FORMATION OF THE AFRASIAN INSTABILITY ZONE 1

In the work of K. M. Truevtsev "The Arab Spring": what's after?" Five main zones of instability were identified, which can be roughly designated as Central Asia (including Afghanistan and Pakistan), the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel region and the Pacific. At the same time, the latter stands out from the general list, spreading exclusively along the borders of the People's Republic of China, and its emergence is a consequence of Chinese foreign policy priorities and ambitions [Truevtsev, 2014]. The remaining regions collectively represent a single continuous Afrasian macro zone of instability.

Keywords: "Arab Spring", zones of instability, orthocausal marriage, conflicts, Middle East.

The conflict potential of the above-mentioned zones is related to the following: over the past decades, the Central Asian region has been a zone of instability with the center in Afghanistan, where even the long-term presence of NATO coalition troops has not been able to fully resolve the conflict. The situation has also significantly worsened in neighboring Pakistan, where after the departure of President Pervez Musharraf, the risks of socio-political instability have increased. And after the collapse of the USSR, the situation in the former Soviet Central Asian republics has noticeably worsened, as evidenced by the civil war in Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz revolutions and ethnic riots in Osh, the Andijan uprising and the riots in Zhanaozen.

At the same time, the events of the "Arab Spring" revealed the crisis of old-style authoritarian regimes that fulfilled their "theological functions - primary modernization and national consolidation" [Truevtsev, 2011, p. 19], also threaten the republics of the former Soviet Union, where N. Nazarbayev, I. Karimov, and E. Rakhmon will soon face the problem of transferring power. Thus, the Central Asian zone of instability is one of the most explosive regions in the world, which is especially important for the Russian Federation, which has a long border with Kazakhstan.

The second zone of instability is the Middle East-traditionally one of the most conflict-prone places in the world. In addition to the already permanent Middle East conflict, after the events of the "Arab Spring", the situation was significantly complicated by the civil war in Syria, which has already affected its neighbors: Iraq, Lebanon, Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Israel and Saudi Arabia. The conflict is dangerous because it is not just a confrontation between the regime of President Bashar

1 The research was carried out within the framework of the HSE Basic Research Program in 2015 with the support of the Russian Science Foundation (project No. 14-18-03615).

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al-Assad and the rebels: it can lead to an interethnic war, in which a special role is assigned to the Kurds - the largest existing nationality in the world that does not have its own state.

However, inter-confessional confrontations can have even more devastating consequences. On the political map of the Middle East, the confrontation between two "crescents": the Shiite and Sunni ones is once again becoming noticeable (for more information, see [Isaev, 2011]). The" Shiite crescent "is Iran and Shiite-controlled Iraq, Syria2 and Lebanon, while the "Sunni crescent" stretches along the North African coast from Morocco to Egypt, further seizing the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula, Syria and Turkey. Thus, it becomes obvious that the Syrian Arab Republic has largely turned out to be an arena of confrontation between two trends in Islam, which can explain such a principled position of neighboring states regarding the Syrian conflict.

The next area is North Africa, where the situation became noticeably more complicated during and after the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, as evidenced by the conflict in Mali and the emerging trend towards turning Libya, in fact, into a conglomerate of independent territories.

It is important to note here that despite all the excesses of Gaddafi's rule, he managed to act as a guarantor of stability in the region, maintaining good relations with nomadic tribes on the southern borders of the Maghreb countries. The same can be said of Egyptian President X. Mubarak, who made great efforts to preserve peace and security in the Middle East and North Africa. However, another revolutionary wave in Egypt and the subsequent overthrow of democratically elected President Morsi only worsened the political crisis in the key country of the region and contributed to the continued presence of North African countries in the zone of political turbulence. At the same time, the Egyptian precedent served as a catalyst for Tunisians who were already showing dissatisfaction with the established Islamist regime represented by the Ennahda party [Isaev, 2013].

The situation is complicated by the long-standing confrontation between South and North Sudan, which has become the source of one of the largest disasters on the African continent. We should also add to this the periodically escalating ethnic contradictions in South Sudan itself (primarily between the Dinka and Nuer).

Finally, the fourth zone of instability extends across the Sahel and Horn of Africa, from the southern Sahara in the north to Nigeria and the Central African Republic in the south, and from Somalia in the east to Senegal in the west.

