Yu. V. ZINKINA

Candidate of Historical Sciences

Institute of Africa, Russian Academy of Sciences

Kenya Keywords:, socio-political instability

The Malthusian trap is a fairly typical situation in pre-industrial societies, where population growth outstripped food production, making it impossible to increase per capita consumption (and improve living standards) in the long run. Accordingly, the majority of the population continued to exist at the level of starvation survival ¹. In pre-industrial societies, the Malthusian trap was one of the main generators of political upheaval.²

A COUNTRY IN THE MALTHUSIAN TRAP

Characteristic features of the Malthusian trap have been observed in Kenya over the past decades. Indeed, while in the 1950s and 1980s GDP grew significantly faster than the population, in the 1980s and 2000s the opposite situation was observed: population growth outstripped economic growth. Thus, in the 1950s and 1980s, the number of Kenyans increased very significantly-by 2.5 times, but GDP grew even more during the same period - by 4 times. This led to a steady increase in per capita GDP: from $6513 in 1950 to $1051 in 1980. "However, in the next three decades (more precisely, in 1980-2008), GDP grew only 2.5 times, and its growth was literally "eaten up" by population growth (also 2.5 times). GDP per capita actually stopped growing at that time and fluctuated between $1,000 and $1,100.

Food consumption per capita also showed similar dynamics. In 1960-1980. it was not very high, but still corresponded to the WHO norm (2300-2400 kcal per person per day) ⁵. However, in the late 1980s it noticeably fell and remains at a clearly insufficient level - about 2000 kcal until now. The dynamics of per capita food consumption in Kenya fully corresponds to the classical Malthusian scenario.

Addressing the problem of insufficient food consumption should be a priority for the Kenyan Government as part of ensuring socio-political stability of the state, especially given the continuing rapid population growth (according to the UN forecast, the number of Kenyans will grow from 40.5 million in 2010 to 96.7 million by 2050, i.e. almost 2.5 times). To successfully escape the Malthusian trap, Kenya must at least meet the WHO recommended food consumption standard (or better yet, exceed it). Accordingly, the country needs sustained economic growth that consistently outstrips population growth. This will be possible if:

- significantly reduce the birth rate: according to the UN forecast, the total birth rate in Kenya should decrease from the current value of 4.8 children per woman to 2.89 in 2050 (and even this figure is significantly higher than necessary for simple reproduction of the population). The Kenyan Government will have to make the most serious efforts to achieve this result. If the birth rate is not reduced, the country will most likely not be able to get out of the Malthusian trap, which will significantly increase the risk of socio-political instability.;

- achieve sustainable economic growth, primarily through the modernization of the agricultural sector, which employed about 60% of the Kenyan labor force in 2006, but produced only about a quarter of the country's GDP (and by 2010 - only 19% of GDP).⁶. Low productivity in agriculture is the main cause of low incomes and malnutrition among the rural population.

However, getting out of the Malthusian trap also carries a significant risk of socio-political destabilization. At first glance, this seems paradoxical: getting out of the trap is usually the result of successful economic policies, modernization of the economy (including agriculture) and growth in labor productivity, increased food consumption per capita, elimination of the threat of hunger, and a decrease in the birth rate - all this indicates a prosperous country. Nevertheless, the combination of these factors regularly generates cases of socio-political instability.

GETTING OUT OF THE "TRAP" AS A FACTOR THAT GENERATES INSTABILITY

Getting out of the Malthusian trap by definition implies eliminating the risks associated with Malthusian factors, but it creates some new risks of socio-political destabilization.⁷

In the process of getting out of the Malthusian trap, the problem of hunger is solved, as a result of which the death rate is significantly reduced. Indeed, countries with per capita food consumption of up to 2,900 kcal per day have a strong negative correlation between this level and mortality.

Since the exit from the Malthusian trap usually occurs at the first stage of the demographic transition, the regression results show that this exit (as a rule, is accompanied by an increase in the number of people in the population).-

Figure 1. Trap at the exit of the Malthusian trap (block diagram).

