The article, based on a series of models and calculations, shows that the Arab-Muslim world, which was among the world leaders in terms of economic and cultural development a thousand years ago, now, despite the presence of solid natural and human resources, generally demonstrates low rates and levels of macroeconomic efficiency, growth efficiency, and international competitiveness, but relatively high rates of political instability. Most of the Arab countries, unlike China, India, new industrial countries, and a number of non-Arab states in the Muslim world, including Turkey, Malaysia, and Indonesia, have not been able to truly embark on the path of modern economic growth and do not fit well into the promising growth models of the XXI century. This is mainly due to their lagging behind in the development of human capital, as well as to the fact that conservative regimes are hindering the implementation of urgent institutional and economic reforms that can dramatically increase the level of management and diversify production and export structures.

Keywords: Arab countries, unstable development, human capital, growth efficiency, international competitiveness, institutions, reforms.

A very significant (more than a third) decline in the level of political stability that has occurred since the beginning of the XXI century in the Greater Middle East region as a whole (BBB, on average for Arab countries (AU) by about a quarter), as a result of which the "bar" of this stability turned out to be, as in the Arab-Muslim world as a whole (AMM), approximately three times (!) lower than the average for the rest of the global community (see graph. 1), is the result of many external and internal causes. Among the latter, we should highlight the crisis of the model of limited, uneven modernization, which was carried out in the region against the background of record-breaking demographic expansion, which turned into an open form in the context of the global financial and economic crisis (see: [Melyantsev, 2011(2); Melyantsev, 2013; System Monitoring, 2012; World Economic Forum,2012). The Arab World Competitiveness Report, 2011-2012; 2013; UNDP, 2009; 2011]).

The following figures indicate the relatively low level of efficiency and international competitiveness of the economies of most countries of the Greater Middle East and, more broadly, the Arab-Muslim world. The Arab-Muslim world, which is home to a significant and rapidly growing part of the world's population (in 1913 - 12-13%, in 1950-14-15%, and in 2012 - at least 20-21%), accounts for no more than 9-11% of world GDP and exports of goods and services, 4-5% of global exports of medium-sized goods and services.- and high-tech goods (excluding Malaysia, Indonesia and Turkey - 0.3-0.5%), 1.5% of global R & D expenditures and approximately 1% of all patent applications filed in the world (calculated from: [Melyantsev, 2003, p. 63; World Development Indicators, 2012, p. 332-334; 2013, p. 20-24, 82-86; UNDP, 2013, p. 160-165, 178-181, 186-189, 194-197; UNESCO, 2010, ch. 10, 12-16, 21]).

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Schedule 1

Level of political stability in the world, maximum = 100

Note. WG - developed countries, PC WHA-developing countries of East Asia, LA Latin America, SSA Sub-Saharan Africa, BBB-Greater Middle East, AMM Arab-Muslim world.

Calculated by: [Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2013].

In 2013-2014, India ranked 60th (out of 148) in the overall global competitiveness Index, China ranked 29th, South Korea ranked 25th, Taiwan ranked 12th, Hong Kong ranked 7th, and Singapore ranked 2nd. The competitiveness index for a number of Arabian oil exporters (Qatar - 13th, the United Arab Emirates-19th, Saudi Arabia - 20th, Oman-33rd, Kuwait - 36th) reaches quite decent values by world standards, but it is very low (and has decreased as a result of events related to "arab spring"), for example, but Yemen (145th), Egypt (118th) and Libya (108th), very low in Lebanon (103rd), Algeria (100th), Tunisia (83rd) and Morocco (77th place) [World Economic Forum. The Global Competitiveness Report, 2013, p. 16-17].

Let me remind you, however, that the countries of the Arab-Muslim world have not always lagged behind. By the IX-X centuries, the Arab-Islamic civilization had achieved considerable success in the development of the economy, trade and culture. Rich cities and extensive libraries were built (in Baghdad, Damascus, Cairo, and Cordoba). The universities of Al-Zitoun (Tunis, 737), Al-Karaouin (Morocco, Fez, 859), and Al-Azhar (Cairo, 972) were founded centuries earlier than the oldest European university in Bologna (1088) [Vidyasova, 1987; Landa, 2005; Naumkin, 2013 Filshtinsky, 2008; Islam, 2008; Issawi, 1989].

