There are more than two hundred international river basins in the world, whose rivers cross political borders between two or more countries. The first place in this list is occupied by the Nile - the largest river in Africa and the world, flowing (along with tributaries) through the territory of ten countries-Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda and the new state - Eritrea. In terms of the length, area of the basin, the number of countries and the total population that uses its water, the Nile has no equal in the world.

Apparently, it has no equal in the complexity of the problems associated with the fair and efficient use of its energy and irrigation potentials.

CHOL DENG ALAK (Sudan)

As the population increases and the economy of the Baltic States grows, the latter spend more and more water on both land irrigation and hydroelectric power generation. According to the Minister of Water Resources of Egypt, Mahmoud Abu Zeid, by 2025, most of the Arab countries may be "below the poverty line for the availability of water resources" ¹.

In recent decades, there has been no shortage of gloomy predictions about the future of the Nile and its water resources. For example, in February 1996, the Geneva-based non-governmental organization Felege Guihon International (FGI) published the "Nile Manifesto", which referred to the alleged threat of drying up of the Nile over the next 20 years, which would lead to further desertification of Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea and north-western Ethiopia. The Manifesto noted that there is a possibility of conflict between Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea over control of the waters ^of the river2. Од-

However, the fears of the authors of the Nile Manifesto are probably exaggerated. More than a decade has passed since the manifesto was published, and there are no signs of this yet.

Nor does it appear that there is a serious threat of armed conflict between the basin States over the resources of the Nile. On the contrary, in recent years, a number of basin countries have developed new promising projects for the use of Pila water resources. It is planned to build new hydraulic structures - hydroelectric power plants, dams, land reclamation systems, new industrial enterprises.

However, all these plans face the most difficult problem of "sharing" the far from limitless water potential of the Nile.

HALF A CENTURY OLD, BUT STILL ACTIVE

The main document regulating the use of Nile waters by all States of the river basin, for almost half a century, is the" Treaty on the Use of Nile Waters " between Egypt and the Sudan, signed on November 8, 1959. In accordance with this document, the entire annual flow of the Nile in the lower reaches of the river was distributed and fixed between the two countries, as well as the size of quotas of each party for the use of Nile water was fixed: 55.5 billion cubic meters for Egypt and 18.5 billion cubic meters for Sudan. These quotas remain unchanged to this ^day3. In addition, Khartoum recognized the right of Cairo to build a high-rise dam and hydroelectric power station in the Aswan area and to use the water of the newly created reservoir for irrigation. In turn, the Egyptians pledged to respect the rights and interests of Sudan on the Nile and, in particular, agreed to the construction of a reservoir by the Sudanese on the Blue Nile in the Al-Rosseiros area. In January 1960, a Permanent Technical Committee consisting of representatives of both countries was formed to monitor and monitor the implementation of the treaty.

Although the 1959 treaty provides for the recognition by Egypt and the Sudan of the rights of other basin States to use the river's water resources, these rights remain purely declarative to this day.

At the same time, it does not provide for a mechanism for reviewing and changing both the agreement as a whole and individual articles. The duration of its validity is also not specified. But no agreement can be concluded forever, because the specific conditions and circumstances in the region, on the continent and in the world can change, and they do change. The population of the Baltic countries is growing, their demand for water is increasing, new agricultural technologies are emerging, the very structure of agriculture is changing, industry and hydropower are developing, and the use of water for household needs is increasing, especially in fast-growing cities. Moreover, new States are emerging. For example, Eritrea joined the Nile Basin in 1993, and it is quite possible that by the end of 2012, another State may appear in the Nile basin if South Sudan obtains State independence during the planned referendum.

ETHIOPIA-THE LEADER OF THE "DEPRIVED"

Other countries in the Nile basin, especially Ethiopia, which has assumed the role of leader of the "deprived" countries, are less and less satisfied with the current situation with the division of quotas. Ethiopia, whose territory accounts for about 85% of the total Nile flow, seeks to establish its share of water resources on the basis of international law and suggests revising the 1959 Egypt-Sudan agreement.

The rivers of the Nile Basin originating in Ethiopia are the main feeding arteries in the Mediterranean drainage system in East Africa. An exceptional place in this system is occupied by the Blue Nile - in Ethiopia it is called Abai. Between 40 and 60 billion dollars flow annually to the place where it merges with the White Nile near the capital of Sudan, Khartoum. cubic meters of water. This is not only a huge amount of life-giving moisture for Sudan, covering 2/3 of its water needs, but also for Egypt, as well as millions of tons of the most fertile silt.

