The article analyzes the peculiarities of the processes of radicalization of Islamic movements and organizations in Malawi and their connection with international Islamic networks. One of the most effective ways to spread the ideology of extremism in the country is to provide financial support to Malawian students and schoolchildren by Islamic charities. The activities of these organizations lead to aggravation of relations both within the Ummah and with the Christian community.

Keywords: Malawi, African Muslim Agency (AMA), Islamic NGOs, Islamic reformism, terrorism.

Formally, the activities of international Islamic charities (al-ighatha al-Islamiya) non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in African countries are limited to helping to develop health systems, education and the preaching (da 'wah) of Islam. However, the scientific literature also provides evidence that some international and local Islamic NGOs support Islamic militarism and terrorism; propagate the ideology of extremism, in particular Salafism/Wahhabism; and, despite claiming to be apolitical, participate directly or indirectly in political activities.

As M. Petersen, a researcher at the University of Copenhagen, notes, by 2012, the United States officially recognized 31 Islamic NGOs involved in Al-Qaeda, Hamas or Hezbollah, the UN - 13, and the European Union - only one [Petersen, 2012, p. 135]. However, if we take into account the branches of these NGOs scattered all over the world, often operating under other names, it turns out that these organizations are much larger [OFAC, 2015]. Although some Islamic NGOs were closed down under US pressure, it was not easy to prove the charges against them in court. For example, the director of the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) Inaam Arnaut, who was accused by the US Treasury Department of having close ties to Al-Qaeda [US Department..., n.d.], was sentenced to 11 years only on charges of defrauding donors, since it was only possible to prove that the funds collected for charitable purposes, he sent to Islamic extremists in Chechnya and Bosnia [Guinane, 2006, p. 11]. Another example: Director of the American branch of the Saudi organization Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation Pete Sida was sentenced to 33 months only for tax evasion and money laundering activities, as he did not indicate on the appropriate form the transfer of 150 thousand US dollars from an Egyptian sponsor to Islamic extremists in Chechnya [Guinane, Turner, Sazawal, 2011, p. 6].

Different authors give a different typology of Salafism (Wahhabism) (for details, see [Wiktorowicz, 2006]), from which it follows that at least two wings should be distinguished in this movement: moderate and extremist.1 In addition, it is important to separate-

1 For the relationship between the terms "Salafism" and "Wahhabism", see [Naumkin, 2006; Wiktorowicz, 2006, p. 235f].

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to distinguish the Salafi/Wahhabi movement from other reformist Islamic movements. For example, S. Turner of the Danish Institute for International Studies points out the existence of Islamic reform movements in Tanzania, which in many aspects oppose themselves to Salafis/Wahhabis [Turner, 2009, p. 243-244]. Field materials collected in 2006 by a scientist on the island of However, the results of his research in Zanzibar suggest that Tanzanian political elites often use the concepts of Wahhabism, fundamentalism, and terrorism to combat political opposition [Ibid., p. 253], while Islamic elites often use the concepts of Wahhabism, fundamentalism, and terrorism to suppress competition from educated Islamic youth [Ibid., p. 257]. The scientific literature on this issue is quite extensive and should therefore be narrowed down to an analysis of those works that address international Islamic NGOs operating in Malawi.

J. Haynes, a professor of political science at the Metropolitan University of London, provides a table titled " Islamic NGOs in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania allegedly supporting Islamic militarism and terrorism," which includes the Kuwait-based African Muslim Agency (Lajnat Muslimi Ifriqya/African Muslim Agency - AMA) and the International Islamic Charity Organization (International The Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) is one of the largest Islamic NGOs in the world [Heynes, 2005, p. 1325]. As the source of the table, J. Haynes points to an article by M. A. Mohamed Salih, Professor of Political Science at Leiden University (Netherlands) [Mohamed Salih, 2002]. But M. A. Mohamad Salih's article does not mention AMA once, and describes IIRO's activities in the most positive way, although it mentions that the organization was banned in Kenya after Al-Qaeda attacked the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.

