Keywords: Africa, UN, Security Council, African Union

Africans have always considered the UN as the most important tool for protecting and promoting their interests in the international arena and have tried to make the most of it.

At first, the main issue on the UN agenda for Africa was the elimination of the colonial system, but after it was finished, the central problem for the continent's countries was overcoming backwardness and ensuring economic, social and humanitarian development. It is through this prism that Africans assess the situation in the world and determine their approaches to what is happening, and they primarily expect the UN to help solve this problem.

Another crucial issue in the African context, for which the continent urgently needs external assistance, primarily from the UN, is the prevention and resolution of conflict situations on the continent.

At meetings of the UN General Assembly, African States, on an equal footing with other members of the international community, can present their views on the situation in the world, put forward proposals and demands regarding ways to solve the problems they face. And not only to propose, but also to actively participate in shaping the positions of the General Assembly, where the states of the continent have about a quarter of the votes, which allows them to exert a significant influence on the content of decisions taken.

At the same time, Africans are convinced that Africa does not have the necessary rights and status in the UN system, and above all in the Security Council. Perhaps the main reason for the difficulties they are experiencing is seen by Africans in the inadequacy of the existing international institutions, the entire toolkit of interaction between the North and the South. Hence the demands for UN reform.

TOWARDS UN REFORM

Reform of the UN and the Security Council began to be discussed in the 70s of the last century. A Special Committee was established to consider recommendations and proposals on the UN Charter and strengthening the organization's role in the maintenance of international peace and security.

The initiators were the states of the then "third world". The demands for reform were justified by the fact that the group of nations that formed the UN in 1945 has since changed and expanded beyond recognition. The victors of World War II were joined by the vanquished and many liberated countries, where the majority of humanity lives. The world has become different, and the UN no longer reflects its realities, supporters of the reform argued.

After the end of the cold war and the growing number of member States of the organization, the need for UN reform has ceased to be disputed by anyone. In 1994, by decision of the 52nd session of the General Assembly, an Open-ended Working Group (OEWG)was established* On the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council. The importance of Security Council reform was also highlighted in the Millennium Declaration.

However, reaching an agreement on what exactly should be changed and how it should be changed proved to be too much for the international community. In 1997, 2002 and

* All UN Member States can participate in the OEWG.

2006 The Secretary-General presented three policy reports on its reform to the UN for consideration. None of them received sufficient support to implement their proposals.

By 2005, two groups of States had put forward their own Security Council reform projects.

Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, or the "quartet" that applied for permanent membership in the Council, proposed to introduce 6 new permanent members, giving two seats each to Asia and Africa and one each to Latin America and Western Europe. The seats of the four new non-permanent members were supposed to be allocated to Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. Africa, as we can see, was not deprived. In order to carry out their draft, the Quartet proposed that the new permanent members of the Council should be given the right of veto, provided that they commit themselves not to use it until the issue is finally resolved, which was given about 15 years.

Another group of States that called themselves "united for consensus" proposed to increase the Security Council's membership by 10 non-permanent members: 3 seats each in Asia and Africa, 2 in Latin America, and one each in Western and Eastern Europe. The group consisted of Italy, Spain, South Korea, Mexico, Canada, Pakistan and a number of other countries, including two African countries - Algeria and Kenya.

It is now the turn of Africa to determine its positions.

EZULWINI CONSENSUS

"For too long, the UN system has benefited the rich at the expense of the poor and the strong at the expense of the weak, "Archbishop N. Ndungane of Cape Town wrote in the preface to a collection of articles published by the University of Cape Town's Conflict Resolution Center under the eloquent title Dialogue of the Deaf, on Africa - UN Relations. ¹

Africans were also concerned about the marked decline in the role of the UN as the main international body responsible for maintaining peace and security. The military actions of the United States and its allies in the former Yugoslavia and Iraq were carried out in circumvention of the UN Charter, and in these violations of the UN Charter, Africans rightly saw a threat to themselves.

