The experiments of philosophically interpreting the realities of autochthonous cultures discussed in the previous article* represent attempts by African researchers to find in them the foundations of a developed logic of thinking, elements of philosophical systems similar not only to ancient Greek, but also to modern European ones. However, the very approach to the analysis of these cultural phenomena reveals a tragic paradox characteristic of African social thought: the consideration of one's own original phenomena from the standpoint of Western criteria. As a reaction to this paradox, other alternative trends in the development of philosophical thought have emerged.

In the late 70s of the last century, there was a desire to get rid of the" hypnosis of European science", to critically understand the works of European scientists and their African students, as well as attempts to discover philosophical systems in the mythological realities of African cultures.

In this regard, the activity of young philosophers who have received education and academic degrees in European universities is noteworthy. It was they who tried to get into the essence of the problem, into the paradox, which was based on the collision of two cultural and ideological streams that influence the formation of a modern worldview: traditional and Western; moreover, the traditional stream appears to African scientists through the prism of Western assessments, in a Europeanized form. One of the young Beninese philosophers, Paul Hountondji, introduces the term "ethnophilosophy" in his book "On African Philosophy: A Critique of ethnophilosophy" [Hountondji, 1977, p.20-22], calling it "ethnology with philosophical pretensions". Young scientists - university lecturers-in the late 1970s organized the First International Conference of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Pan-African Philosophical Association, whose general secretary was P. Huntonji, and the center was Cotonou (Benin), and the preamble to the association's Charter states the need to "change the interlocutor", proclaim "two refusals", the essence of which, first, is the rejection of the practice of only "vertical" exchanges, exchanges with the West. Finally, it is necessary to establish "horizontal" exchanges and discussions among Africans. Secondly, it says, it is necessary to abandon the "exotic African theme", the search for traces of the so-called African philosophy in the local culture.

The "Tempels effect" turned out to have a different side, triggering a wave of studies devoted to the criticism of "ethnophilosophy", which began to be interpreted as a new myth,

* See: Vostok (Oriens), 2006, N 4, pp. 68-79.

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a new version of the theory of prelogical thinking. This criticism was usually ideological in nature and was filled with nationalistic pathos. Cameroonian theologian Eboussy Bulaga in his essay " The Muntu Crisis. African Authenticity and Philosophy " [Eboussi Boulaga, 1977] evaluates the method of ethnophilosophy as a collection of materials that are given a philosophical form using its categories found in language, myths, proverbs, cosmogonic views. P. Huntonji in his book, along with a political critique of the concept of ethnophilosophy and its main adept P. Tempels, sets out a more profound goal The aim is to refute the theoretical foundations of the concept of "Bantu philosophy", which has influenced the search for African philosophy in recent decades. The idea of P. Tempels about the existence of a hidden philosophy, unconscious and collective, embedded in traditional beliefs, myths, and behavior of the Bantu peoples, for many years dominated African philosophers, hypnotized them and dictated to them the only way of research - the reproduction of previously given philosophemes. However, in fact, Huntonji notes, African researchers tend to produce these philosophemes themselves, because, fortunately, they do not just repeat Tempels, but also try to define themselves and their people in relation to Europe, without allowing themselves to be fixed from the outside in petrified definitions. In their arguments and proofs, they reveal unquestionable philosophical qualities, however, they are not able to free themselves from the mythologization of the philosophical form of their own research [Hountondji, 1977, p. 20-22].

Polen Huntonji rightly points out that in order to decide who correctly interprets African philosophy, it would be necessary to refer to the original texts in which it is contained. However, there are no sources of African philosophy, and if there are any, they are not philosophical texts or speeches in the full sense of the word. These are either proverbs, fairy tales, i.e. oral African literature used by Kagame and other African philosophers, or products of the imagination of ethnophilosophical interpreters, which are essentially alien to philosophy. The philosophical concept extracted from these dubious sources, Hountondji writes, is built on sand and is a consequence of the ideological myth of the collective "philosophy" of Africans, which represents a new version of Levi-Bruhl's "primitive thinking", which only received a different assessment [Hountondji, 1977, p.31-32]. "Bantu philosophy," Huntonji concludes, is a myth. Resolutely destroying this myth, freeing up the conceptual horizon for truly theoretical reasoning - this is the task facing African philosophers and scientists today [Hountondji, 1977, p. 37].

