SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FORECAST OF STRUCTURAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC RISKS IN EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES (KENYA, TANZANIA, UGANDA)1

The article analyzes the risks of socio-political instability that lie in wait for the countries of East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) at the exit from the Malthusian trap, and presents a cognitive model of the occurrence of such risks. Particular attention is paid to demographic indicators and the specifics of urban processes, in particular, to such risk factors as the" youth hillock " and the rapid growth of the urban population predicted by the UN. Various scenarios for the development of the above-mentioned countries in the coming decades are considered, and some recommendations are made to avoid the risks of socio-political destabilization.

Key words: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, East Africa, socio-political instability, risk forecasting.

The countries of East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda), as shown in an article by one of the authors [Zinkina, 2012], are still in the "Malthusian trap" and must make some efforts to get out of it. Recall that the "Malthusian trap" is a fairly typical situation for pre-industrial societies, in which population growth overtook the growth of subsistence production, which made it impossible to increase consumption per capita (and increase the standard of living) in the long term; accordingly, the majority of the population continued to exist at the level of starvation survival [Malthus, 1978 (1798Artzrouni, Komlos, 1985; Steinmann, Prskawetz, Feichtinger, 1998, p. 535-550; Wood, 1998, p. 99-135; Grinin, Korotaev, Malkov, 2008; Grinin, Korotaev, Malkov, 2010; Grinin et al., 2009; Korotaev, Khalturina et al., 2010; Korotaev, Khalturina et al., 2011]. This article analyzes the risks of socio-political instability that lie in wait for countries to escape from this trap.

GETTING OUT OF THE MALTHUSIAN TRAP AS A FACTOR GENERATING SOCIO-POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Getting out of the Malthusian trap by definition implies eliminating the risks associated with Malthusian factors ; however, as was shown earlier [Korotaev, Khalturina et al., 2010; Korotaev, Bozhevolnov et al., 2011; Korotaev, Khalturina et al., 2011; Korotayev et al., 2011], it generates some new risks.- political destabilization.

1 The study was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (Project No. 10-06-00344), the Research Support Program of the National Research University Higher School of Economics.

page 105
In the process of getting out of the Malthusian trap, the problem of hunger is solved, as a result of which the death rate is significantly reduced. Indeed, for countries with a per capita food consumption of up to 2,900 kcal per day, there is a strong negative correlation between this level and mortality (Table 1). Since the exit from the Malthusian trap usually occurs at the first stage of the demographic transition, this exit (usually accompanied by an increase in per capita food consumption of more than 1,000 kcal per day) it should be accompanied (as the results of our regression analysis show) by a very serious increase in the population growth rate.

Table 1

Regression analysis

Nsstandardized coefficient

Standardized coefficient

t

Statistical significance (α)

Model

In

Article error

In

(Constant)

38

5.1

.45

< 0.0001

Average per capita food consumption (kcal per person per day)

-0.012

0.002

-0.639

-5.45

< 0.0001

Dependent variable: Total mortality rate (per thousand people)

Source: [SPSS, 2012].

In socio-economic systems emerging from the Malthusian trap, an increase in per capita food consumption is particularly strongly correlated with a decrease in infant and child mortality (since it is children who suffer most from malnutrition and, accordingly, benefit most from its elimination) (see, for example, [Korotaev, Khalturina et al., 2010, p. 4). 185-187]).

Thus, at the first stage of the demographic transition (usually coinciding with the exit from the Malthusian trap), mortality decreases sharply [Chesnais, 1992; Korotayev et al., 2006], especially infant and child mortality, while the birth rate remains high. Accordingly, the number of children who survive to reproductive age increases dramatically. This leads to a so-called demographic explosion (a jump in the absolute population growth rate). Moreover, the generation of children is much more numerous than the generation of parents, and the share of young people in the population structure is greatly increasing. It is known that at the second stage of the demographic transition, a landslide drop in the birth rate occurs (leading in the long term to a decrease in the share of young people in the population structure), but it occurs with a noticeable delay, resulting in the formation of the so-called youth hillock.

