The Central Asian region is characterized by limited water resources, which gives rise to various conflicts based on the dispute over water. Often, the reason for modern conflicts over water is seen in the management system laid down in Soviet times. This approach seems simplistic. This paper offers a broader view of the causes of modern water disputes and examines the history of their development.

Key words: water resources, Central Asia, water allocation, energy, conflict.

Water resources in Central Asia are unevenly distributed. The main source of drinking water replenishment in the region is the Central Asian rivers originating in the Tien Shan and Pamir-Alai Mountains. As they descend to the plain, their water content decreases. Human intervention in the regime of these rivers through the construction of dams, increased water collection for irrigation of agricultural land, the creation of large and small reservoirs and channels without taking the appropriate measures necessary to prevent water infiltration and evaporation, led to a serious shortage of this resource in the flat part of the region. The Aral Sea, which has almost disappeared from modern geographical maps , is a vivid confirmation of this. As you know, the main reason for the Aral Sea crisis is that the two great rivers of Central Asia that used to feed the Aral Sea - the Amu Darya and Syr Darya - practically stopped reaching it. Only in high-water seasons does the Syr Darya flow into the Small Aral, which is almost separated from the Big Aral.

In the contemporary works of Central Asian authors, it is quite often accepted to blame the legacy of the Soviet era for this state of affairs. Is everything so clear?

For an objective assessment of the situation and search for solutions, you should refer to the history. To begin with, the Central Asian region is located in an arid climate, in a zone of risky agriculture. Therefore, irrigation channels were built here in the Neolithic era. If the water left, people moved after it. It is in this connection that many ruins of former settlements and canals are found on the territory of Central Asia, which have different age dates: some cities died, others were born in a new place. Ubiquitous and one-time abundance has never existed here. The most favorable places for settlement were river oases. The most ancient settlements existed in the valleys of the Murghab, Zeravshan, and Tejen rivers. Of particular importance for the desert zone of Central Asia are the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, which provide life for most of the territory of Central Asia from the upper reaches in the mountains to the largest oases in their deltas near the Aral Sea.

With the advent of Soviet power, a grandiose hydro-reclamation construction was launched in the region. In the interests of irrigated agriculture of the lowland part in go-

pax created huge reservoirs of fresh water. At the same time, the dams being built were designed to serve the interests of not only agriculture, but also energy. Water was also used as an energy resource. The water management system was closely intertwined with the energy system of the region, and large hydraulic structures were integrated into the Unified Energy System of Central Asia (OECCA). At the same time, internal administrative borders drawn on an ethnic basis, rather than on an economic basis, were not of fundamental importance from the point of view of water and energy management. The region, based on considerations of economic feasibility, was perceived as a single whole.

Improved living conditions generally led to an increase in the birth rate and a decrease in mortality. As a result, the population increased dramatically: if at the beginning of the XX century there were about 6 million people living here, then at the beginning of the XXI century (2010) there were already almost 62 million people living in the region [World Population..., 2012]. If at the beginning of the 20th century almost 0.6 ha of irrigated land per capita was accounted for, today an average of 0.18 ha is accounted for per capita, despite the fact that the area of irrigated agriculture has significantly increased (up to 8.4-8.7 million ha) [Ibatullin, 2011]. This is a very important point: as the population grows, so does the amount of land involved in irrigated agriculture, and consequently the amount of water consumed. The agricultural sector is the main consumer of water resources worldwide. As for Central Asia, 89-92% of water consumption is used for agriculture [Abdullayev]. Based on the totality of these data, it can be argued that today the population of the Central Asian region has begun to exceed the capacity of the host (feeding) landscape.

But this problem can be partially solved by modern means of resource savings. The possibility of overcoming the constraints of the surrounding landscape lies in the transition to fundamentally new technologies (industrial and post-industrial). Water scarcity could be avoided if the countries of the region manage their land wisely. The example of Israel is typical here. Its agriculture is one of the most economical in the world in terms of water consumption. In the arsenal of Israeli agronomists - the rejection of water-intensive crops, breeding plants that can feed on brackish water, drip irrigation, including spot irrigation of plant roots, the use of treated wastewater, various price mechanisms. In addition, Israel has abandoned water-intensive industries and is educating its population in the spirit of economical water consumption.