"We see powerful States, all so - called democracies, manipulating international institutions, which puts poor developing countries at an extreme disadvantage and causes great suffering," Mandela said in May ^2004.2

At the January 2005 session of the Assembly of the African Union (AU), a group of 15 Foreign Ministers of the Union's member States was entrusted with developing a pan - African position on UN reform. The Ministerial meeting was held in Ezulwini, Swaziland, in February 2005. It resulted in a document entitled "Pan-African Position on proposed United Nations reform: the Ezulwini Consensus", which was approved at the 7th extraordinary meeting of the AU Executive Council, held in March 2005 in Addis Ababa.

Proposals for UN reform in the "Consensus" were preceded by a detailed statement of the AU's positions on the entire range of security issues.

The sequence in which the document addresses the main threats to Africa's security is symptomatic. In the first place - poverty, persistent inequality in international trade, external debt, AIDS and other infectious diseases, environmental degradation. This is followed by inter - State and internal conflicts, the illicit production and proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and only after that-the creation of nuclear, radioactive, chemical and biological weapons, terrorism and transnational organized crime.³ Moreover, the document calls overcoming poverty the "most effective tool" for ensuring security and preventing conflicts.⁴

Much attention in the "Consensus" is paid to international mechanisms for maintaining peace and security. According to the document, the use of armed forces against UN Member States is allowed only in two cases: in self-defense (Article 51 of the UN Charter) and in the framework of the implementation of the "duty to protect" principle, according to which the world community has the right to carry out armed actions against countries whose inhabitants are victims of genocide, war crimes and other crimes. massive violations of humanitarian standards. The AU reserved this right in article ⁴ (h) of its Constituent Act5.

Here you can see a certain international legal inconsistency. The document recognizes that the peacekeeping operations of the AU and other regional organizations are subject to the approval of the UN Security Council. It is noted, however,that due to the distance from the scene of events, the Security Council may not be able to make a timely decision. Therefore, according to the "Consensus", in "certain situations" that "require

regional organizations should take action without waiting for the Council's approval, which can be obtained "after the fact"⁶. Everything seems logical, but isn't this a departure from the UN Charter?

The document's provision on the need to establish clear rules for the deployment of UN peacekeeping operations "in order to avoid arbitrary use of the veto power, which may delay or hinder such deployment,"raises doubts⁷. The UN Charter does not specify the use of the veto. The decision to use the veto or not to use it is the exclusive prerogative of the States that have this right.

The document called for strengthening the cooperation of UN bodies and agencies with the AU and its member States at all stages of the development of conflict situations. It was not without sarcasm that the Bretton Woods institutions were asked to " exercise prudence when making demands for macroeconomic reforms that could lead to social upheaval."⁸. Emphasis is placed on the importance of increasing UN logistical and financial assistance to AU peacekeeping efforts.⁹

The "Consensus" reaffirmed the commitment of African countries to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (Algeria, 1999), and stressed that terrorism "cannot be justified under any circumstances"^.10

The Africans, however, had their own vision of the problem. They considered international terrorism not an anomaly, but an inevitable product of the existing world order with its inequality and injustice, the division of states into "poor" and "rich", "weak" and "strong". The West's policy of using force to fight terrorism was seen by them as an attempt to treat a symptom, not a disease. Moreover, due to the concentration of the world community's attention on the fight against terrorism, the problems of poverty and marginalization, i.e. those very deep vices, without which it is unrealistic to expect the elimination of terrorism, have been relegated to the background. The anti-Islamic focus of the US counterterrorism campaign caused a protest.

Hence the urgent demand for the early adoption by the UN General Assembly of a comprehensive convention on terrorism containing a precise legal definition of this phenomenon.¹¹ Reaching consensus on this issue in Africa was considered the most important condition for the unity of action of the international community in the fight against terrorism. The interpretation of the term "terrorism" should not be broad. "There is a difference between terrorism and the legitimate struggle of peoples for liberation and self-determination." ¹² The desired definition should indicate "the root causes and conditions that drive people to commit terrorist acts" ¹³. The generally recognized duty of States to protect their citizens "should not be used as a pretext for undermining the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of other States", the Consensus stated ¹⁴.

