The thesis about the possibility of a clash of civilizations due to the difference in their cultures, put forward by the British historian A. Toynbee and then re-formulated by the American political scientist and statesman S. Huntington, due to one-sided and rather biased coverage in the media and scientific publications, is transformed in the mass consciousness into an allegedly inevitable and already occurring conflict between Christianity and Islam. Moreover, the Muslim religion is often interpreted as initially aggressive and obscurantist. In this paper, based on the analysis of the underlying causes of Islamism and the socio-political situation in such Arab countries as Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt, where Islamism has manifested itself most actively, we will try to determine whether in reality the conflict between Christian and Islamic civilizations exists as an antagonism of different cultures and value orientations, or whether it is a kind of virtual and a distorted view.

The thesis of a possible conflict of civilizations was put forward by the British historian A. Toynbee in the late 40s of the XX century. Nevertheless, many of those who cite him overlook the fact that in the same work A. Toynbee pointed out "a single great experience of all mankind", which should lead it to a "single community", and this " unity of humanity will be perceived as one of the fundamental conditions of human life - as if part of it." natural world order" [Toynbee, 1995, p. 130].

Then S. Huntington, an American sociologist and politician, made a statement about the clash of civilizations due to the difference in their cultures as a "dominant factor in world politics" (Huntington, 1993, p.22) in 1993 in the work "The Clash of Civilizations?". After the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001, in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005, this thesis appears in the media, journalistic and even scientific foreign and domestic publications, speeches of politicians and, thus, is transformed in the mass consciousness into a very specific form - as a conflict between Christian and Muslim civilizations. Moreover, some authors interpret the Islamic religion itself, which is the basis of Muslim civilization, as initially aggressive, obscurantist and not tolerant of other faiths (there was even a certain term "Islam-fascism"), as proof of which some suras of the Koran are cited 1. Swedish explorer Held Down, in

1 This paper does not set out to analyze the surahs of the Quran that refute the thesis of "aggressiveness" of Islam. Here is just one of them - "Ankabut" ("Spider"), which refers to tolerance for "people of the Book", that is, Christians and Jews: "Do not dispute with the People of the Book except with something better, and say:' We believe in what has been revealed to us and what has been revealed to you. Both our God and your God are one, and we surrender to him "(29: 46). A more detailed argument on this issue can be found in the work of Tawfiq Ibrahim "Forward to Quranic Islam (experience of authentic reading of the Koran "[Vostok (Oriens), 2006, N 3-6; 2007, N 3].

page 85

In turn, it speaks about "the tendency of Islam to expand and absolutize its values," which, however, they are inclined to do (which is confirmed by H. himself). Down), and some areas of Protestantism.

However, the absolutization of "Islamic values" cannot be explained by the dogmas of Islam as such and is most likely related to the mentality of those who profess Islam, as well as to the peculiar defensive reaction of Muslims to increased Westernization. Along with this, it should be noted that in the sacred books of the Abrahamic religions, i.e. in the Torah, Bible and Koran, one can find both calls to fight against "non-believers" and statements about the need for religious tolerance and tolerance. As for Islamic fundamentalism and Islamism, or rather, its extremist jihadist trend, which preaches jihad (holy war) and resorts to terrorist actions, this phenomenon is perceived as a clash of Islam and Christianity, or at least as elements of such a clash.

In this paper, without claiming to be comprehensive answers, we will try to analyze the phenomenon of Islamism, the underlying causes of its emergence, using the example of the situation in the Arab-Muslim world, and answer the question of whether in reality the clash of civilizations occurs as a conflict of different cultures with different value orientations, which are in a state of confrontation, or is it view.

First of all, it is necessary to define the conceptual framework. In our opinion, the definitions of "Islamic fundamentalism" and "Islamism"should be separated. Islamic fundamentalism, or, to use a more precise definition proposed by the well - known Russian arabist V. V. Naumkin, salafism (Arab, salaf - righteous ancestor) [Naumkin, 2006, p. 7], is a religious phenomenon that means turning to the origins of Islam and strictly observing the rules and norms set out in the Koran and Sunnah, in everyday life and social practice. The main idea of Salafists is the postulate that for centuries Islam has been innovated (bid'ah), which often distorted the Muslim teaching. In order to revive the original "correct" Islam, it is necessary, according to Salafism, to turn to the era of the Prophet Muhammad and the four " righteous caliphs "(al-Khulafa arrashidun) - Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and Ali.

Islamism, or political Islam, i.e. the use of Islam for political purposes, in contrast to Salafism, is more of a political phenomenon. According to the definition of the prominent Russian Orientalist R. G. Landa, political Islam "is a certain stage of the socio-political development of the world of Islam, which followed pan-Islamism of the XIX century and nationalism of the first half of the XX century" [Panda, 2006(1), p. 156]. Islamism expresses the ideology of the movement, whose slogan is: "Islam is the solution." Ideologues of Islamism advocate the preservation of "Islamic values" as an indispensable condition for the development of Muslim society. They see their strategic goal in creating an "Islamic state" based on the "eternal and just" laws of the Koran, in which "Islamic social justice" will prevail. In this regard, it should be noted that the idea of a just world order, sufficiently reflected in the Qur'an 2, is inherent to a certain extent in the Muslim tradition and is enshrined in the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1981. In particular, it states that "any person not only has the right, but also the duty to protest against injustice" [cit. by: Zhdanov, 1991, p. 196]. Islamism in more than

2 Surah 4 An-Nisa ("Women"): O you who believe! Be steadfast in justice, and bear witness before Allaah, even against yourselves, or your parents, or your loved ones, whether rich or poor (4:135). Here and further, the translation of the Qur'an is given according to [see: Qur'an, 1990].

page 86

In a broad sense, it represents a trend in modern Arab-Muslim social thought. It reflects the desire of a certain part of society to preserve its historical traditions, religion, culture, i.e. national identity in the face of the challenges of the modern world, primarily globalization. Islamism and Islamic fundamentalism can be considered as interrelated and correlated phenomena.

