S. V. MEZENTSEV

Candidate of Military Sciences Institute of Africa, Russian Academy of Sciences

Peacemaking Keywords: counterterrorism, maritime piracy, "humanitarian interventions". advanced military presence, private military companies. AFRICOM

Recently, there has been a further increase in the use of foreign military force in Africa in general and in the Horn of Africa in particular. Today, this sub-region can be considered as a kind of benchmark for analyzing the various forms of use by the United States of America and other NATO countries of their armed forces (AF) in order to ensure political, military-strategic and economic interests on the African continent.

The increase in the number and quality of NATO's military presence in the Horn of Africa is formally explained by a number of reasons. First, it is an extremely favorable geostrategic position of this area, which is determined by its proximity to the main oil production zones on the Arabian Peninsula, as well as the location of the most important sea communications of world significance. Secondly, the relatively short-lived increase in maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden and coastal waters of Somalia. And, finally, the increased conflict potential of the Horn of Africa, where numerous intra - and inter-State armed conflicts and wars have not stopped for decades.

PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA AND FOREIGN MILITARY POWER

It can be assumed that the leading form of use of foreign military force in order to ensure regional security should be peacemaking ¹. At the same time, in practice, the reverse process has been observed in recent years. There is a gradual reduction in the direct involvement of foreign armed forces in peacekeeping activities under the auspices of the UN, which is increasingly being replaced by so-called "humanitarian interventions", as will be discussed in more detail below. At the same time, the use of foreign military force in the interests of ensuring counter-terrorism activities and an advanced presence in various countries of the African continent is consistently increasing.

In the early 1990s, the participation of the Armed Forces of the United States and other NATO countries in peacekeeping operations, including in Africa, was identified as one of the priorities. This provision was, in particular, enshrined in the military-strategic concept of the administration of American President George H. W. Bush, called "The Base Force". Its direct developer, who at that time was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General K. Powell was in favor of increasing the level of American participation in peacekeeping operations conducted under the auspices of international organizations.²

In 1992, the US government initiated the participation of the US Armed Forces in the planned humanitarian operation "Restore Hope" in Somalia. Directly under the American command, the joint task force (UNITAF) was deployed on the territory of this country, which numbered up to 37 thousand. military personnel. It consisted of military contingents from 24 countries. The total cost of the two phases of the peacekeeping operation in Somalia was $ 1.687 billion.³ However, the activities of foreign armed forces in Somalia were ineffective. The operation here was one of the bloodiest in the entire history of UN peacekeeping. Losses among the personnel amounted to 143 people ⁴.

* Historically, demographically, and geographically, the Horn of Africa is a sub-region that unites Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti. However, in terms of geopolitical significance, it sometimes includes Sudan, which provides a link between the Horn and the Nile Valley, so this sub-region is often called the Greater Horn (author's note).

According to American experts, the "Restoration of Hope" ended in failure due to the phenomenon known in American military theory as "task creep" (mission creep). U.S. Marines landed in Somalia for mostly humanitarian missions, and as a result, they became embroiled in a low-intensity internal conflict. The task was not completed, the conflict became protracted, and the losses incurred caused discontent within the United States5.

The fiasco of the peacekeeping operation in Somalia was one of the reasons that direct intervention in the internal conflicts of "failed states", especially where there are no clearly expressed US interests, has lost the support of the American public. Currently, the item "on the provision of forces and resources for multilateral peacekeeping operations" is only formally preserved in the list of strategic tasks of American military policy.⁶

The former colonial powers (Great Britain, France, Italy, and Portugal), which traditionally demonstrate high political, military, and economic activity in Africa, also minimize the direct participation of national armed forces in African peacekeeping operations. Such a policy is quite justified and understandable, from the point of view of reducing the risks of extremely unpopular combat losses of personnel abroad in Western society, especially in the course of resolving "foreign" and far from their national interests African conflicts.

Since the 2000s, as a rule, Western countries have limited themselves to sending their staff officers to crisis areas as military observers or control officers.⁷ At the same time, the United States and other NATO countries are strengthening their own control over the political and economic aspects of development in Africa, especially in the post-crisis period.

To this end, they maintain and even increase their participation in the process of creating the Pan-African Collective Security System (CSCS) and its basic element-the African Permanent Readiness Force (ASPF). Today, almost all activities in this area are funded by targeted contributions from Western donor countries, which also provide consulting support.

