From the point of view of the demographic situation, the current stage of human history is radically different from all other historical epochs. The emergence and widespread use of effective contraceptives has changed the course of historical processes beyond recognition. And while in most countries the population is now stable or stabilizing, the development of historical societies, especially agrarian empires, was constantly interrupted by demographic collapses, that is, periods of depopulation, each of which is responsible for hundreds of thousands, and sometimes millions of human tragedies.

The theory of demographic cycles goes back to the works of Thomas Robert Malthus (1993). Today, the study of demographic cycles is a developed field of historical science [Yashnov, 1933, pp. 41-42; Postan 1950, 1973; Abel, 1974; Abel, 1980; Murguzin, 1986; Murguzin, 1994; Goldstone, 1991; Braudel 1992; Nefedov, 1999 (1); Nefedov, 1999 (2); Nefedov, 1999 (3); Nefedov, 1999 (4); Nefedov, 1999 (5); Nefedov, 2000 (1); Nefedov, 2000 (2); Nefedov, 2000 (3); Nefedov, 2002 (1); Nefedov, 2002 (2); Nefedov, 2003; Ganja, Gevorgyan, Rusakov, 2003; Read, LeBlanc, 2003; Turchin, 2003; Usher 1989]. One of the leaders in this area, S. A. Nefyodov, describes the demographic cycle as follows::

"Each demographic cycle begins with a period of internal colonization (or reconstruction), characterized by the availability of free land, population growth, acreage growth, construction of new (or restoration of previously destroyed) settlements, low bread prices, high labor costs, relatively high consumption, limited urban and craft development, and low population growth. development of rent and usury. After the depletion of free land resources, the following occurs:This phase is characterized by the lack of free land, high land prices, low land ownership by peasants, the ruin of peasant owners, the spread of usury and rent, the growth of large-scale land ownership, low consumption of the main mass of the population, falling real wages, cheap labor, high bread prices, frequent reports of famine, etc. natural disasters, the suspension of population growth, the departure of impoverished peasants to the cities, where they try to earn a living by craft or small-scale trade, the growth of cities, the development of crafts and trade, a large number of unemployed and beggars, hunger riots and uprisings, the activation of popular movements under the slogans of property redistribution and social justice, attempts to implement social reforms in order to relief of the people, irrigation works,

The authors are grateful to D. M. Bondarenko, N. L. Komarova, A. S. Malkov, A. Omari, I. V. Sledzevsky, and P. V. Turchin for their expert assistance in developing this study.

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policies aimed at increasing land productivity, encouraging colonization and emigration, and external wars to acquire new land and reduce demographic pressure.

Ultimately, the growing disparity between the size of the population and the available food resources leads to an eco-social crisis; this period is characterized by famine, epidemics, uprisings and civil wars, external wars, the death of large masses of the population, which takes on the character of a demographic catastrophe, the destruction or desolation of many cities, the decline of crafts and trade, high bread prices, low prices for land prices, the death of a significant number of large owners and the redistribution of property, social reforms, in some cases taking on the scale of a revolution "[Nefedov, 2003, pp. 6-7].

In the course of the historical process, humanity made innovations that raised the ceiling of the earth's load-bearing capacity (i.e., the ability of a territory to provide food for a certain number of people at a given level of technology). In Modern and Contemporary times, this process has become more and more accelerated, and the indicators of the average global GDP per capita have become increasingly higher than the minimum necessary for simple survival. Unprecedented modernization processes have changed the nature of demographic cycles. The demographic cycles of Modern times became more frequent compared to the cycles of agrarian empires, but depopulations began to cover an ever smaller percentage of the population, gradually disappearing (although in absolute terms, at a certain stage, losses could increase). On diagr. 1 shows the dynamics of the world's population and China from 700 BC to 2003.:

Chart 1

Global and Chinese population dynamics (million people) 700 BC-2003

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Note: The main sources for the world population are: [Durand, 1960; Haub, 1995; Kremer, 1993; McEvedy and Jones, 1978; Thomlinson, 1975; UN Population Division, 2005; World Population..., 2005; World Development..., 2004]. The main sources for the Chinese population are: [Melyantsev, 1996; Zhao Wenming and Xi Shujun, 1988; Bielenstein, 1947; Bielenstein, 1986; Durand, 1977; Ho Ping-ti, 1959; Lee Mabel Ping-hua, 1921].