All these provisions were addressed to the West, whose interference in the affairs of developing countries, attempts to eliminate undesirable leaders and regimes in them, were often passed off as a fight against terrorism.

We should add that terrorism was given the penultimate place in the list of threats to Africa in the document, since it was perceived on the continent as, first of all, an anti-Western force. The threats posed by multiple conflicts, and more broadly by poverty and underdevelopment, were seen by Africans as more serious and urgent.

Now let's talk about what exactly was proposed in terms of UN reform.

The main requirements were to grant Africa 2 permanent seats on the Security Council and to increase the number of non-permanent seats allocated to it from 3 to 5. ¹⁵ A reservation was made that, in principle, Africa was opposed to the use of the veto, but as long as such a right existed, it should be granted to all permanent members of the Council, i.e., as old so are the new ones. Responsibility for the selection of African ^member States to the Security Council was assigned to the AU16.

In the "Consensus", the issue of strengthening the UN General Assembly and enhancing its role in the Organization's activities, including in maintaining international peace and security, was sharply raised. The General Assembly was named "the most representative and democratic body in the UN system", "the world parliament"¹⁷.It must be said that the Africans had, if not perfectly legal, then very solid political grounds for raising the question in this way. Whatever the reasons, the Millennium Declaration referred to the General Assembly as not only the" main deliberative and representative "but also the" decision-making " body of the United Nations.¹⁸

It also referred to the need to "improve the balance of powers and relations between the General Assembly and the Security Council"^.19 The wording is vague, but it suggests that the existing system of relations should be adjusted in favor of the "most representative and democratic" side.

It was proposed to increase the role of the United Nations Economic and Social Council( ECOSOC) by making it responsible for coordinating the work of all UN agencies in the area of development assistance.²⁰

The document expressed support for plans to improve the work of the UN Secretariat. "It is expected in Africa," it said, "that a significant number of Africans will be appointed to mid-and high-level management positions in the process." ²¹

The Secretary - General's proposal to create a new UN body, the Peace Building Commission, was also supported. It was stipulated, however, that it should not be subordinated to the Security Council, since in its work, in addition to the Council, it will need to interact with many other UN bodies, primarily with the General Assembly and ECOSOC.²²

As for the proposal to replace the UN Human Rights Commission with a Council of the same name, which, unlike the Commission, would include all Member States of the Organization, the document approved the idea of creating a more authoritative instrument for the protection of human rights in principle, but the universalization of its membership was considered inappropriate. It was emphasized that the future Council should pay "equal attention" to the full range of human rights - not only civil and political, but also economic, social and cultural.²³

The "Ezulwini Consensus" was approved at the 5th Ordinary Assembly of the AU in Sirte (July 4-5, 2005), which adopted a special declaration on this issue. It was decided to submit a draft resolution on Security Council reform to the UN General Assembly. Along with confirming Africa's request for 2 permanent and 2 additional non-permanent seats, the draft proposed 2 permanent seats for Asia, one each for Western Europe and Latin America, and one additional non - permanent seat for Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America.²⁴ The total number of members of the Security Council would eventually increase from 15 to 26.

The Assembly made a commitment to "preserve the unity and solidarity of Africa" in deciding on its representatives in the Security Council.