At the same time, the heavy dependence of African countries on external financial assistance contradicts their own ability to make independent decisions during peacekeeping operations, not only at the strategic, operational, but sometimes also at the tactical level. A well-known expert in the field of African peacemaking, Cedric de Koning, quite rightly emphasizes in this regard: "Success or failure in further developing Africa's peacekeeping capacity will be determined by whether the right balance can be found between the goals and objectives pursued in this political and military area by Africans themselves and the interests of foreign donor partners." ⁸

At the same time, it should be noted that recently the aspirations of the parties do not always coincide, especially in the course of building a post-conflict future.-

go in many African countries.

Another important use of foreign military force remains the provision of military assistance to Africans in matters of national military construction. US military analysts explicitly point out that "the US army should form an advisory corps that will be sent to various regions of the world and act in the allied armies as the basis of the training and military management system. However, forces on the battlefield must be provided by foreign allies, including in Africa. " ⁹

"HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION", "FIGHT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND MARITIME PIRACY" - REASONS OR PRETEXTS?

As already noted, in recent years, the concept of "humanitarian interventions"has been brought to the forefront in the theory and practice of the use of military force by the United States and its main NATO allies, primarily Great Britain and France, in international relations. As a rule, they are implemented in the form of armed interventions in the course of an internal conflict under the slogan of performing humanitarian tasks (protecting security zones, ensuring the safety of refugees, delivering food, restricting activities or removing "undemocratic" regimes from power, from the point of view of the West, etc.). This trend in the use of military force by the United States and the NATO bloc certainly deserves a detailed scientific analysis. Without going into a more detailed discussion of the concept of "humanitarian intervention" in this article, however, we emphasize that it is always associated with the formulation and solution of political, military, and in many cases economic tasks.

Speaking about the development of the US military policy, we note that as the state leadership changes, it undergoes certain evolutionary changes, including in approaches to the scale and degree of involvement of the US Armed Forces in conflicts on foreign territories. With the arrival of the democratic administration of Barack Obama in the White House on January 20, 2009, the world became cautiously optimistic about possible constructive changes in US foreign policy, especially against the background of gross miscalculations and obvious failures in this area that were made by the previous US administration.¹⁰ Obviously, if in the period from 1996 to 2005. While Washington has assumed the role of military leader and direct participant in foreign military interventions of coalition forces (Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq), the recent events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Mali, and Syria demonstrate more secrecy, caution, and flexibility in US actions. In recent conflicts and crises, the US Armed Forces, as a rule, are mainly involved in providing logistical, information and intelligence and advisory support for the actions of their NATO allies. The use of American personnel is limited to the use of special operations forces units.

This does not mean that the United States intends to abandon the offensive course of its foreign policy in order to achieve political, military-strategic and economic goals in various parts of the world.

We can only talk about some changes in tactics and strategy in the course of implementing the goals set.

In the new conditions of post-bipolar development and the virtual absence of an external military threat, America is forced to justify its military and political actions abroad more and more carefully in order to gain support at home and in the international arena. For this purpose, American politicians still widely use the traditional pretexts of "fighting global terrorism", "protecting democracy around the world", "humanitarian responsibility", "improving the level of security and protection of American citizens and facilities abroad", etc.

Noting the adjustment of the US military strategy in foreign territories, some observers express the hope that the country's political and military leadership is beginning to learn lessons from the long-term unpromising wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Apparently, Washington no longer wants or can not get involved in endless wars with invisible enemies, protecting "ungrateful local residents." Based on this, in the new conditions, the American leadership intends to more actively involve other states and political forces in solving emerging problems, providing them with only indirect support.-

power with weapons, money, military advisers, and intelligence.

In pursuing its policy in African countries, the United States is increasingly taking advantage of its NATO allies, the old colonial powers, with minimal risks to itself. In particular, in the context of the development of the latest internal political crisis in Mali, the main tasks of a military nature were assigned to the French contingent. At the same time, the United States coordinated and directly participated in the transport and logistics support of the French Operation Serval and its intelligence support. In addition, they provided financial and material assistance to the peacekeeping contingent of ECOWAS member countries.* In other regions, such as the Middle East, Americans are actively engaging local political and religious movements for the same purpose. Such a strategy, which has been figuratively called "leadership or playing from behind", is becoming increasingly widely used in the foreign policy practice of the Obama administration.¹¹

Recently, the use of foreign military force in operations to counter international armed criminal groups, including sea pirates, has been increasing.