In the XI century. Egypt, which was about a quarter behind China in terms of per capita GDP, was more than one and a half times the size of Western Europe at that time. According to the Human Development Index (HDI), Egypt was one-third behind China and almost twice ahead of Western Europe. Grain yields in the Middle East and North Africa region, although about a third lower than in Chinese China, were 4-5 times higher than the average in Western Europe. The average level of urbanisation in the Middle East and North Africa was one and a half times higher than in Western Europe (excluding Spain). In 900, five of the world's ten largest cities were Muslim (by 1100, only three were). While the Middle East and North Africa as a whole were about twice as literate as China, they were 4-5 times ahead of Western Europe (1-3%). By 1000, the share of Muslims in the world (14-15%) was already two-fifths greater than that of Christians (10-11%) (compiled and calculated by: [Bairoch, p. 927; Maddison, p. 59, 192, 376; Melyantsev, 1996, pp. 56-57, 59, 61]).

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Schedule 2

Dynamics of the gap in the per capita GDP levels of the Arab world and Western countries, share, in PPP 2008

Calculated from: [World Development Indicators, 2012, p. 42-44, 214-216; Maddison, 2007, p. 59, 176, 192; Msliantsvb, 1996, p. 61, 145].

Later developments (almost three-fold by 1800, and four-fold by 1913-1950) Arab countries lag behind Western countries in terms of per capita income (see graph. 2) and HDI was caused, on the one hand, by the economic recovery of Western countries, which in the 2nd millennium formed institutions that contributed to the rapid growth of physical, human capital and labor productivity, and, on the other, by a significant slowdown in development in the Middle East and North Africa. The latter is largely caused by increased economic and socio-political instability associated with the intensification of destructive external invasions, a low level of protection of life and property (see: Maddison, 2007, p. 4). 175, 177, 229, 376, 378; Pamuk, 2006, p. 815; Melyantsev, 1996, p. 56, 61, 145]).

Speaking about the average indicators for Arab countries, it should be noted that these countries today have a high differentiation in the levels of GNP per capita. The gap in per capita income between the richest and poorest countries in the Arab world (Qatar/Somalia), which was 62: 1 in 1960 and 112: 1 in 1980, reached a 242-fold value by 2010, which is ten times higher than the level of cross-country income differentiation in the EU and OECD (calculated from: [World Development Indicators, 2010; Melyantsev, 2011(1), p. 12-13]).

The Arab countries are differentiated 1 by some characteristics less, by others-much stronger. For example, the coefficient of variation calculated by the indicator

1 One of the first works in Russian literature that thoroughly analyzed this problem was S. L. Stoklitsky, L. A. Fridman, and P. F. Andrukovich's book "Economic Structures of Arab Countries. Economic and statistical analysis". Many Russian Arabists, such as I. O. Abramova, L. S. Bocharova, A.M. Vasiliev, M. F. Vidyasova, V. I. Gusarov, I. P. Ivanova, V. A. Isaev, A.V. Korotasv, V. V. Naumkin, A. A. Tkachsnko, A. O. Filonik, L. L. Fituni, and A. I. Shishkin, have addressed this topic in their research. Yakovlev et al.

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Schedule 3

Changes in the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP in the main segments of the world economy, %

Note. RG - developed countries, AMM-Arab-Muslim world, LL-Latin America, NIS-new industrial countries, CEECA-Central, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, AU-Arab countries, SSA-Sub-Saharan Africa.

Calculated by no: [Maddison, 2007, p. 175-177, 229, 376-379; World Development Indicators, 2012, p. 42-44, 214-216; Msliantssv, 2003, p. 63, 68].

per capita GDP for 2010 was 166%, which was an order of magnitude - 11 times - more than the same coefficient calculated using the Morris Index 2. But in general, it seems that the Arab world can be studied as a single, albeit very heterogeneous, object.

Calculations show that many decades after gaining political independence, the majority of Arab countries, unlike China, India, new industrial countries, and a number of non-Arab states of the Muslim world, including Turkey, Malaysia, and Indonesia, have not been able to truly embark on the path of modern economic growth and do not fit well into promising models growth of the XXI century In the 1980s and 2010s, the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP in the AU as a whole, which declined five to six times in comparison with 1950-1980, turned out to be four to five times less than the average for developing countries (PC) (see graph 3).

In the first decades after independence of the AU, when many of them were nationalized in the most important sectors of the economy, agrarian reforms, an active industrialization policy, increased spending on the formation of physical and human capital, and there was a significant increase (in the 1970s) in prices for hydrocarbon raw materials [Al-Hamad, 2003, p. 7], there was a threefold increase in the average annual growth rate of their per capita GDP - from 1.2% in 1913-1950 to 3.6% in 1950-1980. (on average for AMM - from 0.4% to 2.8%) (see Graph 3). The achieved indicator in the whole of the NA AS turned out to be higher than the average for PC (2.7%) and RG (3.3%) (calculated from sources to Graph 3; see for more details: [Pamuk, 2006, p. 825]).