In the same month, the AU's proposals for Security Council reform were formally submitted to the UN for consideration. More than 40 African States signed the draft resolution.²⁶

THERE WAS NO CONSENSUS

In the future, however, no consensus was reached. The Quartet (Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan) tried to reach an agreement with the AU on putting forward a joint draft resolution, but failed to reach an agreement. The issue of the veto became a stumbling block. At the specially convened AU summit in August 2005, the opinions of the meeting participants were divided. South Africa and Nigeria-two of the three main contenders for permanent membership in the Security Council-have come out in favor of a compromise with the Quartet. The third main contender, Egypt, along with the" second tier " of contenders - Libya, Kenya, Senegal, as well as Zimbabwe and a number of other countries, categorically insisted that the new permanent member of the Security Council be granted the right of veto without any delay.²⁷

As a result, the issue of reforming the Security Council was not resolved at the 60th session of the UN General Assembly.

"UN reform is dead. More than 150 heads of State met in New York in September 2005 to perform the funeral rites for yet another doomed attempt to reform the UN, " wrote A. Abajo, Executive Director of the University of Cape Town's ^Conflict Resolution Center28.

The main blame for this in Africa was laid on the developed countries, which did not want to allow developing countries to take the helm of global processes. There was criticism of the permanent members of the Council who "clung" to the right of veto.

What was missing was self-criticism. However, according to Abajo, the failure of the reform occurred because the African Group did not act together with other supporters of expanding the membership of the Security Council, while its votes could have "paved the way" for obtaining the majority necessary for making a decision.²⁹

Africa's position on UN reform was confirmed at the AU Assemblies in October 2005 and July 2006. The African States also rejected the compromise "interim" model put forward in mid-2007, which provided for the establishment of 10-11 additional non-permanent seats in the Security Council,

those elected for longer terms and with the right to immediate subsequent re-election. In connection with the promotion of this model, the UN started talking about the possibility of establishing the institute of "semi-permanent membership"within the Council.

Despite their insistence on expanding the Security Council, the Africans, despite the commitment made in Sirte, have not been able to agree among themselves on which two States they should delegate to the Council as permanent members. Neither Egypt, Nigeria,nor South Africa received the necessary support from the majority of AU member States. ³⁰

SOME ISSUES OF UN ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

Another acute dispute developed in the UN in 2005-2006 around the issue of administrative reform of the Organization. This project was promoted by the United States and its allies. U.S. Representative J. R. R. TolkienBolton, in an ultimatum, even demanded its adoption, threatening that otherwise the United States would not contribute to the UN budget the amount of contributions collected from them. The Americans managed to recruit Secretary-General Kofi Annan among their supporters.

The fact that the Secretariat is not working efficiently enough, is infected with bureaucracy and corruption, and needs to be reorganized and personnel updated, few people argued. However, developing countries saw this project as an attempt by the West to strengthen its already very tangible control over the Secretariat, while at the same time belittling the role and significance of the General Assembly. The same goals were served by the proposal to form a "representative group" of the States that pay the largest contributions to the UN budget, which could make independent decisions on a number of issues that are not subject to approval at the plenary session of the UN General Assembly.

"The African Group was forced to defend its own interests by opposing the Secretary-General, who was from its own region, "wrote the Sierra Leonean J. R. R. Tolkien in Dialogue of the Deaf. Jonah, who worked for many years in the UN Secretariat ³².

Working together, the G-77 members* rejected the Western draft and in May 2006 secured the approval of the resolution (N 60/260) they had submitted. It noted that "overall responsibility for the management of the Organization rests with the Secretary-General as its chief administrative Officer" ³³ and that structural changes in the management of the Secretariat should be implemented "without prejudice to the mandate" of the Secretary-General.³⁴ Among the issues that the Secretary-General was encouraged to "pay particular attention to" was the issue of "effectively increasing the representation of developing countries in the Secretariat, in particular at the senior level" ^.35

Distribution of votes: 121- "for", 50 - "against", 2 - abstained. Among those who voted "yes" was Russia ³⁶.

A general agreement was reached among the UN member States on the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission (2005) and the Human Rights Council (2006). The Commission established country teams for Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea - Bissau and the Central African Republic in 2007-2008, and in 2010 - for Liberia ³⁷.

