Keywords: foreign policy of the USSR, cold War, history of Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo

Since Kasawubu was not popular enough or influential enough to be a real counterweight to Lumumba, he was quickly replaced with a "strong personality". The choice fell on the Chief of the General Staff, Joseph Desiree Mobutu1. In 1949-1956. he served as a clerk-stenographer at the headquarters of the Belgian colonial forces "Force Publik", received the rank of senior sergeant, then took up journalism. In 1959, he joined the NDK and became Lumumba's secretary. After the soldiers ' riots in July 1960, Mobutu was promoted to colonel, and most of the armed forces came under his direct command. He consistently emphasized his loyalty to Lumumba and even referred to him as his "spiritual mentor." ²

On the night of September 13-14, 1960, Mobutu met with CIA resident L. Devlin. He assured the colonel that the United States recognizes "a provisional government consisting of technocrats." ³

MOBUTU COUP

On the evening of September 14, Leopoldville Radio broadcast Mobutu's address to the nation. He stated that "the army decided to neutralize the head of state, the two rival governments, before December 31, 1960, in order to break the impasse." ⁴

Mobutu acted decisively. He dissolved the parliament, which was occupied by a battalion of his personal guards. Lumumba barely escaped Mobutu soldiers in his own home. He was surrounded by a double ring. UN troops provided security for Lumumba. Parts of the Congolese National Army (KPA) were ordered by Mobutu to arrest the Prime Minister.⁵ Mobutu said that President Kasavubu remains the head of state. He later admitted that on the eve of the coup, the colonel informed him of his plans.⁶

One of Mobutu's first public statements was to demand that Soviet-bloc embassies evacuate the Congo. On September 15, the Soviet ambassador received a note signed by Kasawubu informing him of the severance of diplomatic relations between the Congo and the USSR. Embassy personnel were ordered to leave the Congo within 48 hours. The Embassy of Czechoslovakia received a similar note. On September 17, the ambassadors of the USSR and Czechoslovakia and about 100 embassy employees flew out of Leopoldville.

On September 20, Soviet planes transferred to the Lumumba government landed in Cairo on their way to the USSR, ⁷ while the trucks remained in the Congo and fell into the hands of the Mobutu army and police.

These vehicles were used against Lumumba's supporters. Edouard Mutombo, General Secretary of the Union of Workers of the Congo, who participated in the V World Congress of Trade Unions in Moscow in January 1962, told about this. "A staunch supporter of Lumumba and a former member of the NKD" bitterly said that in cars delivered by the USSR to the Lumumba government, "revolutionaries were taken away to be shot." He himself came to be arrested in such a truck ⁸.

On September 18, Mobutu ordered a halt to the federal offensive on Katanga.

The results of the discussion of the Congolese issue in September-October 1960 at the XV session of the UN General Assembly did not meet the expectations of N. S. Khrushchev. His attacks on D. Hammarskjold

The research was carried out with the financial support of the RGNF, project 09-01-00496a/r " Assistance to decolonization and elimination of apartheid by the USSR/Russia as an important factor in shaping the image of our country."

Ending. For the beginning, see: Asia and Africa Today, 2011, No. 4.

and the proposal to replace the post of Secretary General with a collective body "consisting of three trusted individuals" representing states "included in the military blocs of Western powers, socialist states and neutralist states"⁹ did not receive support, including from Asian and African countries.

Since the Mobutu coup, there have been two Congolese delegations to the UN: one appointed by the Lumumba Government, led by Thomas Kanza, and the other by the new authorities, led by former Foreign Minister Justine Bomboko. Neither of them was allowed to participate in the meetings of the xvth session of the General Assembly.

Kasawubu arrived in New York on November 2. Lumumba remained in Leopoldville under house arrest. On November 8, Kasawubu addressed a meeting of the General Assembly and asked for approval of the credentials of his delegation as representatives of the Congo to the UN.

On November 10, the United States passed its resolution recognizing the authority of the Kasawubu delegation. On 22 November, it was adopted by 53 votes to 24, with 19 abstentions. In addition to the USSR and other socialist countries, ¹⁴ Afro-Asian countries10 voted "against". 6 of them (Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Morocco, and the UAR) had contingents in the UN troops in the Congo.