Source: Korotaev A.V., Khalturina D. A., Malkov A. S., Bozhevolnov Yu. V., Kobzeva S. V., Zinkina Yu. V. Zakony istorii: Matematicheskoe modelirovanie i prognozirovanie mirovogo i regional'nogo razvitiya [Laws of History: Mathematical modeling and forecasting of world and regional development]. pererab. Moscow, KomKniga Publ., 2010, p. 199.

food consumption per capita by more than 1,000 kcal per day) should be accompanied by a very significant increase in the population growth rate - at least by 1% per year.

An increase in per capita food consumption is particularly strongly correlated with a decrease in infant and child mortality (since it is children who suffer most from malnutrition and benefit most from its elimination).⁸. Accordingly, the number of children who survive to reproductive age increases dramatically. This leads to the so-called "demographic explosion" (jump in absolute population growth rates). The generation of children is much more numerous than the generation of parents, and the share of young people in the population structure is greatly increasing.

Then, at the second stage of the demographic transition, a landslide drop in the birth rate occurs (leading in the long term to a decrease in the share of young people in the population structure), but it occurs with a noticeable delay, resulting in the formation of the so-called "youth hillock".

There are sufficient grounds to consider the rapid growth of the share of young people in the population structure as a powerful factor of socio-political destabilization. For example, an outstanding American sociologist, the creator of the structural-demographic theory of revolutions, J. Goldstone states: "The rapid growth of young people can undermine existing political coalitions, creating instability. Large cohorts of young people are often attracted to new ideas or heterodox forms ^of religion that challenge old forms of power. In addition, since most young people have fewer family and career commitments, they are relatively easily mobilized to engage in social or political conflicts. Youth have played a critical role in political violence throughout recorded history, and the presence of a" youth bulge " (a high proportion of youth aged 15-24 in the general adult population) has historically been correlated with times of political crisis. Most major revolutions... - [including] most of the revolutions of the 20th century in developing countries-occurred where there were particularly significant youth bumps. " ¹⁰

Moreover, getting out of the "Malthusian trap" is a powerful factor in intensifying the processes of urbanization, allowing to raise the share of the urban population to a level that is fundamentally impossible to achieve in agrarian societies that are in the "Malthusian trap" ¹¹. Massive migration from the countryside to the city almost inevitably generates a significant number of dissatisfied with their second-class position (low-paid unskilled labor). poor housing conditions) in comparison with skilled workers in modern sectors of the economy with an incomparably higher standard of living.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that,

that young people usually migrate to cities first of all. Thus, the factor of "youth hillock" and the factor of intensive urbanization act together, producing a powerful destabilizing effect. It is the young urban population that is growing particularly fast.

Studies ¹² show that cases of large-scale socio-political instability at the exit from the Malthusian trap are the rule rather than the exception. This phenomenon was observed in African countries such as Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Algeria, Egypt, as well as in a number of countries outside of Africa, such as Albania, El Salvador, South Korea, Iran, Syria, etc.

The events of the "Arab Spring" of 2011 also fit into the pattern of socio-political instability emerging from the Malthusian trap (however, they also have a number of specific features). Paris. 1 presents a flowchart explaining why the emergence of socio-political instability, as a result of the country's exit from the Malthusian trap, should be considered as a natural phenomenon.

Our cross-country study shows that violent domestic political upheavals are highly likely to be expected when and where the number of urban youth begins to grow at a rate of more than 30% over a five-year period. If this figure exceeds 45%, it is already extremely difficult for the countries concerned to avoid such shocks.¹³

For countries where the growth rate of urban youth reached average values (20-30% over the five-year period), the probability of internal violent conflicts was close to 50%. For countries with high (30 - 45% over the five-year period) growth rates, the probability of completely avoiding significant domestic political upheavals drops to a very low level (one chance in four), and at the same time it appears quite high (also one chance in four). probability of full-scale civil wars ¹⁴.

FORECAST OF THE RISK OF SOCIO-POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Based on the results described above, it is possible to predict the risk of socio-political instability in Kenya. To do this, it is necessary, first of all, to consider the dynamics of demographic indicators and urbanization processes in Kenya in recent decades.

