The Arab Political Spring is a revolution of educated youth whose leadership has been taken over by the West and Arab theocratic monarchies. Long dreaming of ending the transformation of the "Nasser era," the powers of the West and the monarchies of the East are trying to rebuild the Arab world today on a neo-colonial basis.

Key words: Arab world, "the era of Nasser", Islamism," Arab political spring", tariqas.

At the turn of 2010-2011, the entire Arab world was the scene of massive socio-political unrest. Their assessments from the very beginning were rather contradictory, but their recognition prevailed, including in our country, as "revolutions" [Izvestiya, 10.02.2011; 21.04.2011]. Only a few authors, in particular G. I. Mirsky, who was one of the first to address this topic, put this term in quotation marks, and even provided a question mark [Mirsky, 2011, p.1]. In the future, the idealization of what is happening in the Arab countries only progressed. They started talking about the "Arab political Spring" and the "new type of movement-the revolution of educated youth" [Zinin, 2011, p. 150]. And there were reasons to think so. However, there were also some doubts about the true background of the "revolutions".

Everyone was struck by the synchronicity of mass demonstrations in almost the entire Arab world, with the exception of the Arabian monarchies1. In the future, the active role of these monarchies in fueling the crisis, sponsoring, stimulating and targeting it explained a lot. But initially everything looked really revolutionary, and it never occurred to anyone to doubt the true nature of the "Arab Spring", linking it, for example, with such global phenomena as globalization, not only in its economic, but also in its socio-cultural and civilizational expression, including the impact of the latest social and network technologies on the population. political life and political Islam, or Islamism, which was the embodiment of the "transnationalization of Islamic resistance" to globalization, which turned into a kind of globalism, i.e. self-serving subordination of globalization processes to the interests of the United States and its closest allies [Middle East..., 2009, pp. 135-138; Burgat, 2005, p. 64]. So the events of the "Arab Spring" are not accidental and are the result of more than half a century of development in the Arab world, which can be called the "era of Nasser"

¹ In Bahrain, the Arab political Spring was expressed in March 2011 in another outburst of discontent among the Shiites of Baharna, who make up about 60% of the population, with the rule of the al-Khalifa dynasty, which is supported by the Sunni Azan (about 25% of the population). With the help of Saudi troops, these riots were suppressed, but in November 2011 they resumed again, this time with the participation of local Iranians (15% of the population). The ethno-confessional crisis in Bahrain has not stopped since the end of the 18th century, i.e., since al-Khalifa came to power [Izvestiya, 23.11.2011].

named after the leader of the first Arab revolution in the XX century, which opened the era of Arab liberation from colonial oppression.

The national liberation revolutions in Egypt in July 1952, in Algeria in November 1954-June 1962, in Iraq in July 1958, in Yemen in 1962, in Libya and the Sudan in 1969 led to the acquisition of political independence by these countries (or turned this independence from formal to real), creating the following conditions: conditions for radical reforms in the life of society, in the development of the economy and culture. A special feature of these revolutions was the decisive role of the army, or rather, the progressive officers. For example, in Egypt, the revolution was made by the secret society of "free officers", which included about 250 of the approximately 2.5 thousand officers of Egypt at that time. And after the victory of the revolution, according to French researchers Jean and Simone Lacouture, "400-500 officers, working 10 hours a day, managed Egypt with difficulty but effectively, "although" half of their efforts were spent on fighting the masterly sabotage of civil officials " [Lacouture, 1962, p. 180, 183]. Among these officers, the majority came from the middle strata and peasants. That is why they came, as their leader and ideologue Gamal Abd al-Nasser (Abdel Nasser) wrote, to "a revolution that comes from the very heart of the people and is filled with their aspirations" [Abd al-Nasser, 1954, p. 32].