The destruction of the myth of the" Bantu philosophy " proposed by P. Tempels is a topic that still concerns representatives of African public thought today. It is not without reason that the new generation philosopher J. E. Vidima connects this theme with the mythological image of sacrifice: "Criticism of Tempels," he writes, " over the years has turned into a sacrificial act: in order to find an authentic philosophy in Africa, it is necessary to destroy the phenomenon of Tempels and, through it, the colonial mentality, because the stake in the discussions around P. Tempels and his followers - The identity of Africa "[Bidima, 1995, p. 265-266].

What exactly should we do to liberate African philosophical thought?

First of all, says P. Huntonji, African philosophy should no longer exist as a collective vision of the world. It should develop in the form of a confrontation of individual ideas in the course of debates and discussions. That is why it is so important, according to Huntonji, to organize philosophical debates-autonomous debates, independent of Europeans, in which African philosophers will participate directly, because philosophy is not reduced to an unconscious worldview hidden in the depths of the psyche of African peoples. Philosophy is theoretical

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However, it is critical and seeks its own justification [Hountondji, 1977, p. 48]. It is time to stop being a "closed system", says the preamble to the Charter of the Pan-African Philosophical Association, it is necessary to switch to a broader philosophical perspective, to start research in the field of philosophical problems in relation to the African reality. Speaking about African philosophy, P. Huntonji defined it as a set of texts, namely, texts written by Africans and defined by the authors themselves as philosophical. Criticizing ethnophilosophy, he denies the validity of its judgments, but recognizes "the existence of this literature as philosophical literature" (Hountondji, 1977, p. 32).

In the 1970s and 1980s, the controversy surrounding ethnophilosophy became so intense that some more sober-minded scholars tried to calm the passions. A teacher from Zaire, A. I. Smet, noted skeptically that "the history of African philosophy risks being reduced to the history of the problematic of the existence of African philosophy." Smet expresses surprise that "even Huntonji, who is fully aware of the essence of the matter, spends so much effort and ability on this discussion" [Smet, 1974, p. 64].

Thus, the two areas considered - ethnophilosophy and its critique-constitute the content of the work of African philosophers for more than four decades. It is striking that despite all the differences, even seemingly opposites of these two trends, they are united by something in common-ideological, or rather, nationalistic pathos. Representatives of both the first and second directions strive to prove the usefulness of African culture, spirituality, and the African mind. Ideologists of the first direction: L. Senghor, A. Kagame, H. Memel-Fote, J. Mbiti and others, as well as their European teachers - M. Griol, P. Tempels, J. Yang - from the standpoint of cultural relativism look for some implicit philosophical schemes in African myths, rituals, language systems, symbolism, original and original, but containing universal truths. Moreover, many of the representatives of the first direction find in these philosophical schemes elements of pre-Christianity (the idea of God-demiurge), Freudianism, Greek philosophical systems, even the foundations of physical laws (H. Memel-Fote).

Critics of ethnophilosophy object passionately to what they consider to be exotic attempts to find the beginnings of implicit philosophy in African cultures and argue that the development of African cultures follows global patterns and that therefore philosophy in Africa is born only in the twentieth century according to the same rules as in Europe in the era of antiquity. It seems that both the first and second positions in this far-reaching debate about African philosophy are one-sided.

Ethnophilosophy is based on the ordinary understanding of the term "philosophy", on what is understood as wisdom, folk worldview, mythology. At the same time, a passionate critique of ethnophilosophy leads to ignoring such an important fact as the existence of a distinctive metaphysical worldview in every culture. It is the core and " soul "of culture, and although it is not philosophy in the scientific sense of the word, it contains elements of natural philosophy and is the living basis of philosophical reflection, called by many scientists"pre-philosophy".

Of course, it is easy to talk about shortcomings from the outside, it is much more difficult to find yourself in disputes about African philosophy, the search for its foundations. The main critic of ethnophilosophy, P. Huntonji, noticed the internal dissonances of all literature on African philosophy, regardless of the positions of its authors. The essence of these dissonances is the gap between the inherently tragic contribution of Africans to the history of world philosophy, on the one hand, and, on the other, dependence on an "Africanist" ideology that is not African in origin [Hountondji, 1977, p.51].