Ethiopia's hydropower resources are also very large. The country ranks second in Africa after the DRC in terms of its potential hydropower resources. The annual output of its 14 main river basins is estimated at 143 billion kWh of electricity. However, only 2% of this potential is actually used. There are only six hydroelectric power stations in Ethiopia, mostly located in the center of the country.

The Ethiopian Government considers energy development as one of its top economic priorities. The country has developed short-and long-term programs for the construction of a number of hydroelectric power plants and the creation of a unified energy supply system. In recent years, a hydroelectric power station on the Uebi-Shebeli River near the village of Melka-Wakana in the province of Bale with a capacity of 152 thousand kW, a hydroelectric power station on the Gilgel-Gibe River in the province of Kefa with a capacity of 300 thousand kW has been built or is being constructed. It is planned to build several new hydroelectric power plants on the Blue Nile, Tekkese, Baro and Akobo rivers; their commissioning will increase the power generation capacity by 30 thousand MW.

Irrigation projects developed in Ethiopia provide for an increase in acreage by 2 million hectares mainly

by using the waters of the Nile basin. Ethiopia has a lot of land suitable for irrigation (about 2.7 million hectares), but less than 300 thousand hectares are used. The construction of reservoirs and other artificial reservoirs in combination with the introduction of so - called small irrigation systems is capable of doubling the revenue part of the state budget in 10 to 15 years, according to the calculations of the International Institute for Freshwater Resources Management.⁴

Ethiopia's plans to develop agriculture and energy using the water resources of the Nile system run into objections from other countries that consume Nile water, primarily Egypt, where large-scale irrigation projects have also been developed.

The fact is that Egypt, when justifying its rights to a significant share of the waters of the Nile, adheres to the so-called doctrine of appropriation, proving that it has traditionally used this water before and has historical rights to it. Ethiopian diplomacy, on the other hand, uses the so-called doctrine of origin in its dispute with Egypt over the division of Nile waters, declaring Ethiopia's sovereignty over the lands that give 3/4 of the Nile's flow.

At the conclusion of the Nile Treaty, Egypt and Sudan ignored Ethiopia's desire to become a possible third party to the agreement. Meanwhile, back in 1957, i.e. two years before the conclusion of the agreement, the Ethiopian Government sent relevant notes to Egypt and the Sudan, stating its desire to participate in negotiations on the Nile, which made it possible to conclude a trilateral agreement and develop a truly international legal regime for the use of its waters. This, however, was prevented by the then political differences between Egypt and Ethiopia, and Cairo chose to simply ignore Addis Ababa's appeal.

Ethiopia does not recognize the bilateral agreements between Egypt and the Sudan and does not consider them legally binding for it. Addis Ababa launched an extensive propaganda campaign, mainly directed against Egypt, insisting that it be allocated at least 14 billion cubic meters of water per year (according to other sources, Ethiopia and Uganda demanded an additional annual quota of 18 billion cubic meters). cubic meters from the share of Egypt and Sudan)⁵.

Ethiopian diplomats, in support of their claims for the right to significantly expand reclaimed land and build new waterworks, claim that it is their country that provides most of the Nile's flow. Consequently, Addis Ababa demands a more equitable division of the Nile waters.⁶

ETHIOPIA AND THE 1959 TREATY OF THE NILE

Ethiopia, in our opinion, has inalienable rights to use the resources of its rivers, both energy and irrigation. The problem, however, is that Ethiopia is still unable to make real use of these resources due to the technical complexity, complexity and high cost of such projects in the specific Ethiopian context.

The fact is that the Blue Nile in most of the territory of this country is a typical mountain river, paving its way in rocky gorges, the depth of which reaches 1.5 km in some places. How to build irrigation facilities here, how to raise water to the fields? How much will it cost?

Another thing is that the mountainous nature of the river can be successfully used for the construction of a cascade of hydroelectric power plants. However, there are also some "nuances"here. To do this, you need to build a super-strong high-rise dam that can withstand the pressure of a powerful river during a flood (on the Blue Nile it is much stronger than on the White One) or a complex cascade of several smaller dams. Such projects require very significant capital investments, which are very difficult for Ethiopia, a country with a large external debt, to find.