The history of Islamism, or political Islam, in its modern form begins with the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood Association in Egypt in 1928 by the prominent Egyptian Muslim figure Hassan al-Banna (1902-1949), which for decades has been and remains an active political force in the Arab-Muslim world. The works of the most famous ideologist of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), are still cited in the program documents of many Islamist groups. The current rise of Islamic fundamentalism - Nahda Islamiyya ("Islamic renaissance") as it is defined by Islamist leaders-has largely been driven by two important factors. The first is the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), which overthrew the pro-American Shah's regime, which was trying to westernize Iran. It was a kind of impulse for the spread and expansion of Islamist ideology in the Muslim world. The second factor is the civil war in Afghanistan (1979-1992), which attracted thousands of Muslims from all over the Islamic world, including from Arab countries, to join the ranks of the United States.Mujahideen (fighters for the faith) who fought against the Afghan regime created as a result of the 1978 coup d'etat, which sought to implement the socialist idea in the country, and the Soviet troops who supported it. Subsequently, Afghan Mujahideen mercenaries (Arabs and immigrants from other Muslim countries) formed the core of many radical Islamist groups both in Arab countries and in" hot spots " around the world.

In the 1980s, during the global confrontation between the two military-political blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively, the United States and Saudi Arabia also played a significant role in the formation of the radical wing of the Islamist movement. These states, seeking to weaken their main strategic enemy, the USSR, provided all possible support to the Afghan Mujahideen through the channels of their special services and various Islamic foundations.3 Later, at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, many Arab countries abandoned their previously proclaimed ideology of nationalism with elements of socialism (national or Islamic socialism) and socialist orientation. It also led to the discrediting and almost complete disappearance of leftist ideology (which previously enjoyed sufficient influence) in the Arab East. As a result, the resulting ideological vacuum was filled with various Islamist concepts that reflected the social protest of the poor in Arab countries, many of which were experiencing a socio-economic crisis.

In the doctrinal concepts of Islamist ideologues, several main theses can be distinguished.

First, the Islamic philosophical, moral and ethical principles set forth in the Qur'an and Sunnah are universal for all times and peoples. In this regard, we will refer to the famous Egyptian professor Hussein Munis, who wrote in his work "Religion and the development of Arab civilization":: "Islam is universal in relation to any time and place, the Islamic doctrines, laws and ethical norms are

3 In the 1980s, approximately 2,300 American-made Stinger anti-aircraft missile systems were sent to the Afghan Mujahideen through CIA channels. Moreover, after the end of the Afghan war, the Mujahideen actively traded in the remaining Stingers at their disposal; for example, more than a hundred Stingers, despite the opposition of the Americans, were purchased by Iran [Coll, 2004, p. 337].

page 87

a powerful incentive for development in any era " [cit. by: Dolgov, 2000, p. 39]. Hassan al-Turabi, a prominent Sudanese ideologue and former secretary General of the Sudanese Islamist National Congress Party, stated that "the adherents of traditional Islamic values will have to enrich the rest of the world culturally, to which they address their spiritual wealth as an enduring value" [cit. by: Polyakov, 1999, p. 107].

The second thesis is that, according to Islamists, Western society is in a state of moral degradation and spiritual impasse. Thus, the founder of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front, Abbasi Madani, wrote in his book "The Crisis of Modern Thought and the justification of the Islamic solution", in particular, that " Marxism and liberalism, the two main Western ideologies, are experiencing a deep crisis." This led to the conclusion that it was "inevitable and necessary" to create an "Islamic alternative" to social development as a natural response of Muslims to this crisis. Abbasi Madani argued that " only Islam, which previously freed us from colonialism, is now able to protect us from the expansion of neo-colonialism. The eternal values of Islamic civilization remain our only shield in this confrontation." by: Dolgov, 2004, p. 55].

The third thesis concerns the creation of an Islamic state based on the" eternal and just " canons of Islam. It has been claimed in one form or another by all modern Islamist ideologues, including the aforementioned Abbasi Madani and Hassan al-Turabi, as well as the leader of the Tunisian Islamist Ennahda party, Rashid Ghannouchi, and the current head of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Mahdi Akef. Moreover, some of the most radical Islamists, such as Ali Benhaj (born in 1956), a former deputy of Abbasi Madani, chairman of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front, considered the creation of an Islamic state in one Arab country, in this case in Algeria, only a stage on the way to achieving the strategic goal of "recreating an Islamic caliphate, which will be established in the future". it should become the spiritual homeland of all Muslims of the world."

* * *

Modern Islamism is represented by both moderate and radical trends. Moderate Islamism, to which the majority of Muslims professing this ideology belong, rejects the practice of political terror and exists in almost all Arab countries either in the form of legally operating political parties, or in the form of public education, charity, and human rights organizations that advocate the preservation and dissemination of Muslim ethical and moral norms. Moreover, political parties that support Islamism do not declare the creation of an Islamic state as their political goal (the use of religion for political purposes is prohibited in the constitutions of all Arab countries), but they preach the preservation of "Islamic values" as an indispensable condition for the further development of Muslim society. Radical (jihadist) Islamism refers to extremist groups that proclaim jihad as the only way to create an Islamic state. Their leaders justify terrorist acts, in particular against those Arab regimes that they claim are "tyrannical and infidel", by referring to suras of the Koran or fatwas of prominent Muslim figures, most often Taqi ad-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328). Both can be interpreted as allowing jihad against those rulers who "do not judge by what Allaah has revealed" (Surah Al-Ma'ida, 5:49).

However, almost all the suras of the Qur'an that authorize armed jihad (jihad of the sword) emphasize its exclusively defensive purpose, i.e., how to

page 88

defense against external aggression committed against Muslims. For example, Surah Al-Hajj says: "Those who have been attacked, those who have been harassed, are allowed to fight. They were wrongfully driven out of their homes only because they professed Allah to be their only Lord" (22:39 - 41)4.