But with the reform of the Security Council, things have stalled. Africa stood firm in its positions. The only agreement that the UN member States were able to reach was to hold informal intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform, which were scheduled to start no later than February 28, 2009. The Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) was instructed to" immediately continue "its consideration of" issues related to the mechanism and procedure for preparing and facilitating intergovernmental negotiations"and submit the results of this review to an informal plenary meeting of the General Assembly no later than February 1, 2009. ³⁸ The 62nd session of the General Assembly adopted a decision in this regard (No. 62/557) on September 15, 2008, the day of its closure.

INFORMAL NEGOTIATIONS ON SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

The President of the 63rd session of the General Assembly, M. d'Escoto (Nicaragua), hastened the event by announcing his intention to start intergovernmental negotiations on November 21, 2008.

Decision 62/557 identified five "key issues" for Security Council reform - type of membership, veto power, regional representation, size of the expanded Council, and relations between the Security Council and the General Assembly.³⁹ The clash of interests and sharp divergences in the positions of the participating States on all these issues are clearly related to-

* The Group of 77 (G-77) or Group of Seventy-Seven is the largest intergovernmental organization of developing countries operating within the UN and its bodies. The decision on its creation was made at the ministerial meeting of developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America in 1964.It was officially formalized at the session of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, held in Geneva on June 15 of the same year. Currently, it includes 130 states (approx. author's note).

they indicated that reaching agreement on them, if possible, is somewhere in the distant future. This also made it difficult to reach procedural agreements - everyone tried to be "alert" and not miss anything that could limit their negotiating maneuver to some extent.

According to document 62/557, intergovernmental negotiations were planned to start "with a view to finding a solution that could receive the broadest political acceptance from States" ^.40 Four meetings of the Open - ended Working Group were held in December 2008 and January 2009 to "continue to review the format and modalities for preparing and facilitating intergovernmental negotiations" ^.41 On 29 January 2009, the Chair of the OEWG reported on the work done at an informal meeting of the General Assembly. The results were not impressive. The OEWG has received several new reform proposals in both written and oral form. That's all.

Informal intergovernmental negotiations opened in February 2009. Seven months later, in its decision No. 63/565 of 14 September 2009, the 63rd Session of the General Assembly, referring to decision 62/557, decided "to continue without delay, at its informal plenary meetings during the 64th session, intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform, taking into account the progress made at 63- th session"⁴². What specific "progress" was made was not specified.

THE UNITY OF ACTION EXPERIMENT

As long as UN reform remained a matter of the future, the issues of improving its work in the present remained relevant.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called Resolution No. 64/289" Coherence in the UN system "adopted at the 64th session of the General Assembly on July 2, 201043" Historic"^.

The resolution reaffirmed and further developed the commitment to fully strengthen the interaction of the UN system with partners at the regional, sub-regional and national levels. The document emphasized the need for UN bodies to take full account of the specific conditions in which they have to operate. "There is no one-size-fits-all approach to development," resolution ⁴⁴ said.

Pilot projects aimed at building coherence in the UN system were pilot country programmes implemented within the framework of the "delivering as one"concept initiated in 2006. The idea was to create a "unified UN system" at the country level, in which all UN agencies should be led by a resident coordinator, in accordance with the consolidated programme, from the consolidated budget.⁴⁵ The experiment was launched in 2008 and involved 8 countries, including 4 African countries - Cape Verde, Mozambique, Rwanda and Tanzania.

Intergovernmental meetings of the pilot countries were held in Kigali in October 2009 and Hanoi in June 2010. In the final documents of these meetings, it was noted that under the experimental conditions, Governments manage the implementation of UN programmes more effectively, and the coherence and effectiveness of UN support is improved.⁴⁶ The experiment is expected to be completed and evaluated at the 66th session of the UN General Assembly in 2011.