One cannot ignore such an aspect as the traditional, centuries-old way of life of the Ethiopian peasant, his agricultural methods. Unlike the Egyptian Fellah and, in part, the Sudanese farmer, the Ethiopian peasant has never engaged in irrigation farming and does not have the right to do so.-

required skills. He, a resident of the highlands-a specialist in terraced farming, knows how to properly plow mountain slopes so that the soil is not washed away by rain, how to grow crops on high rocky plateaus. But he does not have the skills to properly divert water, how to dig channels and ditches, does not know how to take care of them so that they do not silt up. The Ethiopian peasant, moreover, is mostly an individualist: after all, Ethiopia has historically been dominated by farms with a scattered population. And irrigation farming requires the joint, concerted efforts of a significant number of people living in one large community. Thus, from the agricultural point of view, the Blue Nile is of little use to Ethiopia, at least for the time being.⁷

In essence, the issue of Ethiopian participation in the Nile projects is not so much a question of law or specific international agreements, but rather a question of Ethiopia's financial and technical capabilities to implement such projects.

The country's leadership, although dissatisfied with the fact that the waters of this river are actually "single-handedly" managed by Egypt and Sudan, cannot really change the situation yet.

In 1998, the country's Foreign Minister, Seyoum Mesfin, demanded a review of the 1959 agreement between Egypt and the Sudan and, in particular, said:: "The time has come to build dams and reservoirs at the source of the Nile in Ethiopia"⁸. At the OAU conference held in Addis Ababa in February 1998, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, Tekeda Alemu, called for the abandonment of the Egypt-Sudan agreement, saying that such an unfair situation could not continue, as other bordering countries needed their share of the river's waters to meet their own needs. If Egypt refused, the Ethiopians reserved the right to take unilateral action, especially if the implementation of new major Egyptian projects would lead to an increase in Egypt's current quota. This was followed by a rather harsh statement from Egypt, which indicated that Cairo would not stop using force if Ethiopian projects led to a significant reduction in the Nile runoff. ⁹

It is clear from this that Egypt is not inclined today to conclude a multilateral agreement on the allocation of quotas with the participation of all the States of the basin. Stating that the position of Ethiopia poses a threat to their national interests, the Egyptians emphasize that Ethiopia can start implementing its own hydraulic engineering projects on the Blue Nile only after it receives the "go-ahead"from all the "Boreal" countries. ¹⁰

From a formal point of view, the position of Cairo looks legally justified, but Egypt itself does not coordinate its irrigation projects with any of the other Nile countries. Addis Ababa also accuses Cairo of taking measures behind Ethiopia's back to block the decisions of leading donor countries and international financial institutions to finance the construction of any hydraulic structures on the Ethiopian rivers of the Nile basin.¹¹

In general, Cairo is not interested in a conflict with Ethiopia. After all, this would lead to a greater polarization of forces and aggravation of the situation in the region as a whole, as well as limit the influence of Cairo itself on regional processes in the future.

The Egyptians, forced to take into account the changing mood and balance of power in the region, are showing a willingness to resolve their differences with Addis Ababa. They are willing to compromise with the Ethiopians on issues that are not directly related to the Nile problem, while at the same time trying to muffle criticism of their own mega-projects on the Nile.

According to the Egyptians, "equitable sharing" means, first of all, "the most efficient use of the Nile waters by the basin States in accordance with the needs of each"¹². Based on this, they advocate the creation of a mechanism for collective management of the Nile, designed to mitigate the severity of the problem.

NEW NUANCES OF THE SUDAN'S POSITION

The Nile is almost as important to the Sudan as it is to Egypt.

The waters of the Nile feed the vast cotton-growing region of Gezira, located between the White and Blue Nile rivers. Built back in the 20s of the last century, the Sennar dam allowed to irrigate 12.6 thousand hectares. ha for cotton plantations.

In the second half of the last century, a number of major projects related to the use of Nile resources were implemented in Sudan. The largest of them-the project "Manakil in Gezir" was completed in 1964. It provided irrigation of about 320 thousand hectares with water from the Sennar reservoir. About 50 thousand peasant families were settled on the lands introduced into agricultural circulation. In the early 60s, the construction of a hydrotechnical complex with a dam near Al-Roseyres on the Blue Nile was completed, which allowed irrigation of about ²¹ thousand ha13.

The main efforts of the Sudanese Government in the field of water use are aimed at developing the irrigated agriculture sector, which covers an area of approximately 1.7 million hectares. However, the water resources available in the country are not fully used: the area currently under cultivation is only 5.2% of the territory of Sudan - about 12.5 million hectares. only 1.9 million hectares are irrigated ¹⁴.

The same situation applies to hydropower. Despite the significant hydroelectric potential, the total amount of hydroelectric capacity commissioned is relatively small. Small and medium-sized hydroelectric power plants predominate.

So far, there is only one large hydroelectric power station in the country - Rosseirosskaya with a capacity of 280 MW, the construction of which was completed in 1966,15 The reservoir capacity of the Al Rosseiros dam is about 2.1 billion cubic meters, and over 1.2 million hectares are irrigated with its water.