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The dramatic change in the relationship between trend and cyclical dynamics over the past two centuries is particularly evident when comparing demographic dynamics for 700 BC-1800, on the one hand, and for 1800 - 2003, on the other (see figure 2). A comparison of the data from the two diagrams also demonstrates quite well that the radical transformation of demographic development models in the last two centuries was a logical continuation of the trends in the development of the world system that were outlined long before.

Di agram 2

Global and Chinese population dynamics (million people)

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Sources: [Same as in page 1 ]

If the "Ping" political and demographic cycle in China (1650-1851) lasted more than two hundred years, then the next " republican "cycle (the 80s of the XIX century-the 30s of the XX century) lasted less than seventy years, and the "Maoist" cycle (the 40s-the beginning of the 60s- x. XX century) -about twenty years. During the" Pinsk "cycle, depopulation accounted for about 30% of the population, during the" republican "cycle - less than 10%, and during the" Maoist "cycle - less than 5% (if we consider the events associated with the"Great Leap Forward" as a demographic collapse).

In the 19th century, humanity entered the path of demographic transition, and this, along with the growth of agricultural productivity as a result of the most powerful technological breakthrough of recent centuries, allowed most countries to finally break out of the "Malthusian trap" of demographic cycles.

The first stage of the demographic transition is accompanied by a drop in mortality due, for example, to the growth and spread of modern medical knowledge and technologies, which leads to an increase in the rate of population growth. At the second stage, the further development of medicine, coupled with other modernization processes (especially the increase in the level of education among women) [Bongaarts, 2003], leads to the massive use of birth control devices and a decrease in population growth [Chesnais, 1992].

In sub-Saharan Africa, modernization processes generally started later than in other regions of the world. If the number of developed countries has fully stabilized by now, and in some cases tends to increase, the number of developed countries is still growing.

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However, many countries in Tropical Africa have recently moved from the first phase of demographic transition, the phase of increasing population growth, to the second phase, when they are declining. As a result, the population in this region is still growing rapidly (see figure 3).

Diagram 3

Population of sub-Saharan Africa, 1960-2003

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Source: [WorldDevelopment.., 2004].

Although the population of Tropical Africa is growing, the rate of growth has recently declined, primarily due to a decrease in the birth rate, and secondly due to an increase in mortality due to the spread of the AIDS epidemic .1 Population growth rates stabilized in the early 1980s, but have been gradually declining since the early 1990s. The dynamics of fertility, mortality and population growth in sub-Saharan Africa are shown in fig. 4. If the current trend continues, it is possible to predict the stabilization of the population of Africa in 30 - 50 years.

Population growth in Tropical Africa is partially offset by increased agricultural productivity. The grain harvest from 1960 to 2003 increased by one and a half times from about 8 to 12 p / ha2 . The increase in yield is due to the introduction of achievements of world agronomic science, such as mineral fertilizers, more productive agricultural crops and varieties, scientifically based crop rotations, etc.

It is not just crop growth that contributes to the green revolution in Africa. The area of cultivated land on the continent is also growing. In most cases, this is not only extensive, but also intensive growth, since most of the so-called free land in Africa is under deposit. The expansion of acreage here means a reduction in the period of re-taxing, which means an intensification of agriculture. However, in some regions this process goes hand in hand with soil degradation, including anthropogenic degradation [Potemkin and Ksenofontova, 2001; Chernyaev, 2002].

1 It can be said that the AIDS epidemic in modern Tropical Africa also has some Malthusian component, similar to the epidemics that were one of the mechanisms of demographic collapses in agricultural empires. After all, if the population of African countries did not grow so intensively, then African societies would have much more resources to deal with this terrible disaster.

2 However, on average, African yields remain among the lowest in the world [FAO Database, 2003].

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Figure 4

Dynamics of fertility, mortality and population growth in sub-Saharan Africa in 1960-2003 "".

-----

Source: [World Development.., 2004].

The growth rate of agriculture in Tropical Africa in the 1990s averaged 1.4-1.8%, which is significantly lower than the population growth rate of 2.5-3% (Roshchina, 1999). The food problem in the region is solved not only by increasing agricultural productivity, but also by developing other sectors of the economy, the income from which allows you to import food.

For African countries, the danger of the" Malthusian trap "is not that the growing population will" run up " against a permanent ceiling of land bearing capacity, as was the case in agrarian empires before modernization, but that the population may grow faster than this ceiling. Despite certain modernization successes of the Africans (Pavlova, 2001), the sword of Damocles of the food crisis hangs over a number of States.

