H. ALLEG, J. DE BONIS, H. DOUZON, J. FREIRE, P. HAUDIQUET. La Guerre d'Algerie. Т. 1. De I'Algerie des origines a Vinsurrection. 609 p. T. 2. Des promesses de paix a la guerre ouverte. 607 p. T. 3. Des complots du 13 mai a Vindependance. 613 p. P. Temps Actuels. 1981.

The book under review is the first fundamental study by French Marxists on the 1954-1962 war in Algeria. The head of the authors 'collective A. Alleg is a well-known journalist and a member of the editorial board of the newspaper "L'Humanite", in 1940-1965 he lived and worked in Algeria, was the editor and editor-in-chief of the democratic newspaper "Alger republicain", published in 1936-1955 and in 1962-1965, a member of the Central Committee (since 1962 - member of the Politburo of the Central Committee) The Algerian Communist Party (AKP). His books of memoirs about his personal participation in the Algerian events of 1954-1962 and about the courage of the Algerian communists thrown into colonial dungeons found a wide response all over the world, including in the USSR .1 Among other authors are known to have worked extensively in Algeria. de Boni and lawyer A. Duzon,

1 Alleg A. Interrogation under torture, Moscow, 1958. Fighters in captivity, Moscow, 1962.

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in 1951-1955, he repeatedly defended Algerian patriots during trials staged by colonialists .2 All the authors during the war in Algeria were, as A. Alleg writes in the preface, "active participants in the events who believed that France should contribute to Algeria's independence" (vol. 1, p. 9).

The publication is richly illustrated with works by French and Algerian artists (E. Delacroix, O. Renoir, O. Vernet, M. Rasim, B. Taslitsky, etc.). It is provided with maps, diagrams, and many references to sources. The authors used the French and Algerian press of 1830-1962, official reports and reports of French officials and generals, personal archives of participants in the events described, leaflets, diaries, unpublished dissertations, recordings of private conversations, memoirs and official documents, most of which are being introduced into scientific circulation for the first time. They also used an extremely rich and diverse literature on the Algerian war, including the latest works of Algerian historians such as M. Kaddash and M. Tegia3 . At the same time, they continue the long-term study of Algeria by French Marxist scholars .4
In the first volume - "From the original Algeria to the uprising" - there are two parts: "The Hidden Stream" by A. Allegha and "Missed Opportunities" by A. Duzon. Alleg calls his part an introduction to " the main features of Algeria of yesterday, its distant and glorious past." Without this, "it is impossible to truly understand the deep causes of the uprising" (vol. 1, p. 8). He refutes various myths and legends designed to justify the capture and enslavement of Algeria by France, reveals the true nature of the "historical" and other pseudo-grounds for the European colonization of Algeria as the supposedly legitimate heir to Roman rule in North Africa. Tracing the history of Algeria from the "great Numidian kings" of Carthage and Rome to the era of Turkish rule, Alleg shows the reasons for the change of various states and conquerors in Algeria. He highlights the role of the anti-French resistance led by Emir Abd al-Qadir in 1832-1847 and the subsequent anti-colonial uprisings in rallying all ethnic groups of the Algerian people.

A detailed description of colonial Algeria (pp. 87 - 157) shows the countless crimes of colonialism on Algerian soil. Much attention is paid to the internal life of the newly arrived European population, the everyday life of small colonists, and the peculiarities of the political life of Europeans in Algeria. Allegha's personal experience is reflected in his attention to the complexities of living together between Algerians and Europeans, to their relationship in the process of work and coexistence in working-class neighborhoods. The author emphasizes the inequality between Algerians and Europeans in all areas, and especially the inexhaustibility of the "legal arsenal of repression" against indigenous people, starting with the "native code" of 1881, which equated any call for freedom of Algerians to "encroach on the external security of the state" (p.153).

In the period between the two world wars, the foundation of the future Algerian revolution was essentially laid: various currents of anti-colonial protest were formed, the struggle of citizens for political rights and the struggle of peasants against land robbery, prosecution, confiscation and overexploitation were expanded. A huge role was played by the formation of the communist movement in Algeria during these years and the formation of an independent AKP in 1936. In 1926, with the help of the FKP, Algerian emigrants in France created the association "North African Star", which was succeeded in 1937 by the Party of the Algerian People (PAP), which was banned in 1939 and recreated in the legal form of the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Freedoms (MTLD) in 1946.