However, paradoxically, in the next thirty years, despite the development of globalization processes and the information technology revolution in the world (see [Melyantsev, 2000]), which did not bypass most AU countries, the average annual growth rate of their per capita GDP decreased by about six times - to 0.5-0.7%. This indicator, which was lower only in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA, 0.2-0.3%), averaged 0.8-0.9% in Latin America (LA) and 1.6 - 1.7% in developed countries (WG). The economies of the countries and regions where more or less significant changes were made were growing quite well, and in some cases at an accelerated rate.

2. The simplest indicator (geometric mean of the national average of relative indicators of the average life expectancy from birth and adult literacy), which roughly reflects the achieved level of socio-cultural development of the country.

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balanced liberal economic reforms, including many Asian new industrial countries (NIS). The average annual GDP growth rate per capita in 1980-2010 was 2.2 - 2.3% in the AMM (excluding the AU), 4.4% in India, and 5.7 - 5.9% in the East Asian Countries (WHA) (calculated from the sources in Graph 3).

The differentiation of the AU is very large not only in terms of the achieved levels of development, but also in terms of the growth rate of per capita GDP. According to my calculations, in 1980-2010, the coefficient of variation for 22 countries was 1,100% (!). The average annual rates themselves ranged from 2.4-2.6% in Tunisia and Egypt, where a number of limited but generally pragmatic structural economic reforms were carried out, to -6.5% in Iraq (calculated from 3). Without taking Iraq into account, the coefficient of variation under consideration is three times less, but still very large - 329%. The slowdown in the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP, which was higher in the AU as a whole than in the world average (from 2.4-2.6% per year in 1950-1980 to 1.4-1.6% in 1980-2010), is due to a number of reasons, both internal to the Arab world and external, including: with the strengthening of monetary and financial instability in the world economy, a sharp increase in the financialization of the global economy, its dependence on the gigantically increased flows of speculative money (Melyantsev, 2009).

Note, however, that over the past three decades, the indicator of instability in the AU as a whole has tended to decrease - from 460-470% in the 1980s to 150-160% in the 1990s and 40-50% in the 2000s. Simultaneously with the reduction of the average population growth rate in the AU (from 3.2-3.3% to 2.4-2.5 and 1.8-1.9%, respectively) and the acceleration of GDP growth rates (from 1.4-1.5% to 3.2-3.4 and 4.6-4.8%), the average growth rate of per capita GDP in them increased (from -1.6-1.8% to 0.8-0.9 and 2.7-2.8%).

Of course, structural and stabilization programs implemented in some of them have played a certain role in improving the economic dynamics in the AU. But an equally important factor is the return of a more favorable price environment for oil exporters, which, through the mechanism of money transfers and other transfers (aid), has also had a positive impact on the development of a number of poorer countries.

If in the 1980s and 1990s, the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP adjusted for changes in the barter index of terms of foreign trade (- 1.6-1.8%) was four times less than the "traditional" growth rate of per capita GDP (-0.3 -0.5%), then in the 2000s as a whole,it is, On the contrary, it was about one and a half times higher (4.6%:2.8%) than in the 1970s(7%:4.6%).3. Thus, economic progress in the AU is still critically dependent on the price environment in the world for their most important resource — hydrocarbon raw materials.

High population growth rates (2.5% per year in 1980-2010), which, although slightly lower than in the SSA (2.7%), are almost one and a half times higher than the average for the PC (1.7%), remain a very important factor hindering the economic growth of the AU. Population growth, among other factors, is very significantly determined by the level of fertility, which, although declining in the AU, but, due to continuing traditions, on average over the past two decades was still about 4, exceeding its values for VAZ and LA by more than one and a half times [World Development Indicators, 2010, p. 132-134]. Within the Arab world, there is also a strong differentiation in this indicator - in 2000-2008, from 6-7% per year in Qatar (due to the large scale of immigration) to about 1% in Tunisia, where the fertility rate is three times lower than, for example, in Somalia (2.1 and 6.4 children per woman, respectively).