Turning on J. R. R. Tolkien Haynes I's inclusion in this table can be justified to some extent by the fact that the text of his article contains the following information with reference to the European Intelligence Agency: "Assistance to Ugandan Islamists from both Al-Qaeda and the Sudanese National Islamic Front was carried out through various Islamic NGOs" - among which the first one is mentioned in the article. the place of the scientist is given by IIRO [Heynes, 2005, p. 1325]. As for the AMA, this organization is mentioned in the text of the article by J. Haynes in addition to the table only once due to the fact that the Tanzanian government officially qualified this NGO as "questionable" [Ibid., p. 1324]. Such information can hardly be considered sufficient even for hypothetical accusations of supporting militarism and terrorism. Unfortunately, this kind of citation, such as the" Haynes table", is found quite often in articles on this topic, which sets our research the task of comparing each fact with as many sources as possible. The involvement of the AMA in spreading the ideology of extremism is confirmed by field studies conducted in Kenya and Tanzania in 2004-2005. C. Ahmed of the German Center for Contemporary Oriental Studies (Ahmed, 2009), and data from M. Terdman and R. Paz of the Israeli Interdisciplinary Center, obtained mainly by analyzing the AMA websites in English and Arabic (Terdman and Paz, 2007).

Numerous facts about IIRO's involvement in Al-Qaeda's financial operations are contained in the book "Inside Al-Qaeda: The Global Terrorist Network" by R. Gunaratna, a researcher at Nanyang Technological University (Singapore), but only some of them are supported by references to sources [Gunaratna, 2002, p. 145, 164, 182]. For example, evidence that the IIRO office in Tanzania (bordering Malawi) was somehow connected to the Al-Qaeda terrorist attack on the American embassy in that country in 1998 remains unsupported by a source. Despite the fact that IIRO offices in a number of countries have been closed due to suspected cooperation of this NGO with Al-Qaeda, the organization continues to be active in many countries of the world, denying accusations of links with terrorists [Petersen, 2012].

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The spread of the ideology of extremism in IIRO is confirmed in the work of M. Petersen, who conducted surveys of members of this organization and analyzed its documents during the four months of 2008-2009 [Ibid.], and in the report of A. Lesage, written with the participation of political science Professor K. Menhaus. The report, based on interviews with NGO staff and other officials in Somalia in 2003-2004, advocates the need to separate the small number of radical Islamic NGOs associated with terrorism from moderate Islamic organizations. The report also indicates that many Islamic NGOs have come under fire for alleged links to terrorists due to insufficient financial reporting and transparency [Le Sage and Menkhaus, 2004]. E. F. Kohlmann's work, which is mainly based on official documents of the United States and France, provides facts confirming the spread of the ideology of extremism by the Saudi organization World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) [Kohlmann, 2006, p. 5-6]. The scientist analyzes data that indirectly indicates WAMY's involvement in the financing of Al-Qaeda and points to WAMY's close connection with BIF, as well as the facts of involvement in terrorism of the Turkish Islamic Foundation for Human Rights, Freedoms ,and Humanitarian Relief (IHH), including: among the indirect ones-about his connection with Al-Qaeda [Ibid., p. 10-14].

An article by I. Zikand of the Leiden Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World cites rare, but supported by various sources, facts that the Islamic movement Jama'at at-Tablighi ("Community of Preachers" / Tablighi Jama'at-TJ) supports Islamic militarism and terrorism [Sikand, 2006]. TJ's support for Islamic militarism in Pakistan is confirmed by the fact that the Executive Director of the Center for Security Studies (Islamabad)cites in his work Imtyaz Gul [Gul, 2010, p. 13]. I. Sikand also shows in detail that the description of TJ in the scientific literature as an "apolitical organization" does not always correspond to reality and is often based "on a superficial reading of the declarations of its leaders" [Sikand, 2006, p.193] 2. It should be noted that TJ was recognized as an extremist organization by the Supreme Court of Russia and its activities on the territory of the Russian Federation were banned in 2009.

The main sources of our research are the works of Malawian and European scholars published in the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, and one article in the online journal Muslims and Islam in Africa. In these works, researchers either openly defend the ideas of Islamic reformists who are closely associated with Islamic NGOs [Panjwani, 1980; Bone, 1985, 2007; Matiki, 1991, 1999; Mumisa, 2002; Ali, 2003], or take a neutral position [Sicard, 2000; Haron, 2005; Van Kol, 2008]. Sources that critically analyze the activities of Islamic NGOs in Malawi are balanced with publications in other peer-reviewed scientific publications.