It is easy to see that all four zones described above form a single continuous macro-zone of instability, which can be called Afrasian (Figure 1): it is obvious that this macro-zone is currently the main area of concentration of internal socio-political tensions. The world outside this macro zone is looking much calmer now.4
Now let us compare the Afrasian instability zone with the orthocusal marriage zone. In general, cousin marriages (marriages between cousins) are the most widespread in traditional cultures of the world (Ember, 1983, p. 83; Pasternak et al., 1997, p. 133). But in the vast majority of cases, we are talking about a cross-cousin marriage (marrying the daughter of the mother's brother or daughter

2 With regard to Syria, it is more likely a Shiite-Alawite bloc.

3 Similar processes can be traced in Turkey, but the potential for socio-political destabilization associated with these processes is noticeably less than in Egypt and Tunisia.

4 Of course, cases of socio-political destabilization are also observed outside this zone: in 2013-2014, there were quite powerful socio-political upheavals in Thailand, Ukraine, Venezuela and Bosnia.

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Figure 1. Afrasian macro zone of instability.

my father's sisters). The fact is that cross-cousins (children of a brother and sister) belong to different clans, and therefore marriage between them is usually not considered incestuous, since it does not violate the principle of generic exogamy (the prohibition to take a marriage partner within one's own clan), while exogamy was characteristic of the generic organization of the vast majority peoples of the world (see, for example, Korotaev and Obolonkov, 1989).

The other main type of this form of marriage - orthocuse marriage-is much less common. An orthocuse marriage can be divided into two subtypes: matrilateral (with the daughter of the mother's sister) and patrilateral (with the daughter of the father's brother). The first of these subtypes is extremely rare. As a matter of fact, only one such ethnographic case is known: Among the Tuaregs of the Sahara, this form of marriage has traditionally been preferred [Pershits, 1998, p. 543].

The second subtype has a much wider distribution; however, it is attested to be preferred among only a few dozen (out of several thousand) ethnic groups in the world, and the picture of the spatial distribution of these cultures is rather limited. In Fig. 2 shows a map of the traditional distribution of orthocuse marriage. Countries/regions where this form of marriage has traditionally been very widespread are shown in black, and those countries/regions where it has traditionally been noticeable, but not very widespread, are shown in gray.

If we compare the zone of traditional distribution of orthocuse marriage with the Afrasian macrozone of socio-political instability, it is easy to see that the spatial boundaries of both zones coincide almost completely.

At the same time, we do not think that there is a causal relationship between these two variables (orthocousal marriage and socio - political instability), although S. Kurtz [Kurtz, 2007] hypothesized the existence of such a relationship with reference to the work of one of the authors of this article [Korotayev, 2000]. We are sure that there is a third, deeper, variable behind them - apparently, of a civilizational order. This consideration is confirmed by the fact that the Afrasian macro-zone of instability, and consequently the zone of traditional orthocousal marriage, almost perfectly (with a few exceptions) coincides with the zone of an ultra-low proportion of economically active women (see Figure 3). In this figure, countries with an ultra-low (< 29%) percentage of economically active women are filled in black women in the total adult female population (? 15 years), gray - countries with a very low (29-38%) share.

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Fig. 2. Traditional zone of orthocusical marriage distribution.

S o s t a v l e n o p o: [Andreev, 1949, p. 10; Murdock, 1967].

Figure 3. Countries with the lowest number of economically active women

Source: [World Bank, 2013].

As can be seen, the zone of extremely low female employment coincides extremely closely with both the zone of traditional distribution of orthocousal marriage and the Afrasian macro zone of socio-political instability. In this case, the functional relationship with socio-political instability is more obvious. For example, in Egypt, a clear harbinger of the events of 2011 was the strike of weavers at a textile factory in the city of al-Mahalla al-Kubra, which began on April 6, 2008. It was during this campaign that the group "Movement of Youth on April 6" (as a group) appeared on Facebook.

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Figure 4. Comparison of the traditional area of orthocousal marriage, the territory of the Umayyad Caliphate, the zone of ultra-low female employment, and the Afrasian macro-zone of instability

support for strikers), which later became one of the main organizers of the "January 25 revolution" in Egypt (see, for example: [Wolman, 2008]). In almost every other country outside the Afrasian zone, women work in weaving factories, while men work there. If the textile factory in al-Mahalla al - Kubra had been run by women instead of men, they would hardly have been able to be"taken out". However, it is quite clear that this is a significant factor, but not one of the most important factors that generate socio-political destabilization.

Our previous study of the phenomenon of orthocousal marriage (Korotayev, 2000) showed that the closest correlation is observed with the inclusion of a particular territory in the Umayyad Caliphate. Indeed, it is in this case that a particularly close correlation is observed.5 In general, it is obvious that all the considered zones coincide very closely (see Figure 4).