Due to the fact that modernization processes developed more slowly in Tropical Africa in the 20th century than in other regions [Vasiliev, 1999] (largely due to the low level of education of the population on the continent), agriculture continues to play a leading role in the economies of many African states. Although the food problem is critical for Africa, the high contribution of agriculture to GDP is rather a worrying sign. The opportunities for agricultural growth are limited both by the finiteness of the land fund and by the small opportunities for yield growth [Brown, 2001]. The high contribution of agriculture to GDP, as a rule, is combined with a high birth rate and is an indicator of the proximity of the country's development model to the economies of pre-industrial agrarian societies with their tragic demographic cycles.

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The contribution of agriculture to the economy is statistically significant and positively correlated (for the global sample) with the number of armed internal conflicts in the country over the previous 30 years (p = 0.43; α = 10-11 ) 3 (see figure 5).

Chart 5

The ratio between the contribution of agriculture to GDP and the number of armed internal conflicts in the previous 30 years (1973-2003)

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Sources: [World Development..., 2004; African countries, 2002; Sarkees, 1997; White, 2005].

3 Correlation analysis is the most widely used method of analytical statistics. Correlation is a systematic and conditioned relationship between two indicators. Correlation is usually characterized by four parameters: indicators of the bond strength (p, r, τ-b, γ, etc.), its direction, significance (a), and the number of cases (N).

To calculate the strength of the relationship between indicators, most often (depending on the data type) correlation coefficients are used, taking values from - 1.0 to + 1.0. A value of + 1.0 indicates a complete ("functional") positive relationship between the attributes. In this case, an increase in the value of value A is accompanied by an unambiguously defined increase in the value of value B. A value of - 1.0 means complete ("functional") a negative relationship between the attributes. In this case, an increase in the value of value A is accompanied by an unambiguously defined decrease in the value of value B. In the" human world", the patterns described by functional dependencies are almost nonexistent. Almost all social patterns manifest themselves in the form of correlations with a strength from 0.1 to 0.8. The square of the correlation coefficient between certain indicators indicates how many percent they are related to each other. For social research, it makes sense to consider correlations with a coefficient greater than 0.5 as superstrong, from 0.3 to 0.5 as strong, from 0.15 to 0.3 as average, and only below 0.15 as weak.

Statistical significance of the correlation (a) means the probability that this correlation could have appeared as a result of randomness. If, for example, the statistical significance of a certain correlation is 0.01 (or, this correlation is significant at the level of 0.01), then the probability that such a correlation could have appeared as a result of randomness, in the absence of a real regular relationship between the features, is 0.01 (i.e., there is a one-in-a-hundred chance that the observed correlation is In this case, the probability is quite low, and the hypothesis about the presence of a link between the signs can be considered confirmed. Historically, the threshold level of statistical significance is assumed to be 0.05 (~ 5% ~ 1 chance in twenty), i.e. if we received a significance indicator of less than 0.05, then the corresponding hypothesis is considered to have successfully passed statistical verification, but if this indicator is more than 0.05, then the corresponding hypothesis is considered unconfirmed.

Diagram 5 is a scatter plot with a Lowess line superimposed. The number of dots around the dot indicates the number of countries with corresponding indicators of the contribution of agriculture to GDP and the number of internal armed conflicts.

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From diagr. 5 we see that a decrease in the contribution of agriculture to GDP (i.e., economic diversification) leads to a decrease in the likelihood of internal armed conflicts, with the critical level of this indicator being 35-40%.

In some African countries, the following features are typical of agrarian empires during periods of contraction preceding demographic collapse: malnutrition, frequent famine [Morozov, 2002], peasant lack of land, mass migration to cities, urban growth, rapid development of non-agricultural sectors of the economy, falling incomes, cheap labor, relatively high oil prices. basic foodstuffs, relatively high land prices, a large number of unemployed and beggars, hunger riots and uprisings, the intensification of popular movements under the slogans of property redistribution and social justice, attempts to implement social reforms to ease the situation of the people, external wars, the construction of irrigation systems for the development of new land.

Fortunately, there are no full-scale demographic collapses with significant depopulation in modern Africa. However, they cannot be there, because Africa is quite far advanced on the path of modernization, and the ceiling of the earth's load-bearing capacity is steadily growing there.

Population data indicate that demographic cycles of a modern type, accompanied by some population decline between 1960 and 2003, were observed in Somalia. The population growth curve in Somalia is similar to the population curves of modern developed countries at the beginning of modernization.

Figure 6

Population of Somalia in 1960-2003

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Source: [World Development.., 2004].