Indeed, isn't it paradoxical that it is from the books of European scientists that Africans learned about philosophy in Africa, and whether Europeans are right in their search for phi-

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losofsky systems in African cultures? One way or another, African scientists are forced to fight the hypnosis of European science in order to discover the truth. All the more approval is given to attempts to create modern philosophical systems in philosophical circles. Thus, the philosophical theory of Kwama Nkrumah, which he expounded in his book "Awareness" (Nkrumah, 1976), is still highly appreciated. Assessing the state of public thought in Tropical Africa, K. Nkrumah noted a deep spiritual crisis caused by the collision of three spiritual and ideological streams in post-colonial Africa - traditionally African, Muslim and European-Christian. He believed that it was necessary to put forward an ideology that, being aimed at the common good, would replace competing ideologies, and at the same time be able to synthesize the progressive elements contained in each of them. The development of such an ideology is the task of philosophy, which Nkrumah called "awareness."

Nkrumah's book was perceived in Africa as the first philosophical work. M. Bargane Guisse speaks of "Awareness" as a "complete philosophical system" [Guisse, 1979, p. 45] . M. Tova noted that "in the intellectual products of modern Africa and the modern Negro world in general, we see, perhaps, only "Awareness" Kwama Nkrumah as a work corresponding to the method of philosophy "[Towa, 1971, p. 7]. Later he will write: "The awareness of the Kwama Nkrumah factor marks the moment when modern Africa has matured into philosophy. "Awareness" is a work of African philosophy, the first work" [Towa, 1973, p. 148]. At the same time, the emphasis that he places on the ideological nature of philosophy has caused objections from African philosophers. M. Tova accuses Nkrumah of blurring the clear lines between ideology and philosophy. In his opinion, philosophy cannot be concerned solely with the apology of a certain worldview. P. Huntonji also disagrees with Nkrumah's statement about the instrumental role of philosophy in relation to ideology.

Nkrumah's theory, which he called "Awareness", is thus mainly ideological in nature and, despite its importance in the development of social thought in Africa, does not represent an original philosophical work that reflects the African mental-philosophical tradition.

More interesting in this regard, in my opinion, are studies devoted to the analysis of the actual mental structures characteristic of Tropical Africa. The material for this analysis is the same as that of many ethnophilosophists who have been repeatedly criticized: myths, linguistic structures, beliefs, rituals, symbols, fairy tales, and art. However, the method of their research is somewhat different. This is not a search for implicit philosophical systems as a product of collective thought, but an analysis of the philosophical and mythological tradition in Black African cultures as a complex of metaphysical worldview, which they call wisdom, "practical ideology" , etc.

African philosophers - critics of ethnophilosophy do not deny the existence of original African thought. On the contrary, they emphasize that African peoples have their own "practical ideology", which contains elements of their worldview, their knowledge, and which is expressed in the form of myths, customs, rituals, symbols, fairy tales, proverbs, etc."practical ideology", as well as its oral literature, is passed down from generation to generation. The task of modern African scientists is to "demythologize and demystify" the regularities of the development of African thought, to free them from the exotic touch imposed by representatives of ethnophilosophy, especially European ones, who did not take into account the true nature of "practical ideology", which in itself is of significant (but not exotic) interest for the researcher.

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E. Bulaga in his book "The Crisis of Muntu" warns about the danger of seeing in the criticized position of ethnophilosophy the rational grain, which he sees in stating the significance of the creative possibilities of cultural traditions. E. Bulaga sees these opportunities in the fact that they:

1) there is a "non-dormant memory", designed to help avoid the repetition of the slave position;

2) are a symbol of the "movement of African authenticity", which is focused not on the past, but on the future and therefore is not opposed to modernization. Traditions should call for "being together, given to build a common destiny";

3) can provide "conditions for a different point of view on reality, for creating a distance that opens up opportunities for creativity, encouraging a bold revision of all the rules of the social game on a radically new basis."

P. Khuntongji, accused of elitism for his harsh criticism of ethnophilosophy, in an interview with the newspaper "Continent" justifies himself, claiming that "criticism of the anthropological concept of philosophy has absolutely no meaning... nothing to do with a contemptuous attitude towards popular thinking." He does not deny "the existence of traditional African thought," nor does he deny "the exceptional importance of mass thought at the present time." The question is "how to understand these intellectual constructions without distorting them. It's all about the method" [Hountondji, 1988, p. 11-12].

M. Towa, in his Essays on Philosophical Problems in Modern Africa in the early 1970s, set the task of African philosophers "to reconstruct the history of our thought with maximum rigor and objectivity" (Towa, 1971, p.70). From his point of view, philosophy begins "with the decision to subject the philosophical and cultural heritage to unflattering criticism" (Towa, 1971, p.30). We need a new philosophical orientation in Africa in connection with the problems that are now emerging there. The main one is the problem of "clarifying our current attitude to the world" [Towa, 1971, p. 35].

