Keywords: Mali, Tuareg, coup in Mali, Azawad, Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda established itself in southern Sahara at the turn of the century. Mali has been seen as a reserve base for al-Qaeda since 2001, when the Americans intervened in Afghanistan. Even at that time, the transfer of small groups of well-trained Mujahideen to the Sahel zone began. Initially, Osama bin Laden's emissaries tried to rely on the structures of the Salafi Group of Preaching and Jihad-SGPD. (A radical Islamist organization founded by Emir Hassan Khattab in 1996 in Algeria. Seeks the proclamation of Algeria as a clerical state. It operates in the Sahel countries, where it is engaged in recruiting and training militants. It has about 800 active members, of which about 200 are active in Mauritania, Mali and Niger. ¹)

AL-QAEDA EXPANSION IN MALI

In the spring of 2002, Al-Qaeda attempted to take over the SGPA, but Kh. Khattab opposed this, and soon the Algerian security services killed Abu Mohammed, who was responsible for the penetration of Al-Qaeda into the Sahel zone ².

A little later, in 2004, Al-Qaeda militants attempted to establish themselves in northern Mali. However, then the leaders of the Tuareg tribes that controlled this territory, after negotiations with the government, suggested that the fundamentalists leave Mali. Fearing armed conflict and the intervention of the Malian army, the militants moved to Niger. But even then, several dozen Tuareg citizens of Mali joined the terrorists. Later, two groups of terrorists settled in northern Mali, one of which consisted of Algerians and was a combat unit of the SGPD, and the second was recruited from Pakistanis and was a branch of Al-Qaeda. A year later, in September 2006, the Salafists declared recognition of Osama bin Laden's primacy.³

Russian researcher V. Kudelev identifies four factors that have caused Al-Qaeda's increased interest in Mali: the proximity of potential terrorist targets in Europe; the inaccessibility of northern Mali; the presence of Islamist gangs (primarily Salafists) in the region; and conflict relations between the Malian authorities and the Tuareg "masters" of these territories.⁴ Be that as it may, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is becoming an increasingly prominent factor in the military and political situation in the region in general, ⁵ and in Mali in particular.

The presence of al-Qaeda also had a destructive effect on the Malian economy: smuggling drugs and weapons, kidnapping tourists for ransom-all this hindered the creation of tourism infrastructure in the north of the country. As a result, this sector of the Malian economy realized its potential only by 10 - 15^{% .6} On the contrary, the huge money that Islamists received from criminal activities allowed them to recruit supporters from among the leaders of Arab and Tuareg tribes, to attract "knights of the desert"to their ranks.

The presence of Islamists has had a marked and controversial effect on the Malian Government's relations with the Tuareg. On the one hand, official Bamako had every reason to fear that rearming the Tuareg combatants would make them completely unmanageable and greatly complicate the situation in the north of the country. On the other hand, the country's leadership has made cautious attempts to use the Tuareg in the fight against Islamic fundamentalists.⁷ Deputy Speaker of Parliament Bibi Ahmad Ag (formerly one of the leaders of the Tuareg rebels) assured the president that the Tuaregs were only waiting for the green light from the Malian government to launch military operations against Al-Qaeda.⁸

In 2006, an agreement was concluded between tribal leaders and the country's authorities to train Tuareg military units under the command of Malian regular army officers.⁹ And in February 2007, the authorities of Algeria and Mali recruited 3,000 Tuaregs to serve in special units designed to counter the penetration of AQIM emissaries into the region. "We will counter this foreign threat with all the means at our disposal," said Tuareg mercenary leader Ahmed Agbibe10.

THIRD TUAREG UPRISING IN MALI

In 2007, the Tuaregs of Niger rebelled, demanding that the Niger authorities ensure social and economic equality of Tuaregs with other citizens of this country. This included, first of all, the equitable distribution of income from the exploitation of Niger's natural resources, and the provision of opportunities for Tuaregs to advance through the ranks of the national army and engage in political activism.¹¹

After the Tuareg Niger resumed military operations against government forces

Continuation. The beginning of sm: Asia and Africa Today, 2012, N 8.

and the Tuaregs of Mali. May 17, 2007 They attacked an army base on the border of Mali and Niger and took 30 hostages. The third Tuareg uprising in Mali has begun.