Allegheny describes the history of Algeria's national political parties in more detail than other French historians, providing many new materials, drawn, in particular, from the recordings of his conversations with more than 40 veterans of the liberation movement .5
2 See Braun P., Douzon H., Stibbe P., DeschezellesY. La repression en Algerie. P. 1955.

3 Kaddache M. Histoire du nationalisme algerien. T. 1 - 2. Alger. 1980; Теguia M. L'Algerie en guerre. Alger. 1981.

4 Lacoste Y., Nouschi A., Prenant A. L'Algerie. Passe et Present. P. 1960; Egretaud M. La Realite de la Nation Algerienne. P. 1961.

5 After the publication of The War in Algeria, the memoirs of a prominent former leader of Algerian nationalists, Ahmed Messali Hadj, were published (see Les Memoires de Messali Hadj. 1898 - 1938. P. 1982).

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Interesting is the information he provides for the first time about the size of the AKP in various periods of its activity, about the mood and actual situation in the party of Algerians and Europeans, about the relationship of the AKP with other patriotic forces. Allegh gives a new interpretation of the tragic events for Algerian patriots in May 1945, when "repressions were unleashed against the newly matured national movement" (p.256).

After that, Algeria was called "the three departments that were so calm" for nine years (p.269), since the country was divided into the departments of Oran, Algeria and Constantina. But this calmness was only an appearance. The holding of the "Nezhlen elections" in the country (i.e., grossly falsified by the Governor-General M.-E. Nezhlen) and external events (the beginning of the armed struggle in Tunisia in 1952 and in Morocco in 1953, the defeat of the French army in Vietnam in 1954) gradually strengthened the positions of those who had defended the independence of the country in 1947. inside the PAP, the MTLD is preparing for an armed uprising.

A. Duzon, in the second part of the first volume, first describes the social base of the future revolution (small merchants and artisans, peasants, especially the poor), on which all national parties, including the AKP, relied (pp. 306-307). He pays special attention to illegal PAP - MTLD fighters, who, in his opinion, were separated from the party's legal assets only "theoretically" (p.349). Tracing the life path of most prominent underground leaders, he comes to the conclusion about their "Plebeian" (petty - bourgeois-peasant or working-class) origin, about the influence of "simplified and generalized populist ideology", as well as "the language of socialism and liberal democracy" (p.350). Douzon also emphasizes the important role of Algerian labor immigrants in France in the preparation of the revolution, whose "national consciousness was doubly strengthened by their class consciousness acquired during the proletarian battles" (pp. 383-384).

The MTLD crisis, which began in 1953 (in fact earlier, in 1949-1951), sharply sharpened the contradictions between different factions, leaders, generations, and social groups. In the summer of 1954, the party openly split into " messalists "(supporters of the party chairman Messali Hadj) and " centralists "(adherents of the majority of the Central Committee), but a significant part of the cadres did not join either of these factions, either taking the side of the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (RKED), which demanded an end to discord, or taking a wait-and-see attitude position. In the end, the core of underground fighters, partisans, and some legal activists (especially in the mountainous regions) rallied around the RKED and launched preparations for an armed uprising in August-October 1954. It also formed the National Liberation Front (FLN) in October 1954, with its military detachments forming the National Liberation Army (ELN). A significant part of A. Duzon's section contains a large number of specific names, unknown circumstances, and details of the formation of the FLN and ANO (p. 392-424). "The genesis of what became known as the FLN on November 1, 1954, lasted less than one year" (p. 382).