Modern radical Islamists, or, as defined by R. G. Landa, "islamoextremists" (Landa, 2005), define their opponents as "near enemies", i.e., those political regimes in Muslim countries that, according to radical Islamist leaders, have forgotten "true, just Islam" and become puppets in the hands of Islam's leaders. the "distant enemy", i.e. "world Zionism" and the "new crusaders", which means the West in general and the United States in particular, leading, according to the ideologists of jihad, a war against Islam and Muslims. So, Bin Laden in his message to the American people (broadcast by Al-Jazeera), polemicizing with President J. R. R. Tolkien: Bush, who accused radical Islamists of hating "our (American - BD) freedom," said that "we are people who love freedom, so we want to liberate our countries from your oppression, and so we are fighting you" (Kepel, 2005, p. 101). At the same time, one of the trends of radical Islamism, Takfirists (from Arabic. takfir-an accusation of disbelief), also counts moderate Islamists and Muslims who cooperate with "tyrannical" regimes as "near enemies".

Since the beginning of the 90s of the XX century. A Salafist movement is beginning to emerge in the Islamist movement, the most extreme group of which was Al-Qaeda, which was based in Afghanistan and partly in Pakistan and led by Osama bin Laden.5 His worldview as a staunch supporter of jihad was formed under the influence of prominent Islamist figures Muhammad Qutb and Abdullah Azzam. Muhammad Qutb was the brother of the most famous ideologue of radical Islamism, Sayyid Qutb, who was tortured in Egyptian prisons and executed by an Egyptian tribunal in 1966. Abdallah Azzam (1941-1989) was a prominent Palestinian ideologist of jihad, a member of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, a participant in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and one of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood. active leaders and organizers of the Afghan jihad. Abdallah Azzam was the ideological inspirer of the doctrine of liberation of all Muslim lands occupied, according to his beliefs, by "infidels" from Palestine to Andalusia, including the regions of Bukhara, Samarkand and Tashkent (Kepel, 2000, p. 146).

At the beginning of the Afghan war, bin Laden created the Islamic Rescue Fund, which received funds from many wealthy Muslim businessmen, primarily Saudi and Egyptian. In 1986, Bin Laden began organizing training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan, through which thousands of mujahideen mercenaries passed, including the notorious Khattab, a future field commander in Chechnya, who proclaimed himself "emir of the Arab Mujahideen in the Caucasus." Financing and supplying the Mujahideen with everything necessary for conducting combat operations, including modern weapons received through the channels of American special services, passed through "humanitarian Islamic funds" (mainly Saudi ones), and the recruitment of Mujahideen mercenaries was carried out with the help of Pakistani and Saudi special services with the support of their American counterparts. Then, in 1988, Bin Laden began to create his own organization, Al-Qaeda, which was based on an information database (hence the name) that included materials about Mujahideen field commanders who passed through his training camps.

4 See Surahs 22: 39-41 and 2: 190, selected by T. Ibrahim: [Vostok (Oriens), 2006, N 4, p. 73].

5 For more information about Osama bin Laden and his activities, see [Makarov, 2001, pp. 120-130].

page 89

After the end of the Afghan war, some field commanders returned to their homeland or settled in Europe or the United States with Bin Laden's help. The Al-Qaeda leadership continued to communicate with them and provide financial support, so that they could continue their jihad against new enemies. In the 1990s, radical Islamist leaders turned their weapons the other way. If earlier the main task for them was to overthrow the pro-Soviet Najibullah regime in Afghanistan and oust the Soviet troops, then when this goal was achieved, thousands of Mujahideen were out of work. At the same time, their financial and other support from the "Islamic foundations" created during the war and the United States has practically ceased. Moreover, there the Afghan Mujahideen were viewed as a potential threat, as anti-Americanism has always been present in the Islamist movement since the Islamic Revolution in Iran. During the Afghan war, anti-Americanism among Islamist leaders faded into the background, but after the victory of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, it again began to come to the forefront. In turn, Islamist militants who were called "freedom fighters" in the US media during the Afghan war have now been described as "Muslim extremists and drug traffickers."

At the same time, in the 1990s, the old system of international relations with its military-strategic parity between the two superpowers and the primacy of the UN and the UN Security Council in solving international problems was finally scrapped. This system is being replaced by the dominance of one superpower - the United States - and the principle of "respect for human rights and democratic values" proclaimed by it, defined by the same single superpower. This principle justifies the so-called humanitarian intervention under the banner of "protecting human rights" in almost any country in the world and prevails over the previously recognized right of each country to defend its State sovereignty. At the same time, the processes of globalization are gaining momentum both in the economy and in the humanitarian field.

In the Muslim world, these processes lead to further social stratification, as a result of which the income gap deepens between the growing power elite and the relatively narrow layer of society associated with it, which is involved in the export of raw materials, and a significant part of the population, whose standard of living does not increase or is growing very slowly. At the same time, the process of marginalization is increasing among the poor strata of society [Landa, 2006(2), p.178]. At the same time, globalization is accompanied by cultural, ideological and military pressure from the West, primarily the United States, on the Arab-Muslim world, which is perceived by many Muslims as a " war against Islam." In the Middle East, Israel, using the changed balance of power in international relations and the support of its main ally, the United States, is trying to achieve victory in the main and longest regional conflict - the Palestinian - Israeli conflict-by force. For this purpose, numerous military actions are being carried out in the territory of the Palestinian National Authority with the use of tanks, aircraft, artillery, etc., during which hundreds of civilians are killed. The Palestinian resistance movement, in turn, using suicide bombers, carries out a series of terrorist attacks in Israel, which also lead to numerous victims among the Israeli civilian population.

In such a socio-political situation that has developed in the Arab-Muslim region by the beginning of the XXI century, the leaders of radical Islamist groups declare the United States their main opponent and " enemy of Islam." In February 1998, Bin Laden issued a fatwa establishing a " Worldwide Islamic front against Zionists and crusaders." The fatwa was signed by Ayman al-Zawahiri and Rifai Taha, leaders of the Egyptian radical Islamist groups "Jihad" and "Islamic Groups" (Jamaat is-

page 90

Lamiyya), as well as Mir Hamza, one of the leaders of the Pakistan Ulama Society, and Fazlur Rahman, the emir of the Jihad group operating in Bangladesh. The fatwa stated that "it is the duty of every Muslim to kill Americans and their allies, both military and civilian, in all countries where possible." [www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm]. Since then, extremist Islamist groups have committed a series of terrorist attacks, including the bloodiest in recent history on September 11, 2001 in the United States.