Most African countries have advanced further on the path of modernization than Somalia, so demographic catastrophes in many African hotspots are reflected primarily not in the population size, but in the growth rates of its population due to jumps in mortality and emigration .4

4 Similarly, the Second World War had very little impact on the global population growth trend, as the huge human losses of warring countries were offset by rapid demographic growth in countries not so affected by the war.

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Indeed, the data available to us indicate fluctuations in population growth rates in African countries characterized by high levels of internal political instability (see figure 7).:

Figure 7

Population growth rates in Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, 1960-2003, %

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Source: [World Development.., 2004].

The level of per capita consumption is a reliable indicator of the ratio between the population size and the amount of resources. We analyzed the relationship between average per capita consumption in calories per day per person and the level of political stability in different sub-Saharan African countries.

The food problem in Africa is more acute than anywhere else. In the developed world, per capita consumption exceeds 3,000 kilocalories (kcal) per day per person and reaches 3,800 kcal (FAO Database, 2003) in selected countries5 . In sub-Saharan Africa, the average per capita consumption was 2,214 kcal in 1999, which is lower than the WHO recommended rate of 2,300 - 2,400 kcal. If the duration of field work is 4-6 hours a day in the weather conditions of Africa, the employee needs 2800-3000 kcal per day.

South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Nigeria, Mauritania, Swaziland, the Gambia, and Ghana had the highest per capita consumption (more than 2,500 kcal per day) in sub-Saharan Africa in 1999. In Somalia, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, and the Comors, this indicator was below 1,800 kcal, which is dangerous for human health and life.

Consumption declines in African countries usually do not occur suddenly. As a rule, this is a long and steady process, due to the fact that the rate of economic growth lags behind the rate of population growth. For example, in perena-

5 The gap between the level of consumption in developed countries and the WHO recommended norm of 2300-2400 kcal is probably explained by the fact that the human biogram was formed in the Paleolithic, when people were engaged in hunting and gathering, walking several tens of kilometers a day. As soon as the financial situation of the population improves, the level of caloric intake increases. Stabilization occurs at the level of 3,400 kcal, which is probably optimal for a hunter-gatherer, but leads to overweight in a significant part of the population in modern conditions.

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In rural Burundi, consumption fell by 476 kcal from 1960 to 1999, reaching a catastrophic level of 1,628 kcal per day per person (figure 8).:

Figure 8

Dynamics of average per capita consumption in Burundi in 1960-1999"", kcal per day/person.

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Source: [FAO Database, 2003].

Similar processes were observed in most European countries at one time or another.

We conducted a statistical analysis of the hypothesis that there is a link between the level of consumption and the political situation in the countries of Tropical Africa. As units of analysis, we took three-year time intervals in the history of sub-Saharan Africa from 1980 to 2000.6 (Data on the level of political stability were taken from sources: [African countries, 2002; White, 2005]).

The political situation was divided into three types: 1) peaceful years without serious political upheavals; 2) moderate-intensity political upheavals, such as coups and bloody mass riots (including ethnic ones); 3) large-scale civil wars, during which more than 100 thousand people were killed and most often the political regime fell.

In the course of data analysis, we found that a low level of per capita consumption is a fairly strong predictor of political upheaval. The correlation between the level of per capita consumption and the level of political stability is statistically significant (α < 10-7). Especially reliable-

6 The decade before 1980 was not taken into account because it included the achievement of independence by some African countries, and any drastic political changes can themselves be sources of instability in the region. After the outbreak of a large-scale civil war, the country was excluded from the analysis, since such wars destroy agriculture and the economy as a whole and, thus, worsen the food situation. In cases of large-scale civil wars, the analysis included the three-year period before the outbreak of the war, since the first year of the war could have a negative impact on the level of consumption of people. In some cases, the countdown started with 1979 or 1981, in order to avoid the year of the beginning of the civil war in the sample, or to avoid taking into account twice the riots that lasted two or three years. Small island countries were not included in the analysis, as economic, social and political processes there often have a specific logic of development.

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Table

Correlation between per capita food consumption and political stability

Level of per capita consumption, kcal / day / person

Total

<1850

1850 - 2000

>2000

Level of political stability

Stable political environment

quantity

2

23

165

190

%

6.7%

69.7%

90.7%

83.7%

A coup d'etat or bloody mass riots

quantity

6

7

15

28

%

50.0%

21.2%

1.2%

12.3%

The beginning of a large-scale civil war

quantity

4

3

2

9

%

33.3%

9.1%

1.1%

4.0%

Total

quantity

12

33

182

227

%

100%

100%

100%

100%

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Note: p = -0.42; α = 10-5 (one-way test); γ = -0.77; α < 10 - 10 (one-way test). Sources: [FAO Database, 2003; African Countries, 2002; White, 2005].

a reliable predictor of political upheaval is the consumption of less than 1,850 kcal per day per person for an average of three years, i.e. for a period sufficient to accumulate a critical potential of tension in society7 (see Table).