Tova warns against a philosophical position based only on Negroafrican specifics, as was the case in Negritude. In his opinion, neither Negroism nor ethnophilosophy, which is an aspect of the Negroism movement, are suitable for Africa [Towa, 1971, p. 35]. We need a philosophy that is " a critical understanding of what is, what exists or is developing, anticipating the conditions for the implementation of our main tasks."

In the 1980s and 1990s, the activity of African philosophers studying the problems of the philosophical and mythological mental tradition was intensified by the work of a number of research centers, for example, the Center for the Study of Bantu Civilization (Sisiba) in Gabon, which published the theoretical journal Muntu, the Institute of Black Africa in Dakar, national philosophical associations and departments of philosophy, Pan-African Philosophical Association. When studying ethnic cultures, modern African philosophers undertake a philosophical analysis (though with difficulty freeing themselves from European criteria) of the main realities of these cultures: myths, legends, fairy tales, language structures, games. Perhaps the most common method of analyzing language structures. Following A. Kagame, the semantics and vocabulary of the Bantu, Kikuyu, and Kinyarwanda languages are studied by Theophilus Obenga, J. Mbiti, M. Mubumbila, I. Nzenda, and S. Mwanza.

T. Obenga in his fundamental work "Bantu: Languages - Peoples - Civilizations" [Obenda Theophile, 1985], especially in the section "Vision of the Bantu world", raises a number of philosophical problems, such as the structure of the Universe, the idea of God, the formation of abstractions, the idea of the future in Bantu languages, the concepts of "to be" and " to have", symbolism of color, etc. As for the idea of God, T. Obenga concludes that in the Bantu languages, the names of the gods - Mulungu and Kalunga-coincide with the name of the organizer, the one who forms something-

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it gives meaning, identity, and at the same time it is the one who preserves, oversees, protects, and sees without light (in darkness). So, the image of God as an engineer, organizer, Guardian God, and leader is emerging. This may also be the original God (Obenga, 1985, p. 153-154). The structure of the Universe is understood by T. Obenga as the sum of micro-universes, as a set of independent worlds: the world of gods and spirits, the world of cultural heroes, remote ancestors, the world of the living and the world of the dead. Man (muntu) also constitutes a universe consisting of worlds: the body, souls, shadows, etc. All these structures of the microcosm are interconnected and together represent a true universe, a synthesis of the grandiose mechanics of life [Obenga, 1985, p. 165].

Based on the method of A. Kagame in the analysis of Bantu languages, T. Obenga examines the problem of abstract thinking among Bantu-speaking peoples and comes to the conclusion that there is a grammatical system of forming abstract terms in Bantu languages. Using the prefixes vi-, vo-, be-, o-, and-, before the adjective, nouns are formed that denote abstract concepts, such as good, evil, beauty, and old age.

It is necessary to note the research of African scientists, which focuses on the problems of African culture, the mentality of Africans, the peculiarities of their worldview and worldview, mythological thinking. At the end of the XX century. once again, the problems of attitudes towards Negroes are raised. Among these studies (in addition to those already mentioned), the fundamental works of E. Mweng, a Cameroonian historian, cultural critic, and theologian [Mweng, 1974; 1985], Senegalese philosophers I. E. Dogbe [Dogbe, 1980] and A. Ndaw [Ndaw, 1983], philosopher J. G. Vidim, and others are noteworthy.

E. Mweng in his book "Africa and the Church: speeches of a believer" examines the problems of Man and the Cosmos, life and death, the relationship of mythological and scientific mentality in Africa, the peculiarities of spirituality in traditional culture in comparison with Christian spirituality, etc. Throughout his book runs the idea that the Cosmos can only be understood through man. That Space is a stage of drama, in the center of which is the struggle of life and death, and man is a symbol of the triumph of life, its invincibility and eternity. The life that man is the bearer of is a creative force brought in by the Cosmos. There are mutual, indissoluble ties between man and the Cosmos: human existence is impossible without Space, but there is no Cosmos without man. Thanks to these connections, the oppositions formed by the Western tradition (soul-body, thought-matter, nature-supernatural (supra-natural), individual-society, subject-object) do not represent opposites in the Negroafrican cultural tradition, they are more important than unity, mutual connections, because none of the sides of the opposition is impossible without the other, only in a harmonious unity, in which there is no primary and secondary, can they exist and interact [Mweng, 1985, p. 10 - 13; 35 - 36].

