Archaization in modern Arab societies, which is intensified by conflicts, rebellions and revolutions that destroy or weaken existing institutions, lead to chaos and uncertainty, is a universal phenomenon. The revival of the archaic is more active in the traditional society that dominates in many Arab States. There, its influence on domestic politics and foreign policy is felt more clearly.

Keywords: archaization, multiplicity of modernity, religious factor, secularism, institutions, revolutions, transformations, conflicts, traditional society, identities, myths.

In political terms, archaization can be understood as the resurrection of traditional practices, images, and cultural elements of the past, which does not mean a return to "antiquity", but is manipulative in nature. Due to the partial displacement of more modern elements of culture and the revival of idealized ideas about social ties and relations of the past, embedded in modern life, it is possible to solve the most important tasks for society or the elite. Society is looking for ways to adapt to the chaos that inevitably accompanies profound social changes by reconstructing elements of the "golden age" or "greatness" era, no matter how far away it is historically. In this sense, archaization does not necessarily refer to antiquity, but it certainly acts as the antithesis of the reality that causes rejection, which has historical roots.

Archaization, perceived by modern consciousness as a carnival of images arbitrarily plucked from the past, as a tragedy that the postmodern world transforms into a horror film or a theater of the absurd, is in fact an effective means of mobilizing and consolidating society in conditions of uncertainty.

In the era of social catastrophes, the main forms of social culture lose their regulating and restraining functions. And then not only archaism comes to the fore, but also biological instincts that were previously restrained by existing laws and norms of behavior. During the" Arab Spring", the mood of the rebels changed dramatically, as soon as the crowd was joined by marginals on the cultural periphery, who compensated for their complexes, primarily the lack of public recognition, by causing deviant behavior and violence.

While archaization is not a direct result of clashes, conflicts, an unbalanced political system, or an economic crisis, it is reinforced by destabilizing factors. In this context, it acts not only as a kind of defensive reaction to the traditional nature of society, but also as an alternative to the too complex modern reality. At the same time, archaization can be a sign of a modern society that has not coped with the complicated reality. Simpler and more understandable responses to the challenges of our time, building a flat black-and-white picture of the world that does not require reflection, is an integral part of the archaization processes and their practical result.

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LOOKING FOR ANSWERS FROM THE PAST

An idealization of the past has always been common in Arab societies. The search for a foothold in historical epochs long gone was not original and was generated by a sense of national failure, a pullback to the periphery of the modern developed world, uncompetitiveness, and lag. Although the modern Arab world has produced outstanding political figures, scientists, and journalists, created new training programs as part of modernization, and opened itself up to the outside world, societies in general remain quite traditional and there is a real lag.

There are explanations for why the Arab countries in recent times have found themselves in political and socio-economic development behind not only European, but also many Asian states. Military defeats and, most importantly, the peculiarities of the political culture that preserves elements of the archaic, religious ethics, the predominance of communal (tribal) interests over the interests of the individual, the lack of economic structures compatible with the development of a free market economy, as well as fundamental institutions of property and freedom did not create alternatives to non-market forms of labor organization [Istoriya Vostoka, 1999, p. 651]. It is equally important that Islam gradually withdrew into itself with the end of the "golden age", its exponents refused to learn anything from the infidels, which led to cultural isolation. It is no coincidence that in 1485 the Ottoman Empire banned the printing press, which became a symbol of the Renaissance in Europe. It was only after Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in early 1799 that an Arabic printing house was opened in Cairo and a French-language newspaper was published (Petrunina, 2011).

Later, the painful process of colonial modernization reinforced the features of archaization, deepened the desire in traditional society to revive the old norms, institutions, and orders of the heyday and power. Archaization in the Middle East was also a response to "Arab transformations", inter-State contradictions, external interference and long-standing conflicts.

