Africa Keywords:, global economic crisis, international economic relations, foreign trade, investment

Having analyzed in previous articles¹ impact of the crisis on the domestic economic situation of African States and the problems that have arisen in the financial and real sectors of the economy, we will now try to determine how the current crisis has affected Africa's participation in international economic relations. The answer to this question largely opens the veil over what will be the place of the continent's countries in the post-crisis global economy.

Of course, any forward-looking estimates of this kind run into uncertainty about the final part of the global crisis: is it over, or is its "second wave"coming? Technical issues also affect the accuracy of forecasts: how reliable are the statistics available to us and, above all, statistics for Africa?

On the other hand, it is also necessary to recognize that the level of reliability of such estimates is growing as the world economy moves away from the peak of the crisis and the economic situation in an increasing number of countries around the world stabilizes.

In mid-2010, international financial organizations (in particular, the International Monetary Fund - IMF) and research and analytical agencies (Boston Consulting Group, BCG, McKinsey) summed up some results on the recovery of various countries and regions of the world from recession. Both government and independent experts agreed that economic recovery in Africa as a whole is proceeding very rapidly, with the continent reaching pre-crisis levels of GDP growth by July 2010, and so on. ²

GLOBAL MARKET AND AFRICA

Nevertheless, the scope of foreign economic relations of African countries is likely to depend rigidly but non-linearly in the foreseeable future on the speed and stability of the recovery of Western economies and the domestic economic situation in North America and Western Europe.

In the sphere of international trade, the crisis for African countries was mainly manifested in the form of falling global commodity prices for raw materials and a decrease in exports from the continent.

In 2009, the value of total commodity exports from 54 countries of the continent was $357.8 billion, and imports - $363.5 billion (see Table). 1 and 2). In 2009, exports of goods from Africa fell by 2.5%. Due to the lack of foreign currency, imports declined even more significantly - by 8%. The negative trade balance of the continent's countries amounted to $5.7 billion. This is a little more than 1.5% of the value of exports - in general, not a catastrophic value. In addition, it should be taken into account that in the sub-regional context, the negative balance is recorded only in North Africa, which is faced with a decrease in global energy demand and an increase in the cost of many items of its imports, especially food. Sub-Saharan Africa had a positive balance in terms of commodity transactions with the outside world. However, the situation here also differed from country to country.

In 2010, the situation changed somewhat. Preliminary results

The article was prepared with the financial support of the Russian Foundation for Natural Sciences in the framework of the Project 09-02-00551a / r - "The role of human capital in shaping the image of a country in a multipolar world: a comparison of Russian and African realities".

Table 1

Dynamics of Africa's exports and imports in 2005-2010 ($ million)

* Data for the first half of 2010

Source: UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, October 2010.

The data show that the decline in both exports and imports continued. However, the countries of Tropical Africa significantly reduced their imports, and if the trends of the first half of the year had continued, a significant trade surplus could have been expected. But this, alas, was not achieved - a significant part of the surplus in the first half of the year was "eaten up" by the sharply increased world food prices in the second half of 2010. They also added to the North African sub-region's trade deficit with the outside world.

Compared to the pre-crisis period, global prices declined for all major African exports, although the depth of the decline in various items of the commodity nomenclature was not the same. Oil prices sank most deeply (from maximum to minimum-by more than 2.5 times) (see Table 2). Due to the fall in world commodity prices for Africa, the terms of trade indicators worsened. The cost per unit of African exports fell faster than imports, which negatively affected the balance of trade and payments. Foreign exchange inflows declined further due to reduced transfers of African migrant workers and investment inflows from abroad.

Table 2

Dynamics of world price indices for African exports and imports

* Rating.

On the positive side, major donors of official development assistance (ODA) have generally met their commitments. In addition, a number of previous IMF and World Bank initiatives have contributed to some debt relief for the least developed countries.

Many countries on the continent have taken additional steps to attract foreign direct investment. But the latter are sent to a rather limited number of countries on the continent-mainly to those that are rich in scarce raw materials. And these African states are already not in such a poor situation.

Giving a general description of Africa's position in the post-crisis world economy and international economic relations, we can say that it has not undergone radical changes. Africa still plays a fairly modest role in world trade. In 2009, its share in global exports remained almost unchanged compared to the average pre-crisis indicators and amounted to 3.4%. In the area of trade in services, this share is quite insignificant. The commodity structure of exports still consists almost exclusively of raw materials or products of lower degrees of processing of raw materials. Import also includes all product groups, starting with pro-

from manufacturing industries to food and raw materials, primarily energy.