During the period of independent development of Kenya, its population grew very rapidly. Thus, in 1960, according to the World Bank (WB), there were 8.1 million people living in Kenya, and by 1980 the number of inhabitants had doubled to 16.3 million. In general, over 50 years (from 1960 to 2009), the population grew almost 5-fold, reaching ⁴⁰ million people15. The dynamics of mortality and birth rates allow us to distinguish several periods in the modern demographic history of Kenya (see Figure 2).

In 1960 - 1979, the birth rate remained consistently high (50 births per 1000 people), while the mortality rate significantly decreased, from 20.2 to 12.3 per 1000 people (at the same time, infant and child mortality decreased even more noticeably - twice!). The birth rate began to decline only in the early 80's and declined until the early 90's (see also Fig. 3); mortality during this period ceased to decline and stagnated. Finally, from the mid-1990s to the present, the birth rate has stopped declining and remained roughly at the same level (and in the early 2000s, even a small increase was observed). The death rate has increased as a result of the HIV epidemic/AIDS (especially in 1995-2001), then declined, but still remains markedly above the level of the early 1990s.

The identified trends allow us to draw the following conclusions. The birth rate in Kenya declined significantly between the 1980s and the early 1990s, but

Figure 2. Population growth rate, birth rate and death rate in Kenya (in%, 1960-2008).

Note: triangles represent the population growth rate, rhombuses represent the birth rate, and squares represent the death rate.

Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators Online. SP.DYN.CDRT.IN, SP.DYN.CBRT.IN, SP.POP.GROW. Washington, DC: World Bank - http://data.worldbank.org/country/kenya

Figure 3. Share of urban population in Kenya and some other countries of the world (in%, 2009-2010).

Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators Online. SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS. Washington, DC: World Bank - http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators

then it stopped declining, "freezing" at a very high level, by world standards. Accordingly, the potential for declining birth rates in Kenya is still very high. This is consistent with the UN forecast (see p. 55).

Obviously, Kenya will have to make considerable efforts to achieve such a significant reduction in the birth rate, which is absolutely necessary. However, even if this decline occurs, Kenya's population will grow from 40.5 million to 96.7 million by 2050. Such rapid population growth can be associated with a number of serious problems associated with an increase in the demographic burden on the economy. In particular, the need to feed a growing population will put additional pressure on agriculture, where productivity is not only extremely low by international standards, but has also declined in the recent past - from about $400,16 per worker in the 1980s to $330 in the mid-1990s, and since then only slightly increased ($371 in 2007, $349 in 2008 - still much lower than even the level of the 80s, which itself was extremely low against the global background)¹⁷.

In 2006, Kenyan agriculture employed 60% of the country's labor force, but produced only about a quarter of the total GDP. Such a large share of employment in the agricultural sector is a negative indicator, indicating the lack of diversification of the Kenyan economy and low agricultural productivity.

Thus, Kenya's exit from the Malthusian trap requires intensive modernization of agriculture and an increase in labor productivity in the agricultural sector.

URBANISATION

According to the World Bank, the share of urban population in Kenya has increased from 7.4% in 1960 to 21.9% in 2009, i.e. more than 3 times, and the absolute number of urban residents-from 340 thousand to 9 million, i.e. more than 25 times, due to rapid natural population growth and intensive agricultural development.urban migrations.

It should be noted here that the unregulated urban transition in the absence of significant resource constraints is described quite well by the logistics model and is often found both in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond. Recall that logistic growth is a growth with saturation, which gives the following dynamics: the accelerating growth of the indicator (in this case, the share of the urban population) at the beginning of the process is replaced by a slowdown in growth rates and ends with the stabilization of this indicator at a certain level.

However, the dynamics of the share of urban population in Kenya corresponded to the logistic model

Figure 4. Urban population dynamics in Kenya (in%, UN average forecast to 2050).

Source: UN Population Division. 2010. United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division Database - http://www.un.org/esa/population

only until the beginning of the 80s, during a period of fairly successful economic growth. After a significant decline in economic growth, the country's urban dynamics began to deviate more and more from the logistics model, slowing down long before reaching the saturation level. This can be considered as social self-regulation - indeed, if the extremely rapid growth of the urban population continued, against the background of increasing economic problems, this could not but lead to a socio-political explosion.

As a result of the slowdown in urbanisation, the share of urban population in modern Kenya is very small by world standards, and even by Tropical African standards, only a fifth of Kenyans live in cities, so the country's urban potential is still very far from being exhausted (see Figure 3).

However, Kenya has experienced fairly stable and rapid economic growth in recent years, and it is very likely that the growth of the urban population will accelerate again and return to the logistics trend. This assumption is the basis for the UN urbanisation forecast for Kenya (see Figure 4).

A return to the logistics trend implies a significant acceleration in the rate of urbanization (at least until the share of urban population in Kenya reaches 50%). Thus, according to the UN, while the urban population in Kenya increased from 15.7% to 22.2% (i.e., by 7 points) over the 30-year period from 1980 to 2010, it is projected to grow from 22.2% to 40.4% by 2040, i.e., by 18.2 points over the next three decades.. Against the background of extremely rapid projected growth in the total population, this means an explosive increase in the urban population of Kenya - from 9 million people in 2010 to 30.1 million in 2040, more than 3 times in just 30 years.

Such rapid growth of the urban population inevitably leads to serious problems related to the development of urban infrastructure, housing construction, job creation, etc. These problems are already visible in Kenya. If Kenya follows the path predicted by the United Nations and returns to the logistical trend of urbanization, the urban population (especially urban youth) will increase dramatically, significantly exacerbating existing problems, which will pose a significant threat to socio-political stability.

INSTABILITY FORECAST FOR KENYA AND WAYS TO AVOID RISKS

The dynamics of Kenya's economic development in recent years allow us to hope that the country's economic prospects in the coming years will be quite favorable. The global financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009 slowed down the Kenyan economy somewhat (in 2007, the economic growth rate in Kenya was 7%, and in the crisis of 2008 - 1.5%)¹⁸, but there was no sharp decline in it (unlike in most developed countries of the West).

Nevertheless, our consolidated forecast of the risks that threaten the socio-political stability of Kenya in the period up to 2050 looks rather unfavorable. First, the Kenyan Government will have to make a huge effort to significantly reduce the birth rate. Even so, population growth will be huge by 2050. If Kenya does not manage to significantly reduce the birth rate, population growth will be literally catastrophic, and the country will probably never be able to get out of the Malthusian trap, because even the relatively stable economic growth achieved in recent years will not be enough to feed the rapidly growing population. Indeed, the economic success of recent years (as clearly demonstrated by the fact that the Kenyan economy's growth rate steadily accelerated from 0.5% in 2002 to 7% in 2007, and although it slowed down during the crisis, it recovered to 5.3% in 2010) ¹⁹ has not yet been able to provide the Kenyan population with per capita consumption food at the level of the WHO recommended norm. If the birth rate is not radically reduced, the country may be on the verge of a large-scale famine.

At the same time, reducing the birth rate is not the only measure necessary to prevent socio - political destabilization in Kenya. Even if Kenya is able to reduce the birth rate quickly enough, as the average UN forecast suggests, the number of urban youth will grow almost 4 times in just the next 30 years, and in 2021-2025 the growth rate of this indicator will exceed the critically dangerous level of 30% in five years, which threatens serious socio - political upheavals.

However, getting Kenya into the high-risk zone can be avoided. It is possible to prevent the growth rate of urban youth from exceeding the critically dangerous level by influencing two factors-the birth rate and the growth rate of the urban population.

It is basically impossible to prevent the growth rate of urban youth from reaching a critically dangerous level in 2021-2025 by reducing the birth rate alone , for the simple reason that all those Kenyans who will join the youth age cohort (15-25 years) in 2021-2025 have already been born.

Of course, it is necessary to reduce the birth rate in Kenya (preferably even faster than the average UN forecast), because if the process of reducing the birth rate slows down significantly (as has unfortunately happened in Kenyan demographic history), then the period of high structural and demographic risk will last for many years after 2025. again, prevent-

Figure 5. Scenario projections of urban population dynamics in Kenya: Logistics Scenario (UN) and linear growth scenario.

Note: The black line represents the UN logistics scenario, while the dotted line represents the linear scenario.

It is simply impossible to predict that Kenya will fall into the zone of critically high structural and demographic risk in 2021-2025 by its impact on the birth rate alone.