Granting the Kasawubu delegation the right to represent the Congo at the UN meant international recognition of the legitimacy of the Kasawubu-Mobutu regime. This was a major diplomatic victory for the West.

After recognizing the powers of Kasavubu's appointees in the UN, he had legal grounds to demand the removal of UN security guards from the residence of the deposed Prime Minister. Without waiting, Lumumba escaped on November 27, the day the president returned from New York, and made his way to Stanlyville, the capital of the Eastern Province, where his supporters were gathering. Search parties, which were provided with planes and helicopters by the UN Forces Command, overtook and captured Lumumba's group on December 2. He was beaten, arrested, and imprisoned in the Tisville military camp.

During the first two weeks of December, a number of Afro-Asian countries whose troops were stationed in the Congo announced their intention to withdraw them from UN command. The leaders of Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the UAR decided to meet in Casablanca to work out a common position on the Congo and, in particular, to discuss the possibility of reassigning their contingents (all of them had them, except Algeria and Mali), to the Deputy Prime Minister in the government of Lumumba, Antoine Gizenga. The plan proposed by Khrushchev to Nkrumah in September began to become practical.

This would be the worst case scenario for the West. On December 12, A. Gizenga, who led the Lumumbists in the Eastern Province, declared himself Prime Minister, and Stanlyville-the seat of the only legitimate government of the Congo.

D. Hammarskjold said that a country that leaves its troops in the Congo and withdraws them from the UN contingent "will be considered an aggressor" ¹¹. He did not intend to tolerate any alternative UN structures in the Congo. Guinea, Morocco and the UAR withdrew their troops from the Congo, while Ghana left, but under the command of the UN.

Khrushchev initiated the transfer of troops to the Lumumba government. But now the situation was qualitatively different. Lumumba was in prison, and the Soviet embassy was expelled from the Congo. Khrushchev realized that the West had outplayed him in the "heart of Africa" and sought to extricate himself from the Congolese crisis, saving face as much as possible.

THE USSR AND THE GIZENGA GOVERNMENT

Gizenga of Stanlyville regularly sent Khrushchev telegrams asking for help. On December 14, he demanded "immediate, immediate assistance with military equipment and food" to repel Mobutu units. "The province of Stanlyville," the telegram said, " is under serious threat. The landing of your planes in Stanlyville will be secured... Please reply to us ... no later than 2 days, otherwise we will be captured. " ¹² Khrushchev responded ten days later with a general public message.¹³

Khrushchev's caution was justified: deliveries to the Eastern Province bypassing the UN were fraught with serious international consequences. The Gizenga Government-controlled areas of the Congo were under siege, cut off from the outside world. The delivery of Soviet cargo required permission from the Sudanese Government.

The diplomacy of the United States and other Western countries has done everything possible to ensure that there are no gaps in the blockade. Instructions sent by the State Department to several embassies on December 15, 1960, directed "to use all available means and, if necessary, to pursue a hard line to prevent the Sudan from becoming a gateway for Soviet supplies to the regime in the Congo, which is in fact a Communist satellite." ¹⁴

The pressure on Khartoum was strong enough to thwart Soviet diplomats ' attempts to negotiate cargo transportation through Sudanese territory. Even the delivery of humanitarian aid through the Red Cross has not been achieved.¹⁵

Gizenga became more and more insistent. A delegation of three emissaries from the Stanlyville government arrived in Cairo on December 18 and sent a telegram to Khrushchev. They called on the USSR to go to "direct intervention" in the Congolese situation, "begged" "to return the five Ilyushin aircraft sent to us at the time to put an end to the lawlessness of Mobutu-Kasavubu." The nature of the cargo that the Lumumbists would like to receive on the Ila was clearly stated: "The Belgian, American, French colonialists and NATO do not stop at anything and even supply automatic weapons, aircraft, ammunition to the Mobutu-Kasavubu clique, despite the UN presence in the Congo. Why can't the USSR help a legitimate and democratic Government that enjoys the support of the Congolese people?"¹⁶ Appeal remained unanswered. Nor did the Kremlin respond to Gizenga's request on January 4, 1961, for "direct and immediate military intervention." ¹⁷