The problem of the spread of piracy off the coast of Somalia, the Gulf of Aden and the north-western Indian Ocean has long been an international concern. The actions of sea robbers are damaging the development of countries in the region and the global economy as a whole. According to various estimates, the total amount of cash ransoms paid to pirate groups in 2010 is between $4.9 and $8.3 billion.¹²

The increasing activity of pirate groups in the mid-2000s led to increased efforts by the international community to counter them, including through the use of foreign military force. Since 2008, in the waters of the Horn of Africa, naval groups from the US Navy, NATO and the European Union have been participating on a permanent basis in the multinational anti-piracy force. A number of major anti-piracy operations are underway in the region, such as Ocean Shield and Atalanta**, which also involve the US Coalition tactical formation.

In late 2012 and early 2013, the number of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea area significantly decreased. A special report published in July 2013 by the International Chamber of Commerce and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB)¹³ noted that the first half of this year recorded the lowest level of maritime piracy activity since 2006: In the first half of 2013, a total of 138 pirate attacks were recorded worldwide (compared to 177 in the same period in 2012), which resulted in seven hijackings of merchant ships (there were ²⁰ hijackings in 2012). Including 9 pirate attacks in the Somali zone, which resulted in two hijackings14. As of June 30, 2013, 57 sailors and 4 merchant ships were being held hostage at Somali pirate bases. The fate and whereabouts of 11 other sailors captured by pirates in 2010 are unknown.

The report shows a trend of shifting the focus of pirate activity from Somalia to the Gulf of Guinea, where 31 armed attacks on merchant ships were recorded in the first half of 2013, culminating in four pirate hijackings, of which 22 occurred in the territorial waters of Nigeria.

IMB experts note that the reduction of pirate activity in the Somali region was facilitated by a set of measures, including::

- anti-piracy activities of foreign naval forces stationed in pirate-prone areas;

- expansion of the practice of using private security structures for escorting sea vessels;

- more active use of special equipment and equipment installed on board ships;

- improvement of special crew training.

The greatest efficiency is observed when escorting a group of several merchant ships through a pirate-dangerous direction by a warship. During the course of the naval convoys, not a single attempt at pirate attacks was recorded. Warships of the Russian Navy, which are on a rotating basis in the Gulf of Aden on permanent duty, also take part in escorting sea convoys. However, the disadvantage of this method of combating pirates is the rather high cost of the service and the need to wait at the ship collection point (7-12 units) to start posting, which leads to downtime and a significant increase in the current operating costs of shipowners.

Another effective way to counter pirates is to have a group of armed guards on board a merchant ship. This conclusion is supported by statistics showing that pirates have never managed to capture a vessel protected in this way, despite the fact that 45 such attempts were recorded, for example, in 2011. At the same time, a problematic issue with this type of escort is sometimes the legal unresolved issues of storing automatic firearms on board civilian vessels and the practice of their use. This problem led to an incident in Nigeria in 2012, when the Nigerian authorities arrested a ship, crew and armed guards on board on charges of illegal possession of automatic small arms. The trial for this episode continues on ¹⁵.

* ECOWAS-Regional Union of West African countries. The unit has its own ECOMOG collective armed forces. ECOWAS is headquartered in Abuja, Nigeria.

** Ocean Shield is an ongoing NATO operation to combat Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. Launched in August 2009.

Atalanta is an ongoing operation to combat Somali piracy. It has been held by the EU Navy since December 2008.

As for the effectiveness of anti-piracy measures off the coast of Somalia by the US, EU and NATO naval forces, its results remain at a relatively low level. Representatives of the Navies of the countries participating in these operations, at an informal level, recognize that the presence of naval ship groups in the Gulf of Aden does not fully meet the tasks of anti-piracy activities.

It should also be noted that some Somali politicians have recently increasingly expressed doubts about the real interest of Western and Arab States in a practical solution to the problem of piracy in coastal waters. Independent military experts attribute this passivity to the fact that the current situation gives NATO countries a formal excuse to maintain their permanent naval presence in the areas of strategically important maritime transport links.

FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES AND PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES

In analyzing the various forms of use of foreign military force in the Horn of Africa, the increasing involvement of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in combat, especially in crisis areas, deserves attention.

As noted above, the international business of providing paid services for escort and armed protection at sea is actively developing. Currently, a significant number of foreign PMSCs are represented in this market. For example, let's call AdvanFort, G4S, IMSA, MAST¹⁶, etc. ¹⁷ As a rule, such structures are registered in the UK (a relatively simple registration procedure from a legal point of view), in the USA, or have the status of offshore ones. Most PMSCs widely take advantage of retired professional military specialists dismissed from the Armed Forces of the United States, NATO, Israel, Russia, Ukraine and other countries.

In addition, the practice of using PMSCs in peacekeeping and so-called "humanitarian" actions in a number of crisis areas of the world, including in Africa, is constantly expanding. Among the most famous are such Western companies as the American DynCorp International and XE Services*, specializing in international military and police operations.

This type of business was formed during the national liberation wars during the decolonization of Africa in the 1960s and was particularly developed in South Africa. Currently, there are more than 10 thousand large security PMSCs in the world, where up to 1.5 million professionals work, who are not inferior in their special training and weapons to regular army formations. In the United States alone, there are about 100 companies that regularly cooperate with the State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence agencies. ¹⁸ The trend of "privatization of war" is most clearly seen in the course of US and NATO military activity in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it also has its manifestations in the Horn of Africa.

Currently, a large number of foreign PMSCs operate in almost all countries of the sub-region, but the largest number is observed in Somalia. The difficult internal political situation in the country, incessant local fighting between military-clan groups ensure a high demand for PMSC services. Foreign specialists are widely employed both to protect individuals and various facilities, and to train local security structures.¹⁹

In the mid-2000s, the US Military Department expressed interest in expanding its participation in the African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia (MACCOM). Based on the inadmissibility of losses among the personnel of the national Armed Forces, the American command repeatedly used various PMSCs.

So, from January 2007 to the present, the American company DynCorp International (DI) has been actively working in Somalia under a contract with the Pentagon and the US State Department. During the initial phase of preparation for the deployment of the Mission, this structure participated in military training, equipping and organizing airlift operations to Mogadishu of military contingents from the Armed Forces of Uganda and Burundi. Subsequently, the Company carried out deliveries of armored vehicles to Somalia.-

* This PMSC is better known by its former name Blackwater.

vehicles, radio communication equipment, mobile generators, tents, military uniforms and equipment, as well as other technical equipment.

Armed convoys of this American PMSC were involved in escorting and protecting civilian personnel of the United States and humanitarian supplies during their movement through Somali territory. To date, DI has airlifted more than 12,000 African Union peacekeepers to MACCOM, as well as delivered more than 15 million pounds of cargo to and from Somalia using air, rail and sea transport, providing more than 280 air arrivals to Mogadishu and other areas on Somali territory. To support operations in Somalia and other Horn of Africa countries, DI has representative offices or authorized agents in Kampala, Uganda, Mogadishu, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.²⁰

In addition, DI military instructors, together with another PMSC affiliated with the American oil and gas corporation Halliburton under a contract with the US and British Defense Ministries, trained military personnel and police officers for the transitional Somali government. They also participated in military training for the Somali special forces and security services. Special forces training was conducted both on Somali territory and on the basis of military training centers in Ethiopia. Funding for signed contracts is usually provided from the budget of the Pentagon and the US State Department. For this purpose, the articles allocated to support African peacekeeping missions are used.

Various private military structures of Western countries, working through contacts with military departments, are usually used to collect intelligence and economic information. According to some reports, American PMSCs working in Somalia under contracts signed through the Texas oil Corporation Halliburton, under the guise of MACCOM security tasks, evaluated oil and gas fields on Somali territory and the adjacent offshore shelf in order to secure them for the American company.

In conclusion, we will consider another leading form of military force in the Horn of Africa, from the point of view of Western military policy, namely, providing an advanced military presence. The main forms of military presence (according to American views) are: permanent deployment of troops; periodic and temporary deployment of troops; joint comprehensive exercises; port calls and other visits; preventive deployment of military equipment; humanitarian presence; deployment of security teams; state-level assistance; contacts between the military; presence of military attaches ²¹.