"Man," writes Mweng, " is the heart and soul of the world, he has his consciousness and his voice in the face of God. The unity of Man and the Cosmos is not primitive, it is essentially deep and dialectical, because each of the parties, the whole complex of its elements is also dialectical and they are all necessary for each other, Man and the Cosmos are in constant danger of destruction if the ties between them are broken. Why is there a threat of their death? "Because," says Mweng, " their very essence implies the possibility of disintegration, of disunion, and they carry within them their own negation. If the existence of man is life, then the negation of this existence is death. If the world is an extension of man and his essence is also life, then its negation will be death [Mweng, 1985, p. 36-37]. E. Mweng considers this doctrine to be central in African culture: in religion, in cults and rituals, in the great school of initiation, in art, in political, social, and economic life.

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Alassane Ndaw devotes his book "African Thought "(Ndaw, 1983) to the problems of African mentality and cognition. In his opinion, the African mentality combines elements of myth and rationality (however, as in Western thinking, Ndav notes). The dualism of Western logic, which separates the knowing subject and the known object, is contrasted with the knowledge of the Black African, where the way of knowing and the way of being, subject and object are inseparable. For the African mentality, cognition is the same substance of the Cosmos as being. These two substances - reality and its cognizing thought - are two interacting sides of the Cosmos, functioning in a single rhythm. That is why, Ndaw notes, Black-African thought is not characterized by skepticism [Ndaw, 1983, p. 95-122].

In addition to general research, which analyzes fundamental philosophical problems based on the study of various cultural realities, interesting research is devoted to specific myths, legends, fairy tales, in which scientists find specific mental forms, original philosophical constructions.

In this regard, the analysis of the cosmogonic myths of the Fang people, called mvet, which was presented by Dr. B, is noteworthy. Engonga Bikoro (1987, p. 105-121). The myth of the origin of the world says that all creatures that live on Earth have common roots. But nothing is known about the origin of things, except Yeo. Yeo-invisible and formless-is the foundation of the universe. Eyo contains the prerequisites of nature, man, life, his spirituality, gods, energy, and most importantly-has the ability to generate new things and beings. The first element of nature in Fang is copper, a copper egg that obviously represents the earth. This egg splits into four parts, giving four basic realities: "infinity", "nebula", " sky "(illuminated by the sun) and "heaven" - cosmic distances with night stars. Each of these realities arises from the previous one, the primary one being infinity. In infinity, a nebula appears, from it - the earth's sky, then the heavenly distances filled with stars appear. There is no act of creation, no place for God. Yeo is not a god, not a creator. It is only a name, something that is self-absorbed, self-contained, reflecting on itself. Strictly speaking, this is not even the beginning of the world, it is like the deployment of opportunities that can be curtailed, which will not be the end. This is a kind of pulse, a manifestation of cosmic pulsation.

In the Fang myth, from the fourth reality, the fourth hypostasis of the copper egg (heaven, cosmos), there is a consistent chain of spiritual realities - spirits, culminating in the emergence of three supernatural beings - gods. Each of the links in this chain generates the following. First spirit: Ngawa-Bikoko (Ngawa, son of Bikoko). Ngawa means "friendship", "love". Second spirit-Mbah-Ngawa (Mbah, son of Ngawa), - Mbah means-sculptor, cultivator, one who gives the form, craftsman, artist. Mba is at the same time a concept of beauty, the derivatives of this word (Mbamba, Mbeng) mean everything related to aesthetics, therefore, the second spiritual reality is beauty, aesthetic, artistic creativity. Third spirit: Zokomo-Mbah (Zokomo, son of Mbah). Zokomo is a complex concept made up of the concepts of "speech" and "order", "truthfulness", "directness". Therefore, the third spiritual reality is truthful speech. Fourth spirit: Nkwa-Zokomo (Nkwa, son of Zokomo). Nkwa u fang has the meaning of expressing the truth in a dispute over a case, the term is used in the sense of justice. Thus, the fourth spiritual reality is truth, justice. The four spiritual entities culminate in the formation of the most important one-the fifth (fifth spirit) - Mebeshe, son of Nkva. Mebeshe means "bearer" and this concept can be interpreted as the bearer of truth, justice (since Mebeshe, the son of Nkva is born of him), i.e. God.

If we build this chain, it turns out that the cosmic depths (heaven) gave birth to love, which gave birth to beauty, speech grew out of it, which gave birth to truth, and truth created its carrier - God.

