On September 19, 1898, Captain J.-B. led the French expedition. Marchand and the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army, the Englishman Lord H. G. Kitchener, met in a dilapidated fort on the banks of the Nile, located in Fashod. A seemingly insignificant event caused a serious diplomatic crisis between the two colonial Powers. According to many contemporaries, and after them a number of researchers, this conflict threatened to escalate into a full-scale European war. The latter statement is supported by both the mobilization of military forces and the unprecedented rise of nationalism on both sides of the English Channel.

Keywords: Fashoda crisis, Egyptian question, Russian diplomacy, Caix d'Orsay, Franco-Russian alliance, Anglo-French Entente.

In fact, the Fashoda crisis was caused by the unwillingness of the Third Republic to accept the situation in Egypt after its occupation by British troops in 1882.The British dominance on the banks of the Nile after 1882 became one of the main problems facing the Caie d'Orsay. The desire to re-raise the Egyptian question shaped French policy on the Nile throughout the 1890s. Since the incident had a great resonance, Russia, a military and political ally of France, was also involved in its settlement. As further developments showed, the crisis of 1898 had a significant impact not only on the fate of the Russo-French alliance, but also on the change in the vector of the Third Republic's foreign policy, which eventually led it to sign an agreement with Great Britain in 1904. What role did Russia play in the development and resolution of the Fashoda crisis? By answering this question, we can not only shed light on a little-studied subject, but also take a slightly different view of the place of the Egyptian question in the relations of the great powers at the end of the XIX century. The Fashoda crisis is the subject of many studies by both domestic and Western historians. However, Russia's position during the crisis and its impact on the development of Russian-French relations have not yet been the subject of independent research.

The Fashoda crisis, however unexpected it may have been for contemporaries, was a natural result of the French policy on the Nile in the 1890s, which the Russian press described as a policy of "pinpricks" (ADF, 1898-1900, p.89). However, to understand the complexity of relations between France and Russia during the crisis of 1898, it is necessary to recall what preceded them.

The presence of the British on the banks of the Nile since 1882 caused discontent among both powers. Each of them had its own reasons: France traditionally, since the time of Napoleon I, considered Egypt as a zone of its influence, the Suez Canal was dug with French money, it was the French holders who represented the absolute majority in the Cash Register of Egyptian debt, the cultural influence of France was dominant. Russia's interests in the region were much more modest. This

first of all, eastern trade via the Suez Canal ¹, as well as the opportunity to" annoy " the hated British - eternal rivals in Central Asia and Persia. However, Russia has a new reason to want the British to leave the banks of the Nile as soon as possible: the Suez Canal has become the shortest route to India and the Far East, which has begun to occupy one of the first places in Russian diplomacy. The tension between the rivals was growing every day, and it was important for St. Petersburg that in the event of war, the expectation of which characterized the diplomatic situation at the end of the century, the Suez Canal would be neutralized. Formally, this is exactly what the Canal Treaty of 1888 provided for, to which all the great Powers joined. However, in practice, as long as Egypt was in British hands, the implementation of the terms of the agreement was questionable.

There was another reason for Russian diplomacy to support French claims, a reason that was not usually discussed in the press or at official dinners, but it was this reason that ultimately led France to feel confident enough to initiate a conflict in Sudan. The maintenance of Anglo-French rivalry in Egypt was for St. Petersburg one of the most important guarantees for the preservation of the Russo-French alliance.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count M. N. Muravyov, noted in a memorandum to the Ambassador to France, L. P. Urusov, that the Egyptian question is relevant for Russia primarily as "the ground of incessant rivalry between France and England, which serves as a guarantee to us that in all private disagreements in the East" France will "firmly adhere to the alliance with us, even if it is not necessary to in addition to considerations of European policy" [AVPRI, Embassy in Paris, op. 524, d. 2201, p. 30]. He went on to note that Russia was ready to give its ally "moral support in the French effort to shake the illegal domination of England in Egypt and put a limit to their further conquests in this area," but "we believe that recognition of the British occupation would be just as unprofitable for us as an agreement on this basis between England and France, although and difficult to implement, but possible through appropriate compensation" [AVPRI, Embassy in Paris, op. 524, d. 2201, l. 30].