MALAWI: QUICK DETAILS

With a relatively small territory and a population of about 16.5 million, Malawi (formerly a British colony called Nyasaland) is one of the most populous states in Africa (Pozdnyakova, 2004, p. 17; Panjwani, 1980, p.158). Malawi's ethnic fragmentation index is quite high, and its religious fragmentation index ranks it among the three most fragmented countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Heynes, 2007, p. 307). Active penetration of the territory-

2 In the light of these data, one cannot agree with B. Bulji's opinion that the TJ movement "has an apolitical character" [Bulji, 2014, p. 9]. At the same time, his article contains important information about TJ's activities in Central Asia.

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Malawi's introduction to Islam began in the mid-19th century as a result of contacts with Arab slave traders and Swahili merchants living in the north-eastern regions of the continent [Matemba, 2009, p. 44; Nelson, 1987, p. 78]. According to official data, 13-14% of the population in Malawi profess Islam, while 80-83% consider themselves Christians [Matemba, 2011, p. 175; Bone, 2007, p. 14]. Malawi remains one of the poorest countries in the world and continues to live on donor subsidies [Pozdnyakova, 2004, pp. 83-95]. At the same time, its population is projected to double by 2045, due to natural growth [Abramova, 2010, pp. 177-179].

After gaining independence in 1964, an authoritarian regime was formed in the country, led by Kamuzu Banda, a Presbyterian who received medical education in the United States and practiced for several years in the UK [Matemba, 2009, p. 43; Nelson, 1987, p. 188]. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became unprofitable for Western countries to support K. Banda; in early 1992, the Catholic organization of Malawi launched a civil liberties movement and put forward a demand to introduce government accountability to civil society in the country [Bone, 2007, p. 12-13]. Widely supported both within the country and by the international community (up to the introduction of economic sanctions), the movement largely contributed to the retirement of K. Banda in 1994, who, however, was already 96 years old by that time. In 1994, Bakili Muluzi, a Muslim who once held key positions in the Banda government, was elected President for a 5-year term [Pozdnyakova, 2004, p. 82].

In 1999, B. Muluzi was re-elected for a second term despite accusations of his intention to Islamize the country, which were used by the opposition to fight in the election campaign, and widespread rumors that part of the money from foreign loans goes to the president's pocket [Matemba, 2009, p. 45; Bone, 2007, p 15-16; Matiki, 1999, p. 258f.]. B. Muluzi tried to change the constitution, as K. Banda did in his time, in order to stay for a third term, but this was not allowed by the coalition of Christian churches [Bone, 2007, p. 18]. As a result, B. Muluzi appointed a Catholic Bingu wa Mutharika as his successor, who was nominated as the official candidate of the United Democratic Front (UDF) party headed by B. Muluzi [Matemba, 2009, p. 45]. B. Mutharika was elected the third president of the country in the 2004 elections, but soon broke off relations with the UDF [Bone, 2007, p. 19].

INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC NGOs IN MALAWI

In 1981, an Islamic NGO, the Malawian Muslim Agency, was founded in Malawi, later renamed the African Muslim Agency (AMA), as its activities spread to more than 35 countries on the continent [Terdman and Paz, 2007, p. 3; Haron, 2005, p. 267]; cf.: [Ahmed, 2009, p. 427-429]. The AMA was founded by Abd al-Rahman Hamoud al-Sumait, a physician from Kuwait who received a doctorate from the University of Liverpool [Terdman and Paz, 2007, p. 3; Ahmed, 2009, p. 427]. The central office of the AMA is located in Kuwait, and the organization is funded by the Governments of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and private sponsors [Haron, 2005, p. 265; Terdman and Paz, 2007, p. 5]. Since 1999, the AMA often acts under the name of Direct Aid International [Terdman, Paz, 2007, p. 3; Ahmed, 2009, p. 426]. One of the main activities of the AMA is the construction of mosques, madrassas, Islamic centers, primary and secondary schools with compulsory Islamic studies [Ahmed, 2009, p. 429, 432]. The AMA's humanitarian and medical assistance significantly alleviates the suffering of the poorest African countries, but it also provides-

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It is based on the acceptance of Islam, which has already led to the conversion of tens of thousands of Africans [Terdman and Paz, 2007, p. 6-9].