In terms of the geographical distribution of trade, the main buyers of African goods are industrialized countries. In the last decade, the role of the countries of East and South-East Asia and Brazil has begun to grow. But during the crisis, the share of traditional partners increased again. In 2009-2010, only China's positions expanded. The remaining "new players" handed over some of their conquests to the Chinese, Americans, and Europeans. Intra-African trade is still relatively small. It is expected that after some reduction in the acute period of the crisis in 2010, it will make up about 10% of all exports. This is still slightly less than in 1995-1999, i.e., in the five-year period preceding the pre-crisis boom of the beginning of this century (see Table 3).

Table 3

Dynamics of changes in the geographical distribution of exports from African countries (in % of total African exports)

* Rating.

Источник: African Development Indicators, 2010 - http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/africa-development-indicators

In the context of the global crisis, the Achilles ' heel of African economies, like that of Russia, has become low export diversification. We are talking about both the geographical distribution of exports and their commodity structure. Currently, 8 African countries account for more than 75% of their export value through sales of just one product, while 5 countries account for two. Angola's commodity export structure is the least diversified, with crude oil accounting for almost 98% of its export value. Meanwhile, on the eve of independence (in the first half of the 1970s), the country was a major global producer of not only oil, but also coffee, diamonds, and iron ore. In 2010, the total export of these goods did not reach 2% of the total value of Angolan exports. Two other crude oil exporters, Chad (95% of exports) and Sudan (93%), are not far behind Angola. In Guinea-Bissau, unrefined cashews account for 91% of exports. In Algeria, more than 83% of exports come from 3 formally different but closely related commodity groups - crude oil (63%), refined products (10.5%) and natural gas (10%).

The most diversified commodity structure of exports on the continent in 2010 was South Africa (75% of exports consist of 102 commodity items), Tunisia (out of 82), Morocco (out of 72), Egypt (out of 68). In Tropical Africa, Kenya (51 names)is far ahead of all others in this indicator.

In general, there are only 15 countries across Africa that have double-digit export items in their names. Three of them (see above) are located in North Africa.

Objectively, the narrowness of the commodity nomenclature during the crisis meant that as soon as the economies of developed countries began to shrink, their needs for raw materials decreased. The drop in demand led to a drop in prices and a decrease in the physical volume of purchases of this type of resource in African countries. This, in turn, sharply reduced the inflow of foreign currency and reduced the ability of countries to build anti-crisis programs both in terms of helping distressed industries and in terms of social support for the masses of the population affected by the crisis.

However, the variety of export nomenclature itself is not a guarantee of a trade surplus. It is important that there is a steady demand for export goods on world markets. In this regard, it should be emphasized that the export structure of oil-exporting countries is the least diversified in Africa (the only exception is Guinea-Bissau). However, their situation was not so bad, because in the third quarter of 2009, prices for this product reached the following levels:,

providing net income growth and deficit-free budgets, although they remained almost twice below the peak values.

OIL HORIZONS

On the eve of the global financial and economic crisis that spilled from the United States into the global economy in 2008, global oil prices reached an all-time record in absolute terms. Gas prices, due to the specifics of their formation, grew somewhat behind oil prices, but still they also grew. Even the prices of coal, the most environmentally "dirty" and widespread energy raw material in the world, showed an upward trend in the context of the recovery in the middle of the first decade of the XXI century. A number of analysts started talking about the inevitable future shortage of these types of energy raw materials.

The worsening of the crisis brought down extreme commodity prices by the end of 2008 and led to a real reduction in global oil and gas consumption. However, within a few months, the price increase resumed. They reached a fairly high average level of $ 70-80 per barrel for crude oil. The fast-growing economies of the BRIC countries (Brazil, India, Russia, China) and some other countries have resumed growth. The associated pressure on world prices has also returned.

In addition, in the context of macroeconomic uncertainty and ongoing financial instability, the attractiveness of investments in real assets (including oil and gas) has increased for global investors. Despite the end of the crisis, hydrocarbons have once again proved to be an important strategic development resource in short supply and a relatively reliable object of financial investment and speculation.

Under these conditions, the importance of the hydrocarbon resources of the African continent in the post-crisis period acquires some new aspects for the world economy. They are related to at least four features of the extraction, transportation, consumption and sale of African oil and gas on the world markets.

First, Africa is one of the few regions in the world where, according to experts, the so-called peak of oil production ³ has not yet been passed. Secondly, the continent's countries are more attractive to oil and gas multinational corporations (TNCs) that develop hydrocarbon resources on the sea shelf and other environmentally vulnerable territories, due to generally more lenient environmental regulations and requirements put forward by national governments. This allows TNCs to save huge amounts of money. Third, Africa is geographically an attractive source of raw materials from the point of view of the convenience of their transportation as in the old centers of consumption (North America, Zap.