The end of December 1960 and January 1961 were marked by military successes of P. Lumumba's supporters. By mid-January, they controlled almost half of Congo's territory. This raised the" rating " of Gizenga in the eyes of Moscow. It was decided to provide him with financial assistance. Gizenga's representative in Cairo, Pierre Mulele, received $500,000 in two transfers through the Soviet Embassy. ¹⁸

Attempts by Soviet diplomacy to persuade friendly African countries to provide direct military assistance to the Gizenga regime were unsuccessful. Egypt's help was symbolic. "The UAR battalion leaving the Congo," President Nasser told Deputy Foreign Minister V. S. Semyonov in an interview on January 31, 1961, "has been instructed to transfer half of its weapons to the Gizenga troops: light mortars, weapons, and ammunition." ¹⁹ A Soviet diplomat suggested the possibility of sending Egyptians with experience in combat operations in Algeria to Gizenga. Nasser reacted negatively to this idea.²⁰

At the end of 1960, a shipment of Soviet weapons intended for the Lumumbists arrived in Ghana, ²¹ but they were not delivered to Gizenga. President Kwame Nkrumah chose the dubious benefits of military aid to Gizenga over the real and substantial benefits of improved relations with the United States22.

Lumumba was killed in Katanga on January ¹⁷, 1961,23 The provincial authorities announced this on February 13, after which P. Mulele from Cairo and A. Gizenga from Stanlyville bombarded the Kremlin with telegrams demanding urgent military and other assistance. In a telegram dated February 14, Mulele, citing a "reliable source," reported that "two companies of American paratroopers" were ready to " eliminate other members of the Gizenga government." ²⁴

The Soviet Government's statement on Lumumba's murder continued to link the issue of direct aid to the participation of other States, primarily African States. ²⁵

Pierre Mulelet was invited to Moscow, arrived there on March 7, 1961, and held talks for a week. He thanked for the help provided, but complained that it was clearly not enough. One of the reasons given by Mulele was that "we still haven't been able to get the second part of Soviet financial aid - $250,000-from Cairo to Stanlyville" (As it turned out, the CIA had an agent in Mulele's inner circle, he described "the suitcases in which the courier was supposed to transport the money, and how he was going to get to Stanlyville." Devlin organized an operation to intercept this courier at Khartoum airport, where the money was stolen ²⁷.)

Mulele demanded that all - round assistance, primarily military, be provided as soon as possible, proposed the establishment of a Congolese airline with a fleet of Soviet civilian aircraft, and raised the question of "buying 2-3 IL-18 aircraft from the Soviet Union."²⁸

His initiatives were not supported. "The issue of using aircraft, and especially the IL-18, is very complex," said V. A. Brykin, head of the Second African Department of the Foreign Ministry. - We must also take into account the political aspect of this case. We think that it is better to go along the path of negotiations with African countries, because the UN will not give permission for the passage of Soviet aircraft to the Republic of the Congo. "²⁹ Defense Minister R. Y. Malinovsky made a military point:" The UN position is clear to us, it will shoot down these aircraft. " ³⁰

Mulele was made clear that the USSR would not risk confrontation with the West to save the Gizenga regime. He was told that " the passage of aircraft through the territories of African countries and, above all, through Sudan without the permission of these countries is fraught with an international conflict that can escalate into a world war, which we cannot do. They will start to be shot down by neza-

it depends on the flag under which the planes fly " ³¹.

When it became obvious that there was no hope of help from the East, Gizenga began to build bridges with another center of power. At his invitation, on March 10, 1961, an employee of the US Embassy in the Congo, Frank Carlucci, came to Stanlyville. Gizenga talked to him alone for about an hour. The Congolese, according to the US Ambassador to the Congo, K. Timberlake, asked "the Americans to understand them and provide assistance", stressed that they were "not communists", called themselves " honest, peaceful neutrals who... they'll accept help from anyone." "One can conclude," the ambassador concluded, "that they have lost their illusions about the Russians, who did not fulfill their promises." ³²

A U.S. consulate was opened in Stanlyville, headed by F. R. Tolkien. Carlucci. The absence of official Soviet representatives there could be interpreted as an intention to finally cede the initiative in the Congo to the Cold War opponents.