In early September 2007, A. T. Toure, who had just been re-elected President of Mali, went to Libya on a visit. At the meeting with Gaddafi, it was decided to hold a meeting of the heads of all the Sahel countries with Tuareg residents in Tripoli. But it didn't go any further than the declaration of intent.

And on September 12, the Tuaregs fired on an American plane that was supposed to deliver ammunition to the Malian government forces, so that the latter could prevent Al-Qaeda from entering the country. Two days later, the Tuaregs under the leadership of I. A. Bahanga captured the town of Tinzahouaten on the border of Mali with Algeria.

After taking hostages, the Tuaregs demanded the withdrawal of Malian troops from the Tinzoutena region. Moreover, they booby-trapped the road to Bamako, effectively blocking Malian troops in the region. ¹² On September 16, Tuaregs attacked a military convoy on the border with Algeria, killing seven rebels and one soldier. It was reported that I. A. Bahangi put forward a demand to provide the Tuaregs with additional state subsidies.¹³ In fact, it was another attempt by the Tuareg to take control of the traditional caravan routes between the Maghreb and the Sahel.

Shortly after these events, rebel leaders announced the formation of the Niger-Mali Tuareg Alliance (ATNM), whose official leader was Hama Ag Sid Ahmed.

The "uranium theme" has become increasingly insistent in the Alliance's territorial demands, as the Sahel zone, over which Alliance leaders sought to establish control, contains rich deposits of uranium ore - a fifth of all explored uranium deposits. ¹⁴ (This led some experts to call the Tuareg uprising of 2007-2008 a "uranium riot"^.15)

In early April 2008, the Malian Government and the leaders of most Tuareg tribes again agreed to a cessation of hostilities. ¹⁶ There was a lull, but on May 22, the Tuaregs attacked Malian military positions 150 kilometers from Kidal. According to official figures, 17 militants were killed in this clash, and another 20 militants were seriously injured. "There were two or three times more of them (militants ) than in previous attacks. We believe that this is an association of all rebel gangs, " a Malian government official said at the time.¹⁷

In August 2008, an Algerian-brokered truce was reached again, but in December it was broken by the rebels. The Tuareg forces again attacked the Malian military; in addition, they seized uranium mines in northern Niger, paralyzing the work of French and Chinese mining companies. 18 ^{A ceasefire was only reached in May 2009.19}

Violent clashes between Tuaregs and the Malian army, which was also supported by the "Arab militia", resumed in January 2010. Then in one of his interviews, the leader of the Niger-Mali Tuareg Alliance, Ibrahim Ag Bahangi, accused the Malian authorities of patronizing Islamic terrorists, saying that "everything was done to ensure that the Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb units settled in northern Mali, and Bamako gave the green light" ... Since then, allegedly, "the Tuaregs have become the main target for AQIM terrorists." ²⁰

On January 7-11, 2010, a meeting of leaders of various armed groups and tribal leaders of the Malian Tuaregs belonging to the Alliance for Democracy and Change-ADI was held in Algiers ²¹. Following the meeting, H. A. S. Ahmed said that "all the previous disagreements have been overcome." However, the events that followed proved otherwise. On January 11, in Bamako, another informal leader of the organization, Hamada Ag Bibi, announced that "the meeting in Algeria is not related to ADI" and suggested that the participants should not identify with the Alliance. Moreover, according to him, the official head of the ADI, Ayad Ag Ghali, was in the capital of Mali in those days, and not in Algeria.²² There is a clear split in the Tuareg political movement:"moderates" gathered in Bamako,

There are tribal leaders who are willing to cooperate with the government, and in Algeria, the Tuareg tribal elite has consolidated, seeking political sovereignty and, most likely, control over the Sahel's uranium deposits.