3 Calculated using the following formula: g = e. 0. 5(b1 + b2) + c, where g is the GDP growth rate adjusted for changes in the terms of trade, e is the average annual growth rate of the barter index of terms of foreign trade, b1 and b2 are the share of exports of goods and services in GDP calculated by according to purchasing power parities (PPP) of currencies, respectively, at the beginning and end of the period; c - average annual GDP growth rate. (Calculations were made according to: [Melyantsev, 2011(1), p. 11; World Development Indicators, 2010, p. 358-360; UNCTAD, 2010, p. 242-246], sources to graph 3).

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Schedule 4

Dependence of population growth rates on average per capita income

Note. UAZ South Asia, PC VAZ-developing countries of East Asia, see note for other abbreviations. go to graphs 1 and 3.

Calculated from: [UNDP, 2010, p. 146, 187].

[World Development Report, 2010, p. 379; World Development Indicators, 2010, p. 132-134; UNDP. Arab Human Development Report, 2009, p. 33-34].

Overtaking other PCs in general in terms of population growth rates by about one and a half times (see graph. 4), the AU significantly lagged behind the countries of East and South Asia (VAZ, South Asia) in terms of production growth rates in the agricultural sector, manufacturing industry and services, many times exceeding them in terms of the coefficient of instability of GDP growth, largely due to the instability of their barter terms of foreign trade and the political situation [Melyantsev, 2011(1); UNDP, 2013, p. 197].

Arab countries are characterized by a very weak diversification of the economy and export structure (see box 5). Although the share of AMM in the world population in 2009-2010 (21%) was already 3/4 more than that of Western countries (12%), the share of AMM in global GDP (9.7%) and exports (9.9It is many times less than that of Western countries (44 and 52%)4, which indicates the relatively low international competitiveness of the economic systems of many Islamic countries, their weak and generally (according to a number of important indicators) declining involvement in world economic relations during the intensification of globalization processes.

Despite progress in improving the export structure in Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Bahrain, the share of manufacturing products in exports in the Arab world as a whole increased very slightly - from 2-3% in 1960 to 6-8% in 1980 and 10-11% in 2008 (in the WG - respectively from 66% in 1960 to 73% in 1980 and 80% in 2008, in the PC from 13-15% to 42-44 and 59-60%). The share of high-tech products in the value of exported finished products in 2008-2012 in the whole AU (1.8-2.2% 5) was an order of magnitude lower than the average for the Russian Federation.

4 In 2009-2010, the share of AU in the world population, GDP, and exports of goods and services was 5.2%, 3.7%, and 5.8%, respectively, while in the United States it was 4.6%, 20.4%, and 10% (calculated from [IMF, 2010, p.170]).

5 According to available data, in 2008-2012 this indicator was 3% in the UAE, 5-6% in Tunisia and Morocco [World Development Indicators, 2010, p. 340-342; High-technology exports (%of manufactured exports) [http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/rcports/tablevicw.aspx].

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Schedule 5

Arab-Muslim World: the relationship between export structure and per Capita GDP growth dynamics, 1990-2010

Source: [Msliantssv, 2011(1), p. 42].

PC (21-22%). In 2008, on average, the share of finished products in commodity exports in non - Arab countries of the Muslim world (44-45%, without Iran and Nigeria-58-60%) was 4-6 times higher than in the AU, and the share of high-tech products in the value of exported finished products (16-17%) was 8 times higher than in the EU. in the whole Arab world. [Melyantsev, 2009, p. 110; calculated from: World Development Indicators, 1998, p. 188-190; 2010, p. 238-240, 340-342; World Development Report, 1983, p. 186-187; UNCTAD, 2002, p. 137-140; UNDP. Human Development Report, 2003, p. 287-289].

Despite the fact that a number of Arab countries are capital - surplus oil exporters, the level of accumulation of physical and especially human capital is insufficient (1.5-2 times lower than in the VAZ and UAZ countries) (see graph 6). In the second half of the 2000s, the total expenditure of all Arab countries on higher education is typical Education, R & D, and information technology averaged just over 4% of their GDP, compared with 15% in the United States, 13% in South Korea, and 8% in China.

Although the share of total private and public expenditures on the development of health, education and science in the AU GDP increased by about one and a half times in comparison with the 1960s and 1970s, it hardly exceeded 11-12% in the second half of the 2000s: expenditures on health care - 4.8-5.0%, on education, including vocational training - 6.5-6.9%, R & D-0.2-0.3% (!) of their GDP. Although in some countries the total expenditure on human development and science was higher (in Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria and Saudi Arabia - 13-15% of GDP), in the Arab world as a whole, in the second half of the 2000s, it was about a quarter lower than in Latin American countries (14-15% of their GDP). It is one and a half times lower than in the Asian NIS (18-19%) and twice lower than in the WG (22-23%) [World Development Indicators, 2007, p. 74-76; 2008, p. 76-78; 2009, p. 98-100; 2010, p. 102-104, 120-122; UNDP. Human Development Report, 2010, p. 202-205; UNESCO, 2010, p. 259, 271]. If we take into account that in the mid-2000s, the share of R & D expenditures in GDP was 0.4—0.5% in a group of seven non - Arab Muslim countries, 0.3—0.4% in AMM as a whole, 0.6 - 0.7% in LA, 0.8% in South Asia, 1.1-1.2% in Russia, 1.7% in VAZ in the USA - 2.7%, in Japan, South Korea, Finland and Sweden-3.5 - 3.7%, and in Israel-4.7% of GDP, it can be concluded that the rulers, elite and society as a whole in the AU and AMM are not seriously preparing for the post-industrial and other challenges of the XXI century.

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Schedule 6

Share of spending on higher education, R & D and information technology in GDP, second half of the 2000s, %

Calculated by: [World Development Indicators. 2008, p. 308-310; 2012, p. 82-84, 332-334; UNDP, 2013, p. 162-165, 186-189; UNESCO, 20101.

At the same time, the most important changes in the development of the human factor (capital) have undoubtedly taken place in the AMM and the AU. Improvements in nutrition, sanitation, and medical services have led to a reduction in infant mortality: on average in the AU from 153-157 ppm in 1960 to 90-94 ppm in 1980, and 34-38 ppm (in the AMM to 45-49 ppm) in 2008-2010. The results achieved varied greatly by country (115 in Somalia and 9-10 in Kuwait and Qatar), but generally corresponded to the indicators of Western countries and Japan half a century ago. The average life expectancy in the Arab world increased significantly, although not at a record pace: on average, from 44-46 years in 1960 to 56-58 years in 1980 and 67-69 years in 2008-2010. (calculated from: (World Development Indicators, 2003, p. 112-114; 2010, p. 144-146; UNDP. Human Development Report, 2003, p. 238-240, 262-265; The World Factbook, 2011; Мельянцев, 1996, с. 183]).

Considerable progress has been made in AMM and in the field of education. For example, the gross enrolment rate of young people in secondary education increased in the AU from 10-11% in 1960 to 35-37% in 1980 and 68-70% in 2008.In the group of non - Arab Muslim countries, it increased, but not so significantly-from 8-9% to 24-25% and 55-57%. However, by 2008, the average indicator for AMM (58-60%) was slightly lower than for the PC group as a whole, and was at the level of Western countries and Japan in the first half of the 1960s. Starting from an extremely low start, the indicators of youth enrollment in higher education in recent decades (in 1960 - 1-2%, in 1980 - 9-10%, in 2008 - 20%) have generally exceeded the PC mark (2-3%, 8% and 18%, respectively). In the group of other Muslim countries, the results were more modest (1%, 3-4% and 16%). The figures for 2008 in Egypt and Tunisia (29-32%), Jordan (38%) and Lebanon (52%) are much better, but they do not compare with the achievements of Taiwan and South Korea (94-96%), which managed to dramatically increase their international competitiveness largely on the basis of improving the educational level of human potential. According to the indicator under consideration, the AU as a whole reached the Western European and Japanese positions of the late 1960s and reached the level of the United States sixty years ago (calculated from: [UNDP. Human Development Report, 1994, p. 136-137, 207; 2003, p. 237-240, 339; World Development Report, 1983, p. 196-197; World Development Indicators, 2009, p. 84-86; 2010, p. 106-108; UNCTAD, 2002, p. 356-362; UNESCO, 2010, p. 259, 272]).

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The AMM education system is characterized by a number of shortcomings that significantly reduce its effectiveness. In the AU in the early 2000s, no more than 2/3-4/5 of all primary school teachers were considered trained. Outside the private sector, the quality of education is generally mediocre [The Economist, July 23, 2009]. In the last two decades, on average, not much more than 1/3 of all students studied at the natural sciences and medical faculties of universities (40-45% in Asian NIS) [World Development Indicators, 2003, p. 76-78; UNDP. Arab Human Development Report, 2002, p. 155; UNESCO, 2010, p. 273; The Financial Times Times, November 8, 2010].