It is planned to build new hydroelectric facilities on the Nile, which will allow Sudan to make the most of its quota of Nile water16.

The mutual agreement on the Nile reached at the conclusion of the 1959 treaty between the two main water users - Egypt and Sudan - meant, among other things, that they had a specific common interest-the Nile and a related set of issues. This determines the special relations between the two states, which were previously very close. The geopolitical interests of Cairo and Khartoum have been closely linked for many decades. In the new historical situation, Egypt began to assign the role of "strategic rear" to its southern neighbor. This approach was not shaken even in the 1990s, which were marked by increased tensions in Sudanese-Egyptian relations. However, despite the overall negative background, the two Countries continued to work closely together on the Nile issue, holding mutual consultations and agreeing on positions and national plans for the construction of large hydroelectric facilities based on existing quotas. ¹⁷

The Sudanese leadership is aware of the exceptional importance of the Nile issue for Egypt, and the painful sensitivity of Egyptians to it, especially when it comes to changing the current status quo. It also takes into account the fact that on a number of important regional issues, the positions of Egypt and Ethiopia differ very significantly, and on the issue of the distribution of Nile waters, they act as antagonists.

At the same time, Khartoum has had rather strained relations with Addis Ababa for quite a long time due to disagreements on the issue of the South Sudanese settlement (which, by the way, is also an integral part of the "Nile problem"). It was only after the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which broke away from it in 1993, broke out in May 1998 that relations between Addis Ababa and Khartoum began to improve. So far, Khartoum continues to strictly comply with all the points of the 1959 Egypt-Sudan agreement and emphasizes its legal nature. There are good reasons for this.

Sudan does not choose the full quota allocated to it, spending so far about 14.5 out of 18.5 billion cubic meters. ¹⁸ And the conclusion of a new, in fact, expansion agreement with the participation of other Nile basin states is unlikely to increase the Sudanese quota.

Cairo's planned hydropower and irrigation projects do not formally involve an increase in the Egyptian quota set out in the 1959 treaty.However, if Sudan starts to choose its quota in full, this may create additional problems for Egypt, which has already "adapted" to the current water use regime. One might even expect that Khartoum's implementation of some major irrigation or energy projects on the Nile could lead to serious friction between neighboring states.

As a bilateral agreement, even the interests of the Sudan, let alone those of the upstream States, are becoming less and less relevant every year. Moreover, by tying Sudan to Egypt, the agreement pits Khartoum against the upper Nile countries, creating misunderstandings and disputes. Khartoum is also displeased that despite the commitment of both sides to share hydrological information, Cairo has essentially kept it secret, although it regularly receives comprehensive information: in Sudan alone, the Egyptians have two hydrological observation stations: in Khartoum and in Malakal in the south of the country.¹⁹

Recently, Khartoum has cautiously made it clear to upstream countries that its approach to the "Nile problem" is not as straightforward as it is commonly believed, and that Sudan does not intend to blindly follow in the wake of Cairo on this issue, and under certain conditions, the Sudanese side will not interfere with the revision of the 1959 Treaty. replacing it with a new, multilateral agreement ²⁰.

Ethiopia's demand to sign a new agreement on the "fair division" of the Nile's waters does not cause a negative reaction in Khartoum today. In Sudan, they expect that sooner or later both Cairo and Addis Ababa will have to seek Khartoum's support in defending their "historical rights" to the waters of the Nile, which will allow the latter to act as a mediator, of course, not without benefits for their own national interests, increasing international prestige and getting out of the regime of international isolation that has been imposed on them. They are trying to create Western countries around it because of the situation in Darfur. In its contacts with Addis Ababa on the Nile issue, Khartoum tries to act with the utmost delicacy and caution, demonstrating its readiness for a constructive dialogue.

WE NEED A NEW APPROACH

Today, Nile Basin States such as Ethiopia or Uganda, among others, face considerable difficulties in attracting external funds for national programs using Nile waters; they are forced to rely mainly on domestic resources or on loans from friendly countries. However, this can't go on forever.

It appears that the 1959 Nile Agreement, formerly known as the Nile Agreement, was not signed in the first place.-

when a mutually beneficial compromise between Cairo and Khartoum and played a positive role in its time, today it is outdated. And the further we go, the more clearly we can see that today only Egypt is interested in preserving it. Unwilling to negotiate with the countries of the upper Nile except on the terms of preliminary recognition of the 1959 treaty, opposing its revision and hindering the conclusion of a new agreement on the fair division of Nile waters, which is more in line with today's realities, Cairo creates a situation that may ultimately turn against it.