At the same time, special attention should be paid to the fact that the leader of the "radicals" X. A. S. Ahmed linked the problems of stabilizing the situation in Mali with the actions of AQIM in the region and once again announced the readiness of the Tuaregs to form special security forces designed to counter the expansion of terrorists.²³ He blamed the Malian Government for the spread of terrorism and the practice of abducting foreigners in the region and said that failure to comply with the provisions of the 2006 Algiers Treaty encourages Tuaregs to join the ranks of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

MOORISH RAIDS

In April 2010, Algeria, Niger, Mali and Mauritania established a Joint Operational Military Committee in Tamanrasset to develop measures to counter extremism in the region. On October 7 of the same year, a Joint Sahel Information Center was established in Algeria, bringing together the special services of these countries to combat the terrorist threat.²⁴ Chad, Libya and Morocco were also invited to participate in the activities of these structures.

As part of these agreements, Mauritania organized three military expeditions to Mali. With the consent of the Malian authorities, the first raid in the Wagado area was carried out by Mauritanians, with the participation of French instructors, in July 2010, and the second - in September of the same year. Immediately after the withdrawal of Mauritanian troops from northern Mali, AQIM units immediately returned to the area.

At the end of June 2011, the Mauritanian military organized a third expedition to western Mali. As a result, an Islamist field camp near Nara was destroyed. According to the Mauritanian authorities, 15 jihadists were killed during the operation, and anti-tank rocket launchers and man-portable air defense systems were found at the base, which "posed a direct threat to Mauritania." Most likely, this arsenal appeared at the disposal of the AKIM in connection with the events in Libya. The militants of this AQIM group were led by a certain Khaled al-Hinhiti, a native of Mauritania.

At the same time, on June 21, the Malian military, together with the Mauritanians, began combing the area in the north-west of Mali, in the vicinity of Nara. In response, the militants mined the area with Czech-made mines, which were in the hands of terrorists after the war in Libya. The operation resulted in the arrest of 15 militants, mostly Mauritanian citizens, who were sent to Bamako.

In the wake of these events, AQIM issued a statement accusing the President of Mauritania of waging "a war in the interests of France" and calling on the citizens of Mauritania to "condemn this war" and the Mauritanian military to "learn from the losses suffered and abandon the conduct of a war that they do not need"^.25

THE TUAREG AND THE LIBYAN CONFLICT

The events in Libya have dramatically escalated and largely changed the situation in northern Mali.

Ties between the Tuaregs and Gaddafi have a long history. The Libyan leader was driven by the idea of forming special military units of the Tuareg, striving to create a single state that would unite all representatives of this sociolinguistic community. Gaddafi saw such a State as a step towards a Greater Sahara federation.²⁶

Back in the early 70s of the last century, the Pan-African (Islamic) Legion was created in Libya. Then many Tuaregs, suffering from the worst drought in the Sahel, enlisted in this military unit, designed on the model of the French Foreign Legion. In 1980. Gaddafi issued a special decree in which he invited young Tuaregs living in Libya to be trained in military camps. The Legion fought in Chad, Sudan, and Lebanon, but was disbanded in the late ' 80s. Thousands of Tuaregs then remained in Libya and joined the Libyan army. In 2005, Gaddafi granted unrestricted residence permits to all Niger and Malian Tuaregs in Libya. In 2006, he called on all the tribes of the Sahara region, including the Tuaregs, to form a unified force to counter terrorism and drug trafficking.²⁷

During the third Tuareg uprising in 2007, Gaddafi mediated between them and the official authorities of Mali and Niger. This indicated that he had considerable leverage over the leaders of nomadic tribes.²⁸

The 2011 war in Libya and the NATO aggression against that country have divided communities that are very close to each other culturally and linguistically.

V. Kudelev in the article "Tuaregs against Berbers" writes that" two branches of the autochthons "of North Africa -" Amazigh (Berbers) and Tuaregs - for a while were on opposite sides of the barricades during the war in Libya." And just below, he refers to the Amazigh as one of the branches of the Libyan Berbers, and the Tuareg as another.²⁹

This ratio of part and whole is not quite correct. Amazigh is the self-name of the Berber-speaking community as a whole (Berbers are an exoethnonym), ³⁰ and, accordingly, the Tuareg, being part of the Berber-speaking community, cannot oppose the Berbers. In Libya (in the mountains west of Tripoli) live tribes of the Eastern Berber sociolinguistic community ³¹ (Nefusa, Ghadamsi, Fezzan, Aujila, Sokna), which together are part of the Berber-speaking community (Berbers, Amazigh, Amahat)³². The Southern Berber community of Tuaregs, represented by the Ghat, Ahaggar, Taullemmet and other tribes, ³³ inhabits the south of Libya.