What explains such a close correlation? First, we will try to answer the question of why the boundaries of the zone of traditional distribution of orthocousal marriage are so close to the borders of the Umayyad Caliphate.

Apparently, it is difficult to deny the existence of a certain functional connection between Islam and the preference for patrilateral orthocusal marriage. Indeed, this form of marriage is highly adaptive in the traditional Islamic context. An important feature of Islamic law is that it insists on giving the daughter her share in the inheritance (although this share is twice as small as the son's share). Moreover, the daughter should receive a firm share in the inheritance of all types of property left after the death of the father. Qur'anic verses on inheritance issues(4:7, 11-12, 176), they granted inheritance rights to their daughters in a patriarchal society in which all such rights traditionally belonged only to the heirs.

5 This was also shown using formal statistical procedures [Korotayev, 2000].

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male. In the West, women were denied such rights until the 19th century. The Islamic religious authorities usually paid great attention to compliance with these norms, regarding any attempts to deprive the daughter of her share in all types of property due to her as a clear manifestation of the" Satanic right " (see [Dresch, 1989]).

This rule does not appear to have created any major problems in the non-agricultural trading Mecca. However, she often created them in a patrilineal exogamous patrilocal context among intensive farmers.

Let's imagine an extended family of plow farmers living in a medieval settlement and having a large, compact and easy-to-use land mass. Compliance with the above-described Islamic norms for her without changing her marriage practices would have the following consequences: in each generation, a significant part of the land would be inherited by her daughters.

However, in an exogamous patrilocal marriage, the daughters will have to marry men from other villages. Recall that we are talking here about traditional plow farmers, who are also Muslims (with a certain degree of reclusion of women characteristic of them in traditional conditions). In this context, the daughter's husband is more likely to cultivate and control the land than the daughter herself. The relevant plot of land, therefore, will have to come under the de facto control of the large-family community of the daughter's husband.

As a result, over the course of just a few generations, a large, compact and easy-to-use land mass will turn into a "patchwork" of small plots under the actual control of different households belonging to different settlement communities. The men who are part of the extended family we are considering will, of course, in turn gain control of the various small tracts of land inherited by their wives. But the mosaic of these small plots scattered around the village can hardly serve as adequate compensation for the loss of a large, compact and easy-to-use land mass once controlled by this extended family.

In such a socio-legal context, patrilateral orthocausal marriage could really effectively solve the problem described above. If your daughter marries your brother's son, the land she inherits will remain under the control of your family, which will not face any of the problems described above (see, for example: [Rosenfeld, 1957]). Thus, the presence of a significant correlation between the Islamization of cultures and the presence of preferred patrilateral orthocusal marriage in them is not surprising to any extent.

Here, however, you need to pay attention to the following points. Islamic law does not prohibit patrilateral orthocuse marriage. But it does not prescribe it in any way (Schacht, 1964; Al-Jazeera, 1990, pp. 60-61). However, most traditional cultures have a very clear idea of the incestuous nature of the relationship between a man and the daughter of his father's brother. This is evident from the fact that in most languages of the world, the term for the daughter of the father's brother (as, indeed, the daughter of the mother's sister) is identical to the term for the sibling. This usually implies that marriage to the daughter of the father's brother (or the daughter of the mother's sister) is considered analogous to marriage to one's own sister (Korotaev, 1999). Thus, we are dealing with a kind of "cognitive problem" 6.

In this context, permission to marry the daughter of the father's brother is not sufficient in itself to overcome the above-mentioned "cognitive problem", even if such a marriage can bring economic benefits to the groom and his family (as is observed, for example, in most Islamic societies in sub-Saharan Africa). Obviously, in addition to Islamization, it should act

6 A term to describe this situation was proposed by D. Cronenfeld at the 29th Annual Conference of the Society for Cross-Cultural Research (New Orleans, 24.02.2000).

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another factor that could, together with Islamization, lead to the preferred spread of patrilateral orthocusal marriage.

We have little doubt that the vast majority of known cases of preferred patrilateral orthocusal marriage are the result of diffusion from a single source. There is some possibility that the "cognitive problem" described above has been solved only once (at least to the extent that it is a solution that leads to the formation of a preferred patrilateral orthocusal marriage) and that this solution has ultimately led to the emergence of many dozens of cultures characterized by this marriage practice and occupying many different positions. an extensive, but at the same time quite compact area of the Old World.

