The African continent is destined to remain the last bastion of colonialism on Earth for many years to come. By the early 60s of the last century, there were only 10 independent States in Africa. 1960 went down in history as the "Year of Africa", when 17 more states of the continent achieved political independence. It was a fracture. The colonial system has entered a stage of irreversible disintegration.

Throughout its history, the USSR advocated the elimination of the colonial system, in support of the struggle of peoples against foreign domination. Recognition of the right of nations to self-determination was one of the fundamental principles of Soviet foreign policy.

The Soviet Union refused to recognize the mandate system created by the League of Nations, regarding it as an instrument for legalizing colonialism and post-war colonial redistribution.

The position of the USSR in relation to the Anglo-American "Atlantic Charter", published in September 1941, is indicative. Roosevelt and W. Churchill set out their vision for the future of the post-war world. In the days when the fascists were on the outskirts of Moscow, the Soviet Government, while expressing its agreement with the general principles of the Charter, simultaneously issued its own declaration, which was distinguished by a clarity and definiteness that the wording of the Anglo-American document clearly lacked. Thus, the Charter cautiously referred to "striving" for "the restoration of the sovereign rights and self-government of peoples,"¹ whereas the Soviet declaration referred to" the right of nations to self-determination" and " the right of every people to State independence."². When discussing the UN Charter, the USSR insisted that the article of the Charter on the guardianship system should include a provision on promoting the progressive development of the population of the trust territories in the direction of not only self-government,but also independence. ³

THE THIRD WORLD AND THE COLD WAR

The post-World War II world order is commonly referred to as bipolar. The Cold War between the two socio-political systems determined the course of world post-war history and permeated all spheres of international life.

And yet, the post-war reality was not limited to the realities of the bipolar world. The anti-colonial revolution took on a global scale, which resulted in the collapse of the colonial system and the emergence of more than 100 independent states in Asia, Africa and Latin America. A new geopolitical phenomenon has emerged that is so peculiar and does not fit into the established concepts and ideas that it has become known as the "third world".

Of course, the cold War left its mark on the course of the anti-colonial struggle, its forms and methods, the political and ideological orientation of the liberation movements and the liberated states.

The "Third World" has become a field of fierce confrontation between the two systems. Nevertheless, despite its political heterogeneity, the national liberation movement of the peoples of the colonies and dependent countries was an independent subject of international life. In April 1955, the liberated states formed the Non-Aligned Movement at a conference in Bandung, taking shape as a non-aligned "third force".

Non-alignment did not mean, however, complete equidistance. The struggle of the colonial peoples for conquest, and then for strengthening political independence and economic independence, for quite objective reasons, contradicted the interests of the West and met the interests of the East. The Soviet Union and its allies supported the struggle of the peoples of the "third world", which was gratefully received and highly appreciated. On this basis, a process of rapprochement took place, a sphere of common interests was formed, which, if we use the terminology of those years, had an anti-imperialist (read anti-Western) orientation. So we had reason to speak of an alliance between the forces of socialism and national liberation.

Let us note here that in the mid-1950s, the position of the USSR in relation to the political class that took the lead in the anti-colonial struggle underwent a conceptual adjustment. In Stalin's time, "bourgeois" national movements played a rather modest role in the anti-imperialist struggle. The Soviet leadership, headed by N. S. Khrushchev, was able to give the revolutionary potential of the national liberation movement an adequate assessment.

During the Cold War, the Western states saw their strategic task in minimizing the losses that the process of decolonization brought them, maintaining their positions in the liberated states, and suppressing left-wing and pro-socialist tendencies in their domestic and foreign policies. In short,

"leave to stay", replacing direct colonial rule with more subtle forms of economic and political dependence of young states. The growing American penetration into the zones of traditional domination of the colonial powers after the war generated certain internal contradictions and competition in the Western camp. However, the West was united against its common "main enemy". It is significant that until the early 1960s, the United States was inclined to consider the anti-colonial struggle part of Moscow's "program of subversive actions" against the "free world" ^.4

The USSR had strong motivations to "cross swords" with the West in the "third world". Our enemy had to keep a defensive position in this zone and, in the best case, retreat to pre-prepared positions. This gave the USSR the opportunity to pursue an offensive policy in the "third world", hinder the implementation of Western plans there, acquire new friends and allies, and expand its sphere of influence.