The decision of the 64th session of the General Assembly on the establishment of a Joint UN Structure on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, named "UN-Women", had a breakthrough socio-political significance.⁴⁷

NO ONE WANTED TO GIVE IN

In matters related to UN reform, Africa, as before, stood on the position of the"Ezulwini Consensus". Libya demanded a fundamental restructuring of the entire UN system. Gaddafi did not consider himself bound by the position of the AU even after he was elected its chairman in February 2009. Speaking at the 64th session of the General Assembly on September 15, 2009, he took up the UN Charter, declared it "inconsistent with modern realities" and made a gesture that imitated the intention to tear up this document. He proposed granting permanent membership in the UN Security Council to "all unions and groups of states", giving everyone the right of veto or abolishing it altogether, ⁴⁸ and moving the UN headquarters from New York to Sirte, Vienna, Beijing or New Delhi.⁴⁹

It seems that many AU member states were impressed by Gaddafi's views.

In this regard, the speech of the Prime Minister of the Central African Republic, F. A. Abramovich, at the 64th session of the UN General Assembly is symptomatic. - A. Tauder, who called for giving "greater weight to the role and authority" of the General Assembly, as well as for strengthening the" transparency and balance " of the UN Security Council.

The lack of progress in UN reform did not reduce the interest of the AU and the continent's States in close cooperation with the Organization and its support. The UN continued to work actively on

in the African direction. While criticizing the UN, Africans still recognized its indispensability and central role in international affairs.

Here are excerpts from the speeches of a number of African representatives at the 64th session of the General Assembly. "As the most representative organization in the world, the UN represents the conscience of the international community," Moroccan Foreign Minister T. F. Fihriz said^. Zambia's President P. B. Banda called the UN "the central and main body for coordinating international cooperation"⁵², King Mswati III of Swaziland called it "the only hope for overcoming the many and complex challenges facing humanity" ⁵³." The UN remains the main link in the collective consciousness of the community of nations, " stressed Cape Verdean delegation head M. Lima ⁵⁴.

A total of 5 rounds of informal government negotiations took place between February 2009 and July 2010. There was no agreement among the comrades. The only "general" document was prepared by the coordinator of the negotiation process, the representative of Afghanistan to the UN, Zh. Tanin's "coordination text", which reflected the positions of country teams and individual Member States on each of the five" key issues " of Council reform. It didn't go any further. Even Tanin's suggestion to bring together positional approaches that seemed rather similar was not supported. Among those who opposed such a "merger" was the African Group, which considered that its positions in the document were clear and concise and that there was no need to edit them.

The coordinator of the African Group in the negotiations, the representative of Sierra Leone to the UN, Sh. M. Turey, said at the plenary session of the 5th round on July 7, 2010: "The existence of semantic nuances and differences even between those positions that outwardly seem similar, at this stage of negotiations, prevents the process of bringing them together through verbal refinements. Security Council reform is not a simple word game. " ⁵⁵ According to the African Group, the first step is to reach "a consensus-oriented agreement on the principles and substance of the case" and only then to develop a draft negotiating text.⁵⁶

The central issue of reforming the UN Security Council, the African Group considered the right of veto. Africa "will not stand in the way" of those who ^now want to become permanent members without the right of veto, but only if they "show flexibility" and support Africa's demand for 2 permanent seats with this right, M. Tureira quipped.

At the AU Assembly in Kampala in July 2010, it was decided to revisit the issue of Security Council reform in a year's time, given the lack of momentum in the negotiations. During a recent visit to Cameroon, Ban Ki-moon said that a permanent seat for Africa in the Security Council "will only benefit the Organization."⁵⁸. What was said pleased the Africans ' ears, but had no practical consequences.

Africa's commitment to the Ezulwini Consensus was reaffirmed at the 65th session of the UN General Assembly in a speech delivered by the new AU President, President B. Mutharika of Malawi. Africa continued to push for 2 permanent seats on the Council with veto power and 5 non-permanent seats. There is also a requirement that the African Union should recognize "the right to determine which representatives from Africa will be included in the Council" ^.59

In December 2010 - March 2011, two more rounds of informal negotiations on the reform of the UN Security Council were held. Participants were presented with several updated versions of the"coordinator's text". The four most active countries were Brazil, Germany, India and Japan. Its representatives insisted on the earliest possible start of "real negotiations" with concrete results before the end of the 65th session of the UN General Assembly. During the 6th round, in order to change their previous position, they proposed to include in the" coordination text " a provision stating that the new permanent members of the Security Council will have the same rights as the current ones.