In this regard, it is noteworthy that terrorist attacks in the United States were carried out at the height of the second intifada (which began in 2000), at a time when Israeli troops were trying to suppress Palestinian protests in Jerusalem and the West Bank, resulting in Palestinian casualties, including: and children. It is probably impossible to look for a direct causal link between these clashes and terrorist attacks in the United States. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the Arab-Israeli conflict and its key issue - the Palestinian problem-are one of the main irritants in relations between the Arab-Muslim world and the West, especially the United States, which provides unconditional support to Israel. And we are not talking about a confrontation between states. Of the Arab countries, only Syria, part of whose territory (the Golan Heights) has been occupied by Israel since 1967, is in open confrontation with it. Syria's former allies Egypt and Jordan, following the conclusion of a peace treaty with Israel, are pursuing a policy that largely follows in the wake of the United States. The same applies to the Lebanese ruling elite, which has a pro-American position, while Hizbullah, which is not only an armed group, but also a political movement that reflects the sentiments of a significant part of Lebanese society, opposed the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 2006. In contrast to the political elite, a significant part of the population of Arab countries, the so-called Arab street, has increased in recent years, including due to the above factors, anti-Western, primarily anti-American sentiments. This is used for their own purposes by the leaders of the Islamist movement that exists in almost all Arab countries.

Next, we will try to examine trends in Islamist movements in several Arab countries, namely Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt, where Islamism has had a significant impact on their development.

* * *

In Algeria, where the wave of democratization of social and political life, which took place in the context of a systemic crisis that the country was experiencing, in the early 1990s.formed and turned into the most influential political force in the Arab world, the most massive Islamist movement 6-the Islamic Salvation Front (IFF). The rise to power of the Islamists after about 50% of voters voted for the IFS in the parliamentary elections was prevented by the army, which traditionally occupied a dominant position in Algerian society. This, in turn, led to the radicalization of the Islamist movement, which unleashed a long-term armed confrontation with the authorities, which lasted in its active form from 1992 to 1999, costing Algeria more than 150,000 lives and putting the country on the brink of civil war. Nevertheless, the country's leadership managed to suppress radical Islamism, proclaiming a policy of restoring civil harmony in society, continue democratic transformations and quite successfully develop the economy, which has one of the best indicators (according to the IMF) among Arab countries (in 2003, GDP growth was 6.8%, foreign exchange reserves - 34 billion US dollars)., foreign direct investment - 2.3 billion US dollars).

6 According to Abbasi Madani, Chairman of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (IFF), there were about 3 million members of the IFF in the early 1990s. Algerians [Jeune Afrique, 1999, p. 36].

page 91

at the beginning of the XXI century. Algeria is quite confident about becoming a regional "center of power" in the Maghreb.

In May 2004, President Abd al-Aziz Bouteflika of Algeria (re-elected in April 2004 for a second term) presented to the Government a draft programme for the economic, social and political development of Algeria for the period from 2005 to 2009 (the end of Bouteflika's presidential mandate), one of the strategic goals of which was declared to be " the complete restoration of civil harmony in society and building a strong, democratic, rule-of-law state that protects the interests of the citizen and society as a whole" [Le Projet de programme..., 2004]. The program approved by the Parliament provides for the further development of the Algerian economy in all areas, including space and nuclear (the first Algerian artificial satellite Alsat-1 was launched into orbit by a Russian launch vehicle in 2002, and work on the experimental Algerian nuclear reactor with a capacity of 15 MW. continues since 1993).

The program provides for raising the standard of living of the population, which remains quite low - a third of it has an income below the official poverty level and, according to the report of the UN Commission on Cooperation and Development, over the past decade (1992 - 2002) in Algeria, there has been " negative dynamics of poverty indices, while in the first two decades after the independence of Algeria This dynamic was consistently positive" [Jeune Afrique, 2003, p. 173]. Unemployment remains a fairly acute social problem in Algeria, with an average of 17-23% in the country (data for 2003), and up to 50% among young people under the age of 25, as well as the housing crisis (the housing shortage is 1.3 million housing units). Nevertheless, the creation of about 500 thousand new jobs in recent years and the planned commissioning, according to the presidential Supplementary Program, of more than 1 million housing units by 2009 can be noted as a positive trend [Al-barnamaj..., 2005, p. 10], which in fact, if successfully implemented, will solve the housing problem in Algeria. The Government also intends to accelerate the implementation of the" National Charter on Human Rights", adopted by the Parliament in 2003.Along with the reform of the education system, which includes the introduction of foreign languages in lower grades, the role of the Arabic language" as the main vector " of the State's cultural and educational policy is recognized. At the same time, it confirms the importance of Berber culture, including the Berber language (Berbers - the indigenous inhabitants of Algeria, who lived on its territory before its conquest by the Arabs in the VII-VIII centuries, now make up more than 20% of the population of Algeria), as an integral part of the Algerian national identity.

An important area of government policy is to continue the trilateral dialogue between the government, trade unions and entrepreneurs, which was launched in 2002, aimed at reaching consensus in society and addressing the problems that arise during the ongoing privatization (the closure of bankrupt enterprises, leading to job losses and at the same time the need to maintain social protection of employees) and prevent the growth of social tension. In this regard, it should be noted that the significant decline in the standard of living of a large number of Algerians and the resulting social protest were the main catalysts for the rise of the Islamist movement in Algeria in the early 1990s. A further step in restoring civil harmony was the approval of the "Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation"in September 2005 during a national referendum. it outlines 7 concrete measures to overcome the consequences of the long-standing armed confrontation between the Islamist radical opposition and the authorities.