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Mebeshe, the bearer of truth, in turn generates three spirits who are gods. These gods are more accessible to humans than the first god, they all come from Mebeshe, since Mebeshe is the God of gods. However, Mebeshe is not a creator, but an integral part of the universe, a link in the chain of transformations. We see in this case a kind of reverse European logic. God is not the beginning of all beginnings, nor does he create the world and its spiritual realities, but these realities themselves create their bearer - God. The role of the god Mebeshe in this case is like an intermediate one: the generation of three sons - three gods. This act contains the idea of three worlds, each ruled by one of Mebeshe's sons.

The world of the immortals is the world of the mythical Yong people, who have an excellent social organization, a broad democracy. The leader of this people has no guards or slaves. He is the head of the people solely because of his personal qualities-intelligence, wisdom, strength, kindness, tolerance. According to his position in the hierarchy of the Yeongong people, he is a demigod. Yong Gong is a peaceful people who do not know violence, who have great strength, power, and immortality. However, they previously fought with the Okyu people, who encroached on their immortality, so they are always protected, they keep their secrets. Their ideal is peace, justice, and love. The people of Yong gong are beautiful, wise, courageous, rich. They are carriers of spirituality and positive values.

The mortal world is the world of the mythical Okyu people. This is a world of weakness, negativity, naivety. After their attempt to master the secrets of Yeongong's immortality, they became the focus of selfishness and all the qualities opposite to Yeongong. The Okyu people represent the world of shadow, the negative side of man, they are the bearer of evil, dark passions, desires, instincts, and gross materiality.

The world of people, nature, and animals is the real world. This world in the tales of mwet is represented as the world of the Fang people, a world that is a synthesis of two mythical worlds. It combines the positive values of Yong gong and negative okyu, strength and weakness, reason and instincts, wisdom and error, good and evil. The man of our world is both mortal and immortal. Immortal, since he continues to live in the divine ancestors and can become a demigod, he is immortal in the memory of posterity. A man of the earthly world combines the material and the spiritual; physical death is a proof of his materiality and, at the same time, his transition to the rank of demigod ancestors is a triumph of total spirituality.

When reconstructing the worldview of the Fang people in accordance with these myths, one should be wary of one main and most persistent misconception: to interpret cosmogonic myths on the basis of European assessments. It is no accident that Yong'onga Bikoro speaks of a serious difficulty in separating the concepts of the world, life and God. In the Fang cosmogony, the concept of life is combined with the concept of God. The concepts of "world", "life", and " god " are intertwined in a universal concept of the world, which includes the metaphysical and physical, the material and spiritual, reason and intuition. It seems that it is precisely in the statement of this difficulty that the solution lies. The African philosopher comes to the conclusion that European logic is not applicable to the analysis of the worldview in African culture.

It is very interesting to study the legend-parable of the Beti people (Southern Cameroon) by a philosopher from the University of Cameroon, Basil J. Food service. This legend is unusual in form and content: in the form of a dialogue between two friends - Abobo and Otende-Nka, the problem of evil in the world and God's attitude towards it are discussed. Everything about this legend suggests that it originated relatively recently among people who have a different worldview from their ancestors, although they still live in the world of mythological representations and think in mythological categories [Fouda, 1980, p. 38-56].

The essence of the legend: there are two characters - friends of Abobo and Otende-Nka. At the heart of their discussion is a problem: how can it be that God, who is good and powerful, creates beings capable of experiencing or doing evil? These characters-representatives of the forest people - are completely different people. Fearful, sensitive and God-fearing-

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Nennyy Ottend-Nka cites some facts of malice from the life of his family, but raises a generalized question about the cause of evil, about why God allows evil. Abobo-bold, bold, categorical brings his idea to the level of broader, universal generalizations. If Otende is talking about the manifestations of evil, then Abobo is already referring to the category of evil. At the crossroads of roads, he organizes interviews with people who are sick and crippled, and goes from collecting facts to generalizing about God's involvement in human suffering. Abobo boldly accuses God, blaming him for human misery and, moreover, considering him the cause of evil. There are many interesting and unexpected twists in this logic. Thus, three aspects of evil are distinguished: physical and moral suffering; natural mortality and human malice (poisoning of Otende's wife). Abobo, blaming God, seeks the metaphysical roots of evil. This is how the transition from the level of phenomenology of evil to the level of its ontology takes place. The socio-anthropological meaning of the myth is also interesting. There are two individuals at work, two personalities: the personality of the simpleton and the personality of the rebel who defies God. And although the action unfolds in the images of African mythology and according to the canons of myth, it begs the question whether this myth does not indicate the onset of a new stage in the development of African cultures, the African mentality.