Such a shift could not fail to interest Africa. However, contrary to the hopes of proponents of speeding up the negotiations, the 16th AU Assembly, held in Addis Ababa in late January 2011, did not make any adjustments to Africa's position. At both rounds, the African Group continued to oppose attempts to consolidate similar positional approaches in the" coordination text "and to redefine the requirements of the" Ezulwini Consensus " in any way, at least until agreement on the principles of negotiation is reached.

Elements of" dissidence " did, however, occur. South Africa and Nigeria were in favor of finding a common language with the "four". At a press conference in Pretoria on March 5, 2011, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, M. Nkoana-Mashabane, in unison with the Quartet, stated that the South African Government would try to persuade the five permanent members of the Group to join the Group.

members of the Security Council in the need for an early conclusion of the negotiation process ⁶⁰.

* * *

The following figures provide a clear picture of the UN's focus on Africa. In the period from September 2008 to March 2011 The UN Security Council held a total of 529 meetings and adopted 140 resolutions. The Chairman of the Council made 84 statements. 260 meetings were devoted to the discussion of issues related to the situation in individual countries, sub - regions of Africa and the continent as a whole, 72 resolutions were adopted, and 45 presidential statements were made by the Security Council. In terms of the number of discussions, resolutions and presidential statements, the leaders were:: Sudan - 39 meetings, 7 resolutions and 3 statements, Somalia - 36, 14 and 7, respectively, Ivory Coast-31, 12 and 4, DRC-25, 7 and 3, Chad and CAR-19, 5 and 2 ⁶¹.

Ban Ki-moon was right when, in his message of congratulations on the occasion of Africa Day on May 25, 2010, he wrote:: "The United Nations has proven to be an indispensable partner for Africa on various issues, whether it is peace and security, socio-economic development or regional integration." ⁶²

¹ A Dialogue of the Deaf. Essays on Africa and the United Nations. The Centre for Conflict Resolution. Cape Town, 2006. P. XIV.

² Ibid. P. 227.

³ The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: "The Esulwini Consensus". African Union. Executive Council. 7^th Extraordinary Session. 7 - 8 March 2005. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Ext/EX.CLl/2 (VII). P. 1 - 6.

⁴ Ibid. P. 1 - 2.

⁵ Ibid. P. 6.

⁶ Ibidem.

⁷ Ibid. P. 7.

⁸ Ibidem.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid. P. 4.

¹¹ Ibid. P. 5.

¹² Ibidem.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid. P. 6.

¹⁵ Ibid. P. 9.

¹⁶ Ibid. P. 9 - 10.

¹⁷ Ibid. P. 8.

¹⁸ A / RES/55 / 28 September 2000 Millennium Declaration, paragraph 30.

¹⁹ The Common African Position... P. 1 - 6.

²⁰ Ibid. P. 8.

²¹ A / RES/55 / 28 September 2000..., paragraph 30.

²² The Common African Position... P. 7.

²³ Ibid. P. 9.

²⁴ Resolution on the United Nations Reform: Security Council. Assembly of the African Union. Fifth Ordinary Session. 4 - 5 July 2005. Libya. Assembly/AU/Resolution 1(V), point 3.

²⁵ Sirte Declaration on the Reform of the United Nations. Assembly of the African Union. Fifth Ordinary Session. 4 - 5 July 2005. Libya. Assembly/AU/Decl.2(V). P.2.

²⁶ The UN at the beginning of the XXI century. Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 2008, p. 215.