But the bottom line is that these groups of Berber-speaking tribes found themselves on opposite sides of the barricades in the "Libyan confrontation". The Tuaregs became almost the main support of Gaddafi, and the Berber tribes living in the Tripoli region found themselves in the ranks of the pro-NATO rebels. (Note that after the defeat of Gaddafi, the Transitional National Council (in which these tribes were represented) was supported by the so-called Amazigh World Congress.)

However, most of the Tuaregs remained loyal to Gaddafi. Immediately after the outbreak of the war, tribal leaders from Libya, Mali and Niger held a meeting at which it was decided to take the side of the colonel against the "traitors of Libya". Mali's Tuaregs have said they will launch a war against the Malian government if it supports the "rats" or if any of Gaddafi's aides are arrested in Mali. (A similar warning was issued to the Government of Niger.) In addition, the Tuaregs said that only they will decide what can be transported to Libya through the Sahara, and what can not. The change in the rules of movement in the Sahara was as follows: "If the wagon train goes to Gaddafi, you will be guarded and accompanied by Tuareg soldiers. And if it's "rat food," then the cargo will be confiscated, and the "merchants" will be buried in the sand for fertilizer. " ³⁴

In the first week of March 2011 alone, 2.3 thousand Tuaregs from the Kidal region traveled by 40 trucks to Libya via Algeria. For agreeing to defend Gaddafi, each combatant received $10,000, and upon arrival in Libya - $1,000 for each day of combat operations. The "lifting" money came from the Libyan embassy in Bamako ³⁵.

On October 12, 2011, H. A. S. Ahmed called a press conference, during which he told reporters that the Tuaregs were preparing - politically and militarily - to join the uprising against Gaddafi in Libya. ³⁶ And on October 18, the Malian government sent the Interior Minister to the north of the country, but negotiations with the separatists were inconclusive. The Tuaregs declared their independence from Mali and Libya ³⁷.

It should be noted that since the beginning of the civil war in Libya, the Malian authorities have warned that the fall of Gaddafi will lead to destabilization of the situation in the Sahara and Sahel. Indeed, after the defeat of Gaddafi, the situation in northern Mali became explosive, and the process of returning Malian Tuaregs to their homeland began. Both those migrant workers who previously moved to the Jamahiriya in search of earnings, and those who served in the Libyan Pan-African Legion (about 2 thousand people) went to Mali. Tuareg fighters return to Mali with the most modern weapons that were dropped from planes to Libyan rebels in the west during the NATO operation in Libya. Libya, where the Berber population is relatively compact in some areas. According to Figaro, it was, in particular, about anti-tank missile systems and small arms ³⁸. The Tuareg rebel groups announced their unification - the new organization "National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad" declared that it was at the disposal of-

There are 700 fighters in Slovenia ready to fight for independence.

In this context, it is important to note that on August 26, 2011, a field commander and political leader of the Malian Tuaregs, I. A. Bahangi, was killed. His death was attributed by his colleagues in the fight against AKIM to the fact that he had entered into a confrontation with drug traffickers, whose network operates under the auspices of this organization.

Recall that in mid-October 2010, a group of militants under the command of this radical leader attacked a convoy with a cargo of cocaine 100 km north of the city of Kidal. At the same time, the Tuaregs received support from the Malian authorities. (Although in Bamako, this group was considered an unreliable ally, considering such actions as a demonstration of their combat potential in order to get a share of the income in the shadow business.)