With a per capita consumption of more than 2,000 kcal per day per person, the political situation was calm in 90.7% of cases. Political upheavals of moderate intensity occurred in 8.2% of cases, while large-scale civil wars occurred only in 1.1% of cases. Interestingly, there was no correlation between the level of consumption and the level of political stability in this part of the sample. This means that if nutrition is at least slightly higher than normal, then 1) the probability of political upheaval is low; 2) other parameters rather than per capita food consumption act as such factors.

When food consumption is above 1,850 and below 2,000 kcal (which is slightly below the minimum norm set by WHO), the political situation, on average, slightly worsens: The situation was stable in 69.7% of such cases, while moderate-intensity political upheavals and civil wars occurred in 21.2% and 9.1% of cases, respectively.

The political situation was radically different when per capita consumption fell below 1,850 kcal. After having this level of consumption for three years, the situation remained calm only in 16.7% of cases. In half of the cases, there were moderate-intensity political upheavals: coups d'etat and / or bloody riots. It should be noted that in a number of countries such cataclysms were a prelude to civil war. Large-scale civil wars at this level of consumption began in 33.3% of cases, namely in Mozambique (1982), Ethiopia (1991), Somalia (1991-1992) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2000).

7 Consumption of less than 1,850 kcal per day per person for three years means that a significant part of the country's population is on the verge of starvation. In this kind of situation, for many residents of the country, joining criminal groups (or rebel armies, which, as is well known, easily transform into criminal groups and vice versa) turns out to be a reasonable choice in their own way - continuing to try to earn a living in the usual way is often equivalent to almost inevitable starvation, while joining a bandit formation/the rebel army has at least some chance of survival.

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This result indicates the possibility of estimating the probability of political upheaval in a particular country. Average per capita consumption below 1,850 kcal in 1999-2001 was observed (in ascending order) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi and Eritrea. This indicates an exceptionally high probability of armed violence and coups d'etat there in the coming years. In Zambia, Angola, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, the Central African Republic, Tanzania, and Rwanda, the level of consumption in 1999-2001 was above 1,850, but below 2,000 kcal per day per person. If food security in these countries continues to deteriorate, the likelihood of political upheaval and even civil wars will become very high.

Of course, the armed conflicts in Mozambique, Ethiopia, Somalia and the DRC had prerequisites that were not related to the level of per capita consumption: ethnic tensions, miscalculations and crimes of the authorities, intervention by other states, features of the clan and tribal structure, etc. However, there were similar problems in those African countries where the level of consumption was higher. If there were any armed clashes there, they were usually much less intense and often of a short-term nature. In other words, the level of consumption of the population is a certain indicator of the strength of society in the face of the still numerous problems in Africa.

Often, the existing political, social, ethnic, religious and similar contradictions in society provide material for the formation of the ideology of the masses who are dissatisfied with the systematic malnutrition that threatens their lives. The form of expression of popular indignation can be very different, but the real scope of the conflict is given by the demographic pressure of the population on resources.

Consider the exception cases. With consumption levels below 1,850 kcal per day per person, the situation remained relatively stable in Djibouti in 1980-1982 and in Ghana in 1983-1985. In both cases, this period saw the emergence of relatively rigid regimes led by a strong leader. In addition, in both countries, the period of malnutrition quickly gave way to a period of increased consumption.

The outbreak of the Liberian civil war in 1989 and the escalation of violence in Sudan in 1983 were accompanied by good (by African standards) per capita consumption. In Sudan, the rate has only once fallen below 2,100 kcal since 1980, and in Liberia, before the outbreak of war, it was above 2,400 kcal per person per day.

Data on food consumption in Sudan are national averages. Meanwhile, there is reason to believe that food security in the Arab North is significantly different from that in the "black" South.

In the case of Liberia, we should also take into account the dramatic differences in living standards between Monrovia (and especially among American-Liberians) and the regions where the war broke out. However, the armed conflict in Liberia can also be a clear indicator that war can begin even if the food situation is favorable.