There are sufficient grounds to consider the rapid growth of the share of young people in the population structure as a powerful factor of socio-political destabilization. For example, J. Goldstone states:

"The rapid growth of young people can undermine existing political coalitions, creating instability. Large cohorts of young people are often attracted to new ideas or unorthodox religions that challenge old forms of power. In addition, since most young people have fewer family and career commitments, they are relatively easily mobilized to engage in social or political conflicts. Young people have played a critical role in political violence throughout recorded history, and the presence of a "youth bump" (an unusually high proportion of young people aged 15-24 years in the total adult population) has historically been correlated with times of violence.

page 106
political crises. Most major revolutions... - [including] most of the revolutions of the 20th century in developing countries - occurred where there were particularly significant youth bumps " [Goldstone, 2002, p. 11-12; see also: Goldstone, 1991; Fuller, 2004; Heinsohn, 2003; Mesquida, Weiner, 1999; Korotaev, Bozhevolnov et al., 2011 Korotaev and Khalturina et al., 2010; Korotaev and Khalturina et al., 2011].

Moreover, in order to avoid increasing unemployment among young people entering the labor market, the economy needs to create a large number of new jobs at a proportional rate for a young, often not having the required qualifications in the labor market, but very ambitious labor force. This is not an easy task even for a strong economy; if economic growth slows down, the unemployment rate among young people - the part of the population that is most prone to aggression and influenced by radical propaganda-jumps sharply. In these circumstances, it becomes extremely difficult (if not impossible) for the socio-political system to maintain stability.

It is worth emphasizing that such closely related modernization processes as the exit from the Malthusian trap and the demographic transition are also inextricably linked with such an important aspect of modernization as urbanization (urbanization, of course, is older than modernization, but in the course of modernization, a sharp intensification of urbanization processes naturally occurs).

In general, getting out of the Malthusian trap encourages strong urban population growth through several channels. It leads to a significant reduction in mortality (against the background of a still high birth rate), causing a sharp acceleration in the overall rate of demographic growth, which in itself leads to the emergence of a very significant excess rural population. In addition, the displacement of the surplus population from the countryside is further enhanced by the rapid growth of labor productivity in agriculture (which usually quite naturally accompanies the exit of the social system from the Malthusian trap), as a result of which fewer workers are required to create the same (or even significantly larger) volume of agricultural products.

The fact that this system is in the process of breaking out of the Malthusian trap (i.e., it is experiencing a steady increase in per capita consumption) means that the population being pushed from the countryside to the city and moving from rural to urban occupations can be fully provided with food resources; thus, breaking out of the Malthusian trap is a powerful force It supports the sharp intensification of urbanization processes observed in the process of modernization; it is precisely the exit from the Malthusian trap that occurs in the process of modernization that makes it possible to raise the share of the urban population to a level that cannot be achieved in principle in agrarian societies that are in the Malthusian trap2.

This almost inevitably creates some form of social tension: migrants from rural areas do not have urban qualifications (and urban housing), and in the first time after resettlement can only count on the lowest-skilled, poorly paid jobs and extremely mediocre housing conditions. Massive migration from the countryside to the city almost inevitably generates a significant number of dissatisfied with their second-class position in comparison with skilled workers in modern sectors of the economy with their incomparably higher standard of living.

2 At the same time, a way out of the Malthusian trap in modern conditions is impossible without a very high development of the urban (and more broadly, non - agricultural) sector, which provides modernizing agriculture with machinery, equipment, mineral fertilizers, pesticides, special literature, agronomists, etc.

page 107
The situation is compounded by the fact that young people tend to migrate primarily to cities. Thus, the factor of "youth hillock" and the factor of intensive urbanization act together, producing a particularly powerful destabilizing effect. At the same time, the number of young urban residents is growing especially rapidly.

Studies show [Korotaev and Khalturina, 2010; Korotaev and Khalturina, 2011; Korotayev et al., 2011] that cases of large-scale socio-political instability at the exit from the Malthusian trap are not out of the ordinary, but quite a regular phenomenon observed in such African countries as Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire'Africa, such as Albania, El Salvador, South Korea, Iran, Syria, etc.). Moreover, the events of the "Arab spring" of 2011 also represent a fairly pure case of the emergence of socio-political instability at the exit from the Malthusian trap (with its own, however, specific features). Below is a cognitive diagram and a brief verbal description of the "Malthusian exit trap", explaining why such cases of instability should be considered as a natural phenomenon.

1) The beginning of a stable exit from the Malthusian trap means a decrease in mortality, and hence a sharp acceleration in the rate of population growth (which in itself could lead to a certain increase in socio-political tension).

