Moscow: IV RAS Publ., 2014, 350 p. (in Russian)

The new major work of the famous Russian arabist A. Z. Yegorin is particularly relevant due to the cardinal changes and socio-political upheavals taking place in a number of Arab countries today, the outcome of which is unpredictable. As an analyst who has devoted more than a decade to studying the problems of the Arab world, A. Z. Egorin took up the consideration of the ongoing and explosive processes in the Arab world that took place during the two years of the "Arab Spring".

The task that the author solves in this work is to bring these processes into a common semantic channel and try to identify at least in the initial manifestation of their general laws. For its implementation, it relies on dozens of reports from anonymous correspondents of news agencies, newspapers, radio stations, and articles by domestic and foreign authors in magazines and other publications. The monograph uses the materials of 52 authors of experts on the Arab world, published in the two years under study - 2012 and 2013. Therefore, if you try to determine the scientific genre of the work, then it can most likely be attributed to collective monographs. But the painstaking selection of these materials and their assignment to one or another section of the work was made by the author himself, which is his undoubted scientific merit.

The monograph consists of five chapters, an introduction, and a conclusion. The first three chapters are devoted to the analysis of events that took place in the three countries indicated in the subtitle, and the second two deal with general theoretical issues in relation to the Arab region.

Chapter I, "A Fracturing Libya," examines the historical background of the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime and the price that was paid for it.

In the section called "The Forgotten Country "(author-B. Alekseev) It is noted that Salafists from the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIBG), the top tribes of Cyrenaica, discontented representatives of the bourgeoisie who have lost influence in favor of the Americans in tourism, services, oil, construction, medicine, as well as young people and the modern middle classes have united in opposing the regime (p.60). Here, B. Alekseev writes that discontent was also caused by the dismissal of 400 thousand out of 1 million civil servants (who, however, received compensation of $ 200 a month for three years). There were different categories of unemployed, but not through the fault of the regime. With reference to A. Z. Yegorin, he cites data describing the parasitic nature of the Libyan society during the Gaddafi regime. In particular, he writes that in the Jamahiriya, for example, hundreds of land plots with houses built on them were offered for rent, and dozens of fish processing plants were created on the coast. However, none of the Libyans did not want to engage in agriculture or fishing. The inhabitants lived on the money received from the sale of oil, and foreign specialists worked on the sources of hydrocarbons (pp. 60-61).

Similar conclusions are reached by A. B. Podtserob , a well-known Russian Arabist and one of the co-authors of the reviewed monograph on page 326.

In the reviewer's work " The Mediterranean - an open ellipse "(Moscow, 2011), the character of Libyan society before its overthrow in 2011 is defined in a similar way on pages 229-230: "After the revolution of September 1, 1969, a kind of totalitarian system developed in Libya.-

we, under the guise of rhetoric about "direct people's democracy". In socio-economic terms, Libyan society has become a parasite based on the exploitation of the labor of foreign workers and specialists (at the beginning of 1996, there were 2.5 million of them), paid at the expense of national wealth. Many Libyans have come to consider themselves superior to those who provide them with the opportunity for such a parasitic existence. Libyan chauvinism has become a real phenomenon."

This regime, according to A. Z. Yegorin, was overthrown at the cost of the death of 25 thousand people and 50 thousand wounded, which together accounted for 1.1% of the country's population (p. 61, note 75). This is the human cost of Libyans in their struggle to renew their society. However, the driving forces of the "Arab troubles"did not take power. Neither the elite of the Cyrenaica tribes, nor the Salafists, nor the bourgeoisie, nor the militants from Zlitan and other cities received power. This power was seized by Tripolitans, as well as emigrants who came from abroad.