The Middle East has entered the second decade of the twenty-first century in a state of fragmentation and general instability. Interethnic, inter-confessional, and social differences that have always existed in the Arab world have suddenly and rapidly come to the fore, irreversibly disrupting the usual course of things. Thus, disillusionment with secular nationalist regimes that once met public expectations and solved the problem of strengthening the state in the post-colonial era, but then lost their ideological and political appeal, led to the emergence of political Islam, which also proved unable to offer recipes for social reconstruction. The spread of protest moods in the Arab states, the emergence of civil consciousness in the course of popular demonstrations, and the failure of attempts to establish Islamic rule - all this together reflects the problems common to world development, which may have manifested themselves in more acute and disorderly forms that correspond to the specifics of Arab society. In the absence of sufficiently developed civil institutions, the disappearance of ideological guidelines brought to the forefront representatives of political Islam, who proclaimed themselves a force capable of restoring order.

For the phenomenon of transformation in the Arab world, it is very difficult to find a precise definition. Were the processes that took place riots, turmoil generated by the discontent of certain social strata, demonstrations that turned into serious resistance to the authorities, or were they revolutions? What are the reasons for such powerful and synchronized unrest in countries that are completely different in terms of economic development, social sphere, and political culture (from Westernized Tunisia to traditional Yemen and Libya)? And finally, what happened to the local authorities, who for decades demonstrated the ability to fully control the situation when relying on law enforcement agencies?

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Of course, not all regimes collapsed painlessly. If the presidents of Tunisia and Egypt left quickly enough, then Muammar Gaddafi was destroyed with massive external intervention. The civil war continues in Syria. Yemen eventually found itself on the brink of disaster. In the rich oil-producing Arab countries, discontent was "flooded" with money, immediately knocking down the revolutionary intensity.

In the Arab states that survived the "spring", there was no change in the socio-political system (with the possible exception of Tunisia). According to X. According to Arendt, "only there can we speak of a revolution where change takes on the features of a new beginning, where violence is used to establish a completely different form of government, to create a new state, where the goal of liberation from oppression is at least the establishment of freedom" [Arendt, 2011, p.40].

In fact, there was not even a liberalization of public life. The most modern segments of the population were pushed back by traditionalists, who in Egypt managed to realize their aspirations by voting for the Muslim Brotherhood, and in Tunisia-for the Ennahda (Renaissance) party. Later, the political balance was restored in Tunisia, and the military returned to power in Egypt. In Libya, it was basically not a modern revolution, but a different type of confrontation - on a tribal and regional basis. At the same time, the acquisition of power automatically determines access to property that was previously concentrated in the hands of those who got this power at the previous stage of social "awakening", in the wake of the anti-colonial struggle that ended with the collapse of many monarchies (Egypt, Iraq, Libya).

The destruction or dramatic weakening of State institutions in the course of revolts and troubles leads to anarchy, a "revolutionary necessity" that replaces the courts and the law. Moreover, even poorly functioning courts, where justice cannot be found and which become one of the powerful social irritants, are still a product of the modern legal system. The forms of trials that come to replace them are a throwback to the archaic, a tribute to the dense consciousness. The collapse of the security forces, who did not want to protect the former regime, leads to rampant violence.

The collapse of state institutions not only opens up opportunities for abuse, but also forces the opposition to offer values that will make its actions understandable and acceptable in the eyes of traditional society, and give them an ideological justification. The search for ideological alternatives, as a rule, goes in line with a certain primordial folk tradition, which is closely related to the archaic. The need for" primordial " also arises because it can be contrasted with alien Western values. Since political values are still universal (although their interpretation may vary), they are opposed to something purely national and traditional. It can be found either in a conservative rural environment or in a fundamentalist interpretation of religious norms.

According to C. K. Lamajaa, " the main reason for the spread of archaization is the noticeable difference between the goals, forms, and ideals of the social revolution and the cultural ideals of society. A prerequisite for the development of the archaization process is the degree of" overcoming " of the archaism itself by society. If the archaism is largely preserved, then the social return to it in the context of the crisis of social transformation will be large-scale, which will significantly complicate the passage of transformation processes and modernization "[Lamazhaa, 2011, p. 39].