The management system created by the Soviet Union made it possible to avoid water scarcity due to the principle laid down in its foundation: the perception of the region from the point of view of the economy as a single whole. This approach significantly reduces the resulting economic costs, reduces overproduction (in particular, electricity) and resource consumption. Another thing is that the technologies used at that time were imperfect and resource-intensive in themselves.

It is based on the common interests of the region that hydro-reclamation facilities were built, which are closely connected with the work of the United Energy System of Central Asia (OECCA). The republic's power systems were connected to the operation of a single regional power ring, with a significant contribution made not only by natural resources (coal, oil and gas) Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, but also hydroelectric facilities of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. These upstream hydroelectric facilities operated not only for irrigation purposes, but also generated electricity, although, of course, their main mode of operation was correlated with the interests of agriculture in the downstream republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. This interdependence allowed for the exchange of services between water-deficient but energy-sufficient Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Uzbekistan.

Turkmenistan, on the one hand, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are water - sufficient but otherwise poor in natural resources, on the other. All water allocation issues were regulated in 1970-1980. The Ministry of Water Resources of the USSR, which developed "Schemes for the integrated use and protection of water resources" for all the largest river basins in the region.

The essence of this exchange was as follows: in autumn and winter, when reservoirs at Kyrgyz and Tajik hydroelectric power stations (HPPs) accumulated water for irrigation of fields in the lower republics, Uzbek, Turkmen and Kazakh gas, fuel oil, coal and electricity were supplied to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. During the growing season, all the water accumulated in the reservoirs at the hydroelectric power station was supplied to the lower-lying republics for irrigation of fields. This system was supported by established water quotas: each republic was allocated a percentage of the actual water resources that were specified annually. In order to speed up the resolution of annual water allocation issues, two regional Basin Water management organizations were established in 1986 - the Amu Darya and Syr Darya BVI.

The dependence of water and energy problems in Central Asia was successfully solved not by creating isolated management systems in each republic separately, but through regional cooperation. This approach made it possible to avoid additional financial and resource costs, including water. This was especially noticeable in the case of parallel operation of power systems within the United Power System of Central Asia. Parallel operation within a regional system optimally takes into account the location of countries in different time zones and peak loads; parallel operation allows power systems to share the reserve, rather than duplicate it, as if the systems were operating in isolation. Optimal dispatching allows combining the advantages of thermal generation and hydroelectric power, reducing their costs and reducing resource consumption; in cases of emergency situations, parallel flow can reduce the size of negative consequences [Petrov, 2009, pp. 115-116; Analysis..., 2010, pp. 32-33]. The benefits of this system are obvious if you work together in parallel.

* * *

With the collapse of the USSR and the acquisition of national sovereignty by the Central Asian republics, the established regional system of water and energy division began to weaken. Political boundaries have become crucial. However, the previously established economic structure ignored these boundaries. As a result, each of the newly formed countries, at least in some way, but saw the infringement of their interests in the operation of this system in an unchanged form: after all, when the task is set to combine the interests of several parties to achieve a common result, each participant has to sacrifice something. The accumulated mutual dissatisfaction with each other, no longer restrained by any regulator, began to spill out in the form of violations of mutual obligations and the presentation of new requirements. In 1993, for the first time, the supply of electricity and fuel and energy resources from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to the Kyrgyz Republic stopped, compensating for the under-production of electricity at the Naryn-Syrdarya cascade HPP in winter. The population of Kyrgyzstan found itself in very difficult conditions. The hydroelectric power station had to be switched to the power mode of operation and water was released in winter, which led to a shortage of water resources in the summer months.

The following year, the agreements were restored, but the disruptions did not stop. Gradually, a monetary component was introduced into the agreements, but this did not facilitate mutual settlements. The price of energy resources was set arbitrarily by each side, and this caused new disputes. Added difficulties like this

specific things, such as the existing price difference between summer and winter electricity; the price of cheap electricity generated by hydroelectric power plants, especially in summer, could not be equated with winter electricity generated by thermal power plants (TPPs). In addition, not everyone was willing to tolerate delays in paying for delivered goods. Uzbekistan was particularly harsh in this regard: as soon as there were delays in paying for Uzbek gas, the supply of this resource was immediately stopped. In the first years of independence, Kazakhstan had difficulties in supplying coal due to the privatization of its coal industry. In addition, the downstream countries (PK and RU) did not always fully fulfill their obligations to purchase accompanying summer electricity generated by the operation of hydroelectric power plants in the "upper" countries in irrigation mode [Borisova and Panarin, 2012, p.272].