As a result, the training of young people is not fully adequate to the needs of society [World Economic Forum. The Arab World Competitiveness Report, 2010, p. 14, 25]. According to the higher Education Competitiveness Index, only Tunisia (ranked 30th out of 139 countries in 2010-2011), Qatar (32nd), and the United Arab Emirates (36th) have more or less decent positions among AU countries. The rest of us have a much worse situation. For example, Egypt (97th place), Algeria (98th), Morocco (102nd) and Syria (107th) were ranked in the bottom third of the world ranking [World Economic Forum. The Global Competitiveness Report, 2010-2011, p. 20-21].

At the same time, the average adult literacy rate in the AU has increased many times - from 16-17% in 1960 to 39-41% in 1980 and 72-74% in 2007-2009 (in general, for the group of non - Arab Muslim states-from 25-27%, 42-44% and 71-73%, respectively). However, its values were lower than the PC average (in 1900-13-15%, in 1950 - 27-29%, in 1960 - 37-39%, in 1980-55-57%, and in 2007-2009-78-80%). (calculated from: [UNDP. Human Development Report, 1994, p. 27, 136-137; 2003, p. 270-274, 339; World Development Indicators, 2010, p. 114-116; The World Factbook, 2011; Stoklitsky, Fridman, Andrukovich, 1985, p. 154; Melyantsev, 1996, p. 199].

For AMM, the problem of gender inequality in general and the gap in education levels in particular is particularly acute. Despite the fact that between 1970 and 2007-2009, the literacy rate of women in AU increased three to four times (from 16 to 58-60%), two-fifths of all adult women could not read or write. The ratio of female to male literacy in the Arab world has almost doubled in recent years , from 36 to 66-68%. Although in the AU as a whole, this figure is no less than in India (68%), it is clearly not up to the average level for the SSA, as well as for the group of non-Arab Muslim countries (77-80%), China (93-95%), LA and Asian NIS (97-99%). Of the 65 million illiterates in the AU adult population, 3/4 are women. According to the UNDP, in 2010, the Arab world as a whole (70-71%) was ahead of UAZ (55-56%) and AYUS (62-63%) in terms of the ratio of female and male population over 24 years of age with at least secondary education, but lagged behind VAZ (78-79%), LA and RG (97-98%).

In the Arab world as a whole, the average number of years of adult education (reduced in years of primary education) increased, according to my calculations, from 1.6 in 1950 to 4.0 in 1980 and 7.3 in 2007. For all the considerable differences within the AU group, the average level achieved is higher than, for example, in the SSA (5.4 years), does not differ much from India (6.7 years), lags behind the PRC (8.4 years), LA (9.6 years), and lags far behind the Asian NIS and WG (16-17 years) [Melyantsev, 2009, p. 206].

In 1976, low-skilled and unskilled workers accounted for approximately 87% of the Arab world's amateur population, medium - skilled workers-8%, and high-skilled workers-5% [Amin, 1980, Table 14]. After a third of a century, according to my calculations and estimates, the share of the first group has decreased to about 2/3, still making up a huge majority. The share of employees with average qualifications has tripled to 1/4. The share of highly qualified employees has doubled to about 1/10 (Calculated from: [World Development Indicators, 2010, p. 06-112; UNDP. Human Development Report, 2010, p. 193-196]).

But will it be enough to cope with the challenges of the post-industrial era? In developed countries, highly qualified professionals make up at least

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less than half of the employees. But even this is considered insufficient. Knowledge and skills are becoming obsolete. The accumulated human capital, unfortunately, devalues quite quickly (we just try not to notice it). But now, really, as in the famous fairy tale of Lewis Carroll: to stand, you have to walk, to walk-you have to run. So the AU, if they want to stay at least "afloat", will have to carry out more than one series of reasonable, consistent reforms to activate their human potential.

The huge cross-country differentiation in the Arab world in terms of per capita GNP was mentioned above. In the affluent, sparsely populated areas of the Gulf, indigenous people tend to live comfortably (however, there is discrimination against women or, for example, Shiites in Bahrain). In the rest of the Arab world, where approximately 320 million of its 350 million inhabitants are concentrated, socio-economic and environmental problems are much more acute, dominated by police orders. According to a Gallup poll conducted in 2010, in 22 AU countries, 30% of people aged 15 to 29 (40% in Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen) they said they would emigrate permanently if the opportunity presented itself. Only 34% (in Morocco - 18%, in Egypt - 25%) of young Arabs believed that elections in their countries are conducted fairly [The Financial Times, 16.01.2011; Even the Oil-Rich Gulf Monarchies, 2011; Moisi, 2011; Cockburn, 2011].

As far as I know, there is not much reliable data on intra-stratification. The values of the Gini coefficient for AU income/expenditure reported in international statistics range from 0.32 to 0.42 [World Development Indicators, 2010, p. 94-96; Noland and Pack, 2007, p. 67]. But it seems that they are most likely embellishing the reality, probably underestimating the income of the richest and most influential. The Gini coefficient reported by the World Bank for Egypt in 2004-2005 was 0.32, which, all other things being equal, could indicate signs of harmony in society. I will, however, make one clarifying calculation. The United States, as is well known, has a relatively high level of income distribution inequality by RG standards, with a Gini coefficient of at least 0.40, according to the most conservative estimates [World Development Indicators, 2010, p. 94-96; Noland, Pack, 2007, p. 67]. At the same time, the total wealth of Bill Gates, who is considered one of the wealthiest people in the United States ($40-50 billion), is equivalent to only about 0.3% of the country's GDP ($14.6 trillion in 2010). The total holdings of former Egyptian President X Mubarak are unlikely to have reached $ 40-70 billion by the end of his rule, as various media outlets have often mentioned recently, but this (in which I agree with the well-known Russian Arabist V. A. Isaev) is most likely an exaggeration. If we take a more plausible, "modest" figure of about $ 3-7 billion (because it is unlikely that Mubarak was poorer than Ben Ali, the former Tunisian president), then it will be equivalent to about 1.4-3.2% of Egypt's GDP (estimated in 2010 at $ 217 billion at the official exchange rate).. Thus, the relative scale of Mubarak's wealth is perhaps 6-9 times greater than that of Gates. Despite the roughness of the calculation, it suggests that the official data on inequality in Egypt are most likely significantly underestimated (Melyantsev, 2011(1), p. 38).

The problem of the AU is not only that there is and feels a huge stratification in society. Unlike the United States and other countries, there are no so-called social elevators in the Arab world. The rulers sit for a long time, extracting rents and gaining a clientele.

Arab countries have lower indicators than developed countries, as well as Asian new industrial countries, India and China in terms of the level of institutional development, taking into account six indicators: political stability, the degree of compliance with the rule of law, the effectiveness of the state, the quality of regulation, control

6 According to one estimate, Ben Ali's net worth exceeded $ 5 billion. For the extent of corruption linked to the clan of Leila Trabslsi, the last wife of the former Tunisian ruler, see [Le Monde, 15.01.11].

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Schedule 7

Levels of institutional development, 2007 (US=100)

Notes. 1. SSA - Sub-Saharan Africa, AU-Arab countries, LA-Latin America, AzNIS-Asian new industrial countries (weighted average for the Republic of Korea and Taiwan), WG-average for developed countries.

Calculated from: [Msliantssv, 2009, p. 213] as an average of the NSWRSSNOS for six indicators of D. Kaufman, A. Kray, M. Mastruzi (political stability, degree of compliance with the rule of law, state efficiency, quality of regulation, control over corruption, state accountability to society).

Schedule 8

Average annual growth rate of aggregate productivity, %

Notes. 1. Analyzed periods: for China-1952-1978 and 1978-2010; for India-1957-1980 and 1980-2010; for South Korea-1960-1980 and 1980-2010; for Taiwan-1952-1980 and 1980-2010; for Sub-Saharan Africa-1960-1980 and 1980-2010; for Latin America-1950-1980 and 1980-2010; for Arab countries 1960-1980 and 1980-2010 2. Calculated by the formula: r = y - /α· l +(1-α) · k|, where r, y, l, and k denote, respectively, the average annual growth rates of aggregate factor productivity, GDP, employment, and fixed capital; α and (1-α) are the average annual growth rates of aggregate factor productivity, GDP, employment, and fixed capital. indicators of the elasticity of changes in GDP by labor force and capital.

Calculated from: [Msliantssv, 2009, p. 208; IMF, 2013, p. 154, 158-159; UNDP, 2011, p. 141; World Development Indicators, 2012, p. 46-48, 214-216, 246-248].

control over corruption, state accountability to society, and the main one among them is the inefficiency of management systems and public institutions (see box 7).
All of the above groups of factors have led to generally slow growth in aggregate factor productivity in Arab countries (TFP, see graph. 8), the aggravation of social problems and contradictions, such as the huge scale of unemployment, especially among the young, educated part of the population, relatively high levels of poverty and inequality, high and growing inflation, etc.

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income differentiation, which led to large-scale social protests that have engulfed the Arab world in recent years [Melyantsev, 2011(2), pp. 80-83; UNDP, 2011; World Economic Forum, The Arab World Competitiveness Report, 2013].