Moderate Islamism continues to play a fairly significant role in the country's socio-political life. Of the ten political parties represented in the National People's Assembly (the lower house of the Algerian Parliament), three are moderate Islamists. Moreover, two of them - Harakat al-mujtamaa li-s-silm (Society for Peace Movement), which has 38 parliamentary seats out of a total of 389, and Nahda (Renaissance), which has only one seat, are part of the government coalition and fully support the presidential course. Moreover, in the current Algerian Government, three ministers are represented by-

7 The Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation provides for an end to criminal prosecution of Islamist militants who voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after January 13, 2000, the date of entry into force of the Law on the Restoration of Civil Harmony [www.algerianembassy 29.09.2005].

page 92

They are members of the Movement of Society for Peace (DOM) party, and two of them are engaged in quite responsible work - implementing projects under the presidential Program and negotiating Algeria's accession to the WTO. The third Islamist party, Harakat al-Islah al-Wataniyah (National Reform Movement), which has 43 seats in Parliament, opposes the government's policy of large-scale privatization. The " Movement for National Reform "(DPR) advocates" Muslim moral and ethical norms", demands a socially oriented policy and strengthening the fight against corruption and crime. The leader of the DPR, Abdallah Jaballah (born in 1956), is known in Algeria as one of the ideologists of moderate Islamism since the 80s of the XX century. Currently, he is the most popular and influential leader of the legal Islamist opposition. He ran as a candidate for the presidency in the April 2004 elections and came in third place after Bouteflika and Ali Benflis (a total of 6 candidates participated in the election campaign), receiving 4.8% of the vote.

In Algeria, there are also Islamist organizations that do not have the status of a political party, but nevertheless play a fairly significant role in the socio-political life of the country. These are primarily such associations as Al-Wafa ("Fidelity") and the former Islamic Salvation Front (IFF). Al-Wafa, which the authorities refused to register as a political party due to the presence of many former IFS leaders in its ranks, nevertheless actively participated in municipal and parliamentary elections, running its candidates as independents. The head of Wafa, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, a well-known statesman and politician in the past, an active advocate of the policy of "Arabization", tried to participate in the 2004 presidential campaign, but failed to pass all the legal formalities provided for by law. Most of the former leaders of the IFS have abandoned the jihadist concept, switched to moderate Islamism, and are trying to get the court decision (adopted in 1992) to disband the IFS and ban its political activities overturned in order to re-enter the political arena of Algeria. However, the authorities confirmed this ban, in particular with regard to Ali Benhaj, a former deputy chairman of the IFS, who, after a 12-year prison sentence (he was released in 2003) and a five-year ban on political activity, was about to re - enter political life (he was re-arrested in July 2005, but nevertheless released in March 2006).

Radical Islamism is represented in Algeria mainly by two extremist Islamist groups - the " Salafist Group for Preaching and fighting "(Jama'a Salafiya lid-daawa wa l-kytal) and "Armed Islamic Groups" (Jama'a Islamiya Musallaha), numbering, according to various estimates, from 650 to 1 thousand fighters in their ranks [Jeune Afrique/L'intelligent, 2003, p. 54]. The most efficient and numerous is the "Salafi group", headed by the " national Emir "(field commander) Abd al-Wahhab Drukdel and based mainly in the Greater Kabylia mountain range (about 300 km east of the capital Algiers). According to American experts, the Salafi Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPB) is part of the World Islamic Front created by Bin Laden, and maintains links with Al-Qaeda and the Moroccan armed Islamist group Salafi Jihad (Salafiyya Jihadiya). The most high-profile terrorist act of the SSS-8 in recent times was the attack on April 7, 2006, on a convoy carrying Algerian customs officers in the south-east of Algeria (700 km south of Algiers). Algeria), which resulted in the death of 13 people [Jeune Afrique/L'intelligent, 2006, p. 83], as well as car bomb explosions in Algeria on April 11, 2007, which resulted in the death of 30 people.

Nevertheless, it can be stated that the current internal political situation in Algeria has significantly stabilized in comparison with the period of the 1990s, when entire areas of the country were under the control of the armed Islamist opposition. Currently, "Islamist extremists", whose number has significantly decreased, can only carry out individual terrorist actions. The Algerian leadership managed, on the one hand, to suppress pockets of radical fundamentalism, and, on the other, to integrate some moderate Islamists into the country's state and political system.

8 Since September 2006, the SSS has officially joined Al-Qaeda and has since been called Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb State [Al-Ahram, 12.04.2007].

page 93

* * *

In Tunisia, since its independence in 1956, its leadership has pursued a strong policy aimed at secularizing and reforming the largely traditional society. The first president of Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba (1903-2000), perceived Islamic traditions as "a heavy burden that hindered the development of the country" [cit. according to: Jeune Afrique, 1999, p. 35], was a recognized leader of the national liberation movement in the country and, along with such figures as Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ahmed Ben Bella and Houari Boumediene, was one of the most prominent statesmen of the Arab world of the XX century. Among the fundamental documents developed on the initiative of H. Bourguiba and determined the further development of the country is the "Majalla al-Ahwal al-shahsiyya" ("Code of Civil Status"), adopted in 1956. According to the Tunisian historian Mohamed Hedi Cherif, this "revolutionary law, which dramatically changed the traditional way of life and marked the beginning of women's emancipation, turned out to be a social and legal reform with long-term and irreversible consequences" [cit. by: Vidyasova, 2005, p. 405].

In the course of the reforms, Sharia courts were abolished, a unified judicial system was established, and a number of measures were implemented to reduce the influence of religion on the education system, including the transfer of the oldest and most famous Muslim university in the Islamic world, az-Zitoun, along with a network of madrasas, to the Ministry of Education. Nevertheless, despite significant progress in the development of society and fairly stable economic growth (the average annual GDP growth in the 1980s was 7.1%), Tunisia experienced a growing socio-economic and political crisis in the 1980s. This was explained by the fact that most of the income received during the economic recovery was redistributed within the privileged stratum of large and medium-sized businesses, which had connections with the ruling political group, while the standard of living of the majority of the population remained quite low.

The difficult socio-economic situation was exploited by the rapidly growing Islamist movement, which put forward the slogan of creating an Islamic state. Islamist leaders, taking advantage of both socio-economic difficulties and the well-known dissatisfaction of some Tunisians with the demonstrative secularism of the regime and the rejection of certain Islamic traditions, managed to attract a fairly large number of dissatisfied people, among whom, along with the poor, there were many unemployed university graduates and even law enforcement officers. In the mid-1980s, the Islamist movement "Islamic Group" was structured into the political party "Movement of Islamic Orientation", later renamed "Ennahda", whose chairman was a well-known (including outside of Tunisia) ideologist of Islamism Rashid Ghannouchi, who graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Tunis and received the title of professor. The leadership of Ennahda also included prominent Tunisian Islamists, lawyers by training, Abd al-Fattah Murou, Hassan Godbani, and Sadah Karkar, who had a degree in economics. The rise of Islamism in the 1980s. In Tunisia, in addition to internal causes, the already mentioned civil war in Afghanistan, where many Tunisian citizens fought on the side of the Mujahideen, many of whom joined the Islamists after returning home, and the emergence of a powerful Islamist movement in neighboring Algeria led by the Islamic Salvation Front, with which the leaders of Tunisian Ennahda"we had constant contacts.

In 1986-1987, Islamist supporters held numerous protest demonstrations in Tunis and, according to materials later published by the Tunisian authorities, formed armed groups that committed a number of terrorist acts and were preparing to seize power. The difficult socio-political situation in the country was aggravated by intrigues within the family clan and the entourage of H. Bourguiba, who, due to his advanced age, could no longer control the situation. In this situation, on November 7, 1987, the Prime Minister and head of the ruling Socialist Dusturov Party (SDP), Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, with the help of his supporters, removed H. Bourguiba from power, citing Article 56 of the Constitution [Sapronova, 2003, p. 323], announced the temporary assumption of the duties of president and appointed new presidential elections. With regard to the Islamist opposition, Ben Ali pursued a rather skilful and justified policy. While maintaining a fundamental continuity with the legacy of President Bourguiba, Ben Ali, however, rejected the secularism openly and sometimes ostentatiously proclaimed by his predecessor and confirmed the Arab-Islamic idea-

page 94

the economy of Tunisia. Then he clearly distinguished his policy towards radical and moderate Islamists. While the former were hard-fought and repressive, Ben Ali tried to reach a compromise with the latter and integrate them into the state-political system.

As a result, the extremist wing of the Ennahda party was crushed, many of its activists were arrested, and radical leaders Rashid Ghannouchi and Salah Karkar (who were sentenced to long prison terms in absentia by a Tunisian court) left Tunisia and settled in Europe. At the same time, at the suggestion of President Ben Ali, the most prominent figures of the moderate opposition were co-opted into the Supreme Islamic Council and the Socio-Economic Council (an advisory body under the Tunisian Government). At the same time, the "National Pact" was developed, which proclaimed the basic principles of the political system of the Tunisian Republic and was supposed to promote national consensus. The Pact was signed by the leaders of the country's most influential socio-political organizations, including moderate Islamist leader Nur ed-Din Bhiri. An important measure aimed at reducing the influence of Islamist ideology was the reform of the education system, according to which chapters that preached the ideas of Islamism were excluded from school textbooks, the wearing of the hijab in educational institutions was prohibited, and co-education of boys and girls was restored.

The Tunisian leadership began to pay more attention to solving socio-economic problems, since they, while remaining unresolved, became one of the main reasons for the widespread spread of fundamentalist ideology in the country in the 1980s, and the poor were the main social base of Islamists. It has managed to understand the current realities of global development and identify priorities, which, according to President Ben Ali, are " adequate integration into the process of globalization and the development of an economy based on high technologies and modern science." Within the framework of this approach, new industrial zones were created, where enterprises produced electrical and electronic equipment, most of which was exported. Currently, the economic development of Tunisia is quite successful - the average annual GDP growth in recent years is over 5% (in 2003-5.6%), the average annual income per Tunisian in 2004 - 3 thousand 550 Tunisian dinars (about 2 thousand am. dollars), this is higher than in Algeria (1 7,720 US dollars), Egypt (1,470 US dollars) and Morocco (1,190 US dollars) [see Jeune Afrique / L'intelligent, 2004, p. 39].

An important event in the social and political life of Tunisia was the presidential and parliamentary elections held in October 2004. They were preceded by amendments to the Constitution, approved in a national referendum in 2002, which resulted in the formation of the lower house of Parliament - the Advisory Council. The incumbent president was re - elected for a fourth term (2004-2009) with an overwhelming majority (94.49% of voters voted for him). over three other contenders, representatives of three political parties-the National Unity Party, the Renewal Party, and the Social Liberal Party. In the parliamentary elections held simultaneously with the presidential election, the majority of votes were received by the ruling party Democratic Constitutional Association (successor to the Socialist Dusturov Party), which is chaired by President Ben Ali.

Tunisian Islamists do not have their own political party and, consequently, are not represented in the Tunisian Parliament. At the same time, as mentioned above, their representatives work in the Supreme Islamic Council and in the Socio-Economic Council. Nevertheless, the Ennahda Islamist movement, which has abandoned radical concepts, continues to exist. It has lost much of its influence in society, but it is still one of the most significant Islamist groups in Tunisia. Along with Ennahda, there are several other small Islamist organizations operating in the country that are in a semi-legal position. The largest of them is the "Islamic Liberation Party", whose leadership is located abroad. In addition to Islamist organizations, a number of Muslim public-educational and charitable organizations operate in Tunisia, which, unlike Islamists, do not set political goals for themselves. Their leadership sees its task in improving public morals through the dissemination of Quranic knowledge, promotion of Muslim moral and ethical norms, and charitable activities.

page 95

Currently, the influence of Islamism in Tunisia has significantly decreased as a result of the skillful policy of the authorities, who managed, on the one hand, to suppress Islamist extremism and, on the other, to put forward a real alternative to Islamist ideology in solving socio - economic problems and further development of the country.

* * *

In Egypt, the Islamist movement has traditionally played a significant role. As noted earlier, it was on the land of Egypt that the phenomenon of political Islam was born in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood association. At the same time, the peculiarity of Egypt, which is one of the centers of Islamic civilization, lies in the fact that it bears the features of other civilizations, including one of the most ancient in the history of mankind - ancient Egyptian. Nevertheless, Islamist leaders have always emphasized Egypt's belonging to the Islamic civilization and declared the need for the development of Egyptian society on the basis of Islam.

The attitude of the Egyptian authorities towards Islamism has changed in different periods. Thus, if during the anti-monarchical revolution of 1952 the Muslim Brotherhood supported the organization "Free Officers", then, in 1954, the political activities of the Muslim Brotherhood were banned, and they were subjected to repression by the government of President G. A. Nasser. Under President Sadat, the attitude towards Islamists who supported his policies, in particular "denaserization" and a return to "Islamic values", changed, and they were able to act more openly. It was during this period (the end of the 1970s) that the well-known Islamist figures Karam Zuhdi and Sheikh Omar abd al-Rahman formed the radical Islamist groups "Islamic Groups" and "Islamic Jihad", which was led by a prominent ideologist of armed jihad as the only way to create an Islamic state, Abboud al-Zummar. Subsequently, it was the militants of the Islamic Jihad who, after the conclusion of the Camp David Peace Treaty with Israel by Sadat, organized an assassination attempt on him in October 1981, as a result of which he was killed. His successor, President Mohammad Husni Mubarak, has waged a relentless battle against radical Islamists, with the result that the extremist groups Islamic Groups and Islamic Jihad have been largely suppressed.

In 1997, part of the leadership of the "Islamic Groups" led by Omar Abd al-Rahman, after negotiations with the authorities, announced an indefinite truce and called on their supporters both in Egypt and abroad to stop terrorist activities, and in 1998 they were joined by the majority of the leadership of the "Islamic Jihad". At the same time, the most irreconcilable leaders of the groups - Mustafa Kamal (Abu Hamza), Rifai Taha, Ayman al-Zawahiri - joined Al-Qaeda (and al-Zawahiri became Bin Laden's closest assistant) and continue to preach the idea of armed jihad. Radical Islamists do not stop committing individual terrorist acts: for example, in 2005 - 2006, several explosions were carried out in tourist hotels, as a result of which about 20 Egyptians and foreign citizens were killed and about 100 were injured [www.weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2006/792/op61.htm 02.05.2006].

As for the Muslim Brotherhood, they are now the most influential socio-political force in Egypt, expressing the ideology of moderate Islamism. Despite the ban on engaging in political activities, the Brothers have a great influence in public, charitable, educational and trade union organizations. They create their own industrial and commercial structures, finance the construction of hospitals and madrasas, organize the Hajj to Mecca, provide assistance to the poor, and also organize protest demonstrations against Israeli military actions in the Palestinian National Authority and the United States in Iraq, support the Palestinian organizations Hamas and Islamic Jihad that oppose Israel.

The slogan of the" Brothers "remains -" Islam is the solution." Nevertheless, it is impossible not to see the evolution that their views on generally accepted democratic norms have undergone. The Brothers 'policy document, published in March 2004 and entitled "Initiative on Basic Principles of Reform in Egypt", does not differ in essence from the political programs of other opposition parties and includes such points as "respect for political and civil liberties, restriction of the President's powers, civil control over the activities of the state".

page 96

law enforcement agencies and the army " [www.weekly.ahram.org.eg/print2006/815eg2.htm 15.10.2006]. At the same time, the head (supreme mentor - al-Murshid al-am) of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mahdi Akef, in an interview with the Al-Ahram newspaper, answering the question whether the goal of the Brothers is to create an Islamic state in Egypt, said that " an Islamic state cannot be created in the absence of freedom of expression of the will of the people. The first thing we demand is to grant such freedom, and then the people themselves will choose the form of government. " [www.weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2006/813eg5.htm 13.10.2006].

The attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian society is rather ambiguous. Some Egyptians, primarily Copts, express concern about the growing influence of the Brotherhood and consider their statements about their commitment to democratic principles to be electoral tactics. At the same time, many Egyptians support the "Brothers" and tend to view their evolution as a new strategy in keeping with the spirit of the times. During the political discussions that unfolded in Egypt on the eve of the presidential and parliamentary elections held in September and November-December 2005, respectively, some political and public figures of the opposition called for broad democratization, including the full inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood in political life. As a result of the parliamentary elections, the Brothers achieved significant success, winning 88 seats [Jeune Afrique/L'intelligent, 2005, p. 59] in the People's Assembly (the lower house of the Egyptian Parliament) out of a total of 444 (in the past they had 17).9
The Islamists achieved such an impressive success, despite pressure from the authorities, who tried to prevent a successful outcome of the vote for the "Brothers". Nevertheless, the success of the Islamists should be assessed as fairly relative, since the overwhelming majority of seats (336, of which 10, according to the Constitution, were appointed by the president), as expected, was won by the ruling National Democratic Party, whose chairman is re-elected (which was also predicted by most political scientists) for the fifth presidential term of Husni Mubarak. At the same time, the strengthening of the political positions of the Muslim Brotherhood can be considered as a landmark phenomenon in the social and political life of Egypt. Especially if we take into account that the country is experiencing a socio-economic crisis caused by a number of reasons, including a slowdown in economic growth (3% in 2004) along with a significant demographic growth of 2.1%, which causes quite high unemployment - over 11%, inflationary price growth - in 2003 by 40%. Approximately 56 million Egyptians (Egypt's population is 73.4 million) live on an income of less than $ 2 a day [Jeune Afrique/L'intelligent, 2005, p. 78]. This category of Egyptian citizens can only exist thanks to Government subsidies for food provided to the poor in order to alleviate social tensions.

Islamists take advantage of the difficult socio-economic situation in the country, putting forward the slogan of creating an Islamic state in which all problems will be solved. Recent political events in the world, such as the scandal involving cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, the Pope's negative statements about Islam, and especially the war in Lebanon in July-August 2006 and the ongoing Israeli military actions in the Palestinian National Authority, have led to the radicalization of the position of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Their leadership strongly condemned both the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the US that supported it, describing US President George W. Bush as an "enemy of Islam." Similarly, Mahdi Akef also sharply condemned the position of Arab leaders, including the Egyptian President, who did not provide practical assistance to Lebanon.