However, getting Kenya into the zone of high risk of socio-political destabilization is still not inevitable, because there is another modifiable factor-the rate of urbanization.

For example, in China, the dynamics of the urban population share in the 1980s, long before the saturation level was approaching, slowed down sharply and moved from the logistic trajectory of accelerated growth to the trajectory of linear growth and follows it up to the present time. It is important to emphasize that this happened against the background of very rapid and successful economic development, so it is impossible to link this slowdown with resource constraints and the system self-regulation triggered by these constraints. In this case, we are dealing with a fully conscious and purposeful state regulation of the process aimed at artificially restraining the pace of urbanization (in order to prevent explosive growth of the urban population) in accordance with the growth rate of the number of jobs in cities, the speed of urban infrastructure development, etc. ²⁰ Such regulation of the growth rate of the share of the urban population seems highly justified, as it allows avoiding socio-political upheavals, which are extremely likely in such a context during uncontrolled migration of the rural population to cities.

The experience of the PRC shows that targeted public policies can significantly slow down the growth of the urban population and shift the process of urbanization from a logistic trajectory to a linear one, which, as we will see below, could prevent Kenya from falling into a zone of high structural and demographic risk in 2021-2025 (see Figures 5, 6)^.21

As we can see, the trajectory of the key indicator under the linear growth scenario of urbanization runs at a fairly safe distance from the critically dangerous level of 30% over the five-year period, and by 2030 it reaches a level that (of course, if the birth rate is significantly reduced) can allow us to move from a policy of restraining the pace of urbanization to a policy of stimulating them.

Control over the growth of the share of urban residents does not eliminate the need to reduce the share of the population employed in agriculture.-

Figure 6. Forecasts of the relative growth rate of urban youth in Kenya up to 2030 (% over the five-year period): "logistic" and "linear" scenarios.

Note: See Figure 5.

zyaistve. The agricultural sector of the Kenyan economy is characterized by extremely low labor productivity, which leads to an extremely low income level for most Kenyans, which does not even allow them to avoid malnutrition. In order to successfully get out of the Malthusian trap, the country needs to increase labor productivity in agriculture by an order of magnitude - if Kenya is equal in this indicator, for example, with Algeria or Syria, then the same amount of agricultural work will require 10 times less labor!

It is important to understand that this will result in a significant reduction in the share of the population employed in the agricultural sector, who will have to look for other jobs - in industry, service production, etc. This means that over the next 20 years, Kenya will need to create many jobs in the non-agricultural sectors of the economy, especially in rural areas and small towns, in order to avoid the massive migration of this part of the population to large cities (and the risks associated with rapid urbanization described above). Accordingly, it is advisable for the Kenyan Government to devote a significant portion of the revenue generated from the most rapidly developing areas of the economy (for example, tourism) to the modernization of agriculture and the development of non-agricultural industries in rural areas. In addition, since Kenya receives significant international financial assistance (in 2010 - $1.3 billion, while the country's GDP in the same year was $68.4 billion). according to PPP ²²), it would be reasonable to direct a significant part of it to the same goals.

In our opinion, it is this path that can allow Kenya to avoid falling into the "trap at the exit from the Malthusian trap". Moreover, it is quite realistic.

Indeed, during a discussion with Kenyan demographers, economists and development specialists in July 2011, the author of this study found that the Kenyan Government is currently concerned with controlling migration in Nairobi and is seeking to create conditions for more active development of other cities. In the light of the prospects analyzed in this article, this seems to be the right strategy.

^{Malthus T.} 1 Population: The First Essay. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 1978; Artzrouni M., Komlos J. Population Growth through History and the Escape from the Malthusian Trap: A Homeostatic Simulation Model // Genus.1985. Vol. 41, No 3 - 4, p. 21 - 39; Steinmann G., Prskawetz A., Feichtinger G. A Model on the Escape from the Malthusian Trap // Journal of Population Economics. 1998. Vol. 11, p. 535 - 550; Wood J. W. A Theory of Preindustrial Population Dynamics: Demography, Economy, and Well-Being in Malthusian Systems // Current Anthropology. 1998. Vol. 39, p. 99 - 135.