Later, Nasser's decisive measures (nationalization of the Suez Canal, repelling the triple Anglo-French-Israeli aggression in the fall of 1956, helping patriots in other Arab countries) turned Egypt into the leader of the Arab world, and Nasser-into the "champion of Arab nationalism". Following the example of Egypt, societies of" free officers " emerged everywhere in the Arab world and in a number of countries (in Iraq, Libya, Jordan) played a significant role. At the same time, in the 1950s and 1960s, a new generation of Arab leaders entered the political arena: Bourguiba in Tunisia, Ben Bella and Boumediene in Algeria, Gaddafi in Libya, Qasem and the Aref brothers in Iraq, Sallal in Yemen, Hafez al-Assad in Syria. They were people of different personalities and political abilities, who often quarreled with each other, but they had a lot in common. First of all: the firm defense of the real independence of their countries (which did not prevent, for example, Bourguiba from curtseying to the West), the implementation of economic and social reforms, ideological reliance on one or another version of secular nationalism (which explains the consistent struggle of Nasser, Bourguiba, Gaddafi with radical Islamists), and finally - anti-monarchism. The "Nasser era" began, as we know, with the overthrow of the monarchy in Egypt in 1953, the destruction of the Bey's power in Tunisia in 1957, the royal power in Iraq in 1958, in Yemen in 1962, and in Libya in 1969. All this deeply shocked both the elite of the traditional metropolises (England, France, Belgium, which also suffered from Nasser's nationalizations, Franco's Spain, which was forced to withdraw from Northern Morocco, Italy, which finally lost its position in Libya), and the top of the traditional theocratic monarchies, which were unable to oppose anything to the nationalism and anti-imperialism of military revolutionaries.

It was then that the knot of contradictions that so clearly came to the fore during the "Arab Spring"was tied. The "age of Nasser" was a nightmare not only for the colonial powers of the West, who were losing their positions in the Arab world (it is worth mentioning only the Suez Canal, the oil and gas of Iraq, Algeria, and Libya), but also for the still surviving Arab monarchies, especially Saudi Arabia, which was Egypt's main opponent during the reign of Nasser. In the future, the Saudis, like other Arabian monarchies, after the replacement of Nasser by Anwar Sadat, who switched to pro-Western positions, began to fear the Baathists of Iraq and Syria with their charismatic leaders Hafez al-Assad and especially Saddam Hussein, as well as the slogan "Unity, socialism, freedom". In addition, both the West and the monarchies were literally restless as they watched secular republican regimes, some (in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Algeria) -even with socialist programs-gain from the mid-1950s to the middle of the 20th century.

economic, technical, financial, cultural and military assistance from the USSR and other socialist countries in the 1980s, which, despite its short duration and insufficiency, still played a certain role in the formation and strengthening of the above-mentioned regimes.

However, these regimes could not radically solve the main problems of young states due to the backwardness of their infrastructure, the lack of the latest technologies and necessary capital, and the acute shortage of trained personnel. And yet the world did not stand still. The collapse of the USSR and the entire camp of socialism worsened not only the economic, but also the geopolitical situation of all independent countries of the East, including the Arab ones. The accelerated and intensified processes of globalization have drawn the Arab countries into the orbit of the West's comprehensive influence on them through international trade, regulation of export-import mechanisms, and the imposition of Western standards in everything from the principles of morality to the form of clothing - in the field of science, culture, technology, and art. In combination with the previous reforms, this had not only negative but also positive consequences, giving an incentive to industrialization, the development of the agricultural sector, improving the literacy of the population, and the quantitative and qualitative growth of the middle strata, especially the intelligentsia, civil servants, students, officers, technical and other specialists. But do not forget about the contradictory nature of globalization and its negative aspects. "Mondialization", i.e. the universality of economic, technological, cultural and other ties entangling the "globalized" society, is experienced by them extremely painfully, as it leads in one form or another to the breakdown of its structures, the restructuring (sometimes radical and rough, carried out without taking into account local specifics) of social mechanisms and connections between people. Almost everywhere in the East, especially in the Arab world, this leads to an increase in the impoverishment of traditional small (and sometimes large) producers in cities and villages, who are unable to adapt to the "roll" of globalization, and an acceleration in the rate of their ruin and transformation into social marginals. More than half of them remain permanently in this capacity, forming an ever-growing and socially explosive component of society. In some places, its share is equal to 35-40% of the amateur population. Needless to say, the benefits of globalization do not apply to them [Eastern Society, 2009, p. 7-8; The Middle East, 1992, p.73-84].

Thus, in the Arab world over the past decades, traditional class, ethnic, religious, regional and other contradictions have been supplemented by contradictions between "modernized" (relatively affluent) and backward (usually poor) groups. Social diversity increased the complexity and heterogeneity, ideological and spiritual heterogeneity of Arab society, and it was no longer so united by the ideas of nationalism and independence as in the first decades of the "Nasser era". The economic situation of Arab countries (with the exception of oil and gas producers) did not contribute to this either.

