Numerous attempts to resolve armed conflicts in Africa, undertaken by African Governments, individual political groups and international organizations, usually face very serious difficulties.

Karin DOKKEN, Professor at the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Oslo, has researched a wide range of issues related to the causes and characteristics of the political crisis, as well as the obstacles to conflict resolution, in her monograph "African Security Policy Revised"*. We offer our readers a digest of this work.

Already in the twenty-first century, 30 out of 53 African countries experienced political crises or continue to remain in a state of political instability, which, in turn, inevitably affects the state of the world order as a whole due to the increase in the number of refugees, the growth of the international army of unemployed and homeless, the growth of crime, the threat of terrorism, etc.

FORMATION OF THE "MILITARY ECONOMY" IN CONFLICT ZONES

While recognizing that economic inequality and lack of adequate access to natural resources, even vital ones such as water, are a serious cause of conflict, Dokken disagrees with those researchers who believe that it is easy for people to take up arms when they have nothing to lose. They consider "poverty" as the main cause of conflicts on the African continent. It argues, and perhaps with good reason, that the cause of the emergence and, most importantly, prolongation of conflicts in Africa is more the "greed" of its participants than the poverty of the population (p.5).

In most cases, rebel movements are fighting not even to gain access to natural resources and areas rich in minerals, but to increase their production and expand their markets, then use the proceeds to buy weapons and continue military operations. This creates a vicious circle: a war for the right to use resources and their use to continue military operations.

The author concludes that although most of the" new wars " in Africa arise from a deep crisis of state legitimacy, reinforced by failures in governance, the continuation or resumption of conflict is largely due to the developing "war economy" (p.11). She notes that in the past two decades, rebel movements such as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone and the Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire have not even made specific political demands.

In some cases, as the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and some other countries have shown, leaders of States-both in war and in neighboring countries - have extended their activities to territories beyond their control under the guise of helping one or the other side. By creating-with the help of mercenaries-private armies-they established control over the export of valuable minerals, oil, wood and other materials for their own enrichment. As noted in the monograph, in the Great Lakes region, for example, serious economic interests of the parties involved in the conflict in the DRC are associated with the extraction of coltan (columbite-tantalite), an invaluable mineral for the production of mobile phones (now its value on the world market reaches $ 450 per kg. - S. K.). that in response to the help of supporters and opponents of the Zaire dictator Mobutu, the Rwandan Patriot-

* Karin Dokken. African Security Politics Redefined. Palgrave Macmillan, N.Y., 2008.

The Communist Army (RPA) made its profit from the extraction of this valuable mineral. By 2000, the need for coltan had increased dramatically. Since the RPA was almost the main exporter of Congolese coltan, the Rwandan army even sought to strengthen control over its resources in the DRC.

Uganda, on the other hand, profited enormously from the exploitation of gold and diamond mines during the conflict in the DRC. Almost without its own diamonds and gold, this country became a major exporter of diamonds after it became involved in the Congolese conflict (p.183).

Even after the withdrawal of the army units of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe from the DRC, the political elite connections that emerged during the exploitation of Congolese resources did not stop, because the region built a kind of self-financing military economy, in the development of which several parties were interested, and it would be wrong to think the author believes that these parties could seriously discuss issues of peaceful settlement. But it was still achieved...

Thus, access to natural resources became, according to Dokken, the main motive for participating in the conflict and the main obstacle to its resolution, since neither political leaders nor insurgents were willing to give up sources of quick enrichment. It is no coincidence that the most violent conflicts in Africa in recent decades were observed in the most resource-rich countries-the DRC, Angola and Sierra Leone, as well as in Liberia.

Even a slight improvement in the living conditions of those groups of the population who supported the rebels and participated in the extraction and smuggling of diamonds, oil and rare earth metals, K. notes. Dokken has led many Africans to see civil wars as a way to improve rather than worsen the economic situation, especially since the comfort and financial stability of the middle class are simply unknown to them. The "expansion of economic opportunities" for various groups of society during conflict is undoubtedly the main obstacle to peacemaking: too many groups and individuals are interested in its continuation.

REGIONAL NATURE OF CONFLICTS

An important feature of political conflicts in Africa (as opposed, for example, to conflicts in Asia) is their regional nature. First of all, this applies to the civil wars in the so-called Mano River region (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea) and in the DRC.