The processes that have reached the bifurcation point in the states that survived the Arab Spring have forced us to pay attention to the basic contradictions between Arab society and the state. The process of consolidation of culturally diverse societies has remained incomplete. Along with the modernized strata, which, due to their modern education, have gone beyond the boundaries of class and ethno-confessional partitions, there is an extensive group of traditionalists.

Modernization processes are implemented differently in different societies. The theory of" multiple modernities " provides answers to the question of why the results of modernizing societies in the East are so different from those in the West, even though they are not fully developed.-

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schnee can be similar. While postcolonial societies experienced the expected structural transformation of familiar institutions and the emergence of new ones, the emerging social and ideological models were modern in nature, but they also reflected the influence of the dominant culture. The emerging movements and parties often put forward anti-Western slogans, were aggressively nationalist or fundamentalist, but remained a product of modernity. As the Israeli sociologist Sh. Eisenstadt,

"the idea of multiple moderns suggests that the best way to understand the modern world, that is, to explain the history of modernity, is to consider it as the construction and reconstruction of a multiplicity of cultural programs. This ongoing reconstruction of a multiplicity of cultural models is carried out by specific social actors in close association with social, political and intellectual activists, as well as with social movements that have different modernization programs and very different views on what makes society modern. ...One of the most important consequences of the introduction of the term "multiple moderns" is that modernity and Westernization are not recognized as identical concepts and that Western models of modernity are not the only "authentic" ones, although they were historical predecessors and still remain the reference point for others " [Eisenstadt, 2000, p. 2-3].

The dominant political culture in Arab countries differs markedly from Western models. The external similarity of institutions does not mean their essential identity. For example, non-governmental organizations in the East may be so closely linked to the public sector that no one will be surprised by the phrase "government NGO". Political parties may not have national programs and may rely on regional, tribal, or ethnic groupings. Presidents who try to hold on to power for as long as possible, pass it on to an heir or successor, and treat the national economy as if it were a trophy, increasingly resemble autocrats. This may not apply equally to all Arab countries, but it is precisely in such an environment that the archaic is preserved, and at critical moments it is reproduced on a large scale.

Turning to mysticism, rejecting the rational, submitting to authority, and creating idols are rightly considered manifestations of archaic consciousness, but in modern conditions they are realized in special forms. In the usual interpretation for many Arabs, the reasons for their failures either lay in the lack of help from external forces, or were explained by a conspiracy theory. For example, we can recall the events of the "six-day war" in 1967, when the rapid and humiliating defeat of the armies of Egypt and Syria, equipped with Soviet weapons, caused a storm of indignation in these countries and accusations that the USSR did not intervene and defeat the Israeli armed forces.

Reproduction of the past and attempts to subordinate the present to it do not, as a rule, go beyond postmodern simulacra. The camel riders who dispersed the demonstrators in Tahrir Square (the local "anti-Maidan"); the jihadists in black posing for the camera and beheading their victims; the outraged Pakistani fanatics-all this evokes a sense of theater, a game. It is hard to believe that this is happening in real time and seriously, but it is the brutal "game of the game" that fascinates and attracts the undeveloped consciousness of the conventional modern viewer.

The sources of archaization and its impact on society and politics can look twofold. On the one hand, archaization can be the result of a social demand from below, which even authoritarian regimes cannot ignore. The Russian scientist A. S. Akhiezer wrote about the mechanics of the impact of myths on political decisions:

"Myths (in contrast to scientific truths, which often arise as uncomfortable, destroying the usual ideas about the world) are extremely weak to criticism, weakly change under its influence... Waves of myth activation can cover significant masses of people like wildfire, prompting the entire society to rush to crazy, but traditionally sanctified decisions "[Akhiezer, 2001, pp. 93-94].