The Egyptian authorities responded to the Brothers ' demarche by summoning Mahdi Akef to the prosecutor's office for explanations and mass arrests of members of the Brotherhood's leadership and their activists (according to some reports, several thousand people were arrested). At the same time, Mahdi Akef confirmed that the Muslim Brotherhood will act "strictly within the framework of the constitution and in no case intend to violate Egyptian laws." [www.weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2006/813eg5.htm 13.10.2006]. Nevertheless, despite the authorities ' apparent attempts to weaken the Muslim Brotherhood, it is becoming the main opposition political force in the country after its success in the parliamentary elections.

9 The Muslim Brotherhood, not having the status of a political party, nominated its representatives in the parliamentary elections as independent candidates.

page 97

* * *

Thus, Islamism (with the exception of its extremist wing), which exists in one form or another in almost every Arab country, is, as we have shown, a natural result of the development of Muslim society. To a certain extent, it can also be called, following A. Toynbee, a kind of response of the Islamic civilization to the challenges of the modern world, namely, globalization.

The current rise of Islamism, including its extremist trend-jihadism, is caused, in our opinion, by two main factors - socio-economic and political.

The socio-economic factor is determined both by the internal situation in a particular country, and by the foreign policy, global trend of political and economic development. Such a trend, which greatly affects the internal situation in the Muslim world, is the process of strengthening the role of supranational structures in world politics and economy, a kind of "world government" - transnational corporations and international financial and economic institutions (WTO, IB, IMF, etc.), in the leadership of which command posts are occupied by representatives of the United States and to a lesser extent the EU countries. At the same time, the role of national Governments is being weakened, including in determining domestic socio-economic policies in their countries, which are increasingly dependent on decisions taken by supranational structures. One of the strategic goals of the "world government" is to establish full control over natural resources on a planetary scale. As a result of the policy pursued to achieve this goal, the majority of Muslim countries are relegated to the role of raw materials appendages, which leads to further stratification of society, enrichment of the power elite and a very slow rise (or lack thereof) in the standard of living of a significant part of the population. The consequence of this situation is the continuation and sometimes strengthening of the influence of Islamist ideologues among the poor (and not only) part of Muslims, who offer their own "Islamic solution" to socio-economic problems and act as defenders of "Islamic values".

The political factor manifests itself, first, in the desire for hegemony of the only superpower - the United States, including in the Arab East, which leads to the imposition of democracy in the region on the American model and military and political pressure on those Arab countries that refuse to follow in the wake of American policy, and, secondly, in the unconditional support of the United American support for Israel, which has not given up trying to solve the Palestinian problem by force and ensure its security by militarily suppressing the Islamist movements opposing it, which is perceived by some Muslims as a war against Islam.

At the same time, Islamic civilization in general and Islamism in particular do not carry an immanent antagonism and rejection of Western civilization, culture and values as such. We can refer to the fair statement of the prominent French researcher F. Burgat that "the basic fundamental civilizational values of humanity are the common heritage of all cultures, religions and civilizations" (Burgat, 2005, p.65). In fact, as a result of globalization, the differences that naturally exist between Western and Muslim cultures are gradually eroding and, of course, cannot cause a conflict of civilizations.

list of literature

Al-Ahram, 12.04.2007.

Al-barnamaj at-taqmiliy li-daam an-numuw. Fatrat 2005-2009 (Supplementary Development Support Program. Period 2005-2009). Al-Jazair, 2005.

page 98

Vidyasova M. F. Jihad without war, vol. 1. Kn. 2. Moscow, 2005.

Volodin A. G., Shirokov G. K. Globalizatsiya: nachalo, tendentsii, perspektivy [Globalization: beginning, trends, Prospects]. Moscow, 2002.

Dolgov, B. V., The Islamic Rescue Front and the Association of Algerian Ulama-Reformers, Vestnik Moskovskogo univ. Ser. 13. Vostokovedenie. 2000. N 4.

Dolgov B. V. Islamist Challenge and the Algerian Society, Moscow, 2004.
Zhdanov N. V. Islamic concept of the World order, Moscow, 1991.
Koran / Translated by Yu. I. Krachkovsky. Moscow, 1990.

Landa R. G. Political Islam: Preliminary results, Moscow, 2005.
Landa R. G. International Forum of Orientalists and Africanists in St. Petersburg. 2006(1). N 4.

Landa R. G. Sotsiologiya sovremennogo Vostoka [Sociology of the Modern East], Moscow, 2006 (2).

Makarov O. L. Osama Bin Laden // East (Oriens). 2001. N 1.

Naumkin V. V. [Islamic radicalism in the mirror of new concepts and approaches]. 2006. N 1.

Polyakov K. I. Khasan at-Turabi: at the head of the Islamic Fundamentalists in Sudan. Issue VII. Moscow, 1999.

Sapronova M. A. Gosudarstvennyi stroi i konstitutsii arabnykh respublik [State System and Constitution of Arab Republics]. Moscow, 2003.

Toynbee A. J. Civilization before the Court of History, Moscow, 1995.
Basbous A. L'Islamisme, une revolution avortee? P., 2000.

Burgat F. Al-Qaida or the Transnationalisation of an "Islamic" Resistance to the Globalisation of the Maintenance of "American Order" //Arabia Vitalis. M., 2005.

Coll S. Ghost Wars. N. Y., 2004.

Huntington S. The Clash of Civilizations? // Foreign Affairs. 1993. Summer.

Jeune Afrique. 1999. N 2000 - 2001, 2023 - 2024; 2003. N 2221; 2006. N 2362.

Jeune AfriquelV Intelligent. 2003. N 2222 - 2223; 2004. N 2285; 2005. N 2332, 2345.

Kepel G. Expansion et declin de Vislamisme. P., 2000.

Kepel G. Al-Qaida dans le texte. P., 2005.

Le Projet de programme du gouvernement // El Moudjahid. 15.05.2004.

www.algerianembassy 29.09.2005

www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm

www.weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2006/792/op61.htm 02.05.2006

www. weekly .ahram.org.eg/print/2006/813eg5.htm 13.10.2006

www.weekly.ahram.org.eg/print2006/815eg2.htm 15.10.2006.

Permanent link to this publication: