The beginning of armed conflict 1 in the Darfur region of Sudan dates back to 2003, although the struggle between pastoralists and farmers for access to natural resources, which gradually worsened as a result of droughts and the onset of the Sahara, and the growing discontent of Darfurians with their marginal economic and political situation in western Sudan, turned these territories into a zone of constant instability much earlier. The specific nature of relations between the Sudan and its neighbors, Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), was also an important factor in the escalation of the conflict, while Darfur fell victim to the political ambitions of the leaders of these countries.

Keywords: Sudan, Darfur, Chad, Libya, Central African Republic, international relations, conflict, land issue, violence, tribal militias.

Libya and the Central African Republic have played an important, if indirect, role in the Darfur conflict. Immediately after coming to power in 1969, Gaddafi began to extend Arab influence to the countries of the Sahel zone. After the introduction of UN sanctions against Libya in 1992, the influence of official Tripoli in the region noticeably weakened. However, informal channels for the supply of weapons and other goods, as well as the transfer of militants to neighboring countries, have become more important. However, the Libyan Jamahiriya could not remain aloof from the events in Darfur and used the crisis in the area and in Chad to strengthen its role as a regional leader.

CAR policy has had a significant impact on the development of conflicts in Chad and Darfur, as for many years, especially after the overthrow of the first two Presidents of Chad, Francois Tombalbay (1960-1975) and Felix Mallum (1975-1978), the republic was a haven for armed opposition to the Chadian governments operating in all countries of the region. In turn, the drought and insecurity of movement of Chadian and Sudanese pastoralists in the context of armed clashes also predetermined a change in the paths of nomadic migrations, which began to partially pass through the territory of the Central African Republic. General Francois Bozize, who seized power in this country in 2003 and was supported by the Governments of Chad and France, significantly influenced the situation in Darfur, as he forced the Chadian opposition and related Darfurian rebels to withdraw to Sudan, and the Janjaweed Arab militia fighters who fought them, who were responsible for mass killings not only in Darfur but also in the Central African Republic, they received recognition of their merits from the new Central African leader. In addition, according to UN estimates, about 57,000 Darfurian refugees have found refuge in camps in the Central African Republic [Chad and Sudan.., p. 2].

With regard to Chad, to understand the reasons for the close relationship between events in that country and in western Sudan, it is necessary to consider the situation in the Sahel as a whole.

1 During the most active phase of the conflict (2003-2010), between 200 and 400 thousand people were killed, and several million Darfurians became refugees or displaced as a result of military operations (P. L).

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The Sahel is a narrow strip of land that stretches across Africa from Senegal to Sudan. Before the great droughts of the 1960s and 1980s, there were 8-11 dry months a year, baobabs and acacias grew, and the soil in many places was covered with grass. Over the past half-century, the Territory has been subjected to desertification as a result of natural climate change and the depletion of pasture and arable land due to overuse. As a result, the States of the Sahel zone were caught up in severe droughts and famines, especially in the 1970s and 1980s-1984 [United Nations Environment..., p. 48, 59].

In 2007, a group of experts from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) published a comprehensive analysis of the environmental situation in different parts of the Sahel. The study focused mainly on the Sudan, especially Darfur, but it also reflected the situation in the Sahel parts of Chad. In Darfur, one-third of the forest area was lost in 1972-2006. Since 1917, the volume of precipitation has been recorded. El Fasher (Northern Darfur) it has decreased from 300 mm per year to about 200 mm. UNEP experts indicated that this level of precipitation reduction is sufficient to change the environmental situation regardless of human influence. The result was a shift of the desert climate to the south by about 100 km over 40 years [ibid., p. 62]. The decline in precipitation turned millions of hectares of semi-arid pasture land into a desert, and the extinction of trees began. The transformation of the northern part of the Sahel zone into a desert forced nomadic communities to move south in search of pastures [ibid., p. 60].

The" Great Sahel drought of the 20th century " reached its highest level in Wadai (Chad) and Northern Darfur in the mid-1960s. Precipitation did not return to normal levels for another two decades [Burr and Collins, 2006, p.5, 65, 92-93]. By 1973, 70% of the livestock population in Chad had been slaughtered or killed. The warlike nomadic pastoralists (Baggara) of Wadai, Darfur, and Kordofan experienced a period of impoverishment and, consequently, bitterness. Left without food and livelihoods, tens of thousands of Chadians have moved to central and southern Darfur and further east in search of pasture or work. The most hardy Goran and Zaghava turned to the usual occupation for hard times - banditry. During periods of drought, there was no such thing as "security" in the Sahel.

CHAD'S ROLE IN THE DARFUR CONFLICT

Although Chad was a French colony, its history was largely similar to that of Sudan. Like the British in Sudan, the French in Chad created a privileged group of their "wards", and since the northern part of Chad was considered useless from an economic point of view, the francophone political elite of the country was represented by immigrants from the south.

The first President of Chad after gaining independence in 1960 was a Southerner Christian officer, Francois Tombalbay. Muslim Northerners were expelled from the military and civil service and banned from participating in politics. The most destitute of the Muslims, the "lowest of the lowest", as in the Sudan, were the Arab nomads-Bedouins. Anti-government protests in 1963 marked the beginning of a civil war that lasted several decades.

Opposition to Tombalbayu was concentrated in the north, where its first known leader, Ibrahim Abatsha, emerged as one of the first Chadian dissidents to receive material support from Khartoum and access to Chadian refugee sites in Darfur. The small opposition was represented mainly by Chadian Arabs and Darfurians who joined them, living on the border between the two countries. Not surprisingly, the Chadian National Liberation Front, known as FROLINAT, was founded on June 22, 1966 in Nyala (Southern Darfur). In 1967, the rebels carried out at least 30 attacks on Chadian regular army units, but none occurred more than 100 km from the Chadian-Sudanese border.

From the very beginning, the Front experienced internal disagreements, which led to its split into groups whose leaders had different interests and tasks. Gradually, the contradictions between the southerners, on the one hand, and a broad coalition of northern tribes, the backbone of which was the Tubu (leaders-Gukuni Ueddei, Hissen

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Khabre), zaghawa (Hassan Jamu, Abbas Koti), and the Arabs (Abba Siddiq, Ahmed Aqeel, and Asheik Ibn Omar) are on the other side. Endless disputes, accompanied by violence, and temporary alliances between local and national leaders contributed to the escalation and expansion of the Chadian conflict into Sudan. As a result, there are two rebel factions: one led by G. Whedday and the other led by X. Habre fought the government, each other, and other rebel factions, and Habre also fought Libya, which helped Oueddai by enlisting his support in the Jamahiriya's annexation of the Auzu strip, a Chadian territory rich in uranium and oil.

The Libyan revolution of 1969, which brought Gaddafi to power, marked a turning point in the history of the entire region. Gaddafi's geopolitical concept encompassed three circles - Arab, Islamic and African. M. Gaddafi sought to unite-first with Egypt, then with Sudan, then with Tunisia, but none of these projects was implemented. Gaddafi's interest in Chad came to light a few months after he came to power. He first suggested that FROLINAT establish a permanent headquarters in Tripoli, then supported the North Chadian rebels by providing them with weapons. Darfur soon became a base for training Chadian fighters by the Libyans.

However, Gaddafi's attempts to shape a regional policy backfired. On April 13, 1975, the government of Tombalbay was overthrown in a military coup and the Supreme Military Council of Chad was headed by F. Mallum. A new Chadian coalition Government was formed, pledging to oppose FROLINAT and its Libyan sponsor.

The first phase of the Chadian civil war was supposed to end in November 1979, when negotiations held in Nigeria under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) created the Transitional Government of National Unity of Chad, headed by G. Ouedday; X. Habre became Minister of Defense. At the same time, the armed groups did not disband and remained under the command of their leaders. On March 21, 1980, units loyal to Habra attempted to remove G. Ueddei from power, and the war resumed with renewed vigor. To support Oueddai, Libyan troops entered Chad, and soon Habre's troops were pushed out to the Sudanese border.

When Ronald Reagan came to power in the United States in 1981, Chad became an important part of the Cold War. American interests in this country are concentrated around the oasis of Auzu, occupied by Libya in 1973. According to the results of geological exploration carried out by that time, the area could have large reserves of uranium ore. On January 20, 1981, two weeks after Gaddafi's announcement of an alliance between Chad, then headed by G. Ouedday, and Libya, the United States severed diplomatic relations with the Jamahiriya and declared the Libyan leader the main sponsor and participant of international terrorism. Reagan expressed support for the efforts of H. Habre, who has concentrated his forces in Darfur, to launch a war to overthrow the Chadian government.

To isolate Gaddafi within the framework of the OAU, the United Nations, and the Muslim world, the United States initiated a trilateral alliance with Egypt and Sudan. The most important contribution of the then Sudanese leader Jafar Nimeiri to this alliance was the support of X. Habre in Darfur, which included providing his troops with training grounds and weapons. Since Habre has demonstrated the ability to transform his Chadian National Armed Forces (FANT) group into a disciplined army, the United States has increased its supply of weapons to counter the forces of G. Oueddai, who was helped by Libya. At the end of 1981, Habre launched an offensive from the territory of Darfur, and on June 7, 1982, captured the Chadian capital and proclaimed himself President of the country. Darfur served as a springboard for this operation.

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In the context of the Cold War, the meaning of X. Habre grew, and the US continued to supply him with weapons, and France with air cover, which provided his army with firepower and saved him from Libyan air strikes. This led to important military successes for Habre for almost a decade. The United States used a base in Chad to retrain captured Libyan soldiers and turn them into an anti-Gaddafi force.

The Libyan response to the growing American presence in the region was to strengthen the so-called Islamic Legion, formed in Darfur from remnants of Chadian opposition groups, and the Arab Assembly, which, despite its name, included all of Libya's allies in Sudan and Chad - Arabs and non-Arabs, including the non-Arab Zaghawa, Tubu, Meydob and Tuareg nomads [War in Darfur.., 2007, p. 121-125].

In the 1980s, Habré fought with the Libyan army in northern Chad, and in the south, with the remnants of the forces led by G. Ouedday and Asheik Ibn Omar, as well as Chadian rebels, to whom the CAR provided assistance and shelter. Meanwhile, the Chadian leadership remained divided into factions. On April 1, 1989, Idris Deby (then Security and Defense Adviser to the President, Zaghawa of the Bideyat clan), Ibrahim Mahamat Itno (Minister of the Interior since July 1986, half-brother of I. Deby) and Hassan Jamu (Commander-in-Chief of the Chadian army since 1985, Zaghawa of the Kobe clan) tried to overthrow X. Habré. Of the leaders of the insurgency, only Deby survived and moved through Libya to Darfur to reorganize his supporters there [Daly, 2007, p. 217-218].

Since the early 1980s, Libya has supported Chadian refugees in Darfur. Chadian Arab tribes received significant aid in the form of cash, food and, most importantly, weapons, which contributed to the militarization of land disputes and social contradictions in this Sudanese region. When the Chadian Zaghawa weakened their support for Habre, discovering that members of his ethnic group (Tubu) and clan (Anakaza) monopolized all key government posts, Deby used this as an excuse to organize a new opposition faction in Darfur - the Patriotic Movement( PD), which was formed thanks to the support of the future Chadian president by his tribesmen. settled in Libya and Darfur. Supported by Sudan and Libya, on December 4, 1990, I. Debi, after defeating Habre's troops, seized power in Chad. From this point on, the influence of the Zaghawa people in the region and the struggle for power between Zaghawa and other tribes, as well as between individual Zaghawa clans, increased.

POPULATION MIGRATION AS A FACTOR OF EXACERBATION OF THE CHADIAN AND DARFUR CONFLICTS

The repression carried out by the governments of H. Habre and I. Deby created a steady discontent among the population, who fled to Libya and Sudan in search of safety. There was a turn in the direction of traffic on the Chadian-Sudanese border. Living on opposite sides of it, citizens of both countries have crossed it for centuries for a variety of reasons, starting with environmental reasons. But before that, it was mainly a transition from Darfur to eastern Chad: due to the higher rainfall on the Chadian side, camel breeders (abbala) moved there in search of pasture and water sources. In the 1970s and 1990s, Chadians began to leave for Darfur. In 1973, as a result of the Chadian civil war and drought, Western Darfur received more than 200,000 Chadians. By the mid-1990s, about 100,000 people, mostly Zaghawa and Tubu, had ended up in Sudanese refugee camps. The region's population grew from 1.3 million in 1956 to 6.5 million in 2004 [United Nations. Dimensions.., 2006, p. 14]. This far exceeds any possible estimate.

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The rate of natural growth, i.e. immigration from Chad, may have been the main driver of population growth in Darfur.

By the end of the 1990s, about 10% of the Chadian population lived in Darfur (Burr and Collins, 2006, p. 192). Chadians migrated alone, in families and in groups. Migrants rarely maintained their Chadian identity. The fact that they came from border areas and had relatives on both sides of the border made it easier for them to adapt, and they became loyal to the traditional Sudanese leaders. They often joined local tribal militias or official paramilitary groups , such as the Murahilin Defence Force (SOM) and the People's Defence Force (FNL), which helped them gain Sudanese citizenship. The downside of this process was that the Government viewed Chadian youth in need of a livelihood as a source of military mobilization in times of crisis.

The Sahel drought worsened in 1968-1973, and migrants from Chad and other West African countries flooded into Western Darfur. Although the settled Furs (the main ethnic group of the region) usually distinguished "our Arabs" moving from north to south from Chadians, this division was not always easy, since most nomads in Chad and Darfur belonged to the same tribes and even clans. In the late 1990s, as a result of another drought, approximately 100,000 refugees moved from Northern Darfur to Western and Southern Darfur, while the number of migrants from Chad to Western Darfur at that time exceeded 500,000 [Ibrahim Abd al-Rahman Abubaker, 1977, p. 336].

The Darfur conflict is usually associated with the struggle of the Furs against Arab, mostly nomadic, tribes claiming the fertile ancestral lands of non-Arabs and forming a Janjaweed militia that terrorizes the local population. However, almost the main role in the conflict (along with the trucks) was played by the strong and numerous Zaghawa ethnic group, which is a confederation of many independent clans divided by state borders, having separate settlements, but connected by religion and language and exerting a noticeable influence on the politics of Sudan, Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic (Tubiana, Tubiana, 1977, p. 11].

THE ROLE OF CHADIAN NOMADIC TRIBES IN THE CONFLICT

Zaghawa nomads migrate both within and between the countries of the region, and in this they share similarities with other non-Arab and Arab Chadian and Sudanese tribes: Masalit, Toma, Salamat and Mahamid. Zaghawa migration areas are expanding with increasing droughts, desertification, and the spread of large areas of armed conflict [De Waal, 1989, p. 27].

The Zaghawa are in better economic and political conditions than other ethnic groups inhabiting the eastern part of the Lake Chad basin. In particular, due to their extensive family ties, they have representatives in the army and local administrations of southern Libya. In Chad, President I. Deby and his relatives and tribesmen monopolized power and created the backbone of the military leadership. In Darfur, Zaghawa became key figures in rebel groups (Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim Mohamed, leaders of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) Minnie Minawi, Nuren Minawi Bertchem, Djibril Abdelkarim "Tek", etc.). In the Central African Republic, General Bozize carried out a successful coup in March 2003, also with the support of the Zaghawa, including the Debi - Bideyat clan.

Due to the Zaghawa's extensive migrations across the four countries, they either inadvertently became involved in conflicts in these territories, or became the initiators of disputes over land, participation in local authorities, and fugitive rebels joined the Sudanese rebels, or, on the contrary, clashed with them [Daldoum, 2000, p.66].

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Warring factions have always sought refuge among their fellow tribesmen abroad. The defeated groups were moving east with weapons to recuperate in the protected areas of Darfur. Many Chadian refugees have proven to be well-trained militarily.

The Jebel Marra massif was impassable for the Chadian regular army, but could provide a natural defense for Chadian opposition groups. Faced with a massive influx of Chadians, trucks began burning pastures en masse to force refugees to move to other areas, cutting off their access to water sources, often as revenge for refugees stealing their livestock. Driven out of Chad and finding access to Jebel Marra blocked by trucks, the Chadians began to resist. They turned to the Arab nomads of Darfur and Kordofan for help [ibid., p. 81; Harir, 1994, p. 166].

Chadian Arab groups were behind the creation of a new movement in Darfur, formed to unite Arab and non-Arab nomadic tribes in order to protect common interests - the Arab Assembly, which received weapons from the Libyans. The name first appeared in the manifesto of the Arab militia "Kvarish", whose founder Ahmed Akil was considered the "father of Arab nationalism" in Chad [Haggar, 2007, p. 121-123]. The manifesto pointed out the isolation of the Arabs in the region and called for the expansion of the Arab belt in Africa [Harir, 1994, p. 164-165; Burr and Collins, 2006, p. 286].

With Libyan help, an alliance was formed between Chadian and Sudanese nomad militias. Over time, Chadian Arab militias became directly involved in internal Darfur conflicts, fighting alongside Arab Darfurian tribes in "land wars". Chadian opposition groups have shared weapons with Darfurian militias [Haggar, 2007, pp. 124-126]. At the end of 1988, the term "Janjaweed" was first used for Arab militias.

The arming of nomadic tribes alarmed their settled neighbors, who were also looking for ways to strengthen their self-defense, especially since the Chadian wars in Darfur had not caused a shortage of weapons since the 1960s. The Fur militias were generally referred to as the Darfur Federal Army and initially consisted of secret militant groups called jakab ("struggle") [ibid., p. 217]. By May 1988, the trucks had six thousand fighters in training centers in southwestern Darfur and western Bahr al-Ghazal on the border with the Central African Republic (Theobald, 1965, p. 15).

I. DEBI'S POLITICS AND THE DARFUR CONFLICT

Like Habre, I. Debi came to power in 1990 by armed means, also starting his campaign to power from bases in Darfur. However, Debi agreed with the Government in Khartoum that Sudan and Chad would refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs. For a number of years, the border remained relatively peaceful, and when the most active Darfur insurgency began in 2003, Deby withdrew from the issue. However, in 2003-2004, he mediated the signing of the Abeche and N'Djamena ceasefire agreements. Later, under pressure from Zaghawa tribesmen who threatened to oust him, he reversed course and began supporting the Zaghawa-dominated Darfur rebel Movement for Justice and Equality (De Waal, 2008).

Debi's victory in 1990 marked a turning point for the emergence of new trends in Zaghawa's politics that expected him to be grateful. Some Zaghawa Sudanese actually became Chadian army officers. However, when Deby was ordered by Paris to reduce the armed forces, it was primarily the Arab-speaking Zaghawa who were expelled, many of whom returned to Darfur, where they were able to make full use of their military skills. The situation there took a turn for the worse in the 1990s due to increased competition for land between different tribes.

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After defeating Habre, Debi faced armed opposition from all sides: both among long-time enemies linked to the former regime and among Zaghawa allies, the power struggle created tension that sometimes turned into open confrontation. This resulted, for example, in clashes with the Hajarai militia in 1991 and in the Zaghawa riots in N'Djamena in April 1992, despite the promises of Khartoum and Tripoli to resolve the situation. Although there were serious divisions within the Debi camp itself, its main problems were related to the rise of the National Rescue Committee for Peace and Democracy (NCSMD)rebel movements in southern Chad and the Armed Forces for the Federal Republic (AFFR), which operated in the area of the Logan oil fields with the support of the then President of the Central African Republic, Ange-Felix Patasse (Burr and Collins, 2006, p. 256).

The nature of the Chadian regime and the impunity of Zaghawa militias, the Republican Guard, elite corps and ordinary soldiers created conditions for increased crime: looting, murder, and land and livestock grabbing in different parts of the country. The regime was faced with the need to destroy the armed opposition and establish control over politics in the center. The situation was compounded by the President's fragile health and inability to expand his support beyond his immediate circle.

Members of many tribes, mostly Arab, have fled Chad across the border and joined those who had previously settled in Darfur, thus creating the conditions for destabilizing the situation in the entire region. The National Resistance Army (NAS), which opposes the Chadian Government and was formed in 1994 by Mahamat Garfa, the former chief of Staff of Debi, was based mainly on the Tama tribe and operated along Chad's borders with the CAR and Sudan. In mid-2004, the NAS fighters based in Darfur were reorganized with the support of the Sudanese security service, which intended to use them to reach the Darfur rebel groups of SOD/A and JEM [ibid., p. 260].

In the mid-2000s, the political situation in Chad sharply worsened. All power structures of the country were controlled by a narrow group of the president's tribesmen (Zaghawa), most of the high-ranking officials and military leaders belonged to the Debi-bideyat clan. The largest industrial, transport and service enterprises were under the control of Zaghava. Impunity for representatives of the country's top leadership has become the rule, and punishment is the exception. During this period, the army's chief of staff was Mahamat Saleh Kaya, Deby's cousin; Abakar Yusuf Mahamat Itno (Deby's nephew) commanded the Republican Guard; Mahamat Saleh Ibrahim (another nephew of the President) was in charge of the Nomad Guard; Abbas Mahamat Tolly (another nephew of Deby) was finance minister, and finally, Deby's half-brother - Daussa Deby, former Ambassador to Libya, is the President's security and intelligence adviser. However, this list did not indicate a high level of solidarity of representatives of one tribe. Of course, there are many similarities between the Zaghawa clans, but disagreements constantly arise as a result of competition for access to state resources and privileges [ibid., p. 261-265].

Despite the internal instability, Debi successfully played regional and international cards. So, in November 1990. He received the support of France, which was concerned about his rapprochement with the United States, which set up training camps for Libyan opposition figures in Chad. In two other areas, Debi has succeeded in gaining outside support. The first is the formation of an" oil economy " and the delegation of the right to control the distribution of oil revenues to international observers. The second is participation in the fight against terrorism and radical Islamist groups in the Sahara.

Debi carefully controlled his relationship with Livia. Gaddafi had fallen on hard times in the 1990s and therefore relaxed his policy of destabilizing Chad,

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Realizing that confronting N'Djamena will provide his Western opponents with more opportunities to criticize his regime.

Deby eased tensions with the Central African Republic, from which rebel groups were operating against his regime, by signing a peace agreement in 1998. Finding that this was not enough, in 2003 the Chadian leader provided military assistance to the CAR opposition forces, which, under the leadership of Gen. The coup d'etat and the overthrow of A.-F. Patasse [ibid., p. 268].

CHAD-SUDAN

As far as relations between Chad and the Sudan are concerned, they have had a complicated history. Thus, N'Djamena's contacts with Khartoum in the 1990s were peaceful. There were, however, a number of factors influencing Sudan's policy towards the Chadian regime. Their relative importance has been constantly changing and has largely depended on the situation in Darfur at different stages of development and conflict resolution.

First of all, this is a solution to the problem of security on the border between the two countries and the specifics of the policy of Sudanese Islamists aimed at strengthening their influence in North and West Africa by expanding business contacts with the states of these regions. In turn, Debi had reasons to maintain friendly contacts with the Sudanese regime, since Darfur has traditionally remained a safe haven for Chadian anti-government forces, and control of this region would help maintain relative stability in Chad [Marchal, 2006, p. 108-109].