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Signals of public ferment can encourage the authorities to take destructive actions. The desire for greatness, recognition, and ethnic or confessional egocentrism can become sources of conflict, and new leaders and heroes will emerge. The ongoing civil wars and clashes (in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Libya) have among their causes archaic elements of interethnic and inter - confessional (Shiite-Sunni) confrontation. Disagreements, often disguised as cynical struggles for influence and resources, add a value dimension to the conflict that precludes compromise and makes the conflict particularly difficult to resolve.

On the other hand, archaization can be used by the ruling elites as a means of manipulating society, an important element of political technologies. In conditions of socio-political uncertainty, it becomes a kind of tool for political and managerial influence. Archaization is produced in the mass political consciousness as a result of purposeful manipulative influence of the ruling subject (political elite, dominant social group) [Isakov, Ermolenko, 2011, pp. 385-389]. In Morocco, for example, the king, the royal court and the administration are quite modernized. According to V. V. Orlov,

"modernity is represented in the political life of the kingdom by concepts inspired by the European experience, the national state, the constitutional monarchy and the relatively developed system of political parties for the Arab world, which emerged in the 1930s. The traditional foundation of Moroccan politics, laid by the Alawite Sultans since the 17th century, is based on the concepts of Islamic legislation and loyalty of the Muslim community to the king, a descendant of the Prophet. A partial overlap and overlap of religious and political fields in the public life of Morocco is also embedded in the traditional political culture of "mahzena". This word (Arabic, lit., storage) has served as a common name for the state and its institutions in the Maghreb countries since the 12th and 13th centuries. But it also referred to another, more nuanced concept that is also used in the modern political vocabulary - the art of indirectly managing tribal and any other conflicts through alliances, arbitration mediation, and a complex diplomatic game. In the political tradition of Morocco, the monarch and his court have always defended their priority over Islam as a means of political mobilization" (Orlov, 2010).

Sometimes both of these directions (from below and from above) "appeals to the spirits of the past" overlap, and it is extremely difficult to understand what was the primary one. For example, in Egypt, after the election of Abdul-Fattah al-Sisi as president in June 2014, there was a resurgence of "Nasserism". The principle is the same: the search for a foothold in the past, although the reign of Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954-1970) was not tinged with archaism. In the eyes of society, he personifies the period of Egyptian history when the United Arab Republic (UAR) was the recognized leader of the Arab world, when the slogans of Arab unity came from Cairo, when the president was a symbol of national independence, and Egyptians were proud of their country. However, the construct of "neo-Nazism" meets the interests of the ruling group. Turning to Nasser gives additional legitimacy to al-Sisi, who does not have the same massive and unconditional popular support. (Just remember Nasser's resignation after the defeat of the Egyptian army in the 1967 "six-day war" and the sobbing crowds on the streets of Cairo.)

Perhaps there is a more mundane version of turning to images of the past. Nasser fought the Muslim Brotherhood relentlessly, and El-Sisi is doing the same now, but in a different political environment - after the Brotherhood's triumphant victory in free elections in 2012, when they won the support of the traditional majority. I must say that after the counter-coup of 2013, their support base narrowed slightly. Al-Sisi, who persecutes the "Brothers", only repeats the steps of his predecessor, that is, he does not commit anything unnatural. Finally, "Nasserism" represented a secular regime (with all the conventional secularism of the Arab world), and in this sense, the current regime of Al-Sisi will have many supporters who have experienced the peculiarities of Islamist rule.

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TRADITIONAL SOCIETY AND ARCHAIZATION IN POLITICS

The revival of the archaic is most active in traditional societies, and accordingly, there its influence on domestic policy and foreign policy is felt more clearly. The term "traditional" is used to refer to societies that are subject to relatively slow changes, or societies that seek to legitimize their activities by referring to the past [Shils, 1998, p. 240-245; Fedotova, 2014, p. 82].