Geopolitical motives were combined with ideological and propaganda ones. Solidarity with the oppressed peoples of the "third world", the elimination of the colonial system, and support for the newly liberated states-all this served the main goal of the USSR's foreign policy: the struggle against "international imperialism" (i.e., the countries of the West). There could have been no other logic than that of the Cold War at that time.

The main thing, in our opinion, is that during the Cold War, the policy of the USSR in the zone of national liberation generally met the fundamental interests of the peoples of the"third world". They were trying to break out of backwardness and did not want to accept their subordinate and dependent position in the system of international relations. The Soviet Union was on their side.

THE DAY BEFORE

Support was provided both within the UN framework and on a bilateral basis. The USSR insisted on the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt (1947), and opposed British attempts to gain a foothold in the former Italian colonies of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (Libya), Southern Somalia, and Eritrea. Versatile, including military, assistance was provided to the Front for the National Liberation of Algeria, under whose leadership in 1954 the armed struggle against the French colonialists began in the country.

Among the founders of the UN were four African States-Egypt, Liberia, Ethiopia and the Union of South Africa. In the 1950s, Libya (1952), Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia (1956), Ghana (1957) and Guinea (1958) achieved independence and joined the UN.

With all these countries, the Soviet Union maintained diplomatic relations (with the South African Union - consular).

The closest partner of the USSR was Egypt, where in 1952 the organization "Free Officers" led by G. A. Nasser came to power. The Soviet Union played a crucial role in stopping the Anglo-French-Israeli military actions against Egypt in October 1956 in connection with the nationalization of the Suez Canal, which were called the "triple aggression"in the Soviet and Arab media. In the months leading up to the war, Moscow advocated a peaceful solution to the Suez problem, taking into account the interests of Egypt and the channel's users. When the attack began, the USSR warned of its readiness to provide direct military assistance to Egypt, which played a major role in the failure of the "triple aggression". In 1958, Nasser visited the USSR.

The failure of the Suez adventure prompted the United States to assume the role of the main defender and conductor of Western interests in the Middle East. This was announced in the message of the US President to Congress on January 5, 1957, known as the "Eisenhower doctrine".

Eisenhower laid the main blame for what was happening precisely on "communism", i.e., on the political system. The Soviet Union, which allegedly wanted to establish its dominance in the region and by its actions "increased instability" and "aggravated" these problems, in other words, prevented the West from solving them at its own discretion.⁵ The US president showed the highest tact towards the participants of the aggression, calling the incident "a relatively large military attack by Israel" and "involvement in the military actions of Western European states that once enjoyed great influence in this region."⁶. The words "once used" clearly meant that the aforementioned States had lost their influence, which led to the conclusion: "from now on, the greatest responsibility falls on the United States." ⁷

The president instructed developing countries to "show wisdom" and not fall for the bait of "outwardly attractive offers of political, economic and military assistance" from "international communism", i.e. essentially refuse to cooperate with the USSR and other social countries.⁸ The United States is a different matter, and closer cooperation with it will allow the Middle East states to realize "the goals of independence, economic well-being and spiritual development."⁹

The President has asked Congress for the authority to use the US military to help the Middle Eastern states fight back... "armed communist aggression" ¹⁰.

In sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana and Guinea became the "pioneers" of rapprochement with the USSR. In 1959 and 1960, Guinean President Ahmed Sekou Toure visited the Soviet Union. In September-October 1960, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and Togo were added to the list of African states with which the USSR maintained diplomatic relations.

Most of the colonies in this region achieved independence by peaceful means. An exception was Kenya, where in 1952, in response to massive land grabs by English settlers, the armed anti-colonial May May movement developed. The political leadership of the struggle was carried out by the Union of Africans of Kenya, whose leader was J. R. R. Tolkien. Kenyatta is the future president of the country.

The British authorities declared the rebels "bloodthirsty savages" and imposed a state of emergency in the country. Many African members of the Kikuyu ethnic group that May May relied on ended up in concentration camps, political parties and organizations were banned, and J. Kenyatta was arrested.

In the second half of the 1950s, London opted for a political solution. In January 1960, the state of emergency was lifted. Kenya gained independence in 1963 in peace.

Let us not, however, forget the blood shed. According to official figures, about 100 Europeans and 1.8 thousand Africans who supported the authorities were killed by May May militants. Losses of the May May movement amounted to 11 thousand killed. Many researchers consider this figure to be an order of magnitude lower than ^10a.