For example, Dr. Agblemanon Nsougan (1980, pp. 4-5) from the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS, Togo) speaks about the turn and changes in African cultures. The essence of this turn is a change in the content of cultural universals, such as the categories of space and time, and the formation of a new attitude to time and space: the time of stability has been replaced by a time of gaps, conflicts, and crises. The time of myth, the time of the past, becomes peripheral in most societies. Space and socio-cultural space no longer exist in harmony, as in a traditional society, but are also in conflict, antagonism.

In the process of development of African philosophy in recent decades, new topics and areas of research are emerging, and questions of ethics, both traditional and modern, are being raised. The Malagasy writer, philosopher, and public figure R. Andriamanjato analyzes the principles of traditional Malagasy ethics as the basis of self-consciousness and identity of a Malagasy person in his book "Tsini and Tudi in Malagasy Thought" (Andriamanjato, 1982). The concept of "qini", which is the essence of the worldview and dominates all the complex connections and relationships of the Malagasy, can be understood as a moral assessment, moral censorship to which people subject each other, themselves, society and even the gods. This moral censorship, to which a person subjects himself first of all in communication, while trying to understand the interlocutor, as if to take his position, forces the individual to evaluate any act, action, even word in connection with the entire Universe, because any trifle can disrupt the course of things in the family, group, society, i.e. affect the individual's behavior. world order. In the picture of the world presented in Malagasy culture, the individual is not dissolved in society, he has his own personal specifics, moreover, he carries the whole world within him, so he is responsible for it. The concept of " tudi "(return, arrival) in the traditional Malagasy consciousness has the meaning of an eternal cycle of life, an endless chain of departures and returns to the former: the transition from the earthly life to the world of ancestors and returning again to the earthly life - this is an indissoluble chain of being. It guarantees the eternal existence of man.

As can be seen from the above, there is an original trend in the development of African social thought, which is a certain mental philosophical and mythological tradition that reflects the ways of civilizational development, the state of public consciousness and the mental characteristics of the race, the way of life of peoples and their environment. In the formation of this tradition, we can distinguish both the process of long-term evolution and the period of radical changes.-

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changes, the emergence of new ideas that were the answer to the most important questions of life. Such radical changes began at the end of the 19th century, and their pace is increasing.

J. G. Wiedim's research highlights the fact that there is more than a century of written philosophical research belonging to African researchers (D. Horton, A. Blyden in the XIX century, etc.). This written history cannot be ignored, says Vidima. Thus, in addition to the philosophical and mythological oral tradition, a philosophical science was formed in the cultures of Africa, expressed in written texts. Zh. G. Vidima defines the contribution to world philosophy that the young African science has already made.

This is, firstly, the development of the concept of Life, life force, and their role in African societies; secondly, it is the concept of ethnophilosophy. Vidima rehabilitates the repeatedly condemned concept of ethnophilosophy, understanding it as the very essence of African ethnic cultures, the soul of the people. He notes the merit of African philosophers who have focused on this issue and its relevance. "Ethnicity, once seen as an exotic category, is now engulfing Europe," writes Vidima. "To understand the essence of ethnic conflicts, Europeans may need to turn to their own ethnophilosophy." Third, it is a paradigm of transition that is closely related to identity acquisition. African intellectuals attach great importance to the category of transition itself. Transition (initiation) is a traditional category that represents the most important milestone in the life of African society, one of the main rituals. J. G. Vidima understands the transition that is currently being experienced in African society as a time to overcome "fixed poles and obsessive dualisms", necessary in order to establish relations that are unfinished, waiting for a new one [Bidima, 1995, p. 123-124].

The end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries were marked by a new search for identity in Africa. It is important to note that in these searches there is an ever deeper understanding of one's own cultural values, their use in various aspects of public life.