2) The beginning of a stable exit from the Malthusian trap is accompanied by a particularly strong decrease in infant and child mortality. All this leads to a sharp increase in the share of young people in the total population in general and in the adult population in particular (the so-called "youth hill" phenomenon).

3) As a result, there is a sharp increase in the proportion of the very part of the population that is most prone to violence, aggression and radicalism, which itself acts as a powerful factor of political destabilization.

4) The rapid growth of the total number of young people requires dramatically increasing the creation of new jobs, which is a very difficult task. A surge in youth unemployment can have a particularly powerful politically destabilizing effect, creating an army of potential participants ("fuel") for all sorts of political (including revolutionary) upheavals.

5) Getting out of the Malthusian trap encourages strong urban population growth. In addition, the rapid growth of labor productivity in agriculture further increases the displacement of the surplus population from the countryside. Massive migration from the countryside to the city almost inevitably generates a significant number of dissatisfied people with their situation, since migrants from the countryside in the first time after resettlement can only count on the lowest-skilled, low-paid jobs and extremely mediocre (and often frankly unsatisfactory) housing conditions.

6) The exit from the Malthusian trap is ultimately achieved primarily through the development of new sectors and the death of old ones, through structural adjustment, which cannot occur completely painlessly. In all cases, the old traditional qualifications of workers lose their meaning, and without new modern qualifications, these workers are forced to take low-skilled jobs (if they can find them at all), which, of course, can not but generate mass discontent and serve as a serious factor of political destabilization.

7) The factor of "youth hillock" and the factor of intensive urbanization act together, producing a particularly powerful destabilizing effect in the aggregate.

page 108

Figure 1. Trap at the exit of the trap. Cognitive schema

8) Such a situation can lead to the most serious political destabilization, even in conditions of fairly stable economic growth. Political upheavals are especially likely to occur if the government loses credibility as a result of, say, a military defeat or in conditions of a foreign occupation.-

page 109
a severe economic crisis that has replaced the economic recovery (Figure 1).

CORRELATION BETWEEN THE GROWTH RATE OF URBAN YOUTH AND THE INTENSITY OF INTERNAL VIOLENT CONFLICTS: CROSS-NATIONAL TEST

Our cross-national study shows that a sufficiently large number of bloody domestic political upheavals should be expected with a high probability where and when the number of urban youth begins to grow at a rate of more than 30% over five years, but if this figure exceeds 45%, then it is extremely difficult for the respective countries to avoid such upheavals (Table. 2).

Table 2

Correlation between the maximum growth rate of urban youth in 1960-2005 (%% over five years) and the intensity of internal violent conflicts

Intensity of internal violent conflicts (1960-2005)

1 (low, <500 dead)

2 (medium and high, 500-100 000)

3 (very high, >100,000)

Maximum growth rate of urban youth in 1960-2005 (%% over five years)

0 (Very low, <15%)

8

1

0

88.9%

11.1%

1 (Low, 15-20%)

3

2

0

60.0%

40.0%

2 (Medium, 20-30%)

14

12

0

53.8%

46.2%

3 (High, 30-45%)

14

26

13

26.4%

49.1%

24.5%

4 (Very high, >45%)

0

18

17

52.9%

47.1%

Источники: Bercovitch, Jackson, 1997; Clodfelter, 1992; The Cambridge History of Africa..., 1986; Lorraine, 1995; Palmowski, 1997; Project Ploughshares, 2008; Rummel, 1994; Small, Singer, 1982; Century of Genocide..., 1997; Wallechinsky, 1995; White, 2010(1); 2010 (2).

Notes: p = 0.59 (α < 0.0001); γ = 0.74 (α < 0.0001).

We estimated the growth rate of urban youth based on the UN Population Division database. World Population Prospects, World Urbanization Prospects 2012); the data are presented here with a gap of five years; this circumstance led us to choose five-year segments of the history of the respective countries as the comparison unit. This table takes into account only those countries whose population in 1960 was at least 1 million people.

For countries where these rates reached average values (20-30% over a five-year period), the probability of such conflicts already turned out to be close to 50% (i.e., almost one chance in two). For countries with high (30-45% over five years) growth rates

page 110
As the number of urban youth increases, the probability of completely avoiding significant domestic political upheavals drops to a very low level (about one chance in four), and at the same time there is a fairly high (also about one chance in four) probability of particularly bloody civil wars.