The events in the former Belgian colony of the Congo, whose independence was proclaimed on June 30, 1960, took a tragic turn. The government of Patrice Lumumba began to pursue an independent political course, and went on to establish friendly relations with the USSR. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Raek described Soviet cooperation with the Lumumba government as "an attempt to establish a communist base in Central Africa." ¹¹

In June 1960, Belgian troops landed in the Congo in order, as it was announced, to protect European settlers. In reality, however, the landing resulted in a large-scale military intervention in support of local pro-Western and separatist forces opposed to the Lumumba Government.

Congo appealed to the UN. July 14, 1960 The Security Council adopted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping contingent to help the legitimate Government. No such assistance was provided. Initially conniving with Brussels, the NATO powers, having voted for the above-mentioned resolution, in cooperation with UN Secretary-General D. Hammarskjold, managed to organize things in such a way that the UN troops who arrived in the country after the Belgians began to support not the government, but its opponents.

Among them were the President of the Congo, J. Kasavubu, and the self-styled" president "of Katanga province, M. Tshombe, who announced the "separation" of this richest region of the country.

On September 14, 1960, an American-Belgian protege, Colonel Mobutu, seized power in the capital, Leopoldville (now Kinshasa). P. Lumumba was arrested, the parliament was dispersed. The military also removed J. Kasavuba, but soon restored him to the post of president.

The Soviet Union condemned the attempts to dismember the Congo, the Belgian military intervention, and then the actions of the UN forces and its Secretary General. Material and military assistance was provided to the Lumumba Government. After Mobutu's coup, the USSR continued to cooperate with the legitimate government headed by A. Gizenga, deputy of P. Lumumba, who moved the capital to Stanlyville (Kisangani).

History has had its way. At the UN, the majority of Afro-Asian countries did not support the demand of the USSR for the immediate convocation of the Parliament of the Republic of the Congo, voting to recognize the powers of the delegation of J. Kasavubu. In January 1961, P. Lumumba was assassinated. In 1975, a report of a Senate committee was published in the United States, from which it followed that the CIA was actually the organizer of the murder.¹²

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

The historical date was September 20, 1960, when 14 African states joined the UN at once. In late September and early October, they were joined by 3 more. And the "Year of Africa" ended with the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the 15th session of the UN General Assembly on December 14, 1960.

The initiative came from the USSR. When reading the works of many contemporary authors, one gets the impression that, while participating in this session of the UN General Assembly, N. S. Khrushchev did nothing but tap on the table with his shoe. But it was at this session, on September 23, 1960, that the head of the Soviet Government introduced the draft Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and proposed that the question of the same name be included in its agenda.

"The exceptional importance of the international problem of freeing humanity from the shameful colonial order inherited from the past should be obvious to everyone. Dozens of nations and countries have already thrown off the shameful yoke. The time is ripe for the complete and final liberation of all peoples from colonial oppression, " the Soviet leader said from ^the UN rostrum13.

"Colonialism in agony" was stated in the Soviet draft ¹⁴. And further: "The myth of the inability of the colonial peoples to govern, create, and create has shattered"; " The whole course of historical development now raises the question of the complete and final elimination of the colonial regime in all its forms and manifestations. And not ever afterwards, but immediately and unconditionally. " ¹⁵

In the operational part of the project, the requirements were announced:

- "to grant unconditionally to all colonial countries, wards and other Non-Self-Governing Territories full independence and freedom to build their own nation-States" ¹⁶;

- "eliminate all the strongholds of colonialism in the form of possessions and leased areas in foreign territories"¹⁷. It is not difficult to guess that it was primarily about military bases.

The authors of the Soviet project did not miss the opportunity to give it a clear anti-Western orientation. On the way to liberation from colonial slavery, "the self-serving interests of imperialist circles in the West stand in the way of the realization of the just aspirations of peoples," the document stressed. ¹⁸ The policies of the colonial powers - Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal-were sharply criticized. North Atlantic-

The military-colonial block was called the "military-colonial" block. Attempts to replace colonial rule with neo-colonial rule were condemned. The peoples of the colonies should "gain real independence, and not fictitious, under which they would actually be kept within the framework of the colonial regime," the Soviet draft ¹⁹ stated.

The reaction of Western states to the Soviet initiative was, of course, negative. However, they could not openly oppose the discussion of decolonization. In the current circumstances, Western diplomats saw the best way out of the situation in preventing the adoption of the Soviet draft, replacing it with another non-binding document of a general nature.

And here, the positions of the West and the "third world" countries found common ground.