Russia was least interested in a speedy resolution of the Egyptian issue, not least because there were significant differences between Russia and France in the East. Muravyov recognized that " the ties that bind Russia and France as they move away from the center of our continent gradually weaken - in the Middle East they meet with obstacles in the disagreements inherited from the past, and in the Extreme East they leave France indifferent to our interests, which involuntarily forces us to find other political combinations there, the danger of which for France itself is it is obvious" [AVPRI, Embassy in Paris, op. 524, d. 2201, l. 36]. Obviously, the minister hinted at a possible rapprochement with Germany, which could cause discontent in France. Among other things, the union of the Third Republic with an absolute monarchy continued to cause discontent in certain sections of French society. ²

¹ The Society for the Promotion of Russian Industry and Trade, which was under the auspices of the Russian government, sent a delegation to the grand opening to identify "the consequences that may occur for the trade of Russia and especially for the ports of the Black and Azov Seas from the opening of the Suez Canal, which brings Europe twice as close to the very important markets of-India, the Indian Archipelago, China, Japan and Australia" [Skalkovsky, 1870, p. 1]. The Suez Canal occupied an important place in the overseas trade of Russia, in particular, many Russian merchant ships from China passed through it.

² In 1895, S. Roux's book "Journey to the Land of Barbarians: The Truth about the Francorussian Alliance" was published in Paris. An international scam " [Roux, 1895]. In it, the author convinced readers of the savagery and backwardness of Russian society. The Franco-Russian alliance, in his opinion, was caused by Russia's desire to enrich itself at the expense of the French people, who naively saw the despotic state as an ally. The book, written in very harsh tones, reflected the sentiments of the anti-Russian part of the French political elite.

Based on these considerations, Russian diplomacy publicly promised France its support in the Egyptian question, on which, as the Russian press, carefully analyzed in the Caix d'Orsay, wrote in 1897, "the future of its possessions in Asia and its influence in East Africa depend" [ADF, Russie presse, 1896-1913, p. 18]. Russia was to dominate the Straits, and France in Egypt, because "it is on this basis that the two countries should join forces to resist the ambitious plans of England, put an end to the claims of Austria and maintain the disinterest of Germany, which it shows in everything that concerns affairs in the East" [ADF, Russie presse, 1896-1913, p. 18].

By insisting that France play the role of first fiddle in the Egyptian question, did the Russian press, which was obviously influenced by the relevant diplomatic circles, expect that very soon the French would try to follow the advice of the Allies? The Russian statements created certain expectations in French diplomatic circles. As Muravyov wrote to Urusov in January 1898, France saw in the alliance with Russia "a support in its historical struggle against the selfish and shameless policy of England" [AVPRI, Embassy in Paris, op. 524, d. 2201, l. 14].

Beginning in September 1898, by October the crisis had become threatening. In November, the European press was already openly talking about a possible war. At the end of October, the Russian ambassador wrote to St. Petersburg: "It is impossible to conceal the fact that France is not in a position to fight Great Britain" [AVPRI, Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. 470, d.79, l. 161]. By a curious coincidence, it was during the crisis that Muravyov arrived on a visit to Paris. As the ambassador noted, "none of the statesmen with whom our Foreign Minister had contact turned to him with questions about how Russia would react to a possible British attack on France" [AVPRI, Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. 470, d.79, l. 161].