Egypt is the largest Arab country by population. According to UN data for 2012, with a total population of 363 million (362,955,000) in 21 Arab countries, Egypt accounted for 81 million (80,722,000) people, representing 22.2% or almost a quarter of the Arab world's population.¹

Therefore, the state of affairs in Egypt and its dynamics have a direct or indirect significant impact on the situation in the region as a whole. In the peer-reviewed monograph, Egypt is assigned the second section of Chapter 3, entitled " Egypt between Islamism and Secular Traditions "(pp. 190-234). Islamism is most represented in this country by the religious and political organization "Muslim Brotherhood", and secular traditions, despite all the conventionality of such a formulation in this historical situation, are represented and protected by the army. On page 230 of the monograph it is stated, in particular:: "In Egypt, no serious issue is solved without the army. Since 1952, when the military took power in the country, the armed forces have remained the most important player on the political scene. Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak were military men, although they ruled the country without taking off their uniforms."

Below, on pages 230-231, the position and role of the army in Egyptian society is explained: "In Arab countries, the army traditionally has considerable political and economic influence. Although the Egyptian military is not considered a special caste (as in Syria), their influence is enormous. The army is the country's largest "entrepreneur". For example, a third of gas stations are owned by high-ranking officers. They also own cement plants, and they also have their own financial structures. In addition, the military largely controls the tour business in Egypt. Of course, such involvement in the economy has an impact on the desire of the army to participate in solving the country's political problems."

To understand the role of the army in the processes taking place in Egypt today, specific data on its size and composition are important. On page 231, it is noted that the Egyptian armed forces are the largest in Africa and the largest among all Arab countries. They number 468 thousand people and have a four-species structure. They include the ground forces, air defense forces, Air Force, and Navy. Approximately 280 thousand people are conscripts serving from one to three years. What follows is an important social detail: "It is interesting that many people want to join the army, but not everyone succeeds. The fact is that for the poor, who are the majority in the country, the armed forces can become a rapid social elevator. And if you also continue to serve, you can feed half the village of relatives."

Below in this section, we present data on the number of different branches of the Egyptian armed forces and their morale and combat characteristics. These characteristics are summed up on page 232. It says: "In general, the combat readiness of the Egyptian army can be assessed as good. Morale, of course, is lower than that of the Syrians. The Egyptians proved this in all the Arab-Israeli wars - they do not have the ability to "bite in". But they can fight."

Events in Syria during 2012-2013 are covered in the section "The Syrian Troubles" of chapter III " Arab reality of the XXI century "(pp. 155-189). This section presents a wide variety of views on the processes that took place in Syria in 2012-2013, as well as on the positions of different countries and international organizations on the Syrian issue.

Islamists play an important role in the Syrian events. But they act not as a single, cohesive force, but as separate religious and political organizations, including extremist ones.

The Muslim Brotherhood retains the greatest influence among them. An independent democratic Islamic movement is beginning to compete with them in the country.

¹ Calculated from: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics. New York-Geneva, 2013. P. 457-467.

And outside interference in the affairs of Syria is carried out by international terrorist organizations, primarily Al-Qaeda.

The section examines from the perspective of 2012-2013 possible ways out of the Syrian crisis, which involves dozens of different political forces, their coalitions, foreign states and international organizations.

The most detailed assessment of the likely options for resolving the crisis from the standpoint of mid-2012 is given by the Arguments of the Week cited on pages 167-171 in the issue of June 28, 2012. Here, under the heading "The Syrian impasse", an interview is given with the well-known Russian orientalist G. I. Mirsky, who put forward three possible scenarios for the further development of the Syrian crisis. But in reality, as Argumenty Nedeli notes, none of these scenarios of reconciliation of the parties to the conflict works and, as further events have shown, did not work.

A certain place in the section is devoted to the possibility of using chemical weapons by the parties. But, as is now known, thanks to Russia's initiatives, this issue was removed from the agenda in 2014.

The Syrian section of the monograph does not contain any general conclusions, but it ends with the opinion of a specialist in the Middle East region, D. Steshin, on the possible development of events in this region (p.189). He believes that in the next two years, i.e. in 2014-2015, there will not be a single state that pursues an independent policy and has its own national interests. There will be a final change of Middle Eastern elites. The new elites are what they call the "skilfully bribed" Muslims. Those who have experienced tolerance and European freedom, who have learned in the West, and are now sitting in the Presidium of the League of Arab States and in all possible coordination councils.

Chapter IV, entitled "What is Neo-Colonialist Jihad?", is devoted to a thorough analysis of the complex and multifaceted events in Syria during 2012-2013.

In one section of this chapter, it is noted that the war in Syria is caused by huge oil reserves. On page 244, specific data are provided in this context. It is reported here that a small Norwegian company has found 14 oil basins in Syrian territorial waters. Among them, there are 4 major deposits located from the Lebanese border to the city of Banias. Only they can provide oil production equal to Kuwait's. Another 4 other fields have proven reserves equal to Cyprus, Lebanon and Israel combined. Damascus would be able to produce from 6-7 million tons. barrels per day, or just half as much as Saudi Arabia. Norwegian experts also found huge volumes of gas in Syria. If they are summed up, then Syria can reach the 4th place in the world in terms of its volume.

The final chapter V of the monograph is called "Powerless Democracy". This is quite a fair name, in my opinion, primarily for Libya as a country of victorious renewal. On page 282, it is stated, in particular, that, according to experts, the events in Libya demonstrate the collapse of Libya as a state. Muammar Gaddafi's Jamahiriya was replaced by chaos and anarchy. And a little later it is noted that the new authorities are not able to control the situation not only in the oil-bearing regions that are seeking independence, but also in the capital. This position was maintained until the publication of the peer-reviewed monograph.

It is desirable to include a section on demographic processes that have a very negative impact on the socio-economic situation of the Arab world, both in the region as a whole and in its individual countries, in its next publications, which, as it seems, can only be welcomed by the scientific community. These processes are the root cause of the events of the "Arab Spring".

The fact is that according to the centuries-old Muslim tradition, parents in their youth should have a large number of children who will provide for them in their old age. If this principle somehow worked until the middle of the last XX century, then in the future it clearly lost its effect. Since then, the requirements for identity have increased dramatically and continue to increase.

The living conditions of the vast majority of the population of the Arab region are such that out of the 6.5 children per mother on average in the region, only one is usually able to "get back on his feet", which usually takes the place of the father in the shop or on a tractor in the field. The rest form a faceless mass of misfits, lumpens, and beggars. Their share in the total mass of young people reaches, according to available published estimates, 70%. In the event of any crisis situations and social explosions, it is the marginal youth who take to the streets and make up the bulk of the riotous and often violent ones.

By the way, in the family of Mohammed Bouazizi-a 26-year-old Tunisian, an unemployed university graduate who sold fruit and was insulted by the police, whose self-immolation act marked the beginning of the events of the "Arab Spring", there were 7 children. After his death, his mother left five younger sisters and one brother in her arms.

Meanwhile, the population of Arab countries continues to grow rapidly and inexorably. If we take the three countries studied in the monograph - Egypt, Libya, and Syria-their population has increased over the past two decades, according to UN data ², as follows: in 1990, its number (in thousands) was 56,337 in Egypt, 4,260 in Libya, and 12,452 in Syria in 2000, 66,137, 5,176, and 16,371, respectively; in 2012, 80,722, 6,155, and 21,890, respectively. This means that in Egypt for 22 years it increased by 24,385 thousand or 43.3%, in Libya-by 1,895 thousand or 44.5%, in Syria-by 9,438 thousand or 75.8%. The total population of the Arab region increased from 214,418,000 (214.5 million) in 1990 to 362,955,000 (363 million) in 2012, an increase of 148,537,000 (148.5 million) or 69.3% over the years.

The numbers are quite impressive and quite disturbing. In no sector of the economy in any Arab country has production grown at such a pace, which cannot but mean a drop in GDP per capita.

The demographic factor that is extremely unfavorable for the Arab world as a whole is compounded by the attitude of its inhabitants to work. The overwhelming majority of them work at their workplaces with coolness, "carelessly", and do not seek to increase labor efficiency. This is largely due to historical traditions, climatic conditions, low-calorie diet, and difficult living conditions.

All this together means that the struggle for renewal in the Arab East will continue and flare up with renewed vigor in various countries, especially densely populated ones.

² According to: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics. New York-Geneva, 2013. P. 457-467.

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