The attitude of the latter towards the Declaration was largely explained by the fact that the initiative that touched upon the most acute problems of their past, present and future was not made by them, but by the USSR - a state that, although friendly, did not belong to the "third world". Unwittingly, Moscow hurt the national feelings of the leaders of the liberated countries, who reacted jealously to any steps that they thought might call into question their ability to act independently.

On the one hand, the rejection of colonialism was inherent in the Non-Aligned Movement and the entire "third world". In itself, the idea of its speedy elimination could not raise objections. However, the support of the Soviet project by the Afro-Asian group of UN member states would have meant that this group de facto appeared on the side of one of the two opposing blocs, whereas, following the non-aligned doctrine, it was preferable for it to stand "above the fray". In addition, the Governments of many of these States, including most of the former African colonies of France, which were admitted to the UN in 1960, continued to focus on the policies of the former metropolises.

The attitude to the Soviet initiative was influenced by the maximalism of Moscow's position on the issue of the timing of decolonization. The draft itself did not specify a specific time frame, but the Soviet side made no secret of the fact that it proposed to set aside approximately one year for the completion of all this process, "closing" the issue at the next, XVI session of the UN General Assembly. Hence the categorical terminology - "immediately", "immediately", "unconditionally". We believe, however, that such a position was initially of a request-propaganda nature and Moscow hardly counted on its support.

In the light of all these factors, combined with the harsh pressure from the West, the decision of the Afro-Asian group to prepare its own draft Declaration was quite logical.

This decision was not unfriendly to the USSR. The Soviet initiative was not rejected, but was adjusted. The USSR and the "third world" states remained interested in adopting a program document on decolonization, and while not agreeing with Moscow in everything, most Afro-Asian states were ready to make this document more radical than the West wanted.

It is known that representatives of some of them sought to persuade the USSR to withdraw its project from discussion. The intentions were very good: to ensure the broadest possible unity of the UN member states on the basis of the Afro-Asian draft Declaration, taking the issue of decolonization beyond inter-bloc confrontation.

Soviet diplomacy faced a twofold challenge: do not allow the document to be accepted to be emasculated, and at the same time prevent a situation in which the possibility of accepting such a document will be lost.

Moscow was well aware that, given the current balance of power in the UN, the Afro-Asian project had a much better chance of passing than the Soviet one. Nevertheless, it was decided not to remove the Soviet draft, using it as an example and a model for the developers of the Afro-Asian document, which would encourage them not to deviate from principled positions, but to adhere to clear and unambiguous wording.

The Soviet side persistently explained its position on the colonial question through all available channels. In November 1960, N. S. Khrushchev sent a special message to the heads of State and Government of non-aligned countries.

Not everything was possible and not at once. Unveiled in early November 1960, the Afro-Asian project was rather loose and streamlined. But a month passed, and 43 Asian and African states proposed a new draft Declaration, the content of which indicated the transition of this group of countries to positions close to the Soviet ones.

"The Soviet delegation is generally positive about the draft resolution submitted by the Afro-Asian states," said the head of the delegation, V. A. Zorin. ^Noting that "there is a common platform and unity of views on a number of fundamental issues" between the two projects, the Soviet representative regarded this as a "welcome fact", which testified to the " common goals and main direction of the struggle for the elimination of colonialism, which the Soviet Union, all socialist countries and Afro-Asian countries and peoples have been waging for a long time20.

Praising the Afro-Asian project, V. A. Zorin said, however, that he considers it " insufficient and incomplete." The main drawback is that the draft "does not specify any exact deadlines for granting independence to colonial countries." In order to eliminate this omission, the Soviet delegation proposed to write in the Declaration that the process of decolonization should be carried out in such a way that " not later than the end of 1961, all colonial countries and peoples will achieve independence and take their rightful place in the community of nations."²¹.

The second amendment provided for consideration of the implementation of the Declaration at the XVI session of the General Assembly, i.e., just in time for the end of 1961.

In general, however, the new Afro-Asian draft was acceptable to the Soviet Union, and it was ready to vote for it with or without amendments.

Despite this, and now no longer harboring any hopes of approval of his own project, the USSR, nevertheless, did not withdraw it from discussion and continued to defend it to the end.

What is the reason?

Of course, the personality factor worked - it was impossible to simply abandon the project initiated by N. S. Khrushchev himself. But since the predicted negative outcome of the vote, to put it mildly, did not promise any laurels to either the country or its leader, why, one wonders, was it necessary to bring the matter to him? We believe that when deciding whether or not to shoot your project, the choice in favor of the second option, taking into account possible acquisitions and losses, was preferable for the USSR.