²⁷ A Dialogue of the Deaf. Essays on Africa and the United Nations. The Centre for Conflict Resolution. Edited by Adebago and Helen Scanlon .Cape Town, 2006. Fanele - an Imprint of Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd. P. 26.

²⁸ Ibid. P. 19.

²⁹ Ibid. P. 26.

³⁰ Ibid. P. 26 - 27.

³¹ Ibid. P. 215.

³² A Dialogue of the Deaf... P. 71.

³³ Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly at its 60th session. A / RES/60/260. 8 May 2006. Investing in the United Nations: towards a stronger organization around the world. III, item 5.

³⁴ Ibid. III, paragraph 3.

³⁵ Ibid. II, para. 2 (e).

³⁶ UNBISnet. Voting Summary A/RES/60/260.

³⁷ United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. Country-specific meetings - http://www.un.org/russian/peace/peacebuilding/pbc-country mtgs.shtml

³⁸ UN. Resolutions and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its 62nd session. Volume III. December 23, 2007-September 15, 2008 General Assembly. Official reports. 62nd session. UN Supplement No. 49 (A / 62 / 49). New York. 2008. pp. 126-127.

³⁹ UN. Resolutions and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its 62nd session. Volume III. December 23, 2007-September 15, 2008 General Assembly. Official reports. 62nd session. UN Supplement No. 49 (A/62/49), New York, 2008, p. 128.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 127.

⁴¹ UN. Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council. The General Assembly. Official reports. 63rd session. Addition. No. 47 (A / 63 / 47). 11 September 2009, New York. 2009. p. 2.

⁴² UN. Resolutions and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its 63rd session. Volume III, 25 December 2008-14 September 2009 General Assembly. Official reports. 63rd session. Supplement No. 49. (A/63/49), P. 172.

⁴³ Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization. The General Assembly. Official reports. 65th session. Supplement No. 1. A / 65 / 1. 2 August 2010, para. 151.

⁴⁴ Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly at its 64th session. A/RES/64 / 289. 21 July 2010 United Nations system-wide coherence. Preamble.

⁴⁵ Note by the Secretary-General A / 61/583. 20 November 2006. Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit. p.10.

⁴⁶ UN. Report of the Secretary-General, para. 152.

⁴⁷ Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly at its 64th session. A/RES/64 / 289. 21 July 2010 United Nations system-wide coherence. II. 49.

⁴⁸ UN. The General Assembly. 64th session. Official reports. Plenary sessions. A / 64 / PV. 3. pp. 22-23.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 28.

⁵⁰ Ibid. A / 64 / PV. 8. p. 48.

⁵¹ UN. The General Assembly. 64th session. Official reports. Plenary sessions. A / 64 / PV. 9. p. 60.

⁵² Ibid. A / 64 / PV. 6. P. 58.

⁵³ Ibid., A / 64 / PV. 8. P. 13.

⁵⁴ Ibid. A / 64/PV.13. p. 22.

⁵⁵ Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sierra Leone to the United Nations. Statement by H.E. Mr.Shekou M.Touray, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations and Coordinator of the C-10 Permanent Representative in the New York for and on behalf of the African Group at the Informal Meeting of the Plenary on the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and other Matters Related to the Council. New York, Wednesday July 7, 2010. P. 1.

⁵⁶ Ibidem.

⁵⁷ Ibid. P. 2.

⁵⁸ Pulse of the planet. tass. June 15, 2010 AF-3.

⁵⁹ UN. The General Assembly. 65th session. Official reports. Plenary sessions. A/65/PV. 11 p. 22.

⁶⁰ http://www.mg.co.za/article/2011 - 01 - 05-sa-to-push-for-reform-of-un-security-council

⁶¹ Meetings of the UN Security Council and their decisions, July-December 2008, January-December 2009: January-December 2010 - http://www.un.org/russian/documen/scaction/2008/index.html -ibid., 2009, 2010, 2011).

⁶² Pulse of the planet. tass. May 26, 2010 AF-2.

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