The first operations of the FLN-ELN began on the night of November 1, 1954. Douzon lists them in detail, as well as the response of the colonial authorities, the further development of the guerrilla struggle of 1,500 insurgents and the counterattacks of about 50 thousand French troops (p. 426). But his main focus is on the political consequences of the outbreak of war in Algeria, i.e., the reactions of various circles of public opinion of "astonished France", the positions of various parties and groups in the mother country and Algeria, and the echoes abroad, including the efforts of the "Cairo Algerians", i.e., the most powerful group of Algerian emigrants in the Arab countries, called the " foreign the TNF delegation. Their actions in the international arena, especially in Bandung and at the United Nations, are covered in the special section "Algeria among Nations "(pp. 495-509).

The section " Beloved and suffering Algeria "(p. 511-569), ironically called the title of the book by J. Soustel, who was governor of Algeria in 1955-1956, is a hidden, and in some places outright polemic with the colonialist plans put forward by Soustel for the "integration" of Algeria (i.e., merger with France), his attempts to integrate Algeria into the world. combine social demagoguery and repression, persuasion and policing. At the same time, Duzon shows how tactically skilful the most talented of the leaders of the FLN acted in 1955-1956.

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R. Abban, who organized the joining of experienced politicians from among the "moderate" nationalists to the FLN, promoted the growth of the FLN's influence in the working-class and petty-bourgeois environment, established contacts between the ELN commanders in various districts, and stimulated the transition of trade unions and public organizations to the FLN side. Duzon considers August 20, 1955 to be a "turning point in the course of the war", when the uprising, which had seemed to be dying down since the spring, broke out with renewed vigor in the north-east of the country, gradually covering the entire territory by the end of the year. The final section of the first volume is devoted to the struggle for peace in Algeria of the French public in September-December 1955, the protests against the war of young recruits and conscripts, various parties, religious circles and intelligentsia groups. In the January 1956 elections in France, the left-wing parties won. A government was formed under the leadership of the Socialist leader Guy Mollet, who proposed to decide the fate of Algeria through negotiations. However, after the hostile demonstrations of the ultra-colonialists in Algeria on February 6, 1956, Guy Mollet, "who promised peace, began to wage war" (p. 586) in order to avoid "changes in France and in its position in the international arena" (p.593).

Douzon believes that the war in Algeria was for France an "export of internal conflict" caused by the difficulties of adapting to the new balance of power within the system of capitalism. In his opinion, this has repeatedly brought France "to the brink of civil war, for which Algeria was only an episode and a pretext" (p. 288). Therefore, the first years of the war in Algeria were "a history of missed opportunities to achieve peace", which was natural, because "the stake in the last colonial war for the French rulers was not the future of Algeria or even France's relations with Algeria, but the socio - economic and socio-political future of France itself" (p.593). In this way, the war became, as it were, a means of amortizing the contradictions within the mother country and one of the ways of isolating the F. C. P. Therefore, "elected as a leftist, Guy Mollet began to rule as a rightist," adhering to the old reactionary formula: "Better a war in Algeria than a popular dandy" (pp. 571, 586).

In the second volume ("From promises of peace to open war") There are also two parts - "Fire" by P. Odike and "In search of the last Quarter of an hour" by J. de Bonn. This, according to A. Alleg, is " a chronicle of the most terrible years of the war "(vol. 1, p. 8). Odike narrates the events of 1956 and explains them as "the real rise of colonialism", which achieved the mobilization of all the forces of France to "save Algeria" and caused the transition to violent measures and persistent attempts to crush the Algerian national unity. movement "(vol. 2, p. 9). With the light hand of Sustel, the war in Algeria began to be called "an aggressive act of pan-Arabism under the Egyptian leadership" (p. 38), in connection with which the opinion spread that the "rebellion" would choke if you hit Egypt. Guy Mollet's Government has requested and received special powers in Parliament. At the same time, the PCF, trying to achieve unity of the left forces and still not believing in Guy Mollet's apostasy (because, after returning from Algeria, he defiantly opposed colonialism and war, again making a 180-degree turn!), voted for special powers. Odike calls this decision "questionable both then and later" (p. 44). In the future, the process of building up the power of the French army in Algeria, accompanied by various promises, demagoguery and maneuvers of the authorities, and the response process of consolidating the forces of the FLN, rallying the entire Algerian people around it, went on in parallel. At the Summam congress in August 1956, the political and ideological platform of the FLN and the organizational structure of the ANO were approved, and the personnel of the National Council of the Algerian Revolution (NSAR) and the Coordination and Executive Committee (CEC) were appointed. Much new and unknown information is given about the work of the Congress (pp. 194-212).

Special attention should be paid to the role of the AKP in the revolution. The authors of the three-volume book consider it not separately, like most of their predecessors, but in close connection with the course of events, considering the Algerian Communist Party to be as much a participant in the revolution as other national parties of Algeria. In addition to the AKP press and documents, they use a lot of personal testimonies of the party leaders B. Hajj Ali, P. Caballero, A. Mouan and S. Hajeres, who joined the ranks of the ANO and were members of the AKP Central Committee. Saadoun, A. Budiaf, M. Berrahu, A. Benzin, and others. The authors do not hide the difficulties that accompanied prisoe-

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The AKP's involvement in the revolution and the general Algerian public's lack of information about the true nature and goals of the FLN, "intense disputes partly related to the very composition of the party, which is one-third European, mostly urban" (p.111). But after the decision of the Central Committee of the AKP of June 20, 1955, the party moved from covertly supporting the revolution to actively participating in it by joining the FLN, where possible, or by creating organizations of "Liberation Fighters" in other cases. About all this, the second volume contains a lot of unpublished first-hand information (p. 111 - 115, 126 - 129, 169 - 172, 189 - 195, 364 - 369, 476 - 492, 520 - 529)6 . Data on the PCF's struggle against the war in Algeria and its assistance to the FLN and AKP are also interesting. 64 - 84, 355 - 356, 543 - 554, 566 - 569).

In the fall of 1956, the French dealt the FLN a series of heavy blows, seizing a significant part of the weapons going from Egypt to Algeria, capturing the main" external " leaders of the FLN, led by Ben Bella, and taking part in the triple Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt. However, "the fate of Algeria was not decided in Suez" (p. 268). The FLN continued to struggle, managing to overcome all difficulties and even increasing pressure on the French army and police both in rural areas and in cities.

In the second part of the second volume, J. de Bonn focused on refuting the official optimism of the French minister - resident of Algeria in 1956-1958, the right-wing socialist R. Lacoste, who always claimed that the rebels were about to be defeated and that the "last quarter of an hour" was coming in Algeria. However, it never came. In 1957, heavy fighting took place in various parts of the country, during which the ELN improved its military skills, learned how to handle new equipment, began using artillery, mortars, radio equipment, strengthened ties with the population and expanded its ranks due to the constant influx of volunteers. The PAO (political and administrative organization) was also improved, which consisted of local FLN committees led by political commissars, which were based on the grassroots cells of the FLN and elected people's assemblies that operated underground even in the areas where French troops were stationed. At the same time, the international prestige of the FLN grew, and assistance to it from abroad, including from the countries of socialism, increased.

De Bonn dwells in detail on the discovery of "an oil oasis in the romantic desert" (p. 305), which gave new impetus to the supporters of "French Algeria", because the Sahrawi oil was, according to their calculations, "to establish the French presence in the Sahara". Parliamentary combinations, the hopes of businessmen, and the ambitions of politicians were therefore closely intertwined since 1956 with the colonialist concepts of the European "lords" of Algeria and the claims of the army circles, who were eager in Algeria to take revenge for the defeats in Indochina. Hence the stock market hype around the oil projects of the Parisian technocracy, the growing influence of the military, especially "terrorists in leopard uniforms" (p. 417), i.e. paratrooper officers led by the infamous General Massu, the unprecedented brutality of mass tortures, executions and other repressions in Algeria against the rebellious people. In this case, Zh. de Bonn sees the roots of numerous conspiracies against the Fourth Republic in 1956-1958. 325 - 337, 371 - 405, 588 - 591).

By the fall of 1957, the success of the FLN was overshadowed by failure: the "battle for the city of Algiers", which lasted almost a year and a half, was lost, as well as the struggle of the FLN underground in other cities. 7 This contributed to prolonging the war and facilitated the demagogic maneuvers of the French army's military intelligence "psychological action service "and the governing bodies created by it - the" specialized administrative sections "(SAS) and the" urban administrative sections " (ACS), which are discussed in more detail in the third volume.

By the beginning of 1958, the propaganda of colonial chauvinism had intensified in France and among the Europeans of Algeria.-

6 The book also includes previously published materials of the AKP (see The Algerian Communist Party in the War for National Independence, Moscow, 1961; The Algerian People will Win, Moscow, 1961; Essai sur la Nation Algerienne (s. 1.), 1958; Pour une Nation Algerienne Libre, Souveraine et Heureuse. Alger. 1957).

7 During the" Battle for the City of Algiers", almost all members of the"Liberation Fighters" groups who had joined the FLN since July 1, 1956 were killed, executed, or imprisoned. Only in November 1956 - January 1957 140 members of the AKP were arrested in the capital (t 2, p. 485).

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the solution of the Algerian problem in these conditions also began to turn against the liberal circles of the French bourgeoisie, who were trying to find some externally "decent" way out of the war on the basis of a neo-colonialist compromise. The ultracolonialists of Algeria and France, as well as the French officers, were particularly enraged by the intervention of the United States and Britain in the conflict between France and Tunisia due to Tunisian support for the Algerian rebels (pp. 578-588). This led to an uprising of Algerian-European extremists on May 13, 1958, supported by the generals and officers of the French corps in Algeria.

The third volume - "From the Conspiracies of May 13 to Independence" - is entirely written by J. R. R. Tolkien. Freyr. It tells how the events of May 1958 in Algeria served as a catalyst for profound changes in France, leading to the fall of the Fourth Republic and its replacement by the regime of the Fifth Republic. He considers the main reason for this replacement to be the position of the 500 members of the National Council of French Entrepreneurs, who discussed the economic situation of France on May 13, 1958 (vol. 3, pp. 30-38). After that, the war lasted for almost four more years, but the main focus of the struggle shifted to the sphere of politics and diplomacy. Immediately after coming to power in June 1958, de Gaulle went to Algeria, where he tried to combine some of the slogans of the May 13 rebels with his political concepts, including the idea of equality of all Algerians as supposedly "fully French". It was in order to maintain this illusion that the " psychologists "from the paratroopers and self-propelled guns organized fake demonstrations of" Franco-Muslim fraternization "with the help of the"blue" (traitor collaborators). However, the relentless intensity of the fighting clearly refuted the myth of the" fraternization " of Algerians with their oppressors, although in certain circles the FULL NAME of de Gaulle was considered capable of "a wise decision recognizing our independence" (p.68). We had to wait for such a decision for a long time.

Having achieved the results of the referendum in September 1958 and the elections in November 1958 that pleased him, General de Gaulle called for" peace of the brave " in Algeria (meaning the actual surrender of the ELN) and proclaimed a promising five-year development plan for the country, which, if implemented, would only increase Algeria's economic dependence on France and the United States. it did not determine his political future in any way.

Meanwhile, "the war has crossed the Mediterranean" (p. 76): The FIO began combat operations in France from the end of August 1958.8 Relying on broad international support for the struggle of Algeria, including political and material assistance from the socialist countries (p. 95), on the authority of the FLN among the broad masses of Algerians, and on the efforts of the ELN, which heroically continued the unequal struggle in even more difficult conditions after May 1958, the KIK and the NSAR created in September 1958. The Interim Government of the Republic of Algeria (VPAR), which was quickly recognized by many countries in Asia and Africa. Pointing out that Paris clearly underestimated the importance of the emergence of the VPA, Frey also dwells on the" political difficulties and mistakes " of the FLN at that time, on its weaknesses, primarily determined by the separation of the VPA from the fighters inside Algeria. He also writes about the tragic mistake of Colonel Amiroush, the commander of the ANO Kabylia, who was misled by the French secret services and executed many of his soldiers on false charges of espionage and treason (pp. 122-124).

Convinced of the futility of attempts to defeat the ELN militarily, and also (during his many trips to Algeria) of the growing political influence of the FLN, de Gaulle proclaimed Algeria's right to self-determination in September 1959, but framed it in such a way that it would mean Algeria's "association" with France, while retaining control of the latter's defense, foreign policy, finance and education of Algeria. Nevertheless, the very fact that this right was recognized enraged the ultra-colonialists of France and the" seigneurs " of the colonization of Algeria, who began openly preparing a rebellion, dreaming of replacing de Gaulle with a "dynamic military junta "or a kind of" Franco and Salazar " (p.164).

From this point on, de Gaulle played a complex game in which advertising successful military operations against the ELN served in fact as a means of pressuring the FLN in the course of almost uninterrupted secret Franco-Algerian contacts since the end of 1958. Дипломати-

8 J. Freyer refrains from condemning this action of the FLN and does not even mention the negative attitude of the PCF towards it in 1958.

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political maneuvers alternated with reprisals, and acts of "mercy" alternated with acts of intransigence. At the same time, de Gaulle had to engage in an open struggle with the rebellious ultra-colonialists who organized a "week of barricades" in Algeria in January 1960. However, the isolation of the putschists (in France, 13 million people participated in a protest strike against them) allowed the general to easily cope with them (pp. 180-187).

Combining the chronological principle of presentation with the problematic one, Freyr shows that there was a struggle among the Algerian revolutionaries, which was expressed in disagreements about the further ways and methods of warfare, about the role of the ELN and the FLN, about the personal composition of the NSAR and VPA. The French ruling circles, aware of these differences, tried to exploit them and end the war on their own terms.

Having made an attempt to secretly obtain the surrender of a part of the ELN in March 1960 (the"Si Salah affair"), de Gaulle, after its failure, for the first time officially invited FLN delegates to Paris in June 1960, but reduced contacts with them to demanding the surrender of weapons. At the same time, yielding to the pressure of the French peace movement in Algeria, which had intensified again since the spring of 1959, de Gaulle put forward the formula of "Algerian Algeria", but made the cessation of fighting a condition for starting negotiations. After suppressing the reactionary "general putsch" in April 1961, he nevertheless began negotiations with the FLN in Evian in May 1961, then resumed in Lugrain in July of the same year. Since the spring of 1961, de Gaulle also used the pogrom and terrorist activities of the OAS fascists (including against him personally) to put pressure on the FLN. Gradually, however, he was forced to agree to the main demands of the FLN: recognition of the independence and territorial integrity of Algeria, including the Algerian Sahara. These requirements, with minor reservations concerning the temporary presence of French troops and military bases in Algeria, the granting of citizenship to Algerian-Europeans for three years, and the priority of France in the development of the Sahara, formed the basis of the Evian Agreements that ended the Algerian war in March 1962.

Much attention is paid in the third volume to internal events in France: the PCF's struggle to end the Algerian war, the persecution of the Jeanson network and other anti-colonial groups in France that tried to help the FLN, including literary and artistic figures who signed the famous Manifesto 121 in 1960. No less space is given to the metamorphosis of the official position of France, from the unconditional approval of the slogan "French Algeria" to the more flexible formula of "Algerian Algeria" and, finally, the recognition (albeit with reservations and in stages) of Algeria's right to self-determination and independence. It should be borne in mind that one of the tasks of the book was to polemicize colonialist ideas in the minds of the average Frenchman.

The authors coped not only with this task, but also with others that they set themselves in a peer-reviewed study. "We tried," writes A. Alleg in the introduction, " in spite of everything, to show the historical, national and social causes of the war, its duration and cruelty, the blindness of some who desperately clung to the myth of French Algeria, the persistent and passionate desire of others to win the right to be themselves. For what for the French remains the last, most brutal and most traumatic colonial war, for the Algerians is a matter of pride and glory, the time of broken shackles has finally come, despite all the grief, cruelty and destruction" (vol.1, p. 8).

The peer-reviewed work, in addition to its source and research novelty, is also of interest in purely factual terms. The appendices (vol.3, pp. 432-602), which contain texts of many documents and primary sources, personalities, indexes, chronological and statistical tables, are also very valuable. A solid scientific apparatus does not obscure the purely literary merits of the book. But first of all, it is a deep and timely scientific research.

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