According to the author, the way to resolve a political conflict should be determined in the country of its origin. However, the various conflicts in Africa are so interconnected because of the close personal contacts of political leaders in different countries, the development of regional formal and informal economies, the flow of refugees, and the huge number of mercenaries migrating from country to country, that the involvement of regional parties in the conflict and its resolution process, and often, on the contrary, in countering it however, it becomes inevitable. Thus, the civil wars in Liberia were partly triggered by the unstable situation in neighboring countries and, in turn, contributed to the expansion and deepening of conflicts in Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Guinea due to the constant movement of mined minerals, other minerals, drugs, weapons, militants and refugees across borders, with political elites they played almost the main role in this activity.

Civil wars in Africa, K. believes. Dokken issues cannot and should not be considered separately from the socio-political situation in neighboring countries. In other words, what happens in one country will definitely have a positive or negative effect on neighboring countries. The fact that the longest and bloodiest civil wars in Africa over the past two or three decades have been distinctly regional in nature has forced both African politicians and interested international organizations (the UN, the African Union, etc.) to recognize that the resolution of such conflicts can, and in some cases should, be regional in nature. In the last 15-20 years, some intergovernmental regional organizations (the Economic Community of West African Countries-ECOWAS, etc.) have created their own mechanisms for conflict prevention and management.

However, K. Dokken rightly raises the question of whether such organizations can manage conflicts. Will they be able to act as impartial intermediaries between the warring parties? Will their intervention, on the contrary, contribute to the escalation of the conflict? The example of the operation to resolve the crisis in Liberia in the early 1990s by ECOMOG (ECOWAS armed forces) showed that this regional organization did not immediately cope with the task, mainly due to the "conflict" nature of the interests of its participants.

On the positive side, the author notes that the very fact that regional organizations that were originally created with the aim of expanding economic cooperation have developed conflict resolution mechanisms means that they recognize the inextricable link between development and security.

WHY IS AFRICA A HOT SPOT ON THE PLANET?

Sub-Saharan Africa remains unstable, and Dokken points out again and again that the main reason for this is that during conflicts, warring parties have economic opportunities that they would never have had in peacetime.

One of the reasons for repeated mistakes made by international organizations, including the UN, in the process of peacekeeping is the incorrect identification of the parties to the conflict and their interests in prolonging or ending the war. Such actors often include individuals or groups that, until recently, were not perceived by politicians and researchers as serious obstacles to a peaceful settlement. Meanwhile, as the events of the last 10 - 15 years have shown, they can play a significant, often negative, role in the course of a conflict. These are foreign and multinational companies seeking to profit from chaos and anarchy. Their economic interests are among the main driving forces of the ongoing wars.

As an example, K. Dokken cites the activities of the American mining company American Mineral Field, which financed the rebel movement of Laurent Kabila in the DRC in exchange for the right to extract diamonds, cobalt, zinc and copper in the territories controlled by his organization (p. 12), and some oil companies, for example, Elf, were directly involved in " financing wars" and mediation in the arms trade.

The book also covers the activities of Sandline International in Sierra Leone. The multinational corporation for the" sale "of mercenaries also has a" mining department " - Branch Heritage Group. The company dictated its terms "in the security market", and this allowed it to win a number of large concessions for the development of minerals, primarily diamonds. After the UN Security Council banned the supply of weapons to Sierra Leone in 1998, Sandline transferred 35 tons of weapons to the country-AK-47 assault rifles, ammunition and grenades (p. 194).

Transparent borders and lack of control over sea and air traffic make sub-Saharan Africa a haven for arms sales and transportation. In addition, arms dealers became involved in other types of business, in particular in the "weapons for diamonds"system.

"Cooperation" between private foreign paramilitary companies that specialize in protecting political leaders and helping them conduct military operations, and mining corporations in conflict zones negatively affects not only the dynamics of the conflict itself, but also the level of security in the region as a whole.

The sale of weapons by private companies to anyone who pays, the author notes, predetermined the entry of more and more new participants into the conflict. Often, the local population simply grouped around a stronger leader, regardless of their goals and interests. Thus, the phenomenon of multiple and shifting centers of power in Africa has emerged.

THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PARTICIPANTS IN CONFLICTS

Karin Dokken considers it extremely important to identify "shareholders" in the course of a conflict. Some are easy to spot because they are directly and openly involved. Others are harder to recognize because they mostly stay in the shadows. Shadow actors may remain outside the group directly involved in peace negotiations, but they influence the process and results of peace negotiations, and may even act as "dispassionate mediators" while acting in their own interests.

In one way or another, the author believes, arms dealers and carriers are interested in continuing conflicts; drug lords who thrive in conditions of anarchy and war; mercenaries who participated in all more or less major conflicts on the continent; private security companies that provide a wide range of services - from bodyguards to illegal transportation and intelligence; leaders of warring groups. - in and out of power; money launderers - a network of banks and other companies involved in laundering funds obtained from participation in criminal activities; "lords of poverty", that is, individuals and organizations that enrich themselves by appropriating humanitarian aid provided by donor organizations; "money bags" - large commercial banks interested in the free movement of capital and rapid profit-making in war-torn areas.

All of these "participants" are right there

or they are indirectly trying to cash in on the natural resources of the war-torn region. Thus, in the twentieth century, the world economy experienced great needs for oil and diamonds, which are rich in Angola. To a certain extent, K. believes. Dokken, the country's natural resources have become a "punishment" for its inhabitants, the main reason for such a long war in this country.

Angola's "wealth and poverty" has been the subject of much discussion. The largest oil producer in Africa, Angola is among the 15 poorest countries in the world. According to Dokken, there are two reasons: wealth is concentrated in the hands of a narrow stratum, and income from diamonds and oil for many years went to finance the war, and not to socio-economic development (p. 175). The author does not share the opinion of those who believe that without diamonds, UNITA would have lost the war long ago, but he believes that their presence in such a volume allowed Savimbi to "hold the line" for many years.

At the same time, the possession of resources does not in itself become the goal of a conflict: rather, resources are needed to finance it. "Predatory" and "predatory" sentiments are what lead to civil war. The World Bank has even coined the term "predatory autocracy," which is used to describe regimes that spend enormous amounts of money to secure their power and control over resources, as well as on their own needs, and almost nothing on the needs of the population.

Leaders of such regimes usually do not have the popular recognition and legitimacy required in developed countries, so they are particularly interested in security measures - both for themselves and for the regime. While in the first years after independence, "bodyguards "were usually chosen on the basis of ethnicity or personal loyalty, numerous examples of how political leaders, as a result of military coups or prepared" liquidation actions", were victims of their own security service, prompted them to use mercenaries more often. Personal rule and regime security are the most important features of a State in Africa, and this explains why it is the main source of violence, rather than the protector of citizens.

K. Dokken uses the term "supranationalism" to describe those African States that are characterized by a high level of repressiveness, factionalism, incompetence and corruption. As an example of this type of State, she cites Zaire under Mobutu. "Superstates" are an arena for illegal exploitation of natural resources, the purchase and sale of weapons, and armed conflict.

International organizations have repeatedly called on African countries to radically reduce the army and military apparatus. In some cases, the" response " to this call has resulted in a significant reduction in the national armed forces, while creating numerous private armed groups to protect leaders and their regimes. Since the maintenance of their own armies is not reflected in official financial documents, they remain outside the sphere of attention of international organizations and donor countries. Such private "guards", composed of former national army soldiers but trained and led by mercenaries, are concerned only with the security of their" employers"; the security of the State is not part of their sphere of activity. And they are financed by plundering national resources. The circle closes.

One of the most important causes of political conflicts in Africa is the following: Dokken points to the weakness of public authorities in most of the continent's countries. A "weak State" is unable to control the national armed forces. Often, in some countries, as armed conflict spreads, national armies not only give way to insurgents, but also give way to private armies, better armed and trained, that command vast territories.

Along the way, the author makes an interesting conclusion that the rapid collapse of states experienced by some African countries (Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC, Somalia) in the late XX-early XXI centuries may encourage American politicians to take "protective" measures. If 10-15 years ago Africa played only a "side" role in the American concept of national security, now, with the spread of international terrorism and in conditions when the continent becomes "easy prey" for terrorist groups, in terms of organizing militant training camps, weapons depots and shelters for "wanted" people.Africa's place in the international security system is changing dramatically (p. 7). After the events of September 11, 2001, the importance of maintaining stability on the African continent has dramatically increased for the entire world community.

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