Due to constant and mutual violations of contracts, the largest losses were incurred by the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan. For example, in 2001, despite the fact that water from the Toktogul reservoir in Kyrgyzstan was transferred in the agreed volume, the volume of summer electricity consumed by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan was lower compared to the volume included in the contract. As a result, the actual payment received by the Kyrgyz Republic for electricity was 0.88 US cents/ kWh from Kazakhstan, and 2.01 US cents/kWh from Uzbekistan, with a weighted average of 1.48 US cents/kWh. As for the supply of coal, gas and fuel oil, they were delivered to Kyrgyzstan in a much smaller volume than expected under the contract: in total, resources were transferred to the Kyrgyz Republic in the amount equivalent to 29 million US dollars, which is less than the long-term costs incurred by Kyrgyzstan (35 million US dollars). guidelines for the operation of the Toktogul reservoir in irrigation mode [Vzaimodeystviya..., 2004, p. 49].

Disruptions in the supply of energy resources to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan from the underlying countries in winter did not stop. In turn, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had no choice but to switch their hydroelectric power plants from irrigation to energy mode of operation and release all the accumulated water during the cold seasons so that their own population does not sit without heat and light. This was accompanied by flooding of the territories of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

In order to somehow reduce the effects of winter floods, precious water from the Syr Darya and Amu Darya, whose built-up channels could no longer pass large masses of water, had to be periodically drained into two artificially formed lakes located in natural depressions on the territory of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Due to forced discharges that occurred during the high-water years back in Soviet times, Lake Aydarkul was formed in the Aidar-Arnasai lowland, where the Syrdarya water drained, and the modern Sarikamysh Lake, formed due to the Amu Darya waters that did not reach the Aral Sea. Water discharge to the Aidar-Arnasai lowland in 1969 amounted to 21.8 cubic meters. km, and in 1993-2001 - 26.9 cubic meters. km [About environmental...].

As a result of the actions described above, caused by the mutual failure of agreements, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan began to receive less water during the growing season, and the state of the Aral Sea worsened even more.

Subsequently, realizing that their main resource, both in dispute and in life, is water, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with the support of World Bank experts, began to insist on paying for their water storage and supply services, claiming that water is also a commodity, while the "lower" countries insisted on the formula " water "it is a common good and an asset that cannot be restricted." At the same time, the" upper " countries also raised the issue of revising water quotas in their favor. As a result, all parties formulated their own system of argumentation, which was not devoid of logic, but this did not lead to an agreement.

Thus, the lack of a common policy on water issues and the gradual abandonment of the old model increasingly entangled the tangle of contradictions.

The region's energy system has also been affected by the negative consequences of inter-State disputes over water issues. The winter months were a special challenge for her. Faced with a sharp shortage of energy resources due to their short supply, the countries of the upper reaches, in addition to switching their reservoirs to the energy mode of operation, began to take unauthorized electricity from the single energy ring of Central Asia, which led to frequent failures in the regional energy system and equipment breakdowns (see for example: [Safety..., 2009]).

The first country to get tired of such instability was Turkmenistan. In 2003, it withdrew from the parallel work of the ECO of Central Asia and switched to parallel work with Iran; its geographical location and existing energy capacity allowed it to do so. A few years later, the north of Kazakhstan also withdrew from the parallel operation of the EECA, limiting itself to the existing connection to the Russian energy system. Previously, failures in the Central Asian energy ring through Kazakhstan even reached the Russian Federation. The south of Kazakhstan remained operating in parallel with the rest of Central Asia.