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the AMA "minimized its activities in Malawi" [Van Kol, 2008, p. 445]. Willemijn van Kohl, referring to an article by J. Haynes (2005) points out that the AMA was included "in the US government's list of organizations with links to militaristic and extremist Islamic organizations in the Middle East" (Van Kol, 2008, p. 445). But AMA is mentioned in J. R. R. Tolkien. Haynes is out of touch with this list. If W. van Kohl is referring to the table of J. R. R. Tolkien, However, as noted above, its sources are not sufficient for such serious charges. Since September 11, 2001, US government agencies have compiled several official lists of terrorist organizations and their collaborators, but the AMA is not included in them [OFAC, 2015; US Department..., n. d.]. Another possible reason for the AMA's departure from Malawi will be discussed below.

In 1977, the first representatives of the Muslim Youth Movement of South Africa (MYMSA) appeared in Malawi [Panjwani, 1980, p. 167; Sicard, 2000, p. 302], whose functions included the creation of reformist Islamic organizations in neighboring countries [Haron, 2005, p.302]. 269]. One of the" key employees of MYMSA", Farid Chunara, was also the director of the AMA office in South Africa, and" former Secretary General of MYMSA " Fuad Hendricks headed the International Islamic Education Center in South Africa [Ibid., p. 267]. The founder of this Center, Ahmed Didat, who is known for his extremist publications and anti-Christian speeches [Haron, 2005, p. 266; Mumisa, 2002, p. 290], received funding from the AMA [Ahmed, 2008, p. 15].

Since the early 1980s, WAMY has been operating in Malawi [Matiki, 1999, p. 253, 257; Mumisa, 2002, p. 287], which was founded in 1972 in Saudi Arabia and, in fact, is a pseudo-NGO, since it is mainly funded by the Saudi government, and its Secretary-General at the same time Acting Saudi Minister of Islamic Affairs [McCormack, 2005, p. 6; Kohlmann, 2006, p. 4]. The main goal of WAMY is to spread Islamic and secular education among young people [Matiki, 1999, p. 253; McCormack, 2005, p. 6]. V. van Kohl notes that, according to the former head of the WAMY branch in Malawi, Ibrahim Milazi, the branch was forced to stop its activities under pressure from the United States [Van Kol, 2008, p. 445]. The scientist believes that the organization was suspected of having links with terrorists only because it "received funding from the Middle East" [ibid., p. 445].

Since the early 1960s, the TJ movement [Panjwani, 1980, p. 166], founded in 1927 in India by Muhammad Ilyas Kandalavi, has been active in Malawi with the aim of spreading and strengthening the Islamic faith [AHN, 2003, p. 175]. The organization does little charity work, and some of its characteristics - the lack of an administrative structure while maintaining leadership in the hands of the descendants of Ilyas, the six principles of behavior, the regulation of appearance and adherence to rituals - allow researchers to compare this NGO with Sufi tariqats [AN, 2003, p. 178; Haron, 2005, p. 268; cf.: Balji, 2014, p. 9]. A part of the ruling elite of Pakistan is closely connected with TJ and uses it in the political struggle [Sikand, 2006, p. 191]. In South Africa, TJ's activities cause bloody clashes with other Islamic movements and organizations [Haron, 2005, p. 268-270]. The penetration of TJ into Malawi occurred both from the Indo-Pakistani region, as well as from Kenya, Zambia, and South Africa (Panjwani, 1980, p. 165-166). If by the early 1980s TJ cells in Malawi existed in "every big city" [Ibid., 1980, p. 166], then after 20 years it can be "constantly seen in mosques even in small villages" [Mumisa, 2002, p. 290; cf. Saddiq, 2009, p. 4; Sicard, 2000, p. 300].

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The studied sources only allow us to say about IIRO and IHH that they operate in Malawi [Mohamed Salih, 2002; Atalay, 2012, p. 177]. However, given their links to terrorism in other countries, the above data on the presence of these organizations in Malawi is also significant.