The military-bureaucratic and dictatorial regimes in the Arab world have multiplied their efforts to overcome the barriers of economic construction and socio-political development by authoritarian methods that are familiar to the East. Gradually forming, they changed the image of their countries, relying on the army, bureaucracy, police, bourgeoisie (usually not entrepreneurial, but bureaucratic, speculative, comprador, i.e. not productive, but largely parasitic or connected by intermediary functions with foreign capital). All these social groups often merged into a single exploitative stratum, which appropriated more than 80-90% of the national income. In the monarchical states of the East, a layer of "feudal-bureaucratic capital" (FBK) has firmly grown into it, i.e. hundreds (and in some cases thousands) of noble families that simultaneously control the upper echelons of power, the most profitable business sectors, the elite of the army and clergy through their nominees [In the stream of scientific creativity, 2011, p. 125-126]. United in

Medieval clans, whose authority is sanctified by ancient customs and traditions, they often demonstrate their financial, military and other influence outside their countries, as can be seen in the example of Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, Qatar and neighboring emirates. Max Weber also warned that such clans, inevitably combining religious and political functions with the advantages of origin, always claim "unlimited personal power" (Weber, 1947, p.37, 318). The events of 2011 in Libya and Syria and the unexpectedly active role of a number of Arabian monarchies in them reminded us of this.

Arab society has always been characterized by a very contrasting polarization and pronounced forms of social inequality. And in almost all historical epochs, this has caused riots, uprisings, acute conflicts and clashes between privileged groups and the broad masses of the exploited and indigent poor. At the same time, the social and political struggle was closely connected with religion, justified by it, and conceptualized within the framework of religion. In Islam, it has always been considered a fair struggle against the ruling "bad Muslims", i.e. those who violate the precepts of the Koran and Sharia (it was not difficult to find such violations). On this basis, M. F. Vidyasova and V. V. Orlov believe that " the roots of the politicization of Islam are lost 'in the darkness of time'", starting from the confrontation between traditionalism and rationalism that arose in the IX century. Since the XVIII century, Wahhabis have been trying to eliminate them, leading "the preaching of social harmony, brotherhood and unity of all Muslims", and all apostates from strict observance of the norms of Islam, those who recognize "people worse than pagans" [Vidyasova, Orlov, 2008, p.9].

The Arabs actively communicated with their neighbors in Africa and Europe, especially in the Mediterranean region, and actively influenced them during the era of Arab conquests and the flourishing of Arab-Islamic culture in the seventh and tenth centuries, and fought them off just as intensively during the Crusades of the eleventh and thirteenth centuries and the emergence of European colonialism in the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. The widespread advance of this colonialism on all fronts in the 18th and 19th centuries generated a Muslim backlash in the form of Islamic fundamentalism.

Today, it is a direct descendant of nineteenth-century pan-Islamism, which tried (unsuccessfully) to respond to the cultural, ideological, and military-political challenge of European expansion. Nationalism, which succeeded it in the twentieth century, did a better job of achieving independence. However, neither pan-Islamists, nor nationalists, nor Muslim socialists (in fact, the left wing of nationalists) were able to resist globalization. That is why, according to V. A. Isaev, "there is a strong opposition to globalization in the Middle East" and many there imagine "globalization as a continuation of imperialist and colonial policies by other means" [Arab Countries..., 2007, p. 60].

Often the most diverse currents of Arab social and political protest merge, especially where, in the words of the Arab political analyst Hashim Jawad, "Muslims have no legitimate means of expressing their dissatisfaction with the economy, politics and diplomacy of the West, perceived by their despotic governments." It is then that the ground is formed for "confrontational and aggressive" Islam-extremism, which in recent decades has become the most important factor in both the domestic and international life of the Islamic states [Arabs and the West, 1999, p. 29].

However, the Western powers are quite adept at using all the levers at their disposal to influence the Arabs, including with the help of the latest technologies. Recent years are full of examples of expanding the arsenal of tools, approaches and ideological tricks used by the West, as it is now necessary to take into account the increased sensitivity of Arabs to issues of social injustice and inequality due to the growth of their level of education and civic consciousness, and the reduction, especially in cities, of differences in the level of culture of men,

a sharp increase in the level of public awareness due to the wider spread and modernization of the media [In the stream of scientific creativity, 2011, p.124].