Based on my model calculated for 23 countries of the Arab-Muslim world in the 1990s and 2000s, the less dynamic growth of per capita GDP was determined by almost two-fifths of the relatively higher population growth rate; by one-third-by a lower share of non-primary exports (in the export structure); and by one-fifth-by a lower level of quality institutions (approximated in the model by the rule of law index).

Y = 3.66 - 0.83*P + 0.02*M + 1.37*L

(p=0.02) (p=0.04) (p=0.09) (p=0.01),

R2 adjusted = 0.59, N = 23, Т = 1990-2010.

Y and P are the average annual growth rates of per capita GDP and population; M is the average share of finished goods and services in exports of goods and services over the period; L is the average value of the rule of law indicator over the period. All the main parameters are statistically significant (at the level of less than 10%). The adjusted determination index is quite high (see [Melyantsev, 2011(2), p. 75]).

According to another model, the Arab countries as a whole lagged behind the developing countries of East and South Asia in terms of average annual growth rates of per capita GDP in the 1980s and 2000s (by an average of more than 4 percentage points) by about a quarter due to lower (in Arab countries) export growth rates, and half due to significantly lower (In these countries, the rate of expanded accumulation in GDP is also increased by one-fifth, with a relatively deeper income differentiation in the Arab world, which increases overall instability (see [Melyantsev, 2011(2), p. 76]).

Y = 0.164*ЕХР + 0.150*NKH - 0.052*G1N - 0.873

(p=0.0074) (p=0.0002) (p=0.0049)

R2 adjusted = 0.809, N =43, L = 1980-2006

Y and EXP are, respectively, the average annual growth rates of per capita GDP and physical exports of goods and services, %; NKH is the extended rate of capital investment (the share of ordinary capital investment, education and R & D expenditures in GDP), %; GIN is the average Gini indicator for the period by income. All the main parameters are statistically significant (at the level of less than 1%), and the adjusted determination index is very high.

Among the factors that led to relatively low growth rates of aggregate factor productivity (TFP) in the Arab countries and the Greater Middle East as a whole, we can refer to the economic and political instability noted above in the region, excessive state intervention in the economy (the share of government spending in GDP in Arab countries is 34-38% - one and a half times higher than in in general, in other developing countries), the inhibition of the reform process by conservative and authoritarian regimes. 9/10 of the total number of Arab countries are located in the lowest third, and 3/5 - in the lowest quarter of the ranking of levels of development of democracy in the world. According to the ease of doing business rating and the index of economic freedom compiled for 2009-2011, most Arab countries as a whole were located in the bottom third of two very important global "report cards". In terms of the legal protection of borrowers and lenders, as well as the effectiveness of the state and the effectiveness of state regulation, Arab countries are on average two times behind other developing countries (see: [Melyantsev, 2011(1), pp. 19-32;

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Fraser Institute, 2010; Freedom House, 2012; Heritage Foundation, 2012; Doing Business, 2013; World Development Indicators, 2013]).

The average per capita income in Arab countries is about a quarter higher than in China (taking into account the data of the last round of international income comparison in 2013, respectively, 15 and 12 thousand dollars in PPP 2013). However, unlike one of the main globalizers of the modern world, the" breath " and presence of which is experienced by many countries (the effect of the mass of relatively cheap and capable labor, competitive goods, and growing foreign investment), in general, in Arab countries, according to my calculations, the labor intensity is 2.5 times lower, the indicators of specific R & D expenditures in GDP and IQ are 5-6 times and a quarter less, respectively, but the percentage of people with overweight weight, on the contrary, is five times more than in the PRC (calculated from: [Purchasing..., 2014, p. 34-35, 38; World Development Report, 2014, p. 296-297; World Economic Forum. The Human Capital Report, 2013, p. 54-537]). Much needs to be done to overcome the acute crisis in the Arab countries and a number of other States of the Greater Middle East and the Arab-Muslim world, and to increase the competitiveness of their economies. Reforms that strengthen efficient institutions, promote the diversification of their economic systems, activate the private sector, and improve the level of skills and employment of the population are extremely important (see [Saliychuk, 2012, pp. 164-171; Berglof, 2013; Middle East: Focus on the Future, 2013, p. 8-33]). However, all this is not so easy to implement in conditions of instability of the global economy, increasing expansion of competitors from other developing countries, increasing exports of finished products and a variety of services. To do this, there must be a synergy of the will of the masses of the population and their leaders and a two-way power vertical. The case, as they say, is small.

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