At the time of its origin, the preferred patrilateral orthocausal marriage had nothing to do with Islam. The cognitive problem was apparently solved somewhere in the anti-Palestinian region long before the birth of Christ (the oldest cases of mentioning this practice refer to Jews in the Old Testament [Fox, 2011, p. 145]. M. A. Rodionov rightly draws the attention of researchers to the fact that the marriage practice we are considering has traditionally been widespread in Russia as well). in some non-Islamic cultures of the region (for example, among the Maronites or Druze), as well as the fact that it can also have significant functional value in non-Islamic contexts, facilitating the division of property between brothers after the death of their father (Rodionov, 1982). We agree with M. A. Rodionov that this form of marriage in these cases cannot be explained by Islamic or Arab influence. Rather, this form of marriage can be traced back to the same source in both the Islamic world and non-Islamic Syro-Palestinian cultures.

However, in the pre-Islamic period, the distribution area of the preferred patrilateral orthocusal marriage was extremely limited. The situation changed somewhat in the IV-V centuries. At the end of the fourth century, the Himyarite rulers of Yemen adopted Judaism as the state religion. During this era, the Kindites, who controlled Central Arabia, were Himyarite vassals. Unsurprisingly, the Himyarite vassals soon adopted Judaism as well. As is known, in Yassrib (modern Medina) in the V-VI centuries, Jewish tribes (in reality, Judaized Arab tribes) dominated; in the oases north of Yassrib, Jewish tribes dominated even during the Hijra. Thus, in the fifth century, most of the Arabian Peninsula was Judaized to varying degrees (see, for example, Bolshakov, 1989; Korotaev, 2003; Korotaev, Klimenko, and Prusakov, 2007).

Against this background, it is no coincidence that perhaps the only region adjacent to Palestine where this form of marriage became widespread in the pre-Islamic period was the Arabian Peninsula (Negria, 1981; Kudelin, 1994), where this spread could be associated with significant Jewish influence. The Judaization of the Kindites, who were the most prominent Arab clan in the fifth century, may have played a special role here [Korotaev, Klimenko, and Prusakov, 2007]. The Jewish practices they used could in principle have been adopted by other Arab clans, even if they did not convert to Judaism-already because of the extremely high prestige of this Arab clan.

In any case, by the seventh century, the preferred patrilateral orthocusal marriage had become widespread among several influential Arab tribal groups (Negria, 1981; Kudelin, 1994). In the seventh and eighth centuries, this form of marriage spread explosively, as Islamizing Arab tribes spread throughout the Umayyad Caliphate. Although later the preferred patrilateral orthocusal marriage (along with Islam and the Arabs) spread beyond the borders of the Umayyad Caliphate, this spread was already extremely limited. Thus, the observed distribution pattern is

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The preferred patrilateral orthocusal marriage is basically a product of the Arab-Islamic conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries.

Islamic civilization in our country was often referred to as "Arab-Muslim", which met with serious objections from our colleagues from Central Asia (see, for example, [Ahmadjonzoda, 1988]). Let us emphasize, however, that this designation seems to be quite successful in some respects. The fact is that this civilization (especially within the territory of the first Islamic Empire) incorporated many Arab non-Islamic elements (and cannot be understood if this circumstance is not taken into account).

It should be noted here that within the framework of the Arab-Muslim caliphate, the Arabs were the dominant ethnic group at least until the "Abbasid Revolution" of the mid-eighth century, and Arab culture as a whole (including its non-Islamic components, which, in our opinion, should include the preferred patrilateral orthocusal marriage) acquired the highest status. prestige and spread throughout the empire.

Having made their conquests, the Arabs began to control a huge non-Arab population. The non-Muslim part of it could easily be granted a status similar to that of clients in Arabia, so that they would maintain their own self-organization in exchange for paying taxes... But the non-Arabs who converted to Islam presented a new problem because, on the one hand, they needed to be incorporated into Arab society, not just controlled, and on the other,they had experienced defeat and often enslavement, and therefore could not represent full - fledged caliphs (full-fledged allies); the only non-Arabs who could be considered as the only non-Arabs who could be considered as those who received this status were hamra ' and asawira, Persian soldiers who joined the Arabs during their wars of conquest in exchange for a privileged status. It is to solve this new problem that the Islamic Institute wala'(i.e., a system for including non - Arabs in Islamic society as dependent mawali inferiors-author's note) was developed (Crone, 1991, p. 875).

