms that were collected during the implementation of the disarmament program from demobilized rebel fighters were burned in the "bonfire of peace". The ceremony, organized jointly by the Northern Affairs Commission and the United Nations Development Programme, attracted about 10,000 spectators. The President officially adopted a statement on the dissolution of the five rebel movements, which was read out by Zeidan Ag Sidalamin, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Azawad. This event then became a symbol of the end of the civil war and an important stage in the formation of a new model of historical memory of Malians.

Alas, the "bonfire of peace" burned out very quickly...

The fact is that the Tuareg community is by no means united in its interests and goals, and tribal leaders often compete with each other and are not inclined to recognize authorities. Separate skirmishes between various tribes and government forces continued unabated, and after the signing of the 1995 agreement, the authorities ' promises to take into account the economic needs of the northern territories were largely nothing more than a declaration of intent.

The situation seriously worsened in the spring of 2006, when the Tuaregs demanded the implementation of the terms of the previously concluded peace agreements in full and again resorted to force of arms as an argument in the polemic with the Malian authorities. On May 22, rebels attacked two government camps in the Kidal area, a few hundred kilometers from Mali's border with Algeria and Niger. After replenishing their ammunition reserves, they retreated to the Sahara sands.

Shortly after these events, field commanders of several Malian Tuareg armed groups (Ibrahim Ag Bahangi, Hassan Fagaga, Iyad Ag Gali, and others) established the Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADI, also known as the 23 May Democratic Alliance for Democratic Change). The main program requirement of this military-political organization was the federalization of Mali and broad autonomy for the Tuaregs living in the north of the country.

After an armed standoff that lasted from May to July, a new peace agreement was signed in Algeria between the leaders of the Alliance and Bamako. The leaders of a number of Tuareg tribes have declared their readiness to counter the penetration of Islamic fundamentalists under the banner of Al-Qaeda into Mali.

(To be continued)

¹ Population statistics: historical demography of all countries, their divisions and towns - http://www.populstat.info/

² The World Factbook: Mali - http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html; Central Intelligence Agency - http://www.cia.gov/index.html

^{Hershowits A.} 3 The Tuareg in Mali and Niger http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/tuareg.htm

^{Bode P.} 4 Touareg - http://mali-music.com/Cat/CatT/Touareg.htm

^{Bernus E.} 5 Etre Touareg - http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/047023.pdf

⁶ Peoples of the world. Istoriko-etnograficheskiy spravochnik [Historical and Ethnographic reference], Moscow, 1988.

^{Olderogge D. A.} 7 Western Sudan in the XV-XIX centuries. Moscow-L., 1960. pp. 5-36.

^{Olderogge D. A., Potekhin I. I.} 8 Zapadnyy Sudan [Western Sudan]. Series "Peoples of the World", Moscow, 1954, pp. 262-268.

^{Vitukhina G. O., Onuchko V. G.} 9 The Republic of Mali. Spravochnik [Handbook], Moscow, 2005, pp. 68-69.

^{Hershowits A.} 10 Op. cit.

¹¹ For more information, see: Filippov V. R. Elections in Mali: what to hope for and what to fear? // Asia and Africa today. 2012, N 3.

^{Hershowits A.} 12 Op. cit.

¹³ Ibidem.

¹⁴ For more information, see Filippov V. R. Edict op.

^{Novikov S. S., Ursu D. P.} 15 Istoriya Malii v novoe i sovremennoe vremya [History of Mali in the new and modern times]. Moscow, 1994, p.187.

¹⁶ Islam in West Africa, Moscow, 1988, pp. 50, 180.

^{Novikov S. S., Ursu D. P.} 17 Decree. op. s. 197-198.

^{Hershowits A.} 18 Op. cit.

^{Bode P.} 19 Op. cit.

²⁰ Country profile. Guinea, Mali, Mauritania. L., 1987. P. 28.

^{Hershowits A.} 21 Op. cit.

^{Lode K.} 22 Peace process in Mali: context, analysis and evaluation // Conciliation Resources - http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/public-participation/english/lode.php

^{Hershowits A.} 23 Op. cit.

²⁴ Ibidem.

²⁵ See: Novikov S. S., Ursu D. P. Decree, Op. pp. 245-246.

^{Bernus E.} 26 Op. cit.

^{Baque Ph.} 27 Nouvel enlisement des espoirs de paix dans le conflit touareg au Mali - http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1995/04/BAQUE/1370

^{Bernus E.} 28 Op. cit.

²⁹ Le "modele" malien - http://www.clio.fr/CHRONOLOGIE/chronologie_mali_le__modele__malien.asp

³⁰ Ibidem.

^{Baque Ph.} 31 Op. cit.

^{Hershowits A.} 32 Op. cit.

³³ Interview with Abdoulahi Attayoub, President of the Tuareg association "Temust", established in France in 1991. 31.08.2007 - http://www.afrik.com/article12377.html

³⁴ Le "modele" malien...

³⁵ Ibidem.

^{Lode K.} 36 Op. cit.

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