SOVIET DIPLOMATS RETURN TO CONGO

A diplomatic mission was sent from Moscow to Stanlyville "to maintain constant contact with Giesenga and provide him with advisory assistance." The mission consisted of two foreign intelligence officers (head of the mission L. G. Podgornov and O. I. Najestkin), two military personnel and a diplomat.

Judging by Najestkin's memoirs, the journey was long and difficult. In World War II jeeps, the group moved through the equatorial forest in northeastern Congo and reached the administrative center of Polis, "halfway to Stanlyville." There was a small airplane on the tarmac, and the Belgian pilots agreed to take the group to the capital of the Eastern Province "for a good fee". However, not without reason suspecting that there might be intelligence agents among the diplomats, the Belgians demanded to open the luggage, and the Congolese soldiers guarding the airfield were told that there was "Russian spy equipment" there. It was impossible to fulfill this requirement: the sealed "diplomatic baggage" contained " secret ciphers, money, radio stations." After two hours of negotiations between Podgornov and the pilots and soldiers, permission to fly was obtained, and two hours later the mission was in Stanlyville. The radio station was deployed right in the hotel room, fenced off "with sheets from the eyes of random visitors." On July 6, 1961, the mission went live ³³.

The composition of the new Government was approved by the Congolese Parliament on August 2, 1961. The prime minister was Cyril Adula, a trade union official, whose candidacy was "strongly promoted by the Americans to the UN office in the Congo." ³⁴ Gizenga became Deputy Prime Minister. The Soviet government decided to recognize this government because it "received the confidence of the parliament, was recognized as the legitimate successor to the government headed by Lumumba, and most of the posts in it were held by supporters of Lumumba-Gizenga" ^.35

On September 24, 1961, the Podgornov mission moved from Stanlyville to Leopoldville. It was not possible to establish the embassy's work quickly, as this was "hindered for a long time by Congolese figures associated with imperialist circles"³⁶.

After learning that the Russians were going to put the embassy in a "ten-story apartment building" and were negotiating to buy it, L. Devlin sent his agents to the owner of the house. They drew up a detailed plan of the building, and soon technicians arrived from the United States and loaded it with listening devices in what Devlin assumed would be " the ambassador's office, the communications center, and the offices of senior KGB and GRU officers." The CIA used not only modern technical means. Agent Jacques hired a sorcerer who danced around the embassy for hours, shouting curses at the building and everyone in it.³⁷ The Soviet Foreign Ministry sent a request to Leopoldville "on the expediency of leaving the Soviet diplomatic mission in the Congo and the possibility of its departure from the country." The KGB station managed "through its connections" to initiate a discussion in parliament and the government on the implementation of the "decision on accreditation of the Stanlyville diplomatic corps". On December 2, 1961, the Congolese Government "decided to accredit the Soviet diplomatic mission as a full-fledged government and is ready to consider the issue of issuing agreman to the USSR ambassador." ³⁸ Soon Ambassador S. S. Nemchina arrived in Leopoldville.

POLITICAL DEFEAT OF LUMUMBA SUPPORTERS

Soviet analysts believed that the government headed by S. Adula would be able to pursue a "neutralist" policy acceptable to the USSR, since "Lumumba's supporters" occupied 23 of the 42 seats in the government, including " the Minister of Internal Affairs, Justice, economy, agriculture, mining, and foreign trade... etc. " ³⁹

The White House considered the creation of the Adula government as the biggest blow to the Soviet positions in the Congo after the removal of Lumumba from power: "This is the second Soviet defeat in the Congo," Secretary of State Dean Raek wrote to President Kennedy on August 3, 1961. Including the Gizengists in the government "as a minority controlling minor posts," the Secretary of State believed, " is less risky than leaving Gizenga in his redoubt in the Eastern Province. From there, he constantly calls on the Communists to intervene, and by staying there, he can only get even closer to the Soviet bloc. " ⁴⁰

American forecasts were more accurate. Real power was concentrated in Leopoldville in the Mobutu-Kasawubu tandem, which controlled most of the army, had solid financial resources, and enjoyed the support of Western powers and the UN apparatus. The role of "nationalist ministers" was reduced to "technical executors of orders of the head of government"⁴¹. Relations between Giesenga and Adula became so tense that the Deputy Prime Minister, not feeling safe, left Leopoldville for Stanlyville in early October 1961.

The United States spared no effort or expense to support Adula's regime, "considering it pro-American... and any new government will be anti-Western in its orientation." ⁴² In order for Adula to receive the laurels of the unifier of the Congo, Katanga separatism had to be eliminated. Otherwise, Devlin recalls, "we were afraid that instead of Adula, Gizenga or another leftist would come and turn to the Russians for help in defeating Tshombe and returning Katanga to the Congo." ⁴³

On November 24, 1961, the UN Security Council "categorically" condemned " separatist activities illegally carried out by the Katanga provincial administration with the help of external resources and the hands of foreign mercenaries." The Council authorized the new UN Secretary-General, U Tan, ⁴⁴ to "take vigorous measures, including, if necessary, the use of force" to arrest "all foreign military and paramilitary personnel and all political advisers not under the jurisdiction of the UN command, as well as mercenaries." ⁴⁵ The USSR and the United States voted in favor of this resolution, as did Great Britain and France abstained.

On December 5, fighting broke out between UN forces and Tshombe formations. On December 21, an agreement was signed at the Kitona military base in the lower reaches of the Congo River, under which Tshombe recognized the authority of the central government over Katanga. This did not mean that the integrity of the Congo had been restored. Immediately after returning to Elizabethville, Chombe began sabotaging it.⁴⁶

Moscow did not have the opportunity to participate in the solution of the Katanga problem, and the USSR found itself in the role of an outside observer. Soviet diplomats were left to state that Tshombe's delegation in Keaton "was accompanied by the American ambassador, as well as the British, French and Belgian consuls in Elizabethville; the delegation of Prime Minister Adula was accompanied by the Americans Bunch and Gardiner (UN representatives)." And to draw a disappointing conclusion: "The preparation and progress of the Keaton talks once again showed that Adula's government is not free to act, and Adula himself does not make any decisions without consulting the United States and the UN mission in the Congo."⁴⁷

The Keaton Agreement gave Adula a free hand to neutralize Gizenga. On January 8, 1962, the Congolese Parliament called on the Deputy Prime Minister to return to Leopoldville and expressed "censure"against him. The KPA units that arrived from Leopoldville surrounded his residence in Stanlyville. With the help of UN troops who were ordered to "prevent civil war", they crushed the resistance of the city's garrison.

On January 20, Gizenga was flown by UN plane to Leopoldville, arrested and exiled to Bulla Bemba Island in the Congo estuary, where he spent two and a half years in solitary confinement on starvation rations, without medical assistance.

During 1962, the political defeat of the Lumumbists was formalized organizationally: all ministers who "were members of patriotic parties" lost their posts.⁴⁸

Having" cleaned up " the Lumumbists, Adula began to pursue an openly pro-Western course. All Soviet initiatives to improve bilateral relations were dismissed out of hand. The Soviet proposal to take over the training and equipping of the Congolese army instead of the UN was rejected. State Department experts believed that the main reason for the "failure of the Soviets to achieve anything in the Congo" was the "firm pro-Western orientation of Adula and a small circle of his advisers." ⁴⁹

In December 1962 - January 1963, a contingent of UN troops defeated the Katanga army, and the separatist movement was suppressed. This time, the laurels of the winner were awarded to Mobutu by Western propaganda, although KPA units appeared in Katanga only when the successful outcome of the operation was beyond doubt. In May 1963, the President of the United States at the-

awarded Mobutu the title of Commander of the Legion of Honor for the Congolese commander-in-Chief's "liberation of the country from foreign communist elements"^.50

Mobutu decided to demonstrate to the world who is the boss in the Congo, in a proven way - to expel the Soviet embassy. US Ambassador Edmund Gullion's warnings that such a harsh measure would "destroy Adula's image as a proponent of the non-aligned policy and harm US prestige in Africa" failed to materialize.⁵¹

AND AGAIN THE EXPULSION OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY

With the arrival in the Congo of the new Ambassador of the USSR S. S. Nemchina, there were personnel changes in the KGB residency. "Completely exhausted" Podgornov was replaced by Embassy adviser B. S. Voronin. Before leaving for the Congo, Voronin was invited for a briefing in the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee. The intelligence service was charged with "maintaining secret contacts" with the leaders of "national-patriotic parties opposed to the government", which "in all likelihood" "will be banned and go underground." ⁵² "Voronin," recalls Najestkin, " was worried about the premonition that this would not lead to good... These parties were weak organizationally and had no experience of working underground. It was difficult to maintain a secret relationship with them, and failure threatened a major international scandal, possibly a break in diplomatic relations, as it was in September 1960. " ⁵³

Voronin's premonition did not deceive him. In the summer of 1963, opposition parties were banned and became illegal. In August 1963, after the overthrow of the pro-Western regime of Fulber Yulu in the former French Congo, they moved to Brazzaville. Moscow did not remove the task of maintaining contacts with banned parties. The station staff began to meet with opposition politicians in Brazzaville, since they often had to travel there (by ferry) to buy food.

On November 19, 1963, Voronin and the Embassy attache Yu. N. Myakotnykh did not go to Brazzaville for shopping. There Voronin held "a number of responsible meetings" with opposition politicians and "received large packages with materials intended for the"instance"." When they took the ferry back to Lepoldville, the embassy car was suddenly surrounded by "a dense group of gendarmes and plainclothes men... Gendarmes smashed down the car doors with rifle butts, dragged the diplomats out of the car by their feet and immediately beat them on the pier. " ⁵⁴ The captured diplomats were taken to Ndolo prison, which was located on the territory of a military camp.

The Soviet embassy learned about the incident from a British diplomat who witnessed the seizure of ⁵⁵.

Ambassador Nemchin tried in vain to get an appointment with Kasavubu. Then, at about two o'clock in the morning, the ambassador, accompanied by two embassy employees, "literally rammed the sentries at the gate" and broke into the presidential residence. A sleepy, robed Kasawubu "promised to give the order to release our diplomats by morning," but it was clear that Mobutu would ignore it.⁵⁶

In the Ndolo camp, "soldiers under the command of a fairly drunk Mobutu dragged Voronin and Myakotnykh out into the courtyard and put them against the wall. "Mobutu stammered that this was the last opportunity to confess to participating in an anti-government plot. Mobutu then gave a command to the soldiers. They raised their rifles... But then [head of the security service] Nendaka appeared and tried to convince Mobutu of something for a long time. After a very emotional conversation with Nendaka, Mobutu ordered the prisoners to be taken back to their cell. " ⁵⁷

The next day, Myakotnykh and Voronin were flown to Brussels, where they were handed over to Soviet representatives.

On November 21, the Soviet Embassy in the Congo received a note declaring all embassy personnel persona non grata and demanding their departure within 48 hours.

* * *

The Congolese crisis ended in a complete victory for the West. Mobutu, who seized power in 1965, has been his staunch ally for more than 30 years. Only after the end of the Cold War did Western Powers allow Mobutu's opponents to overthrow his regime.

The Soviet line in the Congolese crisis was not determined by Khrushchev's" adventurism", nor by his"excessive caution". The" corridor of opportunities " for the USSR in the Congo was very narrow compared to its main rival, the United States. The United States has managed to turn the UN troops in the Congo into an effective tool for ensuring the interests of the West.

In such a situation, the USSR could not go for direct intervention, it was necessary to act through allies inside the Congo and friendly Afro-Asian countries. Moscow failed to create an international coalition in Syria-

as a counterweight to the UN forces.

The nature and scope of Soviet assistance to anti-Western Congolese forces was determined by the imperative to avoid direct involvement, which would lead to military conflict with NATO countries. Khrushchev did not take the risk of delivering cargo to the Eastern Province, which was under an international blockade. More decisive action might have stimulated the revolutionary process in Congo, but it guaranteed a dangerous escalation of confrontation with the West in a region where the Soviet Union had neither the necessary resources nor reliable allies.