The continuation of the discussion of the Soviet project gave the USSR a propaganda gain, confirmed its "birthright" in raising the question of accepting the Declaration. Keeping the Soviet project on the agenda of the session protected the Afro-Asian project from attempts to soften and weaken it. Western and some pro-Western states would have liked to do so, but the "ghost" of the Soviet Declaration kept them from doing so. They saw the Afro-Asian Declaration as the "least evil".

As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, the existence of the Afro-Asian project gave it freedom of maneuver and ensured that in the end its initiative would be largely successful, and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples would be adopted.

The results of the vote on the Soviet project did not bring any surprises. Neither its operational and motivational parts, nor the amendments of the USSR delegation to the draft of the Afro-Asian group received the necessary majority of votes.

However, although the overall outcome of the vote was, as expected, negative, the balance of votes of the Afro-Asian group states indicated that the tactics chosen by the USSR justified themselves. The commitment to their own project did not prevent many of these States from supporting the Soviet Declaration. So, out of 45 Asian and African countries, 22 voted for the operational points of the Declaration, including India and Indonesia, and from African countries - Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, the UAR, Sudan, Togo. Only three (Thailand, Turkey, and the Philippines) voted against, while the rest abstained. The proposal to consider the implementation of the declaration at the XVI session of the UN General Assembly was supported by 41 states, with 35 against and 22 abstentions. The smallest number of votes, which is not surprising, was collected by the proposal to complete decolonization before the end of 196122. In general, the USSR managed to score some political points in this vote.

There were no problems with the Afro-Asian Declaration. It was supported by 89 states, including the USSR. A number of Western states did not dare to vote against, but they could not step over themselves and vote "for" either. A total of 9 countries abstained-the United States, England, France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Austria, the racist South African Union and the Dominican Republic, which joined them.

The Declaration "solemnly proclaimed the need to put an immediate and unconditional end to colonialism in all its forms and manifestations", stressed that "the process of liberation cannot be stopped or reversed" and that "the subjection of peoples to foreign yoke and domination and their exploitation is a denial of fundamental human rights and is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations"^.23

The colonial Powers were called upon to take " immediate measures to transfer all power to the peoples... those who have not yet achieved independence", stop "any military actions or repressive measures... against dependent peoples", to renounce any attempts aimed at partially or completely destroying the national unity and territorial integrity" of the countries being de-colonized.²⁴

The Declaration's statement that the continued existence of colonialism threatens universal peace was important and very relevant. Colonialism must end "in order to avoid serious crises" caused by "denial of freedom or the creation of obstacles to freedom," the document noted.²⁵ This was the response to claims by Western politicians and ideologues that freedom fighters, not colonial Powers and their allies, were responsible for tensions and conflicts in the "third world".

It clearly followed from the Declaration on the "decisive role" of colonial Peoples in achieving independence that liberation movements were rooted in the national soil and were by no means the product of "outside interference" (the same "communist conspiracy").²⁶.

The Declaration left no loopholes for those who tried to justify the preservation of the colonial order by the "unwillingness" of the peoples of the colonies to independence. "Insufficient political, economic and social preparedness or lack of training in the field of education should never be used as a pretext for delaying the achievement of independence," the document stressed. The right of peoples to "freely determine their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural development"was recognized without reservation²⁷.

The adoption of the Declaration helped to strengthen the international political and legal basis of the national liberation movement.

WHAT HAPPENED NEXT

At the 16th session of the UN General Assembly, at the insistence of the USSR, its allies and many Afro-Asian countries, the issue of the Declaration was included in the agenda. The session decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the Status of Implementation of the Declaration. Initially, it consisted of 17 States, then - 28, including 7 African ²⁸.

Since then, this issue has been considered at all subsequent regular sessions of the UN General Assembly. Resolutions were adopted on specific action plans to accelerate the implementation of the resolution. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) were recognized by the UN as the "sole legitimate representatives" of their peoples.

It took more than 30 years to fully implement the Declaration's provisions. During this time, about 60 countries have achieved political independence.

"Classical" colonialism was eliminated in the mid-70s of the last century. The peoples of the Portuguese colonies - Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde-won their independence with weapons in their hands. Then came the colonial and racist regimes of Southern Africa. The national liberation movements of the South were characterized by a combination of armed and political forms of struggle. Majority rule was established in Zimbabwe in 1980, Namibia in 1990, and South Africa in 1994.