Low per capita consumption as a result of excessive demographic pressure on resources is certainly not the only reason for the emergence of civil wars. Other reasons include, for example, the availability of mineral resources, especially diamond ores, major miscalculations in the domestic political strategy, the negative influence of neighboring states and major players in the regional and global political arena, macro-political shifts, historically formed ethnic and social contradictions, overproduction of the elite, the activity of criminal communities, and a low level of political culture in society.-

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va, not to mention all sorts of random events, etc. However, if you consume less than 1,850 calories a day for several years, political upheaval becomes almost inevitable, and the threat of a large-scale civil war is quite real.

Participants of the State Failure Task Force Report project analyzed correlates of political instability in different regions. For sub-Saharan Africa, they used multiple linear regression to identify the following significant factors (in descending order of significance):: type of regime (democracies in Africa are much more vulnerable to ethnic conflicts, and partial democracies almost always fail [however, there are some reasons to doubt the correctness of the authors ' classification of African countries on this basis]); presence of ethnic discrimination; urbanization (more urbanized countries are more stable); openness of trade relations (the sum of exports and exports). This is a positive correlation with political stability) and the length of a leader's stay in power (recently emerged regimes fail more often than others, as well as regimes where the leader has been in power for quite a long time, more than 14 years). An important factor of political instability is also unbalanced development (high level of urbanization with low GDP per capita output) [Goldstone et ah, 2000]. Note that the latter indicator is also an indicator of the pre-collapse state in the model of S. A. Nefedov [Nefedov, 2003, p. 26]. Indeed, this is usually due to an exceptionally high level of relative overpopulation, which pushes the rural population left without means of subsistence into cities. At the same time, only a part of this population finds legal alternative ways to earn a living outside of their native places, while a significant part of it joins the ranks of criminal groups and rebel armies.

Thus, political upheavals, and especially civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa, have a pronounced demographic background. Civil wars in Africa represent demographic crises of a modern type, only somewhat analogous to the demographic collapses of agrarian empires. Modern demographic crises occur against the background of an increase in the ceiling of the earth's load-bearing capacity and are characterized by an increasingly shorter duration and intensity (as a percentage of the number of victims to the population). Africa's demographic crises are huge humanitarian disasters, but they are killing an increasingly small percentage of the population. As modernization progresses, demographic fluctuations on an absolute scale fade (as in Somalia) and begin to manifest themselves more and more in a decrease in relative growth rates, rather than in absolute population size. In this sense, modern Africa follows the path that developed countries have already taken. The complete disappearance of demographic cycles and, as a result, humanitarian disasters in Africa is possible only as we move along the path of demographic transition and economic modernization.

Studying the parameters of economic development in Africa is a prerequisite for developing tools for predicting and preventing demographic disasters. Economic development trends in a number of African countries are quite alarming. Population growth in a number of countries in this region continues to be exponential. Healthy market economies are also characterized by exponential development, but not all African countries are experiencing such economic dynamics. The economic development of a number of African countries is dominated by a logistics-type trend, which can be described as" growth with saturation", i.e. the phase of active economic growth is replaced by a phase of slowing growth rates, and then stagnation. Examples of such dynamics are shown in figure 9.

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Figure 9

GDP dynamics in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo, US $ 1995 (based on purchasing power parity)

-----

Source: [World Development.., 2004].

While Togo's economy is in a phase of slowing growth, Sierra Leone and Liberia have already gone through a phase of stagnation. Characteristically, the stagnation phase in both cases was followed by a bloody civil war.

Logistics-type processes (i.e., growth with saturation) were observed from 1960 to 2003 in the following countries: Burundi, Ghana (1960 - 1984), Guinea-Bissau, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritania (1960-1993), Niger (1960-1993), Nigeria (1960 - 1985), the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Swaziland, Sierra Leone, Togo, the Central African Republic (before 1997), Eritrea, South Africa (1960-1993), etc.

Obviously, the reason for the slowdown in economic growth in a number of African countries is the well-known law of rising costs, according to which, as the economy produces more and more given products, the alternative costs of the additional unit produced, expressed in the production capabilities of other products, increase [see, for example: Lyubimov and Raneeva, 1995, p. 27]. Many African economies are based on agriculture and extractive industries. Both of these industries are subject to the law of rising costs. Thus, investments in the development of the field will eventually yield less and less profit. The use of mineral fertilizers at the first stages can significantly increase the yield of agricultural crops, but the use of fertilizers in excess of the norm will not only not increase productivity, but may also lead to a decrease in yield [Weight, Kelly, 1999]. It follows that the best economic development strategy for African States is economic diversification.