It is noteworthy that in an interview with the Al-Watan newspaper published a few hours before his death, I. A. Bahangi said that in recent months, AQIM has become well armed thanks to Mali and some Western countries. He claimed that it was with the permission of Bamako that the hostage-taking took place, and accused Western countries that agree to pay ransoms for the release of hostages, "knowing that these funds will be used to purchase weapons for AQIM." According to this newspaper, Bahangi was killed while trying to intercept two jeeps loaded with weapons that were traveling from Libya to the area of the Malian city of Timbuktu, known as the stronghold of AQIM and drug traffickers.

Noteworthy is the version formulated by some Tuareg tribal leaders, who claimed that the murder of Bahanga was evidence of a sharp struggle for leadership among the tribal nobility. In this context, it is interesting that shortly before his death, this leader claimed that the Tuaregs do not support Gaddafi and his death "is good news for all Tuaregs in the region." He expressed the opinion that " the uprising in Libya represents an opportunity for the Tuaregs to return to their homes and demand an account from the Malian authorities, who have always been on the side of Libya in their struggle against the Tuaregs."

THE FOURTH TUAREG REBELLION

Indeed, the Tuaregs were not long in coming. As early as January 17, 2012, veterans of Tuareg battalions from the army of the late Muammar Gaddafi attacked the town of Menaka in northern Mali.³⁹ The separatists came out under the banner of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad and demanded the establishment of an independent Tuareg state in the northern lands of Mali and Niger, as well as in southern Algeria. Even then, experts interpreted these events as the transfer of the civil war in Libya to the territory of Mali. It was clear that this Tuareg action was only the beginning of a larger operation involving all forces loyal to the Jamahiriya. According to Libyan social media accounts, Colonel Gaddafi's son, Seif al - Islam, ⁴⁰, was involved.

On February 19, a full-scale war broke out in northern Mali. ⁴¹ Tuareg detachments consist mainly of fighters who fought as part of the elite units of the Libyan army of the Jamahiriya: The Pan-African Legion and the Khamis Brigade, which was led by another son of the colonel, Khamis Gaddafi. The rebels laid siege to a government camp in the vicinity of Tessalit. The President of Mali sent armored vehicles and helicopters piloted by pilots from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics against them.⁴² However, by 21 February, the rebels had attacked 7 and captured 5 towns in the north and center of the country. ⁴³ In the town of Menaka, the separatists established their administration. The death toll on both sides went into the hundreds.

After the Tuaregs captured the city of Agelhok, they executed several dozen captured soldiers. Demonstrations were held in Bamako, where participants demanded that President A. T. Toure punish the murderers. Later, riots broke out in the capital and other Malian cities, with angry mobs burning down homes and shops belonging to both Tuareg and fair-skinned people. ⁴⁴

And residents of the front-line zone rushed to the south and to neighboring countries: Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania. According to the UN, more than 125,000 Malians were forced to leave their homes by February 26, ⁴⁵. Poor African host countries are no longer able to cope with the influx of migrants. Amnesty International has called the situation in the region the worst human rights crisis in northern Mali in 20 years.

At the first stage of the fighting, the Malian army was inferior to the separatists, but at the end of February it went on the offensive.⁴⁶ Aircraft attacked rebel targets ⁴⁷ to stop their advance towards Kidal. Tuareg leaders announced that the government was bombing ⁴⁸ civilians.

There is no reason to expect that this conflict will be resolved in the foreseeable future. The only way to force the rebels into dialogue is with weapons, Malian National Assembly Speaker D. Traore said in February 2012. "Only understanding the usefulness of dialogue can force people to the negotiating table. And this depends on the military situation, " he rightly noted.

THE SAHARA-SAHEL CRISIS

In the north of Mali, a tight knot of dangerous contradictions is being tightened. The separatists do not hide the fact that their goal is to create a sovereign Tuareg state of Azawad. This means that there is no doubt that the conflict will soon spread to the territory of Niger, and possibly to the territory of Algeria. It is in these countries that the Tuaregs live quite compactly, and most importantly, there are rich mineral deposits explored.

The United States is already ABM-

They showed their extreme concern about what is happening in Mali. "We condemn attacks by armed groups on a number of northern cities," State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said in a statement. In turn, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called on the rebels to " immediately stop attacks and engage in dialogue with the government of Mali."