Today, the status of implementation of the Declaration items has lost its urgency, but it still appears on the agenda of the General Assembly sessions.

Among the Non-Self-Governing Territories whose people have not been given the opportunity to freely express their will, the UN considers the Island of Saint Helena, which belongs to the United Kingdom.²⁹ The Union of the Comoros accuses France of "continuing its colonial policy"for its intention to grant the status of a French department to one of the four islands of the archipelago - the island of Mayotte. ³⁰ In response, Paris refers to the results of a referendum in which the island's population voted for such a status.

But this does not change the overall picture: colonialism has become a part of history.

* * *

The African continent occupied a prominent place in Soviet foreign policy. Various ties were maintained with the liberated countries. Intergovernmental agreements on trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation were signed with many of them.³¹

In Soviet times, cooperation with the liberated states was seen by many in the USSR as helping the strong to help the weak. But that wasn't altruism. Although cooperation was carried out on favorable terms for partners, the USSR received certain benefits.

In geopolitical terms, decolonization and strengthening the independence of African countries during the Cold War meant weakening the "rear" of the West opposing the Soviet Union.

In practical terms, the goal that seemed achievable at that time was to overcome - with the help of the USSR and its allies - the monocultural nature of the economy peculiar to African countries, and to put them on the path of industrialization. Along with projects implemented in Africa's traditional industries (agriculture, mining), power plants and power lines, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, mechanical engineering and construction materials production, and the oil and gas industry were built. Assistance was provided in the development of education systems, training of personnel, and the construction of national armed forces.

In Africa, many people still remember this. At the International Parliamentary Conference "Russia - Africa: Horizons of Cooperation" held in Moscow in June 2010, high-ranking representatives of the African participating countries spoke with gratitude about the role of the USSR in the decolonization of Africa, and called for raising Russian-African cooperation to a qualitatively new level, building on the experience of the past.

¹ Anglo-American Declaration (Atlantic Charter) of 14 August 1941, paragraph 3 - www.law.edu.ru/norm.asp?norma1D=1167579

² Declaration of the Government of the USSR at the Inter-Union Conference in London of September 24, 1941 - http://historic/ru/books/item/foo/soo/20000025/st028shtm

³ UN Charter, Article 76, para.

^{4. Kremenyuk V. A.} 4 USA: the Struggle against the National liberation movement. Istoriya i sovremennost '[History and Modernity]. Moscow, Mysl', 1983, p. 28.

⁵ President D. Eisenhower. "Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East". Eisenhower Doctrine (January 5, 1957) Transcript 2010 Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, p. 1, 5.

⁶ Ibid., p. 1

⁷ Ibid., p. 3.

⁸ Ibid., p. 2.

⁹ Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 5.

^{Chalmers Johnson.} 10а Nemesis. The Last Days of the American Republic. N.Y., Metropolitan Books, 2006, p. 86.

^{Heller Diana and David.} 11 The Cold War. Monarch Books Inc. Derby. Connecticut. October 1962, p. 16.

¹² Istoriya vneshnoi politiki SSSR. 1945-1985 gg. Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1986, p. 272.

¹³ Speech by N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, on Agenda item 8 ("Adoption of the Agenda") at the 15th session of the UN General Assembly. October 12, 1960

¹⁴ The USSR in the struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism. 1960-March 1986. Documents and Materials, vol. 1, Moscow, Politicheskaya literatura Publ. 1986. p. 10.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 18, 19.

¹⁸ The USSR in the struggle against Colonialism ... Vol. 1, p. 10.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 14-17.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 21-22.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 22, 23, 25.

^{Limanskaya T. O.} 22 The role of Soviet diplomacy in the decolonization of Africa (To the 40th Anniversary of the Year of Africa) / / Diplomatic Bulletin of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. June 2000

²³ Resolution 1514 (XV) of the UN General Assembly December 14, 1960-See: USSR in the struggle against Colonialism and Neocolonialism ... Vol. 2, p. 285.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 286.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 285.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 285-286.

²⁸ Annotated initial list of issues to be included in the provisional agenda of the 64th session of the UN General Assembly. June 15, 2009, p. 54.

²⁹ Resolution of the 64th Session of the UN General Assembly A / 64 / 104 of 10 December 2009

³⁰ 9th plenary session of the 63rd session of the UN General Assembly. Official Records A / 63 / PV. 9, p. 16.

³¹ Africa's world economic relations in the context of Russia's Foreign Policy interests. Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 2007, p. 121.

Permanent link to this publication: