Keywords: Senegal, Ivory Coast, opposition, coalition, crisis, elections

At present, when the "color" revolutions cover an increasing number of countries, political scientists are particularly interested in studying the problem of the relationship between the government and the opposition. As a rule, the opposition is in confrontation with the ruling political class. This often leads to conflict situations not only within the walls of the parliament during verbal battles, but also is transferred to the streets in the form of clashes, often with the use of violence.

But, obviously, there is another option, namely: coexistence, cooperation aimed at finding a common dominant.

In the 60s and 70s of the last century, little was heard about the opposition on the African continent, especially about its actions against the existing regime. This was due to the fact that in the initial period of independent development and the creation of an economic base for national development, the slogan of the need to unite all national forces in a single front fully corresponded to the interests of the majority of strata and social groups. The existing authoritarian regimes, led mostly by bright charismatic leaders who made a great contribution to the national liberation of their countries from colonial oppression, fully fit into the political landscape of that time.

But by the 1980s, African society was undergoing a transformation. It is increasingly beginning to activate protest moods, which were provoked by the following reasons:: 1) the deterioration of the socio-economic situation in most African states; 2) the introduction by the West of a structural adjustment plan for developing countries in Africa; 3) the weakening of one-party regimes against this background, which pushed African countries to become multiparty, expand the scale of activities of independent political groups and various types of opposition movements; 4) withdrawal from the political arena (more often due to cause of death) of bright charismatic leaders, who were replaced by authoritarian leaders.

* * *

Using the example of two West African countries - Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire-it is possible to trace how the relationship between the government and the opposition develops, what is common and special in them, and also to consider the prospects for interaction between the ruling political elites and their opponents.

First of all, it is common that in both countries, Presidents A. Wade (Senegal, 2000-2012) and L. Gbagbo (Ivory Coast, 2000-2011) were in power for more than 10 years and did not want to leave their posts. To extend their time in power, they attempted to rewrite the Constitution. Secondly, their competitors, M. Sall and A. Ouattara, who joined them in the struggle for the presidency, were representatives of the opposition, who previously held important political and state posts*. Third, both A. Ouattara and M. Sall gained supreme power as a result of a sharp political struggle with their competitors. In the case of A. Ouattara, this happened not without the help of Western countries and French paratroopers, who arrested the former president of the country, L. Gbagbo.

After the 2011 presidential elections in Ivory Coast and 2012 in Senegal, the positions of power and opposition in these countries were reversed. The main opposition force against M. Sall in Senegal at this stage is the former ruling party-the Democratic Party of Senegal( DPS), which is still headed by A. Wade. In Côte d'Ivoire, the Ivorian Popular Front (INF), whose ideological mastermind remains former President L. Gbagbo, who has been under the jurisdiction of the International Hague Tribunal since ²⁰¹²¹.

Thus, the opposition in both countries represents the interests of elite factions that are not in power, not at the main levers of managing financial flows.

* M. Sall - President of the Republic of Senegal - the main competitor of A. Wada. During the 2012 presidential elections, he was President of the National Assembly (2004 - 2007), before that he repeatedly held ministerial posts. A. Ouattara - President of Cote d'Ivoire-the main opponent of L. Gbagbo - was Prime Minister in the government of F. Abe. Houphouet-Boigny (1990-1993). Both M. Sall and A. Ouattara headed opposition political associations before their election to the highest state post.

GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION IN IVORY COAST

The main feature of Ouattara's policy towards the opposition is its isolation from participation in government. However, he did not abandon the political dialogue with her and entrusted it to the most experienced politician Daniel Kablan Dunkan, who has held the post of Prime Minister of the country since 2012*. At the same time, Dunkan is Vice - President of the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCD), the second largest and most important political party**, which is part of the National Assembly. The party's chairman is 75-year-old A. K. Bedier, a key advocate of consensus-building in Ivory Coast. For Ouattara, the coalition with the PDCD, also known as the Ufuetista Party, is very important, because its leaders, most of whom are aged 60 or older, are guaranteed predictability of their policies, although many members of this party openly regret their removal from the management of state structures.²

D. K. Dunkan himself is 71 years old (born in 1943). For about 40 years, he has been in a friendly and trusting relationship with A. Ouattara. Back in 1990, when he was Prime Minister in the Houphouet-Boigny government, he invited Dunkan to join him as Minister of Economy, Finance and Planning. Their cooperation was quite fruitful.³

And even when A. C. Bedier, the constitutional successor of F. Houphouet - Boigny, offered Dunkan to head the National Assembly, he agreed to take this post only after the approval of his friend Alassane.

At the current stage of political development in Côte d'Ivoire, the opposition is not actually represented in the National Assembly. A small concession of the authorities was only that it was allocated three seats in the country's Economic and Social Council. However, this step towards the opposition was also offset in February 2014 by the fact that the Ivorian authorities handed over one of the opposition leaders, Charles Ble Goude, to the International Hague Tribunal. The reason for his extradition was, first of all, that he was the closest associate of L. Gbagbo. S. B. Gude - a former student leader, who was called the "general of the street". During the post-electoral crisis, he called on Ivorian citizens to take up arms. Even before Gude's extradition to The Hague, A. Ouattara, after coming to power, imprisoned numerous opposition cadres, mainly members of the INF. And the 2012 parliamentary elections were held without her participation at all. The same thing happened in regional and municipal elections in the same year.

Ivorian oppositionists believe that a "presidential-monarchical" regime has been established in the country, since the head of state in his actions does not seek support from the National Assembly, he is "not afraid"of it⁴. Opponents claim the lack of independent justice, mercantilism and corruption, and violations of human rights. Following the extradition of Charles Goude to The Hague, the INF announced the end of political dialogue with the Government, pointing to this fact as one of the main obstacles to reconciliation. ⁵

Mamadou Coulibaly, President of the opposition Party of Freedom and Democracy for the Republic (2001-2011-President of the National Assembly), claims that " A Ouattara governs the country without any opposition, despite the fact that there are 90 political parties and associations operating in the country. " ⁶

In his opinion, the best thing for Africa is a parliamentary regime with the decentralization of power, thanks to which African states would gain stability. He refers to the experience of a country with a parliamentary regime - Cape Verde, which, according to M. Coulibaly, has succeeded in its development. He is sure that " the state, the management of which depends on the will of one person , is weak. And although countries like France are presidential, power is nevertheless decentralized: cities, departments, and regions have their own power and their own financial resources. " ⁷

The Ivorian opposition proposes to introduce the post of vice-president. This view was reinforced after Ouattara's illness in February 2014, when he abruptly left the country for treatment in France, which lasted more than a month. It is considered that the introduction of this post is necessary so that in the absence of the head of state, the country does not remain in a state of uncertainty and is able, as required by the constitution, to organize presidential elections within 45-90 days.⁸

Ouattara's opponents believe that the current regime is most afraid of Gbagbo's return. Threats to internal peace in the country today are identical to those that existed under the former president. The opposition fears that the current regime is unlikely to relinquish power in the next presidential election due in 2015. And one of the reasons for refusing to share power with the opposition is the fear of criminal penalties that could potentially follow for abuses and human rights violations. At the same time, the opposition does not exclude personal responsibility for this ⁹.

The intention of the current government to adopt a law on citizenship and land relations is causing great controversy in the country. The opposition is trying to understand why Ouattara's government is going to adopt this law shortly before the presidential election. It is no secret that both of these issues have been at the heart of the country's 15-year-old crises.

According to M. Coulibaly, these problems should be solved through a broad discussion and during the implementation of the population census. He warns the authorities against a prompt solution to this problem.

However, the opposition itself does not

* D. K. Dunkan was Minister of Foreign Affairs under President A. K. Bedier (1993-1999).

** DPCD has 76 seats out of 255 in the National Assembly. Ouattara's party, the Republican Democratic Union (RDO), has 122 seats.

there is no consensus on this issue. Thus, Pascal Gessan, head of the INF, an organization that currently unites 11 opposition parties, calls for a boycott of the mass census, arguing that first political obstacles must be overcome, namely, the split of society. He believes that "Ivorians live every day in a sense of struggle between the camp of the victors-the supporters of Ouattara and the defeated-the allies of Gbagbo" ¹⁰.

INF Vice-President Al-fon Duati called the census "untimely, preparing to falsify future presidential elections in 2015" ¹¹. In his opinion, "thanks to the collected results, the authorities will grant citizenship to a large number of foreigners living in the country, counting on them as an additional electorate for A. Ouattara" ¹².

But the Ivorian political elite has even more questions about the inclusion of the "ethnicity" column in the census form. Most people don't understand why, 50 years after declaring independence, Cote d'Ivoire should identify its citizens based on their ethnicity. In addition, if the census, as the ruling class claims , is a tool for development, then what is the point of dividing Ivorians into ethnic groups and how will this help the country's development?¹³

Ivorian lawyer Bloade Nansemont believes that " the definition of nationality and citizenship creates a delicate problem in the country. It was the Ivorianism dispute that contributed to the radicalization of the political landscape in the 1990s and early 2000s. " ¹⁴

To "reassure" the opposition, the National Assembly issued the following statement on December 11, 2013: "such structures as tax authorities, health care, and social security need such information to develop their strategy of action." ¹⁵ This answer did not satisfy the regime's opponents, who were convinced that to determine the amount of tax that a citizen should pay to the state, it is not necessary to know his ethnicity at all. ¹⁶ The opposition suggests that before the presidential election, A. Ouattara wants to have the support of the Diula people.

In opposition to such decisions of the authorities, the opposition calls on its supporters to form a coalition against the regime of A. Ouattara. According to M. Coulibaly, this association should not divide Ivorian society along ethnic lines.¹⁷

His program, which he believes the opposition should unite around, consists of five points: a general population census; updating the electoral list; forming a new independent electoral commission; determining the status of opposition political parties; and reforming the security structure. The main condition for forming a coalition is to reject any proposals for joining the government ¹⁸.

In April 2014, M. Coulibaly, together with the presidents of three opposition parties, signed the "Declaration of the 3rd Way"in Abidjan.¹⁹ It is a document that reflects the platform of parties that oppose coups d'etat, riots, brutality and violence as a means of coming to power20. The Declaration calls for building Ivorian democracy based on agreements and justice. "Wars, uprisings, and violence must never again take place in our beautiful country," it says. ²¹

Supporters of the coalition believe that "Ivory Coast is at a crossroads" and that " the upcoming presidential election will be a choice between a corrupt, decadent, inhumane society and a society of solidarity and effective democracy."²².

Another part of the Ivorian opposition, led by the INF, is not inclined to show loyalty to the policy pursued by Ouattara. It is convinced of the correct direction of its actions and supports the early release of L. Gbagbo, whom it puts on a par with such great fighters for the liberation of Africa as P. Lumumba and N. Mandela. ²³

M. SALL IS A PROPONENT OF COMPROMISE

In Senegal, unlike in Ivory Coast, the opposition is allowed to participate in legislative activities. There are 11 standing committees in the National Assembly, three of which she chairs: the Commission on Public Health, Social Affairs and National Solidarity, the Commission on Supply and Transport, and the Commission on Culture and Communications.²⁴

Unlike A. Ouattara, M. Sall wants to legitimize the status of the opposition (parliamentary and extra-parliamentary). According to article 58 of the Senegalese Constitution, the head of the opposition has a status that sets out his rights and duties. He is not appointed by the president, but is approved by the electorate.²⁵

While leading the country, M. Salle relies on a coalition of parties consisting of the Alliance for the Republic (pro-presidential party), the Socialist Party and the Alliance of Progressive Forces. ²⁶ The main counterbalance of this alliance is the Democratic Party of Senegal, which is still headed by A. Salle. Wad, despite the fact that he does not currently reside permanently in Senegal.

Idrissa Seck (Prime Minister of Senegal from 2002 to 2004) has never hidden the fact that he would like to be the fourth president and has dreamed about it for more than 20 years. The leader of the Senegalese Socialist Party, Ousmane Tanor Dieng, does not rule out the scenario of the 2017 elections, in which I. Seck becomes president, and he becomes president of the National Assembly.²⁷

But so far M. Sall's position is quite strong. It is no coincidence that a year after his victory in the second round of the 2012 presidential election, US President B. Trump arrived in Senegal. Obama. It was a gesture of support for the new president. In Senegal itself, M. Sall is considered the leader who "saved the country from the tragic Ivorian experiment" ²⁸.

In order to strengthen his position within the country, M. Sall is trying to establish relations with the opposition.

During his short time in power, he made two visits to the rebellious province of Casamance, where residents supported his candidacy in the second round of voting in the 2012 presidential election. ²⁹ During a visit to the region, M. Sall announced that it would become "the pole of development of Senegal", that the main focus would be on the development of agriculture, primarily crops such as rice and mango. The President promised the Casamanians the construction of new schools, roads, bridges, and the rehabilitation of hospitals in Ziguinchor (the capital of Casamance) and another major city of Sediu30.

However, the leaders of the separatist Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance are skeptical of the words of the head of state. According to the leader of this movement, S. A. Badiat, M. Sall does not take any measures to resolve the crisis in this region. The rebels insist on bilateral talks in the United States or Europe, counting on their support and pressure from them on M. Sall.

Senegal's next presidential election is still three years away. Therefore, the political situation in the country is a little calmer than in Ivory Coast. Nevertheless, the indicators of the country's socio-economic development are currently not in favor of the current president. So, in the World Bank's Doing Business classification made in 2014, Senegal moved from 166th to 178th place.³¹

The absence of a sharp political confrontation between the ruling political class and the opposition is due, not least, to the fact that Senegal is one of the few countries in Africa that has never had a military coup.

The foundation of political stability was laid during the reign of the first Senegalese president, L. S. Senghor (1960 - 1980). Back in 1976, the country made the transition from a one-party system to a three-party system*, which met the requirements of the Socialist International (since 1976, the Socialist Party of Senegal is a member of the Social International, it is also ruling in the country since 1960 In 1978, the Government authorized the activities of a fourth party, the Senegalese Republican Movement.

By the early 1980s, 10 political parties were officially registered in the country. On the basis of the 1981 law, the previous restrictions on the number of political parties operating in the State were abolished. The policy of pluralism pursued first by President L. S. Senghor and then by Adiouf (1981-1990) was aimed at weakening and dividing the opposition forces in the country. At the same time, official propaganda touted these internal political changes as evidence of Senegal's transformation into a "laboratory of democracy" for the whole of Africa, which strengthened the position of the ruling class and did not cause noticeable public tension until 2011 - 2012, when an acute pre-electoral crisis broke out in the country.

* * *

Thus, the period before the presidential election is the most difficult in relations between the government and the opposition. This is now particularly evident in Ivory Coast, which has entered the pre-electoral race. The contradictions that have existed in the country for decades on ethnic and religious grounds have not disappeared. And they can appear again in the same forms. The main thing, according to Western political scientists, is that the ruling class does not go out of control to the West, otherwise the French military will again "help" the opposition.

In Senegal, where there is still time before the elections, everything will depend on whether M. Sallou manages to rally a coalition of parties supporting him, on the internal political situation in the country and on whether the main opposition leader - A. Sallou-can succeed. Wad - to influence and direct the activities of the Senegalese Democratic Party, which was the ruling party from 1990 to 2012. It is determined to regain its lost ground.

In general, it should be noted that in Sub-Saharan Africa, the opposition did not develop as an organized political force that would have strong mass support and offer clearly reasoned programs. As a rule, it represents the interests of those elite groups that were not in power.

* Socialist Party of Senegal, Senegalese Democratic Party, African Independence Party of Senegal.

¹ See: Filippov V. R. Cote d'Ivoire: Factors of electoral conflict / / Asia and Africa Today. 2011, N 5 (Filippov V. R. Kot-d'Ivuar: faktory elektoralnogo konflikta / / Aziya i Afrika segodnya. 2011, N 5); Sadovskaya L. M. Will peace come to Cote d'Ivoire? // Asia and Africa today. 2012. N 6, 7. (Sadovskaya L.M. Pridyot li mir v Kot-d'Ivuar? // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. 2012, N 6,7).

² Cit. по: Jeune Afrique. P. N 2718, du 10 au 16 fevrier 2013. P. 77.

³ Ibid. P. 75.

⁴ http://www.fratmat.info/focus/inter-view/item/110-mamadou-k

⁵ http://www.connectionvoirienne.net/ 98064/cote-divoire-en-par

⁶ http://www.fratmat.info/foeus/inter-view/item/110 - mamadou - k

⁷ Ibidem.

⁸ http://news.abidjan.uet/h/488343.html (17.02.2014)

^{9 http://news.abidjan.net/h/488343.htm}!

¹⁰ http://www.africa.1com/spip.php? article 41756 (20.03 2014)

¹¹ Ibidem.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ http://www.connectionvoirienne.net/ 98060/cote-divoire-comm

¹⁴ Ibidem.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ http://Sicobois.net/2014/01/01/Ko-ulibaly-appelle-a-la-coalition-

¹⁹ http://www.connectionvoirienne.net/ 98157/cote-divoire-declaration

²⁰ Ibidem.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ http://lecripanafricain.net/cote-divo-ire-3-ans-apres-lelection-da

²⁴ http://democratie.francophonie.oorg/ article.php3?id_article-577

²⁵ http://www.lequotidien.sn/index.php/ politique/item/14718-stat

²⁶ http://www.jeuneafrique.com/ Articles/Dossier/YA2759p076.xml0

²⁷ Ibidem.

²⁸ Macky Sall: www.macky2012.com.Senegal

²⁹ http://www.senenews.com/tag/ma-cky-sall (29.03. 2014)

³⁰ http://www.setal.net/Paix-en-Casa-mance-Le-M3K-compte-app ³¹ Ibidem.

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