In 2009, Tajikistan was disconnected from the ECO, but not by its own will. It was turned off, taking advantage of its territorial position in the center of the power grid, Uzbekistan. Relations between these two countries were considerably damaged by water and energy problems [Borisova, 2011, pp. 214-216]. Being highly dependent on the energy capacity of neighboring countries, Tajikistan decided to overcome this problem by completing the construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power station, the largest in the region. Its construction was started in the Soviet Union, but then the construction was frozen. It is important to note here that for more than 15 years, Tajikistan has been living in conditions where electricity is supplied to some remote areas for 4-6 hours a day in winter. At the same time, according to the data announced by Tajik President Emomali Rahmon at the international conference "Water for Life", held in Dushanbe in early June 2010, Tajikistan's hydropower potential is about 527 billion kW, and it has been developed only by 3-4% [At the water forum..., 2010]. Uzbekistan has strongly opposed the resumption of construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power station, seeing this project as a threat to its national interests in many areas, ranging from ecology, food security and ending with a change in the balance of power in the region not in its favor. The conflict around Rogun is periodically accompanied by the transfer of Tajikistan to a state of blockade due to the fact that Uzbekistan blocks all (with the exception of aviation) transport links between Tajikistan and the outside world. For the Uzbek leadership, such manipulations are not difficult to carry out, since almost all Tajik roads and railways, including between their own regions, as well as main power grids, pass through Uzbek territory due to the complexity of the terrain.

* * *

Instability and lack of agreement in relations have led to the fact that today all countries of the region have taken a course towards the development of national energy systems and gradual withdrawal from the unified energy ring. In early 2010, a line connecting the Novo-Angren thermal power plant in the Tashkent region with the Ferghana Valley began operating in Uzbekistan. This line allowed Uzbekistan to temporarily stop using electricity from Kyrgyzstan. However, later it turned out that without electricity from hydroelectric power stations, which covers the lack of peak capacity, you still can't do without it. The Guzar-Surkhan line was also introduced, which allows the supply of electric power to the city.-

electricity to the south Surkhandarya region of Uzbekistan, bypassing the Tajik electricity grid. The Datka-Kemin electric line, which is separate from the United Power System of Central Asia, is being laid across the territory of Kyrgyzstan, which will save the republic from dependence on Uzbek networks. Tajikistan built a South-North transmission line—500 in 2009 at the expense of a loan provided by China. Previously, electricity supplies from the energy-sufficient south of the country to the energy-deficient north were carried out through the electric networks of Uzbekistan.

In general, in the short term, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are able to solve the problem of energy shortage in conditions of forced autonomous operation only by relying on hydropower, which requires the operation of reservoirs in the energy mode. This is unlikely to ease regional tensions.

At the same time, as shown by the Soviet system of management, and later by calculations of the World Bank specialists [Vzaimodeystviya..., 2004], working in irrigation mode rather than in energy mode could bring the greatest benefits to everyone, provided that fair payment for water storage and supply services to the upper reaches is made. But this option is becoming less likely.

The hidden conflict over water and energy resources has become so much overgrown with accompanying problems that the countries of the region no longer consider it possible to unravel this tangle by returning to the Soviet, even if modernized, model of management. Now each country relies on its own resources and the help of foreign donors. Unfortunately, intraregional cooperation is carried out on a very limited scale and is mostly forced.

Each Central Asian country is trying to solve a complex of water problems without resorting to the help of its neighbors. In particular, new reservoirs are being built in the downstream countries. For example, Uzbekistan, contrary to the agreement on filling the Kairakkum reservoir in Tajikistan, intends to build a reservoir in the Ferghana Valley; Turkmenistan has been building an artificial lake in Karakum for several years; Kazakhstan, solving the problem of winter floods, has built a Koksaray counter-regulator below the Toktogul reservoir [Koksaraysky..., 2011]. With the support of the World Bank, Kazakhstan also solves the problem of its part of the Aral Sea: in 2005, a dam was built between the Small and Large Aral to prevent water and fish from leaving the Big Aral, where the water evaporated and the fish died [Kazakhstan..., 2008]. Uzbekistan, for its part, is no longer counting on the revival of the Aral Sea and is planting drought-resistant plants on its dry bottom and developing oil and gas fields [Kravets, 2009]. In turn, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are developing projects and looking for sponsors for the construction of a cascade HPP system. According to their version, it is the cascades of hydroelectric power stations that will allow storing water for irrigation of lower-lying fields, and generating electricity in the cold seasons.

Ultimately, the reorientation from regional to national levels significantly increases the overall cost of combating water scarcity, but it does not solve the problem of saving this vital resource for all. The Soviet model, although it had its significant drawbacks, still coped better with the problem of limited water resources that always existed in this region.

Today, in order to solve all the accumulated problems, we need to act in several fundamental directions. First, from an economic point of view, the Central Asian region should still be considered as a single whole, which entails the need to create a working political and economic association. Secondly, it is extremely important to introduce new resource-saving technologies. And, third, it is equally important to address the problem of overpopulation in the region.

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