LOCAL ISLAMIC NGOS

The leading local NGO in Malawi is the Muslim Association of Malawi (MAM), founded in 1942 by Muslims of Indo-Pakistani origin [Sicard, 2000, p. 300; Saddiq, 2009, p. 2]. Indians living in Malawi and South Africa provided and continue to provide significant financial support to mothers [Bone, 2007, p. 8]. According to W. van Kohl, in the 1970s and 1980s, it was through MOTHERS in Malawi that " money was sent from the Middle East, from communities of Muslims of Indian origin in South Africa, Pakistan, and Malaysia"[Van Kol, 2008, p. 444]. The influence of the Indian diaspora, in particular the South African one, is very noticeable in Malawi, which, however, causes an aggravation of relations between the natives of India and the indigenous Muslim population (cf.: [Mumisa, 2002]).

Since 1981, the main financial and logistical support has come to Malawi from the AMA, primarily through the MA [Bone, 2007, p. 9; Van Kol, 2008, p. 445-446; compare Sicard, 2000, p. 302; Matiki, 1991, p. 128]. As a result of this and other sources of funding from Arab countries, several local Islamic youth NGOs emerged in Malawi in the early 1980s with the goal of reforming Islam [Bone, 2007, p. 9-10; Van Kol, 2008, p. 440-444; Sicard, 2000, p. 302]. These organizations were founded by Muslim students who received higher religious and secular education abroad and perceived the version of Islam (often based on Salafism/Wahhabism) that they met there as the most "pure" [Van Kol, 2008, p. 443; Bone, 2007, p. 9; cf.: Turner, 2009]. Thus, in 1982, the Muslim Students' Association (MSA) was founded in Malawi "on grants from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait" (Sicard, 2000, p. 301). The MSA saw the main means for reforming Islam in spreading a secular school education that develops a reflexive attitude3 in relation to Afro-Islam and thus opening up the possibility of forming a new Islamic identity [Van Kol, 2008, p. 441, 447; Bone, 1985, p. 416]. MSA also received significant support from MYMSA, which is closely related, as shown above, to the AMA [Van Kol, 2008, p. 446-447].

The MSA's program slogan was an open challenge to traditional Afro-Islam: "No Qadiriyya! No sukutiya! Islamia! "[Sicard, 2000, p. 301; Van Kol, 2008, p. 440]. The terms "qadiriyah" and" sukutiyah " used in the slogan refer to the Sufi tariqas qadiriyah and shaziliyah [Sicard, 2000, p. 298; Panjwani, 1980, p. 164-165; Thorold, 1997, p. 113]4. If the sacred practices of Malawian Qadiriyya are characterized by "loud singing and reading texts in Arabic, as well as ecstatic dancing", then for Sukutiyya this way of expressing their faith is impossible [Sicard, 2000, p. 298-299]. The word "sukutiya" itself comes from the Arabic sakata (to be silent) and is contrasted with the loud singing and dancing that is characteristic even of the funeral rites of Qadiriyya adherents [Thorold, 1997, p. 110-111; Sicard, 2000, p. 307f.; Van Kol, 2008, p. 439-140] 5.

3 For the development of a special type of reflection that is absent in traditional culture through school education, see [Ponomarev, 2009].

4 On the history of the spread of tariqa (Arabic). tariqah-path) of Qadiriyah and shaziliyah in sub-Saharan Africa, see [Trimingham, 1989, pp. 43-45, 48-51].

5 Sigvard von Sicard points out that in Malawi, "ritual initiations became the main route of Islamization" and "Islam spread not in a doctrinal form, but rather in the form of customs and practices" (Sicard, 2000, p. 296; compare Thorold, 1997, p. 108). This situation is generally typical for many local variants of Afro-Islam, which have absorbed the features of African traditional cultures, in which

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Young Muslims who had been educated abroad were striving for a radical reform of Islam in Malawi, so the terms "kadiriya "and" sukutiya", denoting Afro-Islam that had lost its" purity "in the discourse of reformists, were contrasted with the term" Islamia", i.e. Islamic reformism. An attempt to" purify " Afro-Islam from traditional beliefs and practices, undertaken by international Islamic NGOs through local organizations, provoked active resistance from the Qadiriya tariqa. And since this reform was made possible in no small part by the financial support of the AMA, Qadiriyya's followers dealt the main blow to this organization. David Bone testifies :" Individuals from the Qadiriya movement eventually succeeded in deporting the main representatives of the AMA, which led to the withdrawal of this organization from Malawi and to a strong decline in the effectiveness of the Muslim Association of Malawi " [Bone, 2007, p. 12]. This evidence points both to other reasons for the departure of the AMA from Malawi than those given by V. van Kohl above, and to the fact that this NGO was the main support of the IAM. The decline in the effectiveness of the IAM also seems to have many reasons: "Corruption-related concerns lead to the fact that foreign funding is withdrawn from the IAM's management and sent to organizations established by donors themselves" [Saddiq, 2009, p. 8].

Another Islamic youth NGO that emerged in Malawi in 1982 was the Blantyre Islamic Mission (BIM), which receives major funding from the Kuwait African Muslim Committee (Sicard, 2000, p. 302). If the MSA was gradually forced to limit its activities due to opposition from traditional Islam, then BIM continues to function actively. BIM not only conducts training sessions on Islam in the "Islamic centers" and general education schools created by it [Matiki, 1991, p. 128], but also organizes youth field training camps [Sicard, 2000, p. 302]. Islamic studies are often conducted in an informal and friendly environment, and an important element of meetings is communication with peers and teachers from other countries (cf. [Mumisa, 2002, p. 291]).

It was with the help of the AMA that educational "Islamic centers" were established in Malawi in the early 1980s, training ulema "in the spirit of reformists to teach in a growing number of madrasas" [Bone, 2007, p. 10]. Often, teachers of both these centers and secular schools with an Islamic component are hired in Muslim countries-Suda6, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, and graduates get the opportunity to continue their studies there [Bone, 2007, p. 10, 19]. In South Africa, the popularity of Islamic centers is so great that they are the main tool for converting non-Muslim African youth to Islam [Mumisa, 2002, p. 291]. The same is true in other sub-Saharan African countries, where Islamic centers are established and supported by the AMA [Terdman and Paz, 2007, p. 5; Ahmed, 2009, p. 429].

An analysis of the works of Islamic Reformist researchers [Panjwani, 1980-7; Bone, 1985; Matiki, 1991, 1999] shows that they see the main means to achieve their goals in the dissemination of secular school education, and that is why international Islamic NGOs allocate significant funds for this [Bone, 2007, p. 19]. An alternative way to spread Islamic reformism is to create Arab-Islamic schools (mainly in rural areas) that compete with traditional Quranic schools. So

rites of passage (initiation) from one age group to another perform the functions of transferring experience, knowledge and skills to the next generation [Ponomarev, 2009J.

6 The Sudanese NGO Munazamat al-da'wa Islamia is active in the field of Islamic education in Malawi [Saddiq, 2009, p. 5], noted for spreading political Islam [Le Sage, Menkhaus, 2004, p. 28].

7 Ibrahim Panjwani was the coordinator of the IAM in the early 1980s (Panjwani, 1980).

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Since the majority of teachers in Arab-Islamic schools are hired from among reformists, as a result of their creation, village ulama lose income and authority, which increases their antipathy to reformists [Bone, 2007, p. 11-12, 20-21; Mumisa, 2002, p. 293].

POLITICAL ACTIVISM OF MALAWIAN ISLAMIC NGOS

MAM played a significant role in the political events of 1992-1994 in Malawi, joining the Social Movement Committee coalition formed to fight for free multi-party elections [Bone, 2007, p. 13]. After B. Muluzi came to power, important positions in the public sector were occupied by local Muslims and people from the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Directly and through international NGOs, Malawi began to receive more assistance from Muslim countries, many new mosques and madrassas were built throughout the country, and contacts with Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates expanded [Matemba, 2009, p. 44; Bone, 2007, p. 14; Matiki, 1999 Finally, B. Muluzi established the Muslim holiday "Eid al-Fitr" (Bayram), marking the end of fasting in the month of Ramadan as a national day off [Matemba, 2009, p. 45; Bone, 2007, p. 14].

In June 2003, five foreign Muslims-citizens of Kenya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey - were arrested in the Malawian city of Blantyre [Packard, 2003; Jimu, 2003]. They were suspected of laundering money for Al-Qaeda, but according to D. Bone, "further events showed the baselessness" of these accusations [Bone, 2007, p. 17] .8 Two of those arrested were heads of Islamic NGOs (one of them: Islamic Zakat Fund-IZF) and one was a teacher in BIM (Jimu, 2003). It is through IZF that many Malawian students are funded to study in Arab countries [Saddiq, 2009, p. 4; Van Kol, 2008, p. 441; Bone, 2007, p. 20]. Despite the ruling of the Malawian court, all five were deported to the US Guantanamo Bay detention center, which caused a wave of Muslim protests in Malawi [Matemba, 2009, p. 45; Van Kol, 2008, p. 442]. In the Mangochi area, five Christian churches were burned and several Christian priests were beaten [Matemba, 2011, p. 215]. The rendition of those arrested significantly lowered the rating of B. Muluzi, and the MLF and MAM branches were attacked by protesters, which further indicates a deep split in the Malawian Ummah [Bone, 2007, p. 18; Packard, 2003].

The political activity of mothers and youth MSA was most clearly manifested during the school reform, which caused serious inter-religious confrontation. These organizations, together with South Africa's MYMSA, had a significant impact on the development of the new Religious Education (RO) curriculum [Van Kol, 2008, p. 447; Matemba, 2009, p. 45]. In 1995, a national symposium on education was held, at which it was decided to replace the subject of RO in secondary schools, which is based on Bible study, with the subject of "religious and moral education" (RME), which includes the study of various religions [Matemba, 2011, p. 127]. A commission was formed to draw up the RME program, which was "reported to be dominated by MA representatives" [Matemba, 2009, p. 45]. If the RO was a subject of choice, i.e. the student could opt out of it, then the RMO was supposed to be made mandatory. An essential component of the RME was the study of the Qur'an, which schools were required to use Muslim teachers to teach. Despite the obvious lack of funds in the country's budget, the RME was provided with textbooks that were delivered to schools [Matemba, 2011, p. 102-134].

8 D. Bone erroneously indicates the date of his arrest as "April 2002" [Bone, 2007, p. 17], and N. Saddiq - as "2006" [Saddiq, 2009, p. 2].

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Training in the RME program was supposed to start in January 2000 in junior high schools, but its content and terms of introduction were perceived by most secondary schools and Christian organizations as an "Islamic invasion" conducted "for the purpose of spreading the Islamic faith" [Matemba, 2009, p. 46-47]. President Muluzi had to receive a delegation of representatives of Christian churches and agree to their demand to suspend the introduction of the RMO. However, the MAM leaders also soon obtained an audience with the head of state and presented him with an "ultimatum" demanding to cancel the decision to suspend the RMO within three days, threatening that otherwise "the country will be in chaos" [Matemba, 2011, p. 140]. The MAM failed to implement its threats, as under the pressure of public opinion and the police, it was forced to retreat [Bone, 2007, p. 17; Matemba, 2009, p. 47]. The way out of this situation was the convocation of a National Advisory Committee, based on the work of which the Government decided to introduce both ROS and RMOs for the selection of schools in parallel [Ibid.].

* * *

The AMA's promotion of the ideology of Islamic reformism and its long - standing financial and logistical support for Malawian Islamic NGOs lead to their confrontation with the Sufi Tariqa of Qadiriyya on the one hand, and the Christian community on the other. The links identified between Islamic NGOs suggest that both the AMA and other international Islamic NGOs are behind the manifestations of Islamic extremism in Malawi. By funding the construction of primary and secondary schools with a mandatory Islamic component in the curriculum, international Islamic NGOs are investing in the development of a new Islamic identity in Malawi, often based on the ideology of Salafism/Wahhabism. Data on the active activities of international Islamic NGOs in Malawi, linked to the financing of terrorism and militarism in other countries, indicate the possibility of spreading extremist ideas in this small and poor African country.

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