The Congo was lower on the list of Soviet geopolitical priorities than Europe, Asia, and North Africa. The behavior of the USSR during the Congolese crisis is a vivid example of the complex interweaving of ideology and pragmatics in its foreign policy.

¹ In January 1972, as part of a campaign to promote "authentic Zaire nationalism", he changed his name to Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Basha (An all-powerful warrior who goes from victory to victory, burning everything in his path).

^{Volodin L. D.} 2, Orestov O. L. Difficult days of the Congo. Politicheskiy reportazh [Political Reportage], Moscow, 1961, p. 142.

^{Devlin I.} 3 Chief of Station, Congo. A Memoir of 1960 - 67. N-Y., 2007. P. 76 - 80.

^{Kama T.} 4 The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba. Conflict in the Congo. L, 1978. P. 304.

^{Dayal R.} 5 Mission for Hammarskjold. The Congo Crisis. Princeton, 1976. P. 69 - 74.

^{Volodin L. D.} 6, Orestov O. L. Decree. op. p. 149.

^{Epstein H.} 7 (ed.). Revolt in the Congo 1960 - 1964. New York, 1965. P. 48.

⁸ WUA RF. f. 590. On. 4. P. 6. D. 19. L. 94.

⁹ UN. Official GA reports. The first part of the XV session. Plenary Sessions, vol. 1. September 20-October 17, 1960. New York, M., 1965. P. 102.

¹⁰ WUA RF. F. 590. Op. 4. P. 6. D. 16. L. 16. First Secretary of the OMO of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs V. Polyakov. United Nations discussion on the situation in the Congo from July 1960 to April 1961, 25 April 1961

¹¹ The National Archive of the United Kingdom (NAUK). Prem 11/3188. United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations - Foreign Office. Congo. December 24, 1960.

¹² WUA RF. f. 590. Op. 3. P. 1. d. 11. L. 5.

¹³ USSR and African countries 1946-1962 Documents and materials. Volume II (September 1960-1962). Moscow, 1963. pp. 140-141.

¹⁴ Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1958 - 1960. Wash., 1992. Vol. XIV: Africa. P. 630.

¹⁵ WUA RF. F. 0590. Op. 3. P. 4. D. 1. L. 33. Recording of a conversation between Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V. S. Semenov and UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser, January 31, 1961

¹⁶ WUA RF. f. 590. Op. 3. P. 2. d. 9. L. 62-63.

¹⁷ WUA of the Russian Federation. f. 590. On. 4. p. 5. D. 11. L. 130.

¹⁸ WUA RF. F. 0590. Op. 3. P. 4. D. 1. L. 71. Recording of a conversation between the Deputy Minister of Education of the USSR V. V. Kuznetsov and the Minister of Education and Arts of the Republic of the Congo Pierre Mulele, March 8, 1961

¹⁹ Ibid. Op. 3. P. 4, d. 1. L. 34.

²⁰ Ibid., l. 36.

²¹ WUA of the Russian Federation. F. 0601. Op. 2. P. 4. D. 9. L. 6. About L. I. Brezhnev's trip to the Republic of Guinea, Ghana and Morocco, February 24, 1961.

^{Mazov S. V.} 22 Soviet Policy in West Africa, 1956-1964. Unknown pages of the History of the Cold War, Moscow, 2008, pp. 174-177.

²³ Statement of the Soviet Government in connection with the assassination of Pagris Lumumba, February 14, 1961-See: The USSR and the Countries of Africa, vol. p. 194-198: De Witte L. The Assassination of Lumumba. L., N.Y., 2001. P. 61-124; Mazov Sergey. 201 Patrice Lumumba Days - http://www.vokrugsveta.ru/print/telegraph/history/853 5, 2009; Sidorova G. M. Military intervention in the Congo / / Asia and Africa today. 2010. N 3. P. 68.

²⁴ WUA RF. f. 590. Op. 4. P. 5. d. 11. L. 91.

²⁵ The USSR and the countries of Africa ... Vol. p. p. 197.

²⁶ WUA of the Russian Federation. F. 0590. Op. 3. P. 4. D. 2. L. 71. Recording of a conversation between the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR V. V. Kuznetsov and ... P. Mulele, March 8, 1961

^{Devlin L.} 27 Op. cit. P. 140 - 141.

²⁸ WUA RF. F. 0590. Op. 3. P. 4. D. 2. L. 16, 19. Recording of a conversation with ... P. Mulele, March 9, 1961

²⁹ Ibid., l. 19.

³⁰ WUA of the Russian Federation. F. 0590. Op. 3. P. 4. D. 2. L. 73. Recording of a conversation between Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR V. V. Kuznetsov and ... P. Mulele, March 8, 1961

³¹ WUA RF. F. 0590. Op. 3. P. 4. D. 1. L. 64. Recording of a conversation with ... P. Mulele, March 8, 1961. Present: V. V. Kuznetsov, R. Ya. Malinovsky, S. A. Skachkov and others.

³² FRUS. 1961 - 1963. Vol. XX. Congo Crisis. Wash.: United States Government Printing Office, 1994. P. 103.

^{Nazhestkin O. I.} 33 Gody kongol'skogo krizisa (1960 - 1963) [33 Years of the Congolese crisis (1960-1963)]. Zapiski razvedchika [Notes of a scout].

³⁴ WUA RF. f. 590. Op. 4. P. 6. D. 19. L. 104. Second African Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo is Cyril Adula. (Quick reference), August 4, 1961

³⁵ WUA of the Russian Federation. F. 0590. Op. 4. P. 8. D. 18. L. 6. Reference of the II African Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs "Republic of the Congo", January 8, 1962.

³⁶ Ibid.

^{Devlin L.} 37 Op. cit. P. 194 - 195.

³⁸ WUA RF. F. 0590. Op. 4. P. 8. D. 18. L. 6. Reference... Republic of the Congo, January 8, 1962

³⁹ WUA of the Russian Federation. F. 590. Op. 4. P. 6. D. 19. L. 38, 39. Reference of the II African Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR "On the situation in the Republic of the Congo", October 14, 1961.

⁴⁰ FRUS, 1961 - 1963. Vol. XX. P. 185.

⁴¹ WUA RF. F. 0590. Op. 4. P. 8. D. 18. L. 75. Third Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR in the Republic of Congo L. Petrov. Activities of the Adula Government. (Reference), May 28, 1962

⁴² Executive Secretary of the Department of State William H. Brubeck to McCone (CIA) with attachment, November 9, 1962. - In: CWIHP Conference Reader Compiled for the International Conference. The Congo Crisis, 1960 - 1961. Washington, D.C. 23 - 24 September 2004. Organized by The Woodrow Wilson Center's Cold War International History Project and the Africa Program. Edited by Lise Namikas and Sergey Mazov for The Cold War International History Project - http//www.wilsoncenter.org./topics/docs/Congo%201960 - 611.pdf

^{Devlin L.} 43 Op. cit. P. 187.

⁴⁴ Hammarskjold was killed in a plane crash on 18 September 1961 near Ndola in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), where he was supposed to meet Chombe.

⁴⁵ USSR and the countries of Africa..., vol. II. p. 732.

^{Kalb M.} 46 The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa from Eisenhower to Kennedy. N-Y., 1982. P. 322 - 23.

⁴⁷ WUA RF. F. 0590. On. 3. P. 6. D. 17. L. 66. II African Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "On the situation in the Congo," December 29, 1961.

^{Vinokurov Yu. N. Orlova A. S.} 48, Subbotin V. A. Istoriya Zaire v novoe i sovremennoe vremya [The History of Zaire in Modern and modern times]. Moscow, 1982, p.222.

⁴⁹ Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, Research Memorandum "The Soviets, the UN and the Congo", March 29, 1963 - in: CWIHP Conference Reader...

⁵⁰ Cit. by: Vinokurov Yu. N. The Democratic Republic of the Congo. Power and Opposition, Moscow, 2003, p. 37.

^{Kalb M.} 51 Op. cit. P. 377.

^{Nazhestkin O. I.} 52 Edict. soch. p. 159, 160.

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 159, 160.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 161-162.

⁵⁵ M. Kalb calls him "the chief agent of British intelligence in the Congo" - see: Kalb M. Op. cit. P. 377.

^{Nazhestkin O. I.} 56 Decree. op. p. 162.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 163.

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