According to the accepted definitions, a traditional society is a society with a dominant agrarian structure, its own methods of social regulation and protection, and institutions that ensure this regulation. The behavior of individuals in it is strictly regulated by traditional moral and ethical norms. It is subordinated to group interests - family, clan, tribe, community. Such a society rejects innovations, fearing a violation of long-existing and in principle working balance sheets. Although traditionalism is somewhat identical to conservatism and is characterized by a rejection of innovation, this does not protect traditional communities from crises. As an example, we can mention the changes in the life of the extremely conservative Eastern European Jewish community that occurred under the influence of the ideas of Enlightenment (Taskalah) and Hasidism, the meaning of which was to correct traditional values and shift the traditional hierarchy. According to the Israeli historian Yaakov Katz, "Haskalah and Hasidism replaced traditional values with new ones (or gave these new values an equal meaning to the old ones) and thus deprived the tradition of its exclusive authority" [Katz, 2010, p. 356 - 357]. That is, the crisis of traditional society is associated with the emergence of new values, which, however, are not perceived by its members as contrary to tradition.

In the countries of the Middle East, the political culture that defines the basic and most typical rules of political behavior and interaction between the authorities, society and its individual members has the features of traditionalism and modernism. The evolution of most regimes took place in the direction of their "hybridization", when along with the "rigid vertical" of authoritarianism, there were also elements of democratic institutions. Thus, according to the Russian researcher M. Z. Razhbadinov, in Egypt under the rule of Hosni Mubarak (1981 - 2011), the authorities

"efforts were made to expand market liberalization and strengthen the independence of the judiciary in order to attract foreign investment. Laws were passed to strengthen civil institutions, media freedom was expanded, additional parliamentary seats were granted to opposition parties, and a number of political prisoners were amnestied, with the expectation that these steps would give the regime additional legitimacy in the eyes of the population and in the international arena" [Razhbadinov, 2013, p.76].

In Eastern societies, freedom of political maneuver is limited by the rules dictated by the existence of so-called solidarity groups, i.e. the decision-making process has features that are not always clear to an outside observer.

The rule of Saddam Hussein (1979-2003) demonstrated the former Iraqi leader's ability to use traditional mechanisms of power. Hussein became President of Iraq in 1979, and over the course of thirty years, he formed a dictatorial regime marked by brutality, corruption, and the absence of any counterbalances. As the head of the Ba'ath Party's security service for many years, who repeatedly resorted to political assassinations, as head of State, he also ensured the stability of the regime by reformatting the traditional system of government. He purged the Ba'ath of intellectuals, prominent military figures, and leftist politicians who had influence among the population. Their places were taken by people loyal to Saddam, who received education, positions and were enriched by working in the party apparatus. He came from a province where tribal, clan and family ties were very strong-

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However, Hussein actively engaged traditional institutions, combining them with the security forces. His tribesmen have taken major positions not only in the personal security service of the president and his family, but also in the services responsible for the security of the most important strategic objects. Members of the President's family - stepbrothers and cousins, and later sons-were given the most important posts in the field of security and public administration [Yaphe, 2002, p. 17-18].

If the structuring of the regime was in line with tradition, then the cultivation of myths about the special Iraqi greatness and mission can be defined as archaization, as blurring the line between the imaginary and the real, between myths and the pragmatism of their use. Behind the Iraqi army's military invasion of Kuwait in 1990 were mythologized notions of long-standing territorial claims to its neighbor and the need to assert its influence in the Persian Gulf. It was the underestimation of its own capabilities and the changes that were taking place on the world stage that led Iraq to disaster.

In traditional societies, the authorities can ensure their legitimacy by using archaic methods. For example, in Libya, large revenues from oil exports, on the one hand, and the demands of local society, on the other, predetermined the evolution of the image of Muammar Gaddafi from a young officer who destroyed the monarchy, to a Bedouin in traditional clothing, unable to do without a tent and a large retinue.