It should also take into account the hidden means of conducting its military policy on the territory of third countries, such as providing military assistance (sending military instructors and advisers to the country), as well as military-technical assistance (including the sale, transfer, supply of military equipment and weapons, and their storage on the territory of other countries).²².

GEOSTRATEGY, MILITARY POLICY IN AFRICA AND AFRICOM

The main motivation for increasing NATO's forward military presence in the Horn of Africa is, of course, its extremely advantageous geostrategic position.

First, it is home to a key transport hub centered in Djibouti. It is the most important sea routes for the delivery of goods (including hydrocarbons) from North America to Asia and back, as well as from the Middle East to Africa. Given the availability of modern weapons delivery systems and radar tracking, it is possible to control not only the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, but also access to the Arabian Sea and the Strait of Hormuz from the territory of the Horn of Africa. The value of the latter is determined by the main routes of oil transportation from the Persian Gulf*.

Secondly, the special significance of the Horn of Africa is determined by the fact that from the south it is closely adjacent to the oil-bearing region of the Greater Middle East outlined by Western strategists. It is no coincidence that in the 1970s and 1980s this area was the scene of intense competition between the United States and the USSR for dominance in providing an advanced military presence. It can be said that the struggle for the possibility of sea and land bases in Somalia, Djibouti or Ethiopia was then a determining factor in making the most important foreign policy decisions implemented by Moscow and Washington in these countries during the Cold War.

Without delving into this broad topic, which is independent for a separate historical study, we will note only one episode. Thus, according to some estimates, the decisive factor that determined the reorientation of the Soviet Union from supporting the Somali leader Siad Barre to providing military assistance to the Ethiopian regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam was the ability to access the infrastructure of Ethiopia, namely, the port of Aseb and the island of Dahlak. According to the Soviet military leadership, the use of these facilities in the interests of basing the Soviet Navy opened up wider opportunities for controlling the Red Sea, compared to the lost base in Berbera on Somali territory. ²³

Since the end of the cold War, the Horn of Africa has not lost its geostrategic significance in the post-bipolar era.²⁴ Moreover, today we can talk about its further growth, especially against the background of the well-known processes taking place in North Africa and the growing confrontation in the Middle East.

* An average of 10 to 15 heavy oil tankers pass through the Strait almost daily.

The Middle East, as well as escalating tensions around Iran. Under the current circumstances, the Horn of Africa is once again becoming a zone of increased attention for NATO countries, which are now increasingly competing with China and India.

Currently, there is a permanent military presence in this sub-region of the United States, other NATO countries, Japan and China. The land and sea contingents of these States are deployed on various contractual and legal bases, which involve the long-term deployment of personnel and military equipment in Djibouti. This small African country in terms of territory and population is figuratively called a " geographical dwarf turning into a geopolitical giant."

Today, the American Coalition joint tactical formation "Arikan Horn" (COOTF - AR)²⁵, two military bases and several military facilities of the French Armed Forces are stationed on the territory of Djibouti. It also houses advanced command posts, temporary bases, fuel and lubricants storage depots and logistics facilities, as well as military communications missions of the Armed Forces and Navies of Germany, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Great Britain and Japan. The possibility of a permanent base in Djibouti is being explored by the Chinese Government.

According to some reports, a number of similar military installations have also been deployed or are being deployed in Somalia, in particular, in the territory of the self-proclaimed unrecognized Republic of Somaliland near the port of Berbera, in some areas of Ethiopia and the oil-rich South Sudan adjacent to the Horn of Africa.

A new tool for conducting the policy of using military force in the Horn of Africa, as well as on the African continent as a whole, was the relatively recently created American command of the US Armed Forces-AFRICA Command²⁶. Its area of operational responsibility includes the entire African continental region, with the exception of Egypt.²⁷

We will focus on a brief analysis of the declared and actual goals of AFRICOM and its role in the implementation of American policy in Africa. According to one of the initiators of the idea of creating a separate Command for Africa, US President George W. Bush, the new military-political structure is designed to ensure the development of US cooperation with Africa in the field of security.

According to American leaders, AFRICOM should help strengthen efforts to help Africans maintain peace and stability on the continent, as well as promote American values such as development, strengthening health care, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa. ²⁸ According to American officials, AFRICOM's activities are based on the so-called principle three "D's" (Defense, Development, and Diplomacy*).