Chronologically speaking, shortly after Deby came to power, Khartoum had to deal with an insurgency that resulted from the entry into Darfur of the South Sudanese Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SNM/A) led by Daoud Bolad. Although the offensive was suppressed, it demonstrated the need to take measures to prevent the expansion of the war beyond South Sudan.2 Establishing contacts with Deby would provide guarantees that Chad will not support the Darfur and South Sudanese rebels. At the same time, Debi would make sure that SNOD/A did not carry out military supplies to any movements through the territory of Chad.

In turn, the Sudan has supported the Chadian Governments by arresting rebels who have taken refuge in Darfur (mainly in 1992, 1994, 1998 and 2003).

Debi benefited from an alliance with the Sudanese Government, not only strengthening the regime's security, but also engaging in lucrative economic projects, primarily related to oil production and the construction of the Chadian-Cameroonian pipeline. Thus, in November 1999, after the French Elf-Akiten left the oil consortium that produced oil in Chad, its place was taken by the Malaysian company Petronas, which by that time had become the main oil producing company in Sudan and a successful designer of a pipeline stretching from the southern regions of the country (the current territory of the Republic of South Sudan) To Port Sudan. As a result, Exxon, Chevron, and Petronas members of the Chadian consortium received 40, 25, and 35% shares, respectively (Kostelianets, 2009).

For Khartoum, the existence of a friendly regime in Chad meant the possibility of undermining the US policy of sanctions against Sudan. While other neighbors - Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Egypt (each for their own reasons) - have at various times supported the US policy of sanctions against the regime of Omar al-Bashir (President of Sudan since 1989), Chad has never done so. Besides,

2 The Republic of South Sudan seceded from Sudan in July 2011.

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The alliance with Debi meant easier movement of goods and migrant workers across the country.

The Darfur crisis has destroyed the established pattern of relations between the countries of the region. Given the close contacts that existed between Chad and the Sudan in various spheres, when the Darfur conflict became irreversible at the beginning of this century, Khartoum began to consider N'Djamena as one of the forces that could be used to resolve it. According to the Sudanese authorities, Deby should have established control, if not over all the Zaghawa in the region, many of whom fought in the ranks of the Darfur rebels, then at least over his own clan. At the same time, Khartoum was outraged that Debi could not "restore order in his own house." The longer the Darfur conflict went on, the less trust Deby had with al-Bashir, and the more disagreements they had.

Debi was not indifferent to the ongoing conflict in Darfur and participated in its resolution, but he did not do it for the sake of his Sudanese friends. He also had his own reasons for opposing the leader of the Darfur rebel Movement for Justice and Equality (JEM) Khalil Ibrahim, whom he tried to arrest back in 2002, when he was on friendly terms with al-Bashir. As head of state, Deby believed that he was simultaneously at the top of the socio-political hierarchy in the state and in the Zaghawa ethnic group; Khalil did not recognize this for various reasons. First of all, whatever may be said (and certainly not without reason) about the marginalization of Darfurians, the Sudanese Zaghawa have always had greater opportunities for education or entrepreneurship than the Chadian Zaghawa. Furthermore, the Kode (Khalil Ibrahim clan) were historically a Chadian royal clan that once dominated the Zaghawa, so the JEM leader looked down on the Bideyat Debis, who were mostly poor until Debi took over. In addition, Debi tried to legitimize his power not only by forming a political system within which he became the legitimate president, but also by restructuring the traditional Zaghawa social hierarchy and creating the Bideyat Sultanate, which he put his half-brother Timan Debi at the head. This decision was welcomed by some Zaghawa clans, but not supported by many [Burr and Collins, 2006, p. 275].

Debi tried to split or destroy JEM Khalil. The creation of the small Darfur-Chadian opposition National Movement for Reform and Democracy (NDRD) in the fall of 2004 was a pleasant surprise for both Deby and Omar al-Bashir, as the Zaghawa of the Kabka clan joined the NDRD from JEM, and Khalil's organization split. Key NDRD figures were supported by Debi as the" right " representatives of JEM. First of all, they were Nuren Minawi Bertchem, formerly a member of the Patriotic Movement led by Debi and author of the biography of the president published in Arabic, and Colonel Djibril Abdelkarim "Tek", who previously fought in Darfur on the side of various factions, and then served in the Chadian Presidential Guard.

Since the beginning of the Darfur crisis in 2003, the Sudanese security forces have been convinced that the Chadian President is playing a double game. Their doubts about its credibility as an ally deepened when they noticed how close the Darfur rebel delegations were to the Chadian representatives during the Abeche and N'Djamena peace talks. Suspecting that Deby had not stopped supporting the Darfur rebels, or at least some groups of them, during the entire period of "friendly relations" between the two countries, Khartoum responded by supporting his opponents.

In mid-2005, Chadian opposition groups used by the Sudanese Government to fight the Darfur rebels were granted permission to set up their own camps on the territory of Darfur and began to receive their own permits.

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weapons from the al-Bashir administration. In December 2005 they carried out a poorly planned raid on Chadian territory, which failed thanks to French intelligence. But by the end of December, a new group was formed with the support of the Sudanese Government - the United Front for Democratic Change (OFDP), which became an umbrella organization for the Chadian armed opposition in Darfur.

Debi's response was to try to unite all the Zaghawa in the Darfur rebel movement to defend their own regime. In January 2006, an agreement was signed in N'Djamena to establish an Alliance of the Revolutionary Forces of Western Sudan with the participation of JEM, SLM/A and other groups, which by that time numbered dozens in Darfur. Khalil Ibrahim was declared the leader of the new association, and his Kobe clan became even more influential [War in Darfur.., 2007, p. 193].

In April 2006, Darfurian rebels fought hand-in-hand with Debi troops against Chadian political refugees in Darfur, with Khalil Ibrahim and some other JEM leaders having ambitions of Chadian significance and potentially holding high positions in the Chadian Government (or, on the contrary, removing Debi from power).

In the mid-2000s, there were strong divisions within the Sudanese establishment about the political situation in Chad. The army and the president's entourage, after years of friendly relations with the Deby regime, have become its main opponents, while some leaders of the ruling National Congress Party and members of the Government have called for the restoration of good relations with its neighbor in order to close the Darfur insurgency in the enemy ring.

In 2006-2009, relations between Khartoum and N'Djamena remained mostly unfriendly, with periodic rapprochements and divergences. In December 2008, al-Bashir ignored a promise made to him by Deby to lead Chadian rebels deeper into Sudanese territory. In 2009, immediately after the signing of the "goodwill treaty" between Khartoum and N'Djamena, fighting broke out between the two sides (at the initiative of Sudan), partly reflecting the sharp contradictions in the government of al-Bashir. To a large extent, this was due to the complex personal relationships between the heads of the regimes. However, on February 9, 2010, Debi paid a visit to Sudan to meet with al-Bashir. During the meeting, a decision was made to prevent the supply of weapons to the rebels across the border between the two countries. Debi called on the Darfurian rebels, especially JEM leaders, to lay down their weapons and start a peaceful dialogue with Khartoum (Shishkin, 2010).

Meanwhile, the unexpected "allies" were in unequal conditions. If al-Bashir controlled the Chadian opposition in Darfur through the national security services and was free to choose methods and means to fight the rebels, then Debi had less room for maneuver, both because of the common tribal affiliation with the JEM leaders, and because of the possession of weaker armed forces than the rebels. by their own forces [ibid.]. Throughout the Darfur crisis, the possibility of his regime being overthrown by an offensive from neighbouring territory remained.

* * *

Instability in the Chad - CAR - Darfur triangle has acquired a regional character primarily due to the presence of numerous groups of people living in the territories of these countries, linked by a common history, traditions and interests. Furthermore, given the fragmentation of armed opposition and militia groups, cross-border incursions, and the presence of more than a third of the population of Darfur in camps, including in Chad and the Central African Republic, there is a constant possibility of violence spreading across borders.

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