It is impressive that such a highly qualified specialist in early Islamic history as P. Crown did not notice another (and incomparably more significant) exception - the Yemenis. This is probably due to the efforts of the Yemenis, who tried to convince the Arabs that the South Moravians are the same Arabs as they are, 7 or even more pure Arabs (al - 'arabal-airibah in contrast to al -' Arabal-musta'ribah [Piotrovsky, 1977, pp. 20, 23, 29; Piotrovsky, 1985, p. 67; Robin, 1991]) than the Arabs themselves, and that they had always been Arabs, proved so successful that they convinced not only the Arabs themselves [Ibnal - Kalbi, 1966, p.40-41], but also the Arabists.

However, in order to be recognized as Arabs (and therefore as full-fledged members of early Islamic society), Yemenis had to adopt a significant number of actual Arab practices, and even those that were not directly related to Islam in any way. A good example is the Yemenis ' adoption of the Arabic genealogical tradition.

The ancient South Arabian communities were sha'bami-territorial communities that did not have any developed genealogies:

"In sharp contrast to the North Arabian practice of compiling long genealogical lists (recorded in Safaitic inscriptions and for the pre-Islamic period), the ancient South Arabian identification of a person consisted simply of his own name plus the designation of belonging to a certain social group (usually baytu) with an optional additional mention of the father's name, but never indicating any ancestors of a higher degree. Here it is difficult not to recall the statement attributed to Caliph Umar ("Study your genealogies and do not be like the" Nabataeans "of Mesopotamia, who, when they are called "Nabataeans").

7 And these efforts were not unfounded, because some Arabs for some time refused to recognize Yemenis as Arabs (see, for example: [Piotrovsky, 1985, p. 67]).

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They ask who they are and say, "I am from such and such a village"), which Ibn Khaldun quotes with a very remarkable comment, according to which the statement is also true of the agricultural population of Arabia... Kabila... "it's basically a blood-related association, and that's what makes it fundamentally different from the Sha'ba..." In the Qur'an (49:13), ja'alna - kumshu'ubanwa-qaba 'ila clearly refers to two different types of social organization, and Ibn Khaldun, when referring to the sedentary inhabitants of Arabia, strictly uses the word shu'ub, not qaba'il, which he uses only for nomadic social associations" [Beeston, 1972, p. 257-258].

In the early Islamic era, under the influence of the culture of the North Arabian nomadic tribes, which acquired a high status in the Muslim world, the South Arabian sha'bys, while remaining basically territorial [Dresch, 1989; Serjeant, 1989], transformed into qab'il - tribes formally built on genealogical grounds. The transformation of the territorial "Sha'bas" into genealogical tribes, in turn, was the result of the hard work of the South Arabian people to develop their own genealogies, as well as their quite successful struggle for recognition of these genealogies by the Arab world and for integration, thus, into the Arab ethnic group that dominated the early Islamic state (VII-mid-VIII centuries) [Piotrovsky, 1977 Piotrovsky, 1985].

All this shows that in the Umayyad Caliphate, although informal, there was extremely strong social pressure on Islamized groups of non-Arabs, which actually forced them to adopt Arab norms and practices, even if they were not directly related to Islam (this concerned, for example, genealogy and patrilateral orthocusal marriage). On the other hand, after such cultural models became widespread, the high functional value of some of these practices (in particular, orthocousal marriage) was inevitably revealed, which should ensure their sustainable reproduction in subsequent generations. In this historical context (when the Arabs were the dominant ethnic group of the Caliphate), their norms and practices were adopted by Islamizing non-Arab ethnic groups that sought to achieve full social status. Thus, a systematic transition to the practice of preferred patrilateral orthocusal marriage was observed where the Islamization of communities was accompanied by their Arabization. This is exactly the situation that was observed in the Umayyad Caliphate until the very end of its existence - 750, when, as a result of the Abbasids coming to power, the non - Arab Muslims ' unequal position was radically eliminated. It is this circumstance that seems to be the main reason for the strong correlation that we found above between the spread of the practice of preferred patrilateral orthocusal marriage in the ethnographic area and the entry of the area into the Umayyad Caliphate.

Thus, orthocuse marriage is, in fact, a good marker of belonging to the Arab - Islamic civilization. There are reasons to assume that certain characteristics of this civilization in modern conditions contribute to socio-political destabilization. In this paper, we will focus on just a few of them.

Apparently, one of these characteristics can be considered a combination of strict prohibitions on extramarital sexual relations with a whole set of marriage and family customs, which in the context of modernization led to a sharp increase in the age of marriage, especially for men [Rashad, Osman, Roudi-Fahimi, 2005, p. 6; Marks, 2011(1), p. 5, 25; Marks, 2011(2); Pushmann and Matthijs, 2012, p. 15, 19].

It should be noted that the practice of early marriage, especially for women, was traditionally widespread in Arab countries (which, however, was typical for the vast majority of traditional societies [Schlegel and Barry, 1991]). Often, the bride's family hid the real age of the girl in order to give her away as early as possible

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Figure 5. Dynamics of the average age of first marriage (number of years) for men in some Arab countries in recent decades

Source: [UN Population Division, 2013].

married. At one time, Nahhas Kamel identified the following reasons for early marriages in Arab countries. First, from a religious point of view, marriage is a sacred obligation, and the Qur'an encourages the creation of a family and marriage. Second, the early appearance of sexual desire necessitates marriage in order to avoid sin. Third, there is a strict gender division in Arab countries. Fourth, the desire to have children - both among men and women. Fifthly, a girl should not have sexual relations with a man before the wedding, as otherwise it would endanger the honor of her family and entail serious punishment (therefore, the girl's family tried to marry earlier in order to preserve her honor) [Kamel, 1954, p. 293-300].

However, due to the inclusion of Arab countries in the modernization processes, there are obvious changes in all spheres of society, including in the sphere of marriage and family relations. In recent decades, modernization has led to a widespread increase in the age of marriage, but in the Arab world this phenomenon has become particularly pronounced among men (see Figure 5).

One of the main reasons for the widespread increase in the lower threshold of the marriageable age is that young people are increasingly unable to get engaged due to financial difficulties. In recent decades, weddings in Islamic countries have become particularly costly for both the groom and the bride and her family. The groom must pay mahr 8 and assume obligations for the full financial support of his wife and children, while the amount of both official mahr and unofficial kalym (payment by the groom for the bride to her parents) has grown enormously in recent decades 9.

Thus, a wedding requires a significant amount of money to take place, and the man responsible for paying most of that amount must work hard to earn it. Many young people, after signing an engagement agreement, go to work for several years in one of the oil-producing Arab countries in order to

8 The term mahr itself is used in Muslim family law to refer to the property allocated by a husband to his wife at the conclusion of an equal marriage (zawaj). The payment of mahr is the main condition of such a marriage and is considered as a payment to the wife for marital relations. In this context, terry cloth can be absolutely anything that has any value and can be subject to property rights (see, for example: [Spies, 1913-1936; Bogolyubov, 1991, p. 164]).

9 For example, in Libya, back in the first half of the 1970s (during the oil boom), the average bride price jumped from $ 3,500 to $ 35,000 in just a few years [Toros, 1975, p. 3].

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save up some money. On average, until the age of 30, an ordinary Muslim Arab cannot afford to get married, because he must first find a job with a salary sufficient to buy a car, build a house or buy an apartment, furniture, and finally have the amount to pay mahr for the bride and an expensive wedding gift for her [Shmeleva, 2004, pp. 67-71].

"The tradition of lavish celebration of Arab weddings has been overlaid with the growing modernization of the region and increasing consumerism, which has made marriage and related ceremonies extremely expensive. In Arab countries, young people in their 20s and 30s usually say that they are putting off everything they can in order to be able to get married a few years in the future" [Rashad, Osman, Roudi-Fahimi, 2005, p. 6].

The rising cost of getting married is an important reason for postponing it. By the end of the 1990s, the average cost of marriage in Egypt was approximately $ 6,000, while the annual national income per capita was only $ 1,490. This explains why young men and their families have to save money for many years in order to finally get married [Pushmann and Matthijs, 2012, p. 19].

In this regard, back in 2005, B. Mensh, S. Singh and J. Casterline was marked:

"Postponing marriage beyond a certain point cannot be considered universally positive, even if it was caused by increased expectations rather than worsening economic circumstances. Indeed, the late age of marriage resulting from limited resources cannot be considered desirable for young men - it can be a source of frustration, especially in regions where premarital sexual relations are not allowed" [Mensch, Singh, Casterline, 2011, p. 26]10.

In this regard, it is extremely relevant that unmarried men are significantly more prone to radicalism and extremist political actions (up to direct terrorism) than married men of the same age, which was shown using direct empirical data on Egypt [Marks, 2011(1), p. 9-17]. Thus, the significant increase in the average age of marriage among men observed in most Arab countries in recent decades can be considered a significant factor in socio-political destabilization in this part of the world.

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