Such behavior is explained, in his opinion, "partly by a certain sense of dignity", "partly by knowledge of the true political circumstances" [AVPRI, Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on. 470, d. 79, l. 161]. However, French diplomatic documents show the opposite. As early as September 1, 1898, immediately after receiving information about possible complications on the Upper Nile, the French Foreign Minister T. Delcasse wrote in his message to the Marquis of Montebello, the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg: "This situation... it can create difficulties for all the great powers interested in maintaining the status quo in the East. Please draw Count Muravyov's attention to the implications that our agent's report points out, and let me know how they are being handled by the Imperial Foreign Ministry. " [ADF. Russie. Politique étrangère, France - Russie, 1898-1900, p. 25]. Already on September 12, Delcasse received a reply from St. Petersburg. As the ambassador wrote after a personal conversation with the Russian minister, Muravyov assured Delcasse that "in this matter, as in all matters related to Egypt, the imperial government intends to agree with us and coordinate its approach with that shown by the French government" [ADF, Russie. Politique érangère, France-Russie, 1898-1900, p. 30]. Moreover, the tsar expressed the hope that "the sultan's protest, supported by the great Powers, could be successful" [ADF, Russie. Politique étrangère, France-Russie, 1898-1900, p. 30]. In this context, Urusov's statement that France did not make any demarches regarding Fashoda raises a number of questions.

Moreover, in the French press, and after it in the English press, there appeared a sensational story about how the Russian ambassador in London, invited to an audience with Lord Salisbury immediately after the Baron de Courcelles, the French ambassador, loudly declared:: "I must inform you that in the event of a war between France and England, you must be prepared for the fact that Russia will support its ally with all its might." To which the British Prime Minister allegedly replied: "I know that, and I'm at it.-

I took all possible measures" [ADF, Russie. Politique étrangère, France-Russie, 1898-1900, p. 10]. The veracity of the story is rather difficult to verify, but the Russian press and diplomatic circles did not follow a single refutation. This news appeared in the official "Le Temps" and in the "Birmingham Gazette". In addition, Le Figaro wrote that at the time of the crisis, the Russian ambassador in Paris said to President Felix Faure: "If you fight, we will fight too" [ADF, Russie. Politique étrangère, France-Russie, 1898-1900, p. 10]. But, as the Birmingham Gazette added, just a few days later, the tsar gave Count Muravyov an order to " inform the president of the Republic that it is not worth starting a war." From this, the French press concluded that "the tsar wanted to go in agreement with us (with France - AA), but only on condition that we did not go" [ADF, Russie. Politique étrangère, France-Russie, 1898-1900, p. 10].

At the same time, the Russian press not only expressed full support for France, but also made quite loud statements. So, in one of the newspapers it was noted that the Egyptian question is not limited only to the Anglo-French rivalry: In fact, this is "the conflict of England with the whole world" [ADF. Egypte. Politique intèrieure. Présence anglaise. Pt. 2, p. 3]. The Francophile publication Svet emphasized that the Egyptian issue "is no less important for Russia than for France, since it is connected with the problem of neutralizing the Suez Canal" [ADF. Egypte. Politique intèrieure. Présence anglaise. Pt. 2, p. 3]. Most newspapers expressed regret not only about the outcome of the Fashoda crisis for France, but also because most of Africa was now under British control. Peterburgskie Vedomosti wrote with regret about "English Africa" [ADF, Russie. Politique étrangère. Dossier général, p. 69].

It was obvious that Russia would not come to the aid of France in the event of war. Also, the question was, should Russia go to war over the colonies? According to the agreements of 1891-1892, the Franco-Russian alliance was directed against the powers of the Triple Alliance, especially against Germany [International Relations..., 1957, p. 25]. The possibility of a military clash with England was not even considered in the agreements. Already after the crisis was resolved, in the summer of 1899, a Russian newspaper noted with some annoyance: "Everyone forgets, first of all, that the Franco-Russian alliance was concluded solely for the purpose of protecting, if necessary, the security of the two states and maintaining their fundamental interests, but not in order to ensure the success of adventurous and inappropriate ones enterprises " [ADF, Russie. Politique étrangère, p. 89].

Russia's inaction, as well as its calls to keep a cool head and not provoke a war, have caused a serious rift in relations between the two allies. Already at the end of October, Urusov warned Muravyov: "Public opinion in France, which represents the people much more than the government, is clearly becoming confused and every day shows more and more bewilderment due to Russia's apparent indifference to the danger in which the allied country is located" [AVPRI, Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. 470, d. 79, l. 162]. "The Fashoda incident," the ambassador admitted, " proved, in the eyes of the opponents of the Russian alliance, the supposedly isolated position of France." As a result, he concluded that "our charm was affected due to the disappointment experienced by the French in the Fashoda case" [AVPRI, Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. 470, d. 79, l. 168].

On October 28, the British government decided to mobilize the fleet. One of the reports of a French secret agent in London noted: "The English Channel squadron, which is the most powerful of all that England has ever had in its waters, is at the time when I write to you, preparing an additional supply of ammunition..." [Documents Diplomatiques Francais. Série 1. Vol. 14. Doc. 430]. The mobilization of the fleet was supposed to be the first step towards the deployment of a military conflict, for which the French side was obviously not ready.

At the end of November, Delcasse was finally convinced that Salisbury would not give up, and to insist further on the revision of the Egyptian question meant being left alone with the entire power of the British Empire. Given the dire crisis facing French society over the Dreyfus affair, which effectively divided the country into two warring camps, an escalation of the international conflict would only complicate the Government's position. The Russian position only reinforced Delcasse's decision to order the evacuation of Marchand's detachment.

After Marchand's recall, the French press unleashed all its anger on Russian diplomacy. One of the most popular Parisian newspapers, Le Soleil, wrote:: "The Government of the Republic has not concluded an entente with Russia, because the entente implies mutual concessions... All the benefits of the alliance were provided to Russia, and in the case of Fashoda, it abandoned us without any hesitation" [ABPRI, Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on. 470, d. 79, l. 173]. Similar statements appeared in the German press. In January 1899, the Berliner Tageblatt newspaper published an interview with Emperor Wilhelm, in which he stated that "the Fashoda conflict was provoked by England only to see to what extent it is possible to put pressure on France without provoking Russia." The newspaper concluded by noting: "The Fashoda incident clearly showed that relations between Russia and France are far from the closeness that everyone believed in up to this point" [ADF, Allemagne. Politique étrangère, relations avec la France, 1897-1900, p. 104].

The crisis in relations between the two powers reached such an extent that Tsar Nicholas II considered it necessary to convey a message to the French allies through the Minister of War A. N. Kuropatkin. The latter, at the end of January 1899, invited the French ambassador in St. Petersburg and asked him to carefully write down every word. Kuropatkin stated that "if the British government... If this would only make matters worse, the emperor would be prepared to intervene in a categorical manner in order to prevent England from attacking you" [Service historique de la Défénse. Attachés militaires. Russie, 1898-1900, le 30 janvier 1899]. However, the minister added that it would be too much for France to demand that Russia "sacrifice thousands of lives and spend millions, in our difficult financial situation, just to save Fashoda". Kuropatkin noted that the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance did not apply to colonial issues. However, what deserves a lot of attention in this conversation is information about the partial mobilization that was carried out on the instructions of the tsar at the height of the crisis, in particular, the ports in the Far East were brought into a state of combat readiness. In general, in the Asian theater of military operations, if the war really started, Russia was ready to put up about 735 thousand troops. soldiers, which was obviously not enough to stand up to Great Britain. Thus, Kuropatkin noted with regret, "we were not ready at the moment when the Fashoda crisis broke out for a serious offensive operation against the Indian Empire and, as in 1885, we were simply forced to remain in a defensive position" [Service historique de la Défénse. Attachés militaires. Russie, 1898-1900, le 30 janvier 1899]. By supporting France in its claims over Egypt, Russia was not only uninterested in war, but also unprepared for it.

Dissatisfaction with Russia's position was also observed in France later. Thus, in 1902, the publicist Charles Loiseau, in his pamphlet On the Russo-French Alliance, drew particular attention to the inaction of imperial diplomacy on the Egyptian question, especially during the Fashoda crisis, and concluded that "the alliance did not justify itself" (Loiseau, 1902, p.2).

The Fashoda crisis not only brought France the realization that there would be no revision of the Egyptian question, but also demonstrated the weakness of Russia as a political ally. Perhaps the disappointment that Paris experienced was also due to the fact that the vision of the union and its significance had changed by the end of the 1890s. He was imprisoned

in an atmosphere of "armed peace" with Germany, when revanchist sentiments were strong in the country. However, by the end of the decade, virtually no one among the French political elite seriously considered the possibility of a war for Alsace and Lorraine. Of course, Germany continued to be perceived as an enemy, an alliance with it was impossible for France, but in some issues the powers managed to find a common language, in particular, in Africa and the Far East. At the same time, the contradictions between France and England were becoming threatening. The incident of 1898 showed that Russia not only does not want to interfere in the colonial confrontation between the two powers, but also restricts the operation of the union exclusively to the continent.

Immediately after the crisis was resolved, articles appeared in the press about the possibility of changes in international relations, in particular, they talked about Franco-German rapprochement and a possible continental union of three powers: France, Russia and Germany. Thus, the influential Russian publications Svet and Novoe Vremya expressed their dissatisfaction with the Franco-German "flirting". In the summer of 1899, the newspaper Novoe Vremya noted that it was absolutely impossible to work out a common program for France, Germany, and Russia, not only because the powers pursued completely different goals in Europe, but also because of the differences that exist between them on the Eastern question [ADF, Russie. Politique étrangère, France—Russie, 1898-1900, p. 84]. On this occasion, the French ambassador wrote in his next report: "Now we know that they (Russians - AA) consider Germany their enemy in Asia much more than in Europe, they are anxiously following its success and hope that we will put an end to them. All help is rewarded, and the moment may be approaching when we will finally be able to reap the benefits of our alliance " [ADF, Russie. Politique étrangère, France-Russie, 1898-1900, p. 84].

Birzhevaya Gazeta noted that "Russia is too influential a power, and it requires so little from its neighbors to suspect it of being concerned about such a rapprochement" [ADF, Russie. Presse, p. 67]. However, it was also noted that it would be naive to believe that even such an event as Fashoda could contribute to the reconciliation of two powers that have too many contradictions between them. In this regard, the official German newspaper Berliner Tagelblatt noted that the intention of French diplomacy to improve relations with Germany was caused "not so much by hostility to the British as by the position of Russia" [ADF, Russie. Politique étrangère, France-Russie, 1898-1900, p. 35].

At the same time, Nicholas II, in a conversation with the French ambassador, openly hinted at the desirability of a continental alliance with its obvious orientation against Great Britain [ADF, Russie. Politique étrangère, France-Russie, 1898-1900, p. 40; DDF. Série 1, T. 15, doc. 26]. The tsar made it clear that Germany had come to the aid of the Russo-French alliance in the Far East and that its support in other matters would also be desirable for both powers. To the ambassador's objection that the British and Germans were on fairly friendly terms, the tsar remarked that their agreements concerned only the colonial sphere, and not continental politics. In conversations with Delcasse, the Russian ambassador also spoke about the need for Russia to move closer to Germany in order to " resist the actions of England in the Far East." Most Russian diplomats were of the opinion that the only way to neutralize the threat from Britain, which "wants war", is to conclude an alliance with Germany [DDF, vol. 14, doc.515].

After the Fashoda, Delcasse began to search for new allies in Europe. In Paris, they began to look more closely at Italy. The first steps towards rapprochement were taken by France and Italy at the end of 1898. On November 21, 1898, the Franco-Italian trade treaty was signed, which opened the way for closer relations in 1899. Before that, France and Italy clearly competed in Af-

rike. It is enough to recall how the French helped the troops of the Ethiopian Negus resist Italian aggression and contributed to the crushing defeat of the Italian troops at Adua in 1896. Therefore, everything that happened in late 1898-early 1899 was of serious importance for both countries. Of course, the French did not want to limit their relations with Italy only to the economic sphere: the trade agreement was supposed to be the basis for political rapprochement. Delcasse saw cooperation with Italy as a guarantee of preserving French influence in the Mediterranean. It was even said that if France and Italy joined their naval forces, they would be able to turn the Mediterranean Sea into a" Latin lake " (Marder, 1940, p.337). The steps taken to resolve the disputed issues between the two countries have borne fruit. On January 24, 1900, the Italian Foreign Minister E. Visconti-Venosta and the French Ambassador in Rome C. Barrer signed a protocol on the delimitation of French and Italian spheres of influence in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

As for the rapprochement with Germany, it has not been further developed. It is curious that the French press was accused Russia that the latter wished to persuade France to the Alliance with Germany: "After Russia has convinced us that Britain is our most bitter enemy, it is trying to reassure us that the Germans are our best friends" [AVPRI, Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. 470, d.79, p. 173]. This idea caused rejection in French society not only because of the traditional hostility with its eastern neighbor, but also because, as Le Soleil wrote, "Hohenzollern is returning from its triumphal journey to the East, and France is returning from Fashoda" [AVPRI, Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. 470, d. 79, l. 173]. The author of the article concluded: "The Prussian is an even rougher rider than the Cossack. The horse will be France again."

Paradoxically, even the idea of an agreement with England was already in the air during this period. So, the Russian newspaper Svet wrote that the enemies of the Franco-Russian alliance continue to do everything to undermine it. In particular, she argued that the idea of "replacing the Russian alliance with the British one after Fashoda" was suggested to the French press by a certain secret British agent [ADF. Russie. Politique étrangère. Dossier général, 1898-1908, p. 56].

It is clear that Delcasse did not intend to abandon the alliance with Russia. Moreover, already in 1900, measures were taken to strengthen it. In particular, representatives of the military staffs of Russia and France, Generals Sakharov and Delan, met on July 2, 1900, and on behalf of their powers made some amendments to the military convention of 1892. Their essence was to add a clause on the possibility of a military conflict between the alliance countries and Great Britain, according to which, if one of the powers threatened war with England, the second start mobilising [adf. Russie. Politique étrangère. France-Russie, 1898-1900, p. 178].

The main goal of the alliance has also undergone some changes. The Russo-French alliance was now directed not only against the countries of the Triple Alliance, but its main goal was now to "maintain the balance between European forces", which included Great Britain in its orbit. However, some historians consider this amendment, initiated by Russian diplomacy, rather as a weakening of allied obligations [Hogenhius-Seliverstoff, 1997, p. 181].

Thus, the Fashoda crisis had serious consequences for Russian-French relations. It demonstrated the vulnerability of the alliance and the unreliability of Russia as a military ally. Immediately after its settlement, France began to search for new international partners. After improving relations with Italy, rejecting an alliance with Germany, it eventually came to the signing of the "cordial accord" with Great Britain in 1904.

list of literature

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI).

Archives Diplomatiques Françaises (ADF).

Documents Diplomatiques Français (DDF).

Service historique de la Défènse.

International Relations and Foreign Policy: 1871-1957 (collection of documents), Moscow, 1957.

Skalkovsky K. Suez Canal and its significance for Russian trade. St. Petersburg, 1870.

Hogcnhius-Sclivcrstoff A. Une alliance franco-russe: la France, la Russie et l'Europe au tournant du siècle dernier. P., 1997.

Loiscau Ch. Apropos de l'alliance franco-russe. P., 1902.

Mardcr A.J. The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-dreadnought Era, 1880-1905. N.Y., 1940.

Roux S. Voyage au pays des barbares. La vérité sur l'аlliапсе franco-russe. L'escroquerie internationale. P., 1895.

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