Table 4

Export of oil and petroleum products from Africa in 2009 (million tons)

Notes: "-" - no export during the specified period; "0" - exports amounted to less than 0.05 million tons.

Compiled from: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2010.

Europe, Japan) and new ones (China, India, Southeast Asia, Brazil).

Another, fourth, factor is also important. The West assumes that the military-political and geostrategic risks will decrease as the sources of sustainable supply of hydrocarbons to its economies shift from the Middle East and Russia to Africa.

In addition, in the foreseeable future, there are no major changes in the volume of oil and gas consumption in Africa itself, which, in theory, could force African producers to reorient their export flows of raw materials to the domestic market. Although the continent's energy consumption is increasing with the growth of the population and economies of African countries, the continent-wide energy consumption per capita (both in general and separately for oil and gas) remains very modest by world standards. Africa is home to 15% of the world's population, but accounts for only 3% of global commercial energy consumption. At the same time, the continent's countries collectively produce almost 12% of the world's energy raw materials (in terms of energy consumed), and there is a tendency for this indicator to grow significantly.⁴

Around 2025, the demand for oil and gas in countries such as Brazil, China, and India will double.⁵

The West has long recognized the importance of Africa's oil and gas reserves in the face of a global shortage of hydrocarbons, and has responded with increased attention to the region and a military presence in it. According to the analytical departments of leading multinational oil and gas corporations, in the next 10 to 15 years, oil production in Africa (including the offshore zone) can grow by about 6% per year. (It has grown by 25% over the past 20 ^years6.)

According to open data, most of the oil reserves are geographically concentrated in five countries-Algeria, Angola, Libya, Nigeria, and Sudan. They account for more than 90% of the continent's proven oil reserves. At the same time, in countries without hydrocarbon deposits, there is a growing interest in finding alternative energy sources, in particular on the basis of raw materials of agricultural origin.

The crisis has had only a limited impact on the flow of foreign investment into the African oil and gas industry. In 2009 they increased by 4% here, while they fell by 16% globally. It is expected that by 2030, 30% of global capital investment in offshore oil and gas production will be in Africa.⁷

Since the beginning of the crisis, there have been some changes in the composition of oil producers in Africa. In 2009, Angola and Nigeria surpassed Libya and Algeria as the continent's top crude oil exporters, although the latter have large reserves (estimated to total $ 56 billion). barrels), and also export significant volumes of petroleum products. According to open data from the Economic intelligence division of British Petroleum (BP), Africa produced 9.7 million barrels of oil per day in 2009. The main producers were located in the following order: Angola, Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Chad, Tunisia, Cameroon8. Table 4 gives an idea of the directions of global supplies of African oil at the height of the crisis.

The crisis has hardly affected the positions of national oil producers in Africa. Some of them conduct production independently (for example, Algeria's Sonatrach or Angola's SONANGOL), but many are still only co-founders of joint African-foreign oil companies. However, as before the crisis, the vast majority of African fields are either owned or operated under concession by the "big five" companies - BP, Chevron, Shell, Exxon Mobil or Total.

In general, the dominant positions in the industry belong to American, Anglo-Dutch and, to a much lesser extent, French and Italian capital. TNCs continued to increase investment in the industry during the crisis, although the annual growth rate of investment declined.

CHINESE WARNINGS

Traditional African oil producers are being squeezed by China, India, and Brazil. The strengthening of Chinese positions in the oil and gas industries of certain African countries is particularly visible. Today, China buys 17% of African oil, the US-29%, and the EU-35% (calculated by the author according to Table 4).

China's oil strategy places a special emphasis on Africa. During the crisis of 2009, Chinese oil imports from Africa totaled up to 1.262 million barrels. per day (or 62.8 million tons per year - the order of volumes is the same as in the pre-crisis period)⁹. Most of China's oil imports from Africa came from the Gulf of Guinea and Sudan. According to some estimates, China's investment in developing oil and gas production in Africa reached $4.6 billion by ^the end of 2009.10

The main supplier is Angola (14%), which replaced Saudi Arabia as the leader in terms of oil supplies to China. A real battle has unfolded between Washington and Beijing for Angolan oil.