But in addition to the above, there is another factor, perhaps the most important today. This is the growing role of Islamism, or political Islam, not only in the Middle East, but also around the world. In most Arab countries, conditions are very favorable for it: 25-35% of the working-age population here are marginals. And there are even more semi-marginals and those who are close to them in their social status. All of them find an explanation for their troubles in the declarations of ideologists of Islamic fundamentalism, who claim that the Muslim poor will be happy only when the states in which they live are "truly Islamic", and their constitution is the Koran [Middle East..., 2003, No. 18, pp. 163-193; Kepel, 2004, pp. 154-164].

All attempts to solve the problem of Islamism by force by Western countries, including the United States, fail. Moreover, they cannot cope with such a serious problem as the huge Muslim diasporas in the countries of the "golden billion", i.e. Europe and North America. Migrants from Islamic countries, job seekers, economic and political refugees, students and false students, countless small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, adventurers and smugglers, honest workers and impersonating them-all of them are part of these communities that have long been rooted in the Western lands, numbering from 3040 thousand people in Germany to 15 million in the United States. US $ ². It is almost impossible to determine their exact number, since no one knows how many illegal immigrants arrive in the West, and every day, under the guise of relatives," temporary " workers, or even seeping through the criminal paths laid out long ago by various drug dealers and other criminals. This is often why the same authors name different numbers of Muslims in Europe: either 24 million or 40 million people. If we agree with the American-Tunisian M. Tlili, then only in the Mediterranean region there are 20 million "European Muslims" and "almost 200 million Arabs" (many of whom, as is known, are not Muslims). But do they include millions of Muslims in the UK, Belgium, Scandinavia and the Netherlands? [Zinin, 2011, p. 149-150].

In any case, the socio-political potential of this mass is huge and a significant part of it is also under the influence of Islamists. Moreover, sometimes certain factions of these diasporas play the role of "fifth columns", providing shelter, supplies, finances and weapons to the most aggressive Islamist extremists. For example, accomplices of Islamist terrorists who settled in the West were trained as pilots in the United States (who later participated in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington), established the use of the mechanisms of the US financial system to sponsor terrorism and support Al-Qaeda militants in the United States and Great Britain, and organized bombings in the London subway and Paris, at the train station in Madrid and in Berlin's night clubs [Vasiliev, 2012, pp. 204-205; Landa, 2006, pp. 43-45].

At present, it is already clear that Islamism dominates almost all Muslim societies and is a new mass ideology that plays a dominant role in the world of Islam. I have already suggested that Islamism is "a certain stage of development... the world of Islam" and "it will not be possible to change it in a short time" [Landa, 2006, p. 264]. This assumption is based both on the phenomenal vitality of Islamism, which quickly recovers its structures and cadres after the most severe defeats, and on a clear change in the West's attitude to Islamism. For some time now, we can even talk about his hidden indulgence of Islamism. "The Arab revolutions provided the Islamists with an ideal

² These figures have long been changed and more than once. As for the Muslims of the United States, they are dominated not by newcomers (although there are many of them), but by local African-Americans who have converted to Islam.

a springboard for attacks on the Old World, " the European media noted with alarm in the fall of 2011. The "power vacuum" created by the West (unwittingly?) in a number of Arab countries led to the fact that "many jihadists were released from the prisons of these countries, and the military arsenals accumulated by previous governments were left virtually without control." What is this but pandering to Islamist extremists, a direct invitation to them to take advantage of the freedom so suddenly acquired and the weapons so kindly provided? [Izvestiya, 06.09.2011].

In our literature, there are doubts about the hidden springs of events in the Arab world. In short: "Does the Washington regional committee work?". There are different answers to this question: some consider Islam-extremists to be independent movements of a "new type", reflecting the growth of civic consciousness of the numerically increased and much-learned youth in recent years [Zinin, 2011, p. 150]. Others believe that "in the short term, it is completely unclear to Washington how events will develop", especially "what will happen next, what reforms or repressions will take place in Arab countries, and how the new regimes will stand" [Vasiliev, 2012, p. 285, 295].

Both points of view deserve attention. But there is another interesting opinion of the French expert Alain Antal, who emphasized that the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan sought not to eliminate Al-Qaeda, but only to oust it, but in the end allowed it to create branches in "Mesopotamia and the Maghreb countries." At the same time, he drew attention to the following: "Getting from Iraq or Afghanistan to Europe or America is difficult and risky. It is much easier to do this from Tunisia or Libya." In short, we are talking about a transfer (perhaps pre-calculated?)of the data. "Al-Qaeda" to Africa, which "puts at risk first of all not the United States, but the countries of the European Union "[Izvestia, 06.09.2011]. Or maybe even Russia? To be more cooperative in negotiations on missile defense, oil, gas, and NATO's positions in Europe?

It seems that this opinion should also be taken into account, especially if we recall that Islamism, for the emergence of which there were, as noted above, objective reasons within the Arab-Islamic world, was largely supported militarily and financially (if not nurtured, as many believe) The United States and other Western powers during the Soviet Army's 1979-1989 war against the Dushmans in Afghanistan. We can talk about the mistakes of the leadership of the USSR, which decided on such a war, which the whole world of Islam considered a challenge to itself. But how much would the Afghan Dushmans have won without the help of weapons and money that they regularly received from Western countries through Middle Eastern intermediaries, without tens of thousands of Muslim volunteers from different countries (who were not only delivered to Afghanistan, but also" earned " there 1.5 thousand dollars each)? per month!). And how much money was spent on the corresponding propaganda and propaganda of Islamism from Morocco to Indonesia? Deductions from the profits of FBK of the Persian Gulf alone would hardly be enough for such a grandiose, literally global enterprise! [Islam and Islamism, 1999, p. 154; Kepel, 2004, pp. 144-148]. Recall that after the end of the 1979-1989 war, the Taliban emerged in Afghanistan, and many Islamist extremist groups from Algeria to Xinjiang (including the North Caucasus and Central Asia), and the transnational Al-Qaeda, either combining all these groups, or "just" sponsoring, supplying and directing them.

There is no consensus among experts in the Islamic world about whether al-Qaeda exists or is just a myth that frightens the confused and misinformed layman in Europe and America. By the way, this technique (to deny their own existence) has recently been used by smaller Islamist organizations, for example in Indonesia, in order to distract attention from themselves, to get out of the close surveillance of the authorities. Nevertheless, Al-Qaeda exists alongside other Islamist extremist organizations on an international scale,

In particular, the Islamic Liberation Party (IRP), which operates from Jordan and Palestine to Central Asia and even the Volga region. However, almost all groups of Islamist extremists are somehow connected with each other. For example, the East Turkestan Movement of Islam and the Movement of the Religion of Islam (the most prominent of the 27 terrorist groups in China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region) have been linked to the Taliban in Afghanistan, Islamist extremists in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and even Chechnya. Similarly, the Pakistan-based Jamaat-e-Islami party had branches in India and Bangladesh, and the Jamaat-e - Tabligh party had branches throughout South and Southeast Asia. In turn, the corresponding groups in England, the United States, Kashmir, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka are not formally connected with the Jamaat-i-Islami, but in fact are its parts. The Islamist Ennahda (Revival) in Tunisia closely interacted with the Islamists of Sudan and Algeria [Landa, 2006, pp. 249-250].

It is almost impossible to trace all the connections of Islamist organizations (and not to confuse them with moderate, charitable, cultural and similar communities), because about 330 Sufi brotherhoods-tariqas (from the Arabic "tariq", i.e. the path of understanding the divine truth "Haqiq") often join hundreds of such organizations. Many of them are influential in large regions (for example, the Maghreb), while others are" globalized " from Tropical Africa to Central Asia and Singapore. In Egypt alone, by 1967, there were 67 of them, and the number of "khvan" (brothers) in them-up to 5 million people. By 2000, there were 22 tariqas in Morocco, 20 in Tunisia, 15 in Algeria, and 10 in Turkey and Syria [Asia and Africa Today, 2000, No. 9, p. 56; Landa, 1993, pp. 141-149; Islam, State..., 1958, p. 191]. Tariqas have played a huge role in the political and religious life of the Islamic world. Formally, they are alien to Islamism and even criticized by it. But their inner life is a deep mystery, and the diversity of their influence makes them ideal translators of slogans, attitudes and moods, in short, reliable and tightly closed communications. Somehow it would not be logical not to use such a well-established structure since the Middle Ages! In addition, any murid (novice) the tariqa must, in its relations with its murishd (mentor, teacher), "having renounced its will, ... be like a corpse in the hands of a corpse washer, who turns it around as he wants" [Islam and Problems..., 1994, p.17-18].

Unfortunately, there are examples of the involvement of tariqas in the games of Islamist extremists. Thus, the Haqqani Foundation, established in London in the early 1970s and associated with the Islamic Party of the United States, the Islamic Supreme Council of America, and American Muslim Aid, formed a new tariqa, Haqqaniyya, which was separated from the Naqshbandiyya brotherhood and established its centers in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Lebanon (the nephew of the founder of the tariqa is Lebanese), as well as "in most of Western Europe" and the Caucasus. The Turkish Cypriot Sheikh Nazim al-Kubrousi al-Haqqani, a student of the Dagestani theologian Abdallah al-Dagestani, became the head of the tariqa. The question of their relations with the United States is unclear due to the closeness of the internal life of the tariqa. But the hakkanists have already been seen funding Chechen separatists and inviting their leaders to the United States (although in 1998, i.e. before the separatists were defeated). They somehow got lost against the background of 24 US organizations that finance North Caucasian militants. But their example, at least, shows that Sufi fraternities can be involved in one way or another in the activities of Islamists and are able to contribute to them [Ethnicity, politics..., 1998, p. 1-4].

Thus, the Sufi fraternities, previously hostile to Islamists and condemned by them (for "superstition" and trying to stand "between Allah and believers"), now seem to be at a crossroads and, not wanting to lose influence among believers, are simply forced, at least, to take into account the growing authority of Islamists in the world of Islam. This phenomenon is comparable to the phenomenon of "Islamization" of a significant part of the intelligentsia of this world. Indeed, many intellectuals who have never been interested in religion, all these engineers, mathematicians, architects, chemists, physicists (sometimes-even

nuclear scientists) began to change their atheism or indifference to Islam to support Islamism. At the same time, the question of their actual religiosity is not worth it. Islam is primarily a political weapon for them. In their perception, it is not so much a worldview and worldview, but rather an ethno-confessional characteristic, an indicator of national identity, a spiritual connection with the traditions, customs and mentality of their people. Hence the relative ease of" re-Islamization "of the intellectual elites of the Islamic countries, at least a significant part of them, and their efforts to "re-Islamize" the entire society, because Islam is also a symbol of anti-Western patriotism, and at the same time more and more often a form of opposition to their pro-Western government [Roy, 1995, p. 61-81; Charnay, 1994, p. 339].

Returning to the problem of the reality of Al-Qaeda, let's pay attention to the duration and persistence of the US special services ' efforts to eliminate Bin Laden (who obviously knew a lot about his organization's contacts with the CIA at first), and such figures as both ideologists and practitioners of extremism as Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Musab al-Suri Yusuf al-Qardawi, Hasan al-Turabi, who, for all the shades of their position and tactics, are united by a single philosophy and a single goal, to which they simply go in different ways [Sikoev, 2010, pp. 114-222].

Moreover, Al-Qaeda is not only the mastermind, sponsor, organizer and unifier of Islamists, but also their symbol. It is known, in particular, that about 3 thousand Algerian militants who previously fought in Afghanistan, and then took part in the intra-Algerian civil war of 1992-2002. as part of the "Armed Islamic Group", which was distinguished by the greatest cruelty of all groups of this kind, later renamed themselves the "Salafi group of preaching and Struggle", isolated in a small town a mountainous area in the northeast. But in 2007, calling themselves Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, they received outside help with weapons, food, equipment and even the latest technical means, which allowed them to transfer their actions to the Sahara and, with the help of Al-Qaeda "specialists" who arrived, even partially spread these actions to Mali. Niger and ... Libya [Mokeddem, 2010, p. 24-92]. The Algerian journalist Mohamed Moqaddam, who reported on all this, also provided information about Al-Qaeda's actions in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and even France with the participation of still surviving militants from Algeria [Mokeddem, 2010, p. 24-92; Landa, 2011, p. 210-211]. Al-Qaeda is also known for its sinister role in the defeat of Libya, in the struggle for power in Yemen, its penetration into Egypt, and more recently into Syria.

In the light of all the above ,the "Arab political spring" appears to be the result of the interaction of at least three political forces: 1) the educated and democratically minded part of Arab society, mainly young people, who no longer wanted to tolerate economic inequality, social injustice, and political disenfranchisement; 2) the Western powers, who had long been looking for an opportunity, taking advantage of the contradictions and difficulties of the Arab world, to reverse its development and finally put an end to the "Nasser era" by rebuilding the geopolitical structure of this world 3) Arab theocratic monarchies, even more than the Western powers, who were eager to put an end to the "Nasser era", which was a constant threat to their existence, a source of deadly ideas of anti-monarchism, republicanism, anti-clericalism (but at least secularism), hostility to imperialism (without which monarchs-theocrats simply do not exist). they will hold out).

All the haters of the "Nasser era" have decided that now is the right time to end it. The economic and social situation of the Arabs is not good, the percentage of marginals is growing uncontrollably, as is the polarization of society. And there are almost no charismatic leaders among the Arabs who "made" what we call the " Nasser era." There is no Nasser himself, no Bourguiba, no Ben Bella, no Boumediene, no Gaddafi, no Saddam Hussein (for all his negative features, who was popular in the United States).-

in the Arab world). Bouteflika in Algeria and Bashar al-Assad in Syria are alone and have great difficulty resisting external pressure. And for the Arab, like any other, East, an authoritative leader is already half the success.

Of course, there were other participants in the "Arab spring", first of all influential Islamists throughout the Arab world, who at first kept a low profile, as well as the army and state apparatus, on which much depended. But it so happened that the army and state apparatus in Tunisia and Egypt did not resist the rebellious youth (clearly under the influence of Western countries that actively intervened in the course of unrest through the Internet and social networks). However, the youth was not organized politically. Therefore, it was replaced by Islamists, who have a very developed underground in the Arab world. From that moment on, the army and the state apparatus in both Tunisia and Egypt, sacrificing their leaders Ben Ali and Mubarak, decided to prevent the dismantling of the political system that generally suited them. In Tunisia, it was possible to reach a compromise with the Islamists who won the elections (it is not known just until what time), taking advantage of the flexible position of their leader Rashid al-Ghannouchi, who, unlike other Islamists, stands for "democracy and human rights" and for "building a modern Islamic society that could draw on the principles of democracy and human rights". to the bottom of everything valuable from Western culture, without getting lost in it " [Guchetl, 1999, p. 71].

Al-Ghannouchi's willingness to come to terms with the West and pro-democracy supporters has reached the point where Tunisian Islamists even ceded the presidency (albeit for one year) to the human rights activist and pro-French center-left Mansif al-Marzouki. This reveals one of the possible outcomes of the "Arab spring" - a compromise between the rebel Islamists and other political forces in the country and their consideration of the role of France in organizing the "political spring" in the region and its claims "to participate in the formation of a new political landscape here "[Izvestia, 17.11.2011; Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 26.10.2011]³.

However, Tunisia is the exception rather than the rule. Its specific features are its long - standing and multilateral ties with France, the high level of education received by Tunisian youth and part of the middle classes in France or in French in the Maghreb, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland. All this is forced to take into account both the United States, and the Islamists incited by them, and the military and officials who are clearly shocked by the course of events.

Obviously, there is no compromise of this kind in Egypt. The ruling Military Council issued a Constitutional Declaration on June 17, 2012, according to which legislative power is transferred to it, and before the election of a new parliament, and they will take place only after the Constitutional Assembly develops a new constitution within three months. Thus, the military would like to retain its power indefinitely, and the president of the republic, whether he is anyone, even an Islamist, will not influence either the lawmaking process or even the declaration of war, which he must coordinate with the army command [Izvestia, 19.06.2012].

And the military has plenty of reasons to maintain power, even to declare a state of emergency or even martial law in the country: the penetration of Al-Qaeda in Egypt (especially in the Bedouin environment of the Sinai Peninsula) and neighboring Libya, the ongoing fighting in the same Libya, Syria and Yemen with the participation of the same organization. Al-Qaeda, the constant tension in the Gaza Strip, dominated by the Islamist movement Hamas, the endless influx of Africans from the south of the continent, who decided to use the power vacuum in North Africa to break into Europe.

³ According to some sources, the compliance of al-Ghannouchi and his party is due to their rivalry with radical extremists (Salafists), who consider al-Ghannouchi's followers "apostates". It is characteristic that the Salafists enjoy financial and other support from Qatar, which played an important role in the defeat of Libya, and is now seeking the same in Syria [Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 13.03.2012].

Now the military is removed from power in Egypt. They are already another generation of Arab officers, neither spiritually, nor ideologically, nor psychologically connected (or almost not connected) with the "era of Nasser". They are much closer to Sadat and Mubarak, and represent a privileged social group in Egypt, largely "Westernized" due to their education, social orientation, and outlook on life. But that is why they are unlikely to go into the shadows.

For the grave diggers of the "Nasser era", the main enemy is the regime of Bashar al - Assad in Syria, against which all their forces are thrown. They are inspired by the success in Libya, where 14 NATO countries and 4 of their partners (Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Sweden) carried out tens of thousands of combat airstrikes and special forces operations (Britain, France, and Qatar), killing at least half of the world's population. according to the leaders of the Libyan rebellion themselves, up to 50 thousand people (this figure does not include those tortured in prisons and dungeons) and destroying almost the entire transport and energy infrastructure of one of the most affluent Arab countries [Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16.04.2012]. The Americans, Saudis, Qataris and other "human rights" zealots are now eager to establish a similar "freedom" and "democracy" in Syria. And although the Syrian opposition forces are divided and do not agree with each other and in fact cannot overthrow the Assad regime, they hope that everything will be done, as in Libya, by their friends, sponsors and patrons-British special forces," foreign legionnaires " of France, Al-Qaeda militants, mercenary units transferred from Libya, as well as countless Sunni fighters, who are now a clear surplus in the Middle East after the operations of US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. They should all be given jobs, too, and at the same time, their national and political discontent with the endless acts of aggression of the West against the East should be melted down into a purely religious confrontation with the Shiites supported by Iran. And it is the United States, the "Wahhabi tandem" of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and other theocratic monarchies of the East that are most afraid of him (though for various reasons).

Of course, the most unpromising thing is to prophesy about how events in the Arab world will go further. Of course, the "Nasser era" is in the past. It cannot be returned, as well as its creators, their actions and the conditions of these actions. But the prospects of what Al-Qaeda and its allied "Wahhabi tandem", supported by the West, are doing, also raise doubts. Their attempt to incite Sunni-Shiite hostility has taken place before and has always failed. He still has a high chance of failure. Lebanon's Shiites, now the country's leading denomination, have greatly strengthened their positions due to the strengthening of the Hizbadla movement, which many in the country already call a "state within a state", which has significant capital (up to $ 2 billion) and very combat-ready detachments, which have greatly increased the authority of this organization in the country, and all over the Arab world. Although the Americans managed to provoke hostility between Shiites and Sunnis during the years of occupation of Iraq, there are very few Iraqis who are inclined to listen to the propaganda coming from the United States, including their demagogy about "human rights", because almost all the leaders of the Iraqi Shiites are Ali al-Sistani, Baqir and Abd al-Aziz al-Hakimi and Muqtada al-Sadr have their own model of democracy and do not accept the US presence in the Middle East. Recall: in Lebanon and Iraq, Shiites are the main force [Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16.05.2012]. In Syria, American attempts to isolate Alawites and other non-Sunnis have been failing for a long time: As you know, there, since the spring of 2011, opponents of Assad simply bought participants in anti-government demonstrations, paying a simple demonstrator $ 60. for going out on the street, $ 100-for going out with a poster and $ 300-for going out with a machine gun! [Izvestiya, 19.08.2011; 23.09.2011]. Since then, a lot of water has flowed away and, apparently, money was crying, thrown away for a not good cause. There is no unified, coherent and mass opposition in Syria. And there is massive support for Assad, as well as the indignation of ordinary Syrians at the gross interference from outside in their affairs.

Not to mention the dubious political future of Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia, their relations with their Western backers are far from perfect, as evidenced by the recent assassination of the US Ambassador to Libya. And in Yemen and East Africa, the West and Al-Qaeda are engaged in a fierce war involving thousands of American soldiers and almost daily deaths of terrorists and their field commanders [Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15.05.2012].

So most likely, the "friendship" of the West with Al-Qaeda and Islamists in general cannot be long. This purely tactical alliance is very fragile and is failing even in Libya, where the situation is likely to remain uncertain for a long time. In all other countries, this "friendship" has neither a solid foundation nor long-term prospects.

Of course, the "Arab political spring" of 2011-2012 will remain in history not only the tragedy of Libya, the drama of Syria, the bloodshed in Tahrir Square in Cairo and the clashes between Saudi troops and Bahrainis. Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, which have experienced a lot during this time, are unlikely to live in the old way. Liberalizing and even somewhat democratizing these countries, as well as others (Morocco, Algeria, Jordan), is making progress, albeit with difficulty. The Arabs expected more from their "political spring". But outside interference, attempts to "Islamize" and in some cases "freeze" this spring still did their job. And much of what could have been done today is being postponed for the future. And, let's hope, the West, which has decided to return to the new colonial policy, will not always be able to use the latest technologies to intercept the initiative of the Arab "grassroots" and distort it in its own interests.

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