Most likely, in the near future, the United States will use the regional crisis to dramatically strengthen its military presence in the Sahel zone as part of the Africom military-political project. Perhaps they will do so in an alliance with France, which claims a special role in relations with its former colonies. The head of French diplomacy, Alain Joupe, has already called for a dialogue with the widest possible representation of all interested parties.⁴⁹ At the same time, while in Bamako, he assured the Malian authorities that France would help stop the fighting and preserve the country's territorial integrity. ⁵⁰ (In this context, it is worth recalling how the French military helped preserve the territorial integrity of Ivory Coast in 2011) The words of one of the Tuareg leaders, Hamma Ag Sid Ahmed, may be prophetic:"The day will come when this region will no longer belong to us. We have a feeling that everything has been done to ensure that this is the situation. " ⁵¹ And will Mali belong to the Malians?

(The ending follows)

¹ Nechitailo D. A. Al-Qaeda's activities in Africa - http://i-r-p.ru/page/stream-exchange/index-14718.html

² Comment en finir avec AQMI - http://www.courrier-international.com/article/2010/10/07/comment-en-finir-avec-aqmi

³ UN Special Representative Robert Fowler released in Mali -http://korrespondent.net/world/813925-v-mali-osvobozhden-specpredstavitel-oon-robert-foul er

⁴ Kudelev V. V. "Al-Qaeda" against Mali: the struggle with variable success - http://i-r-p.ru/page/stream-exchange/index-23779.html

⁵ "Al-Qaїda" irreductible au Sahel - http://www.courrier-international.com/article/2010/09/09/al-qaida-irreductible-au-sahel

⁶ Nechitailo D. A. Al-Qaeda in the Sahel region http://ww.iimes.ra/rus/stat/2010/13 - 12 - 10.htm

⁷ Mali: Les Touaregs s'en vont en guerre contre "Al-Qaida" -http://ffs 1963.unblog.fr/2010/10/12/mali-les-touaregs-sen-vont-enguerre-contre-al-qaida/

⁸ Nechitailo D. A. "Al-Qaeda" in the Sahel region...

⁹ Daniel S. Се que veulent les "rebelles" de Kidal - http://www.rfi.fr/ actufr/articles/078/article_44115.asp

¹⁰ In Algeria and Mali, Al-Qaeda members will be targeted by Tuaregs - http://www.newafrica.ru/anonses/070305/tua.htm

¹¹ Kudelev V. V. The Second Tuareg Uprising: causes and possible consequences - http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2007/17 - 10 - 07b.htm

¹² In Mali, Tuareg nomads attacked a government garrison - http://lenta.ru/news/2007/09/14/mali/

¹³ Malian Tuareg rebels declare a truce -http://lenta.ru/news/2007/09/19/mali/

¹⁴ Tuareg Uprisings 2007-2009 - http://tjazhelyjsite.tk/kon-flikty-v-2007-godu/tuaregi-vosstaniya-2007 - 2009

¹⁵ Les Touaregs declenchent la guerre de l'uranium! - http://www.tama-zgha.fr/Les-Touaregs-declenchent-la-guerre-de-l-uranium%2C2169.html

¹⁶ Degradation de la situation au nord Mali: Vers une guerre civile intercommunautaire? - http://issikta.blogspot.com/2009/01/dgradation-de-la-situation-au-nord-mali.html

¹⁷ Not less than 15 people killed by Tuaregs in Mali -http://briansk.ru/news/ne-menee-15-chelovek-ubity-tuaregami-v-mali.2008522.133473.html

¹⁸ Former Gaddafi loyalists seize towns in Mali - tens of thousands of refugees - http://www.newsra.com/world/21feb2012/ mali.html

¹⁹ Tuareg Uprisings 2007-2009...

²⁰ Kudelev V. V. On some results of the Algerian Tuareg meeting-http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2010/02 - 03 - 10.htm

²¹ Lutte contre AQMI: Alger seul contre tous? - http://www.cour-rierinternational.com/breve/2010/08/25/lutte-contre-aqmi-alger-seul-contre-t ous

²² Kudelev V. V. On some results...