Thus, the African Command is positioned as a model of the "military-political structure of a new format and content", deployed in the changed foreign policy conditions after the end of the Cold War. In this regard, its focus is presented by American propaganda, first of all, as the coordination of humanitarian, peacekeeping, diplomatic and only last of all the actual military activities.

However, there are other assessments of the challenges facing AFRICA, which are formulated in a more closed format by American analysts as follows::

- ensuring the control of African areas rich in natural, primarily hydrocarbon resources, protecting mining facilities and their transportation routes;

- countering the spread of China's political and economic influence in Africa;

- extension of American control to "weak African states" in order to prevent the possibility of using their territories and facilities by unfriendly regimes or international terrorist organizations;

- Ensuring stability and maintaining peace (including using force to enforce peace) in the most volatile regions and selected countries in Africa ²⁹.

Thus, it seems that the continued and recently expanded military presence of the United States and its Western allies in the Horn of Africa region is in line with the offensive aggressive policy of the North Atlantic Alliance. US and NATO military bases in the countries of the sub-region are considered by the US military command as the second echelon and reserve logistics support point for the coalition forces deployed in the Iranian direction. The strategic importance of the Horn of Africa for the United States also increases due to the aggravation of the military-political situation in the countries of North Africa and the need for military cover of oil production areas in the countries of the Middle East allied to Washington.

It should be noted that some Western politicians use various challenges and threats to international security (terrorism, maritime piracy, etc.) as pretexts for increasing the use of military force in the Horn of Africa and in the adjacent sea areas, however, as in other regions of the continent.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the prospects for a real and lasting stabilization of the situation in the Horn of Africa, as in other parts of the world, are not connected with the build-up of a foreign military presence. The solution of pressing problems of sub - regional security, including overcoming existing intra-and inter-State conflicts, lies primarily in the political, economic and social spheres, and depends on the capabilities of the State.

* Defense, Development, And Diplomacy.

development of cross-country economic cooperation.

Since the Cold War and up to recent events in Somalia, Ivory Coast, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Mali, practice has shown that any kind of foreign intervention, especially military intervention, under whatever plausible humanitarian pretexts, has inversely proportional results, exacerbating existing problems and creating new ones. This is largely due to the fact that humanitarian motives for external interference are often mixed up with their own political goals and aspirations of external players. On the other hand, foreign intermediaries lack knowledge of the real situation on the ground and understanding of internal political, ethno-confessional processes, clan and tribal relations that take place in conflict zones.

Based on the above, we can say with a high degree of confidence that the lower the level of external influence on the Horn of Africa becomes, the more stable the long-term prospects for its development, including in terms of ensuring sub-regional security.

¹ One of the main forms of peacekeeping activity remains peacekeeping operations - one of the main types of using military force to restore and maintain peace, and to prevent armed violence both within States and in relations between them. The specifics of these operations are that they must be carried out under the mandate and in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions, in some cases under the mandate of regional organizations, but, as a rule, with the consent and decision of the UN Security Council. Such operations also include the so-called peace enforcement, when peacekeeping forces conduct combat operations aimed at stopping aggression and restoring the status quo. A characteristic feature of peacekeeping operations is that military force is used in this case not for the traditional purposes of seizing territories, sources of raw materials, etc. (although this is far from obsolete), but in order to restore international law and order, maintain peace and security, and carry out necessary humanitarian actions.

² Military force in International Relations: a textbook (Collective of authors, under general ed. Annenkova V. I.). Moscow, KNORUS, 2011. p. 306.

^{Zaemskiy V. F.} 3 UN and Peacemaking, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 2012, p. 242.

⁴ Only the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), in which 245 soldiers were killed, and the United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), in which 245 soldiers were killed, were recorded to have suffered major personnel losses in a single operation over a comparable time period (1960 - 1964). Losses totaled 162 people (see: Zaemsky V. F. Decree, op. cit.).

⁵ Military force in international relations... p. 306.

⁶ Ibid., p. 484.

⁷ For example, in 2008, at the end of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), the 3,369-strong military contingent consisted mainly of Indian troops, while 213 officers from the United States, Western and Eastern European countries, and Russia participated as military observers. The United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), which has been operating since March 2005, is also largely represented by NATO officers as military observers. In the African Union - United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), Western officers also serve in the headquarters management team and as part of the Mission's military observer team. (Source: according to the author's personal data obtained during his years of work in the region.)

^{Cedric de Coning.} 8 Peacekeeping - Peacebuilding: Preparing for the Future. Paper presented during Conference in Helsinki on 29 May, 2006.

⁹ The Wall Street Journal. May 13, 2013, p. 13.

^{Krupyanko M. M., Areshidze L. G.} 10 USA and East Asia: the Struggle for the "new order", Moscow, International Relations, 2010, p. 7.

¹¹ http://www.ng.ru/world/2013-02-01/1_usa_mali.html

¹² See, for example: Lansing Paul and Petersen Michael. Ship-owners and the Twenty-First Century Somali prates: The business ethics of ransom payments //Journal of Business Ethics. 2011. Vol. 3. P. 507 - 516.

¹³ http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/865-imb-piracy-report-highlights-violence-in-west-africa

¹⁴ According to the IMB, 219 pirate attacks were recorded in 2010 and 237 in 2011. At the same time, as of January 30, 2011, Somali pirates held 33 vessels and about 800 hostages from among civilians-members of the crews of sea vessels - www.icc-ccs.org/home/piracy-reporting-centre

¹⁵ www.dni.ru/society/2013/2/19/248480.html; www.fontanka. ru/2013/06/18/159/

¹⁶ http://www.advanfort.com, www.imsaltd.com; www.g4s.com, http://www.mastconfex.com

¹⁷ http://advanfort.com/; http://www.imsaltd.com/; http://www.g4s.com/; http://www.mastconfex.com/

^{Nesterkin V.} 18 Grazhdany FRG na sluzhbe chastnykh voennykh kompany [Citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany in the service of private military companies]. July 2006. p. 30.

^{Kinsey Christopher Paul, Hansen Stigjarle and Franklin George.} 19 The impact of private security companies on Somalia's governance networks // Cambridge Review of international Affairs. 2009. Vol. 22. N 1. P. 147 - 161.

²⁰ http://www.dyn-intl.com/what-we-do/somalia-case-study.aspx

²¹ Military force in international relations... p. 486.

²² Ibid., p. 46.

²³ См., например: Mezentsev S. Ethiopian-Somali border war of the 1977 - 78 and reflections on the role and impacts of foreign countries // African Armed Forces Journal. January 2013.

²⁴ См., например: The Horn of Africa Intra-State and Inter-State conflicts and security (ed. bv R. Bereketea). Nordic African Institute. 2013. P. 87 - 88.

²⁵ In 2006, the United States signed an agreement with the Government of Djibouti to increase its base area from 90 to 500 acres. Independent military analysts estimate that the budget allocated for the development of the AP COETF, currently the main stronghold of AFRICOM, is about $6 billion. The allocated funds are used for the development of the base's infrastructure: in particular, the construction of additional parking lots and taxiways to increase the number of the military air component, as well as the improvement of berthing and port equipment. The annual maintenance of the AP CCDF is estimated at $300 million.

According to some sources, the number of personnel of the AP KOOTF by 2011 was increased from 1,500 to 3,500 people. Further plans provide for a phased increase in the number of up to 7,500 military personnel.

In 2011 US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta visited Djibouti. During the visit, the issues of expanding the base were finally agreed upon, as well as the legal basis for its operation by the US Armed Forces was developed. In particular, it was agreed that after the full completion of the construction program, the base will officially be transferred to the ownership of the Government of Djibouti with a guaranteed condition for its operation by the US Armed Forces for up to 99 years. See: Mountain Thomas C. Back to Djibouti: Africom and the New White Burden - http://bit.ly/xDQwhn/(February 14, 2012)

²⁶ Full name-Unified Combatant Command for Africa (Joint Command of the US Armed Forces in the African zone).

²⁷ Prior to this period, regionally divided African countries were part of the operational areas of responsibility of three different US Military commands (European Operations Command (EUCOM), Central Operations Command (CENTCOM), and Pacific Operations Command (RASOM)). According to US military experts, this distribution significantly reduced the ability to control the continent and reduced the effectiveness of operational control of troops in global theaters of war.

²⁸ The White House Office of the Press Secretary. "President Bush Creates a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa". 6 February, 2007.

^{Daniel Volman.} 29 Notes based on the Conference on "Transitional National Security: AFRICOM - An Emerging Command". National Defense University, Virginia, 19 - 20 February, 2008.

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