² См., например: Chu C. Y. C., Lee R. D. Famine, Revolt, and the Dynastic Cycle: Population Dynamics in Historic China // Journal of Population Economics. 1994. Vol. 7, p. 351 - 378; Nefedov S. A. A Model of Demographic Cycles in Traditional Societies: The Case of Ancient China // Social Evolution & History. 2004. Vol. 3, No 1, p. 69 - 80; Turchin P. Historical Dynamics: Why States Rise and Fall. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2003; Turchin P., Korotayev A. Population Density and Warfare: A Reconsideration // Social Evolution & History. 2006. Vol. 5, No 2, p. 121 - 158.

³ International dollars of 1990 are used. Jiri-Hamisi at purchasing power parity.

^{Maddison A. 2010.} 4 World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, A. D. 1 - 2003 - http://www.ggdc.net/maddison

⁵ См., например: Naiken L. FAO Methodology for Estimating the Prevalence of Undernourishment // International Scientific Symposium on Measurement and Assessment of Food Deprivation and Undernutrition, Rome, Italy, 2002.

⁶ World Bank. World Development Indicators Online. SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS, NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS. Washington, DC: World Bank - http://data.worldbank.org/country/kenya

^{Korotaev A.V., Khalturina D. A., Malkov A. S., Bozhevolnov Yu. V., Kobzeva S. V., Zinkina Yu. V.} 7 Zakony istorii: Matematicheskoe modelirovanie i prognozirovanie mirovogo i regional'nogo razvitiya [Laws of History: Mathematical modeling and forecasting of World and regional development]. pererab. Moscow, KomKniga Publ., 2010, pp. 159-227.

⁸ Ibid., p. 186.

⁹ Non-orthodox, heretical.

^{Goldstone J.} 10 Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent Conflict // Journal of International Affairs. 2002. Vol. 56, No 1, p. 3 - 22. P. 11 - 12. См. также: Goldstone J. Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991; Fuller G. E. The Youth Crisis in Middle Eastern Society. Clinton Township, MI: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2004; Heinsohn G. Sohne und Weltmacht. Terror im Aufstieg und Fall der Nationen. Zurich: Orell Fussli Verlag, 2003; Mesquida C. G., Weiner N. I. Male Age Composition and Severity of Conflicts // Politics and the Life Sciences. 1999. Vol. 18, p. 113 - 117.

¹¹ On the other hand, a way out of the Malthusian trap in modern conditions is impossible without a very high development of the urban (and more broadly, non - agricultural) sector, which provides modernizing agriculture with machinery, equipment, mineral fertilizers, pesticides, special literature, agronomists, etc.

^{Korotaev A.V. et al} 12 Decree. soch. pp. 159-227.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 207-213.

¹⁴ In our proposed forecast, only "positive results" are really significant (i.e., those results that reveal the presence of a high risk of political instability in a particular country in a particular future period). We tend to interpret such results as evidence of a real risk of developing political instability at a given time and place (unless, of course, adequate measures are taken by the relevant governments in a timely manner). On the other hand, in our opinion, "negative results" cannot be considered as a guarantee that political upheavals are impossible in a given country until 2050 (because we are not inclined to believe that the causes of bloody political upheavals can be completely reduced to structural and demographic factors).

¹⁵ World Bank. World Development Indicators Online. SP.POP.TOTL. Washington, DC: World Bank - http://data.worldbank.org/country/kenya

¹⁶ Constant dollars 2000

¹⁷ For comparison, in 2005 this figure was $1,660 in Gabon, $2,100 in Egypt, and $2,200 in Algeria. (World Bank. World Development Indicators Online. EA.PRD.AGRI.KD. Washington, DC: World Bank - http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-develop-ment-indicators)

¹⁸ World Bank. World Development Indicators Online. NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG. Washington, DC: World Bank - http://data.worldbank.org/country/kenya

¹⁹ Ibidem.

^{Zhao Zhong.} 20 Rural-Urban Migration in China: What do We Know and What Do We Need to Know? Peking: China Center for Economic Research, Peking University, 2003.

²¹ However, in order to avoid being caught in the Malthusian trap again in the coming years, Kenya needs to reduce its birth rate to at least the level of the UN average forecast (and preferably even lower).

²² World Bank. Op. cit.

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