Some regimes in the Middle East have hardly evolved (despite economic modernization), remaining within the framework of medieval archaism. An example is the regime of Saudi Arabia, whose possible transformations observers tend to associate exclusively with the future coming to power of young scions of the royal family. Religious fundamentalism as an ideological basis, support (not directly by the government, but by Islamic funds) of extremist Salafi groups, paternalism, laws that involve medieval-type punishments, and peculiarities of income distribution-all this allows us to assert that the Saudi regime piously observes traditions, although it is under the influence of rapid changes in the world and in the region. If for the older generation of Saudis, the archaic political system and traditional ethics remain the only possible form of existence, then in some other Middle Eastern monarchies, power functions are performed by quite modern people who are forced to act in ways that are familiar and understandable to local society (Morocco, Jordan).

THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR: BETWEEN THE ARCHAIC AND THE POSTMODERN?

The revolutionary upheavals and civil wars created a favorable environment for the strengthening of the religious factor in the states of the Middle East. In a crisis of global philosophical and ideological concepts, there is usually a demand for religion as a value that is not subject to market conditions. The success of Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia reflected the civilizational choice of a traditional society unable to face injustice in the context of modern culture. This explanation is the main one, but not the only one. The network nature of the protest, the lack of leaders who would be perceived as national, limited the possibility of choice for most of the rebels. It could only be made there and only when modern institutions (trade unions and human rights NGOs in Tunisia) played an important role in the events. According to V. A. Kuznetsov, who coined the term "Islamic secularism "to describe the specifics of the political situation in Arab countries, there were practically no differences on religious grounds between the leading political parties in Tunisia:"...the very categories of "Islamism" and " secularism "(laicism), in fact, are not applicable today and remain only a legacy

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the past turned into a simulacrum that masks completely different lines of division... " [Kuznetsov, 2013, p. 63].

The instrumentalist approach fully reflects the realities of political struggle in any Arab country, where religious or secular slogans are equally aimed at fighting for the electorate. The problem is the voter himself. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was perceived by the majority of the population as the party that most fully expressed its aspirations, and was considered martyrs who knew the value of suffering and justice. It was very difficult for non-Islamic parties to compete with them, especially since the old elite was associated with a military-bureaucratic regime that Egyptian society was tired of. The removal of the most modernised part of the population from power by the Muslim Brotherhood showed the blurring of the line between them and the previous rulers and the fact that a rather rigid authoritarian regime began to crystallise under the talk of" democracy in Islamic garb". And the point here is not so much in M. Morsi (2012-2013) and his supporters, but in public sentiment. Relying on the majority, the Islamists offered their own version of governance. In turn, the military, having managed to use the mood of a disillusioned minority, turned out to be winners in the Egyptian turmoil and immediately struck at both Islamists and, just in case, local liberals.

The relativity of the concept of "secularism" in the Arab states is related to the peculiarities of Islam itself, culture in general, and the inability to make secularism (in the Western sense) an organic part of the political process. In this regard, some Western researchers propose the concept of "plurality of secularities" along with the "plurality of moderns":

"the rejection of the concepts of secularization and secularism in much of the Islamic world is not necessarily due to the lack of differentiation between religious and secular and the ubiquity of religion... We assume that there is no ready-made guide on secularism that can legitimize such differentiation. In addition, Islam is often referred to as a cultural identity, especially in the Arab world with its belated formation of nation states. This blurring of the boundaries between religion and culture makes positive understanding of secularism extremely difficult" [Wohlrab-Sahr, Burchardt, 2012, p. 882]. Nationalist secular regimes in Iraq, Egypt, and Syria were still far from ideal models for separating state and religion.

Can the growth of the number of Islamic organizations, including Salafi organizations, in Arab countries be considered an extremely archaic phenomenon? The answer to this question depends on what their role in society is and how archaic that society is. Thus, the mobilization of young people by Salafists is not a manifestation of archaism. On the contrary, by encouraging young people to join "free communities of real Muslims", Salafis help them break out of the usual circle of tribal slavery, obedience to their elders, the ban on expressing their opinions, etc.The "Protest" story with a return to traditional clothing was observed, in particular, in Oman. After September 11, 2001, Islamophobia began to develop in Western societies, to which the Arabs reacted by emphasizing their identity and wearing black abayas and headscarves by young women who had recently dressed in European style.

An archaic wave has swept the Middle East with the emergence of many jihadist organizations that have been formed or strengthened in the course of conflicts. The Islamic State (IS), Al-Qaeda, and Jabhat al-Nusra have become the embodiment of a kind of Islamist international and are actively transforming the region, opposing existing borders, states, and regimes.

IS gathers not only Sunni radicals from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya and other Arab states, but also representatives of Islamic communities from Central Asia.

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Asia, Europe, and Russia. Using the narrative of heroism and brotherly love in combination with a powerful financial base makes it possible to attract more and more adherents. IG uses the specifics of modern pop culture with its characteristic violence, easily transforming it into real violence. The deliberate theatricality of executions and bullying blurs the line between reality and a thriller in which beautifully blood-drenched enemies die. The search for an ideology with global and understandable guidelines can generate a demand for the most radical and extremist variants of social reconstruction that exist in the postmodern world, but draw ideas and slogans from the distant past. Cultivated excessive violence, which is disgusting in itself, is also richly flavored with frightening savagery, intimidation, and self-love.

The danger of such trends is well understood by some leaders of the Arab world. Speaking at Al-Azhar University in Cairo in early 2015, President Al-Sisi addressed Islamic scholars with the following words::

"It is impossible that the thinking that we consider most sacred will turn the entire Islamic world into a source of danger, unrest, murder and destruction for the rest of the world. Impossible! ...I say and repeat again that we need a religious revolution. You imams are responsible to Allah. The whole world... waiting for you to take action... because our Ummah is being torn apart, destroyed and destroyed... from our own hands" [Levant, 2015].

* * *

The problem of archaization in the Arab world requires a more in-depth and differentiated study of local societies, traditions, behavioral patterns, and features of religious beliefs. The universal nature of the topic under study suggests that it is particularly relevant at the present stage. The interaction of the traditional and the modern-the archaic and the postmodern that dominates politics-cannot but change the manifestations of both. Moreover, if weak but still functioning institutions are destroyed, resorting to past practices that partially compensate for the lost stability can lead to a dangerous destruction of society itself, its even greater fragmentation.

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Isakov A. L., Ermolenko V. V. Modeling of the archaization of the political process as a methodological problem of social and humanitarian knowledge // Engineering Bulletin of the Don. Vol. 17, No. 3. 2011.

Istoriya Vostoka [History of the East]. Vostok na rubezhe srednevekovie i novogo vremya [East at the Turn of the Middle Ages and Modern Times].
Katz Ya. Tradition and crisis. Jewish Society at the End of the Middle Ages, Moscow: Knizhniki Publishing House, 2010.
Kuznetsov V. A. The problem of secularism in the countries of the "Arab Awakening": Tunisian version // Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta [Bulletin of the Moscow University]. Ser. 13. Vostokovedenie [Oriental Studies]. 2013, N 4.

Lamazhaa Ch. K.Arhaizatsiya obshchestva v period sotsial'nykh transformatsii [Archaization of society in the period of social transformations]. 2011, N 3.

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Razhbadinov M. Z. Anatomiya egiptskoy revolyutsii-2011: Egypt before and after the Political crisis in January-February 2011, Moscow, IV RAS, 2013.

Fedotova V. G. Modernizatsiya i traditsiya [Modernization and Tradition]. Understanding. Ability. 2014, N 2.

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Levant E. In need of a religious revolution // http://www.torontosun.com/2015/01/05/in-need-of-a-religious-revolution.

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