Disillusionment with Western democracy, which does not correspond to African conditions and the worldview of Africans, forced intellectuals to turn to "African democracy", based on the"wisdom of their ancestors". Its essence is expressed in the traditional African "palabra" - a conversation of leaders, elders, sages gathered around the fire. The model of "traditional democracy" formed the basis for the idea of the National Conference, which was founded by the Beninese philosopher P. Huntonji and the Cameroonian theologian and philosopher F. Ebussi Bulaga. "... These conferences became the main event of the transition period, and in some cases even opened this transition, as in Benin, " writes the Russian Africanist V. S. Mirzekhanov [Mirzekhanov, 2001, p. 91]. F. Eboussy Bulaga believes that it is the National Conferences that can give an answer to the question,"...how to enter today's scientific and technological world and not get lost in it, how to modernize yourself and return to your roots" [Eboussi Boulaga, 1993, p. 169]. The National Conference, according to its ideologists, embodies such values and aspects of traditional life as rites of passage, redemption and healing, as a holiday, therapy, play, meeting and conversation. Many African scholars write about the National Conference in Africa and the Palabra traditions that underlie it [see: Atangana, 1965; Ruijtenhuijs, 1993; Raynal, 1994; Bidima,1997; Mouelle Kombi, 1992].

The analysis of the history of the development of philosophical problems in modern Tropical Africa, which is far from complete, has, as we can see, a direct access to the study of the formation of modern identity, including the formation of relevant intellectual space, especially in the second half of the XX century. The boundaries of this space in Africa are permeable and unstable, intellectual thought develops as if between Scylla and Charybdis: between without-

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the world of traditional mythological consciousness, on the one hand, is rich, but full of secrets and traps, and the coldly logical, pragmatic, but very attractive world of Western science, on the other. And virtually all research by African intellectuals cannot escape the influence of these two worlds. Exploring the realities of African cultures, scientists use Western methods and at the same time cannot get rid of the deep foundations of their own authentic mentality, the archetypes of their own consciousness. As a result, the most seemingly rigorous scientific research and conclusions suddenly begin to glow with a certain mystical light, and mythological logic appears in scientific logic.

list of literature

Mirzekhanov V. S. Intellectuals, Power and Society in Black Africa, Moscow, 2001.

Andriamanjato R. Le Tsiny et le Tody dans le pensee malgache. Antananarivo, 1982.

Atangana B. La parable de l'histoire //Etudes. 1965. Avril.

Bidima J.G. Laphilosophie negro-africaine. P., 1995.

Bidima J.G. La Palabe. Une juridiction de la parole. P., 1997.

Dogbe Y.E. Negride, culture et civilisation. P., 1980.

Eboussi Boulada F. La Crise du Muntu. Authenticite africaine et philosophie. P., 1977.

Eboussi Boulada F. Les Conferences Nationales en Afrique Noire. Une affaire a suivre. P., 1993.

Engonga Bikoro B. Cosmologie bantu: Origine de la vie, du monde et de Dieu chez les Fang, "Muntu". Revue scientifique et culturelle du CJCJBA (Centre international des civilisations Bantu). Libreville, 1987. N 6.

Fouda B. J. Dialogue philosophigue et probleme du mal chez les Beti (Sud-Cameroun) // La philosophie africaine. Addis Ababa, 1980.

Guisse M. B. Philosophie, culture et devenir sociale en Afrique. Dakar, 1979.

Hountondji P. Sur la "philosophie africaine" (critique de l'ethnophilosophie). P., 1977.

Hountondji P. Interview // Le continent. 1988. N 177.

Mouelle Kombi N. La Conference Nationale africaine: l'emergence d'un mythe politique // Afrique 2000. 1992. N7.

Mweng E. L'Art d'Afrique Noire. Yaounde, 1974.

Mweng E. L'Afrique dans l'Eglise: paroles d'un croyant. P., 1985.

Ndaw A. La pensee africaine. Paris-Dakar, 1983.

Nkrumah K. Le Consciencisme. P., 1976.

N'sougan A. Problematique de la philosophie africaine, hier et aujourd'hui // La philosophie africaine. Addis Ababa, 1980.

Obenga T. Les Bantu: Langues-Peuples-Civilisations. Paris-Dakar, 1985.

La parable de l'histoire // Etudes. 1965. Avril.

Raynal J. J. Les Conferences Nationales en Afrique: au-dela du mythe, la democratie? // Renant. 1994. N 104.

Ruijtenhuijs R. La conference nationale souveraine du Tchad: Un essai d'histoire immediate. P., 1993.

Smet A.Y. Histoire de la philosophie africaine. Problemes et methode. // La philosophie africaine. Kinshasa, 1974.

Towa M. Essai sur la problematique philosophique dans l'Afrique actuelle. Yaounde, 1971.

Towa M. "Consciencisme" // Presence africaine. P., 1973. N 85.

Towa M. L'idee d'une philosophie negro-africaine. Younde, 1979.

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