If GDP growth per capita is not always linearly reflected in the level of per capita consumption, then a drop in this indicator in most cases leads to a decrease in the level of consumption per capita.

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to the deterioration of the food situation in the country. On average, in the risk zone (i.e., at the level of food consumption of about 1,900 kcal per person per day), a drop in GDP per capita by one US dollar in 1995 (in purchasing power parity) leads to a drop in daily per capita consumption by an average of 4.2 kcal.

Based on this, we have created a mathematical model of the current economic and demographic cycle in a country with logistics-type economic development. This model reflects the situation leading to the outbreak of civil war in African countries [see more about this: Korotaev, Malkov, and Khalturina, 2005, pp. 271-301].

The model describes the following situation. The country's population is growing exponentially overall. The economy is developing according to the logistics scenario. The country makes an economic breakthrough, but after a while its opportunities are exhausted, and GDP growth slows down. This is reflected in a drop in GDP per capita during the economic stagnation phase. As a result of the fall in GDP per capita, there is a drop in per capita consumption and a slight decrease in population growth (mainly as a result of an increase in mortality), which, as a rule, only postpones, but does not prevent, a political crisis. The average per capita consumption falls to less than 1,850 kcal per day per person. After maintaining this level of consumption for three or more years, either a civil war begins in the country, or a series of minor political upheavals, which, if the situation does not improve, also lead to a civil war, i.e. to a political and demographic catastrophe of the modern type.

Using this mathematical model, we generated the dynamics of GDP per capita in this situation.

Chart 10

Dynamics a) GDP per capita generated by the model and b) the level of per capita consumption in Zambia (kcal!day/person)

-----

Sources: [Korotaev, Malkov, and Khalturina, 2005; FAO Database, 2003].

The curve generated by the model well describes the real dynamics of economic development in some economically disadvantaged African countries. The consumption curve in a number of countries had the same shape: an increase in the level of consumption, quickly followed by stagnation and prolonged decline.

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Recognizing the demographic component of the causes of many political upheavals on the African continent (as well as in some non-African countries) can help to adjust the strategy of assistance to countries where the average per capita consumption level is close to critical.

It is known that women's education, even minimal, plays a crucial role in reducing the birth rate (Bongaarts, 2003). Therefore, international funds that help the poorest countries should invest primarily in educational programs, especially for women. An interesting option is the distribution of food aid in schools, as a positive precedent for which we can consider free school breakfasts, which effectively stimulated school attendance in the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War.

In economic terms, the optimal strategy for African countries (and other countries with similar levels of economic development) is to diversify the economy and reduce the share of agriculture and extractive industries, i.e. if an African country is experiencing a decrease in agricultural growth due to the exhaustion of the main resources for the development of the industry, then investing heavily in agricultural development is often it may be not only unnecessary, but also dangerous.

History shows that a demographic explosion accompanied by a drop in per capita consumption and/or the emergence of large numbers of lumpenized migrants from rural areas to cities is a serious challenge for any society. It was against this socio-demographic background that the October Revolution and the subsequent bloody civil War in Russia took place. The eminent economist D. Keynes notes:

"Before the war, the combined population of Germany and Austria-Hungary not only exceeded the population of the United States, but was practically equal to the entire population of North America. It was in this population size, which occupied a compact territory, that the power of the central forces lay. But this same population, which even the war has not significantly reduced , is no less dangerous to the peace of Europe if it is deprived of its means of subsistence. The European part of Russia increased its population even more than Germany - from less than 100 million in 1890 to 150 million at the beginning of the war. In the year immediately preceding 1914, the excess of births over deaths in Russia was impressive - more than 2 million a year. This unusually rapid growth of the Russian population, which has not been properly noticed in England, seems to be one of the most significant facts of recent years. The great events of history are often attributed to the slow age-long course of population growth and other fundamental economic causes, which, because of their gradual nature, escape the attention of modern observers and are therefore attributed to the weaknesses of statesmen or the fanaticism of atheists. The extraordinary events that have taken place in Russia over the past two years - the greatest social upheaval that has overturned what seemed so immutable - religion, the foundations of property, land ownership, and the forms of government and class hierarchy-are perhaps more due to the deep influence of the growing population than to Lenin or Nicholas II. to play a greater role in the destruction of the foundations of society than the power of ideas or the mistakes of autocracy " [Keynes, 1924, cit. by Kapitsa, 1999; see also Isupov, 2000].

In Africa, as in the rest of the world, the "population explosion" is mostly on the decline. After a few decades, the population of the continent is stable-

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it is being leased. The international community should do everything possible to prevent the escalation of armed conflicts in individual countries, since civil war can negate the long-standing efforts of African Governments and international agencies to modernize local societies (including educational processes that help reduce demographic pressure). It is particularly important to avoid conflicts against the background of, and to a large extent due to, low consumption levels. If armed conflicts can be avoided in the future, then in a few decades African countries will be able to develop normally, and humanity will witness their significant economic, social and cultural success.

The results of this study are also useful for analyzing the political situation outside sub-Saharan Africa. The relationship between consumption and the political situation is found in the poorest countries around the world. At the same time, as noted above, this pattern does not apply to relatively prosperous African States. For example, in Algeria, the domestic political situation worsened in the early 1990s, despite the fact that in the 1980s the level of per capita food consumption increased from 2,667 to 2,890 kcal per day. However, the War of independence (1954-1962) took place against a background of consumption levels comparable to those in the poorest African countries today (1,730 kcal per day per capita in 1961).

Outside of Africa, average per capita consumption below 2,300 kcal per day in 2002 was observed in Yemen (2,038 kcal), Cambodia (2,046), Haiti (2,086), Uzbekistan (2,241), Solomon Islands (2,265), Panama (2,272), the Palestinian Authority (2,272), Mongolia (2,250), Guatemala (2,219), Bolivia (2,235), Bangladesh (2,205), and Armenia (2,268). Of particular concern is the food situation in Tajikistan, where FAO services recorded consumption of 1,828 kcal per day in 2002 and 1,789 kcal per day in 2001, which probably explains the intensive labor migration from Tajikistan. This means that there are significant prerequisites for political destabilization in modern Tajikistan, and the international community should take a more responsible approach to the issue of assistance to this country.

The results of this study allow us to take a fresh look at the political situation in Palestine. The relatively low average per capita consumption in this region (2,271 kcal / person per day) is an average value for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (for comparison, the same indicator for Israel was 3,666 kcal in 2002). The economic situation is extremely difficult in both regions, but the situation in the Gaza Strip is even worse than in the West Bank. The CIA estimates that the production of GDP per capita in 2004 was $ 800 in the West Bank and $ 600 in the West Bank. in the Gaza Strip at purchasing power parity [World Factbook, 2005]. At such a low level of consumption, this difference can be critical. Thus, according to the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, the unemployment rate in the West Bank was 27%, and in the Gaza Strip-40%.

Thus, there is every reason to believe that the level of per capita food consumption in the Gaza Strip is lower than in the West Bank, and if not equal, then at least close to the critical level of 1,850 kcal per day per capita. Among the poorest segments of the Gaza Strip's population, consumption levels may almost certainly be below critical levels. As we know, this level of consumption leads to a radical increase in political tension and violence in society. The situation is complicated by the large number of unemployed representatives of young cohorts, who represent the "ready-made nutritional soup" for all revolutions (Goldstone, 1991). It is in the Gaza Strip that the greatest danger is experienced-

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It is used by the radical organization" Hamas", and it is there that the headquarters of this organization is located. The results of this study suggest that normalizing the level of per capita consumption in the West Bank and especially in the Gaza Strip could reduce the severity of the problem of terrorism in the region (including in Israel).

Against this background, the decision of the Israeli leadership to withdraw Jewish settlements from the Gaza Strip, which is difficult from an internal political point of view, seems completely rational from the point of view of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the one hand, this measure can increase the resource base of the malnourished Arab population. On the other hand, what could be more conflict-prone in such an economic situation than the sight of flourishing Jewish settlements in the middle of a poverty-stricken sector?

However, a long-term solution to the conflict in this region will require more serious measures. It is necessary to reduce the demographic pressure in the region, as well as achieve significant economic growth that would create the necessary resource base for the Palestinian population. Once again, in our opinion, the best solution lies in the field of education. Both objectives would have been met if the Israeli leadership and / or the international community had managed to achieve a mass departure of Palestinian youth (including girls) to study abroad by allocating a significant number of scholarships.

First, such a measure would remove the main explosive force - unemployed youth-from the Palestinian territories (which would be a serious blow to extremist organizations). In the long run, improving the educational level in this region would help to reduce the birth rate. Finally, improving the level of human capital development would contribute to a healthy economy in the Palestinian Authority.

The elimination of the demographic and economic prerequisites of terrorism (especially if the Israeli leadership fulfills its intentions to return to the borders of 1967 with the actual granting of full State sovereignty to the Palestinian Authority) could lead to the complete exhaustion of the Arab-Israeli conflict in a violent form.

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