²³ Les Touaregs s'en vont en guerre contre "Al-Qaida" -http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/2010/10/ll/les-touaregs-s-en-vont-en-guerre-con tre-al-qaida

²⁴ Une reunion pour lever les divergences face au terrorisme -http://www.courrierinternational.com/breve/2010/09/27/une-reunion-pour-lever-les-divergen ces-face-au-terrorisme

²⁵ Nechitailo D. A. "Al-Qaeda" in the Sahel region...

²⁶ Tinariwen - http://apocalipsisnow.livejournal.com/16857.html

²⁷ Libya: the cry of the Tuareg - http://stalin-ist.livejournal.com/ 255636.html

²⁸ Kudelev V. V. Libya: Tuaregs versus Berbers? - http://www.ii-mes.ru/

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Kozlov S. Ya. Long-lived berbers of North Africa -http://www.ng.ru/science/2011 - 03 - 23/12_bcrbery.html

³¹ Aikhenvald A. Y. Structural and typological classification of Berber languages. Author's abstract. cand. diss. M., 1984.

³² Berbers / / Peoples of the world. Istoriko-etnograficheskiy spravochnik [Historical and Ethnographic reference], Moscow, 1988, p. 99.

³³ Berbers / / Peoples of the world. Encyclopedia, Moscow, 2007, p. 100.

³⁴ Libya: the cry of the Tuareg...

³⁵ Radov Z. Among the African mercenaries fighting in Libya against the rebels, many are natives of Mali - http://kp.ru/daily/ 25648/811887/

³⁶ Tuareg fighters in Mali preparing to join Libyan resistance -http://za-kaddafi.ra/node/5068

³⁷ Tuaregs declare independence from Mali and Libya -http://www.dzd.ee/602174/tuaregi-zajavili-o-nezavisimosti-ot-mali-i-livii/

³⁸ Kudelev V. V. Livia: Tuaregs vs Berbers?..

³⁹ Combats dans le nord, la nouvelle 'guerre' des Touaregs -http://reliefweb.int/node/471708

⁴⁰ Galeev P. Loyal to Gaddafi Tuaregs attacked the state of Mali - http://nr2.ru/inworld/368253.html

⁴¹ Radov Z. Gaddafi's supporters brought the war to Mali / / Komsomolskaya Pravda. 27.02.2012.

⁴² Yusin M. The Libyan War migrated to Mali / / Kommersant. 21.02. 2012.

⁴³ Former Gaddafi loyalists are fighting a civil war in Mali - http://obozrevatel.com/abroad/43568-smi-livijskaya-vojna-otkochevala-v-mali.htm

⁴⁴ Former Gaddafi loyalists seize towns in Mali -http://www.newsru.сom/world/21 feb2012/mali.html

⁴⁵ Diallo T., Schwartz G. Au Mali, Juppe appelle au dialogue avec les rebelles touaregs - http://www.challenges.fr/monde/20120226.REU0550/au-mali-juppe-appelle-au-dialogue-ave c-les-rebelles-touaregs.html

⁴⁶ Mali: Aqmi, rebelles touaregs, meme combat? - http://fr.news. yahoo.com/mali-aqmi-rebelles-touaregs-m%C3%AAme-combat-182147884.html

⁴⁷ Masin Ferkal. L'aviation malienne s'attaque a des civils touaregs -http://www.tamazgha.fr/L-aviation-malienne-s-attaque-a.html

⁴⁸ Mossa ag Attaher. L'armee malienne bombarde des civils touaregs -http://www.tamazgha.fr/L-armee-malienne-bombarde-des.html

⁴⁹ Face au probleme touareg, les Maliens et leurs voisins s'activent -http://www.pressafrik.com/Face-au-probleme-touareg-les-Maliens-et-leurs-voisins-s-activent __a78259.html

⁵⁰ Diallo T., Schwartz G. Au Mali, Juppe appelle au dialogue avec les rebelles touaregs - http://www.challenges.fr/monde/20120226. REU0550/au-mali-juppe-appelle-au-dialogue-avec-les-rebelles-touaregs.html

⁵¹ Kudelev V. V. On some results of the Algerian Tuareg meeting - http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2010/02 - 03 - 10.htm

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