Second most important African country-

The largest oil supplier to China is Sudan. Sudan's oil production is growing rapidly, and there is potential for further exploration in areas currently inaccessible due to the conflict in Darfur governorate.¹¹

Other oil-producing countries have also attracted Beijing's attention in recent years. During the crisis of 2009, China came in second place after the United States in terms of oil imports from Equatorial Guinea, ahead of Spain and Japan.¹² Various Chinese companies are implementing oil projects in southern Kenya, ¹³ in the Sahara Desert in Algeria, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, the Republic of the Congo, northern Namibia and Ethiopia.¹⁴

This suggests that China's position in the African oil and gas industry will continue to strengthen in the post-crisis years. In the short term, this will be supported by the prolonged fiscal turmoil in a number of EU countries and the slow pace of industrial recovery in the West as a whole. This conclusion applies mainly to the oil industry, but the gas production sector will also remain in the focus of attention of Chinese investors who are trying to diversify the sources of hydrocarbon raw materials supplied to the PRC.

THE SMELL OF GAS

Africa now accounts for a relatively small share (about 8%) of the world's natural gas reserves. The share in global production is even smaller (about 7%). However, the main African producers - Algeria, Libya, Egypt and, to a lesser extent, Nigeria-which together account for 6% of global production, are becoming an increasingly serious competitor to Russia (which accounted for almost 18% in the world in 2009) in the European market.

Gas fields (91.5% of proven reserves) are located in the territory (and within the exclusive maritime economic zones) of Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Nigeria. Depending on how quickly the economy of Western Europe will recover from the crisis, countries where oil and gas fields were discovered just before the global recession, and therefore their intensive development was postponed for the post-crisis years, may join the list of leading gas exporters. These countries include Tanzania (gas), Uganda (where a significant Olbertine Graben oil field has been discovered), and Ghana (the area of offshore oil fields in the western part of the country's coastal economic zone also has gas prospects, according to experts).

In 2009, Spain was the largest buyer of African gas in the EU (38.08 billion cubic meters). Italy (31.09 billion cubic meters) and France (11.67 billion cubic meters). In addition, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Slovenia and England purchased gas, but its supplies fluctuated between 0.2 and 3.4 billion cubic meters.¹⁵ The crisis has slowed but not canceled plans to build three new gas pipelines from Africa to Europe. Two of them will supply gas to Spain. Spain is a dynamic market that is developing rapidly, but only recently has Russia started to take part in this development: during the visit of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Spain. Medvedev's visit to Madrid in February 2009 resulted in the signing of agreements on cooperation in the gas sector.

For African countries, the post-crisis evolution of the global hydrocarbon market will mean the strengthening of two multidirectional trends that have already emerged: a) a significant increase in the foreign exchange earnings of African oil exporters (and, as a result, stagnation and gradual death of other less currency-efficient sectors of the national economy) and b) increased pressure on the economies of African oil importers, who are already experiencing difficulties due to a lack of foreign exchange earnings.

(The ending follows)

¹ See: Asia and Africa Today, N 8 and 9 for 2010.

² http://www.afriqueavenir.org/en/topics/development

³ True, for many North African countries (Libya, Algeria, Egypt) it has already, in general, passed. At the same time, for most sub - Saharan oil exporters, these critical values are a matter of the mid - or long-term future. In addition, some countries have only recently joined the list of globally significant oil exporters.

⁴ For oil (one), the indicator is slightly higher-approx. 19%. - См.: Oil and Gas in Africa. Oxford University Press. Oxford, 2009, p. 75.

⁵ Ibidem.

⁶ Abbreviated reviews of major British Petroleum studies are publicly available. ConocoPhillips, Royal Dutch Shell. См., например, http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview; http://www.conocophillips.com/EN/about/company_reports/Pages/index.aspx; http://www.shell.com/home/content/media/reports_pubIications/

⁷ http://www.afriqueavenir.org/en/2010/06/23/rise-of-african-oil-production/

⁸ This rating differs somewhat from the sequence widely published in non-specialized mass media (in particular, with respect to data on Angola, Algeria, and other countries). However, in our opinion, due to the high professionalism of BP's staff, he deserves trust. The rating is given by: http://www.bp.com/statistical review

⁹ World Energy Outlook. 2007. China and India Insights. International Energy Agency. Paris, OECD/IEA. 2007, p. 261.

¹⁰ The US Department of State. Wash., November 2, 2006.

^{Pan Ester.} 11 China, Africa and Oil. Council on Foreign Relations. January 2006 - http://www.Cfr.org/publication/9557

¹² The Nation. Nairobi, April 14, 2006.

¹³ East African Standard. April 18, 2006.

¹⁴ Reporter. Addis-Ababa. March 4, 2006.

¹⁵ http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview

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