A new approach is needed. All countries and peoples of the basin have an equal right to a decent life and sustainable development, which in this case are closely linked to the reasonable and equitable distribution of rights to use the Nile's waters.

The idea of creating a body that could undertake the review and improvement of existing agreements on the Nile has long been in the air. But for many years, the issue has not been resolved, although the Nile basin countries have made efforts to develop a mechanism to start the negotiation process on this issue.

The first attempt was made in 1997, when the Nile basin States, with the assistance of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), organized a forum for inter-State dialogue on the legal and organizational aspects of the upcoming Nile negotiations. Representatives of the participating countries (but three representatives from each country) formed a so-called Expert Group, which attempted to prepare a preliminary general document that would outline the essence of the problem. In 2000, such a document was presented to the attention of representatives of the participating countries, but it was not possible to reach a common opinion at that time.

The Council of Ministers of the Nile Basin countries, the so-called Nile-COM (it includes the Ministers of Water resources or government officials of all 10 countries corresponding to their powers), decided in August of the same year to expand the framework of the dialogue and to reach an agreement on all fundamental issues without fail.

As early as 1998, all the countries of the Nile basin, with the exception of Eritrea, joined the dialogue on the establishment of a Regional partnership for achieving sustainable development and managing the waters of the Nile. In 1999, Nile-COM formed a new body, the Nile Basin States Initiative (NBI). The organization adopted a document - "Shared Vision", in which

From the very beginning, the Nile Basin Initiative was created as a temporary, transitional structure: it was assumed that over time, a permanent body would be created to deal with most of the Nile problems. In the spring of this year, it was announced that such a body was created. In April 2007, the self-dissolution of the Nile Basin Initiative was announced and a new regional body, the Nile Basin Commission, was set up to replace it, which is expected to include all members of the Nile Ten. Unlike the previous structure, the newly created Nile Commission will become a permanent body and, more importantly, with significantly greater rights and powers than its predecessor.

which formulated its main task: "Achieve sustainable socio-economic development through equitable water use and benefits from shared basin water resources" ²¹. The NBI consists of Nile-COM, the Committee of Technical Advisers (Nile-TAC) and the Secretariat (Nile-SEC), based in Entebbe, Uganda²².

As stated in the official communique, the main purpose of the newly created body will be to monitor the fair division of water resources of the largest African river. The commission should include representatives from all countries of the Nile basin, as well as other interested parties. The commission will have a technical committee, which is expected to include the most experienced experts.²³ It is of fundamental importance that in May 2007 this interstate body on the Nile was officially recognized by Cairo.

However, only time will tell how and how successfully the new organization will operate. After all, each of the ten participating countries still looks at the problem of allocating Nile resources from its own point of view, and, of course, no quick solutions can be expected.

^{Mamedzade I. I.} On the problem of full resources in the Middle East and Africa - www.times.ru/rus/stat/2004/21 - 09-04

² Egypt. Information about the country. Description of all countries of the world. Ch. "Pil" www.geo 2000.da.ru

³ runoff. In the collection Middle East and Modernity, 2000, N 10, p. 218.

⁴ "Human Development Report". UN document 2006, ch. 5, p. 196 - www.un.org/Russian/esa/hdr/2006

^{Nilsky E. Kh} 5 Decree. soch., p. 221.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 369-370.

⁷ The only exception is the area of Lake Gana, near the very source of the Blue Nile. In agricultural terms, it is extremely favorable. In the Middle Ages, it was even called the "royal fiefdom".

⁸ Middle East. May 1998, p. 7.

^{Nilsky E. H.} 9 Edict. op., p. 221.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 221-222.

^{Nilsky E. H.} 12 Edict. soch., p. 222.

¹³ History of Sudan in modern and contemporary times. Edited by V. S. Koshelev. 1992, p. 215.

¹⁴ Internet encyclopedia "Krugosvet" (25.08.07). Sudan. Economy www.cliktor.ru

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 39.

^{Nilsky E. H.} 16 Edict. soch., p. 220.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 218-219.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 4.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 219.

^{Le Moyne G.} 21 Incentives and benefits of cooperation between countries in the Mekong and Peel River Basins. Chapter "A new era of regional cooperation after 1992" - www.ca-water-info-et./lidrary/rus/almaly/le-moigne2

²² Ibid.

²³ Bulletin " Construction of the Northwestern Federal District "(Published by the World Construction News Agency "INFOLine"), 3rd quarter 2007.

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