It is worth paying attention to the fact that in our proposed forecast, only "positive results" are really significant (i.e., those results that reveal the presence of a high risk of political instability in a particular country in a particular future period). We tend to interpret such results as evidence of a real risk of developing political instability at a given time and place (unless, of course, adequate measures are taken by the relevant governments in a timely manner). On the other hand, in our opinion, "negative results" cannot be considered as a guarantee that political upheavals are impossible in a given country until 2050 (because we are not inclined to believe that the causes of bloody political upheavals can be completely reduced to structural and demographic factors).

SOCIO-POLITICAL INSTABILITY FORECAST FOR EAST AFRICA

Based on the model described above, as well as on the previous analysis of the socio-demographic development of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (Zinkina, 2012), it is possible to forecast the dynamics of socio-political instability for the countries of East Africa.

Urbanisation. According to the World Bank, Uganda is one of the three least urbanized countries in the world (along with Burundi and Papua New Guinea) - only 13.3% of Ugandans lived in cities in 2010. The share of urban dwellers in Kenya and Tanzania was higher (22.2% and 26.4%, respectively), but they are also among the least urbanized countries in the world [World Bank, 2012].

It is necessary to understand how the urban transition in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda took place, and why these countries are moving so slowly and have not been able to make significant progress in this transition. To do this, let's turn to models of urban dynamics. Unregulated urban transition in the absence of significant resource constraints is described quite well by the logistic model and is often found both in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond [see, for example, Korotaev et al., 2011]. Recall that logistic growth is a growth with saturation, which gives the following dynamics: the accelerating growth of the indicator at the beginning of the process is replaced by a slowdown in growth rates and ends with the stabilization of this indicator at a certain level (Figure 2).

Let's look at the extent to which the dynamics of the urban population share in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and some other African countries corresponded to the logistics trend (Figure 3).

Figure 3 shows that the dynamics of urbanization, for example, in Gabon almost completely corresponded to the logistic model and reached the saturation level at a very high level in Africa.-

Figure 2. Typical dynamics generated by logistics models

page 111

Figure 3. Urban population share in some countries of Tropical Africa,%, 1960-2010

Source: World Bank, 2012. Workd Development Indicators.

By Russian standards, it is more than 85% of the urban population. In other countries, for example, in Nigeria (for which data are also shown in Fig. 3), the share of the urban population grew linearly, but at a fairly high rate, so that approximately half of the Nigerian population now lives in cities. At the same time, the situation in the countries we are considering is fundamentally different. The urban dynamics curve of Kenya and Tanzania corresponded to the logistics model only until the early 1980s, when economic growth was fairly strong; after a significant decline in economic growth, the growth rate of the urban population declined markedly long before reaching the saturation level, and the dynamics of urbanization shifted from a logistic trend to a linear one. This can be considered as a manifestation of healthy social self-regulation - indeed, if the quasi-exponential growth in the share of the urban population (characteristic of logistic growth with small values of the corresponding indicator) continued further, then against the background of increasing economic problems, this could not but lead to a socio-political explosion. In Uganda, the growth of the urban population was greatly slowed by the coup and the rule of Idi Amin (1971-1980). the share of the urban population increased by less than 1%). Urbanisation in Uganda accelerated slightly over the next decade, with the share of the urban population rising from 7.5 per cent in 1980 to 11.1 per cent in 1990, but then slowing sharply again, and despite economic improvements and sustained economic growth, it grew by only 2.2 per cent by 2010.

However, in recent years, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have experienced fairly stable rapid economic growth, and it is very likely that the urban dynamics of these countries will follow the logistics trend. It is on this assumption that the UN forecast of urban population growth is based (Figure 4).
A return to the logistics trend implies a significant acceleration in the rate of urbanization (at least until the share of the urban population does not exceed the current level).

page 112
it will reach 50%). For example, according to the UN, over the 30-year period from 1980 to 2010, the share of urban population in Kenya increased from 15.7% to 22.2% (i.e., by 7 percentage points), and in the next three decades it is projected to grow from 22.2% to 40.4% by 2040, i.e., by 18.2 percentage points. points. A similar pattern is observed in Uganda, where the share of the urban population increased from 7.5% to 15.2% (by 7.7 percentage points) in 1980-2010, and by 2040 it is projected to grow to 30.5%, or by 15.3 percentage points. Since Tanzania has had the highest rate of urbanization out of the three countries, the acceleration will be less significant, but still noticeable: in 1980-2010, the share of urban population increased from 14.6% to 26.3% (by 12 percentage points), and by 2040 it is projected to grow to 43.4%, or by 17 percentage points [UN Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects, 2012].

Figure 4. UN average forecast for urban population dynamics in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda to 2050 (%)

Source: UN Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects 2012.

Against the background of extremely rapid growth of the total population, this means explosive growth of the urban population in all three countries in 2010-2040: in Kenya - from 9.5 million to 31.8 million people, more than 3 times in 30 years; in Tanzania - from 11.8 million to 46.7 million people, more than 4 times in 30 years. in Uganda - from 5 million to 23.2 million people, more than 6.5 times in 30 years.

Such a huge increase in the urban population inevitably leads to serious problems related to the development of urban infrastructure, housing construction, job creation, etc. If the countries under consideration follow the path predicted by the UN and return to the logistics direction of urbanization, the urban population (especially urban youth) will increase dramatically, significantly exacerbating existing problems, which will pose a significant threat to socio-political stability.

Indeed, our analysis of the average UN projections for demographic and urban dynamics in East African countries has shown that it assumes the following dynamics in the growth rate of urban youth (Figure 5).

As we can see, even if the social and demographic development of East African countries follows the UN average forecast that is sufficiently favorable for these countries (in fact, it assumes that these countries will leave the Malthusian trap in the coming decades), in Kenya and Tanzania, we should expect the growth rate of urban youth to reach critically dangerous levels exceeding 30% in five years and serious socio-political destabilization. Especially

Figure 5. Forecast of the relative growth rate of urban youth in East Africa until 2035 (% over the five-year period)

Note: Calculated based on the UN Population Division average forecast. World Population prospects, World Urbanization Prospects 2012).

page 113
The structural and demographic risk of socio-political destabilization is high in relation to Uganda, where these rates will be particularly high under the UN average scenario and will remain above the critically dangerous level throughout the 2020s.

However, getting into the high-risk zone can be avoided. In general, the two main modifiable factors, the impact on which can prevent the growth rate of urban youth from reaching a critically dangerous level in the medium term, are the birth rate and the growth rate of the share of the urban population.

At the same time, it should be noted that just by reducing the birth rate, it is basically impossible to prevent the growth rate of urban youth from reaching a critically dangerous level in 2021-2025 - for the simple reason that all those East Africans who will join the ranks of the youth age cohort (15-25 years) in 2021-2025 have already been born. Of course, it is necessary to reduce the birth rate in East Africa (preferably at a rate significantly higher than the average UN forecast), because if the process of reducing the birth rate slows down significantly (as has unfortunately happened in the demographic history of East Africa), then the period of high structural and demographic risk will last for many years after 2025 However, it is no longer possible to prevent East African countries from falling into the zone of critically high structural and demographic risk in 2021-2025 due to their impact on fertility.

Nevertheless, the inclusion of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in the zone of high risks of socio-political destabilization is still not inevitable, because there is another modifiable factor - the pace of urbanization.

For example, in China, the dynamics of the urban population share in the 1980s, long before approaching the saturation level, shifted from a logistic trajectory of accelerated growth to a linear growth trajectory, which it has been following up to the present time. It is important to emphasize that this happened against the background of very rapid and successful economic growth, so it is impossible to link this change with resource constraints and the system self-regulation they trigger in this case. The fact is that in this case we are dealing not with self-regulation, but with fully conscious and purposeful state regulation of the process, aimed, among other things, at artificially restraining the pace of this process (in order to prevent explosive growth in the urban population) and at bringing the rate of this growth in line with the growth rate of the number of workers places in cities, the pace of development of urban infrastructure, etc. [Zhao Zhong, 2003]. At the same time, in the light of what was said above, such regulation of the growth rate of the share of the urban population seems quite justified, since it avoids socio-political upheavals that are extremely likely in such a context with uncontrolled migration.

The experience of the PRC shows that a purposeful state policy can ensure that the trajectory of urban population dynamics is transferred from a logistic trajectory (extremely dangerous in the early stages of the urban transition process, when it has a quasi-exponential form) to a linear trajectory, which, as we will see below, could prevent East African countries from entering the zone of high structural- demographic risk. Indeed, our calculations show that in order to avoid falling into the "trap at the exit of the Malthusian trap"3 Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda need only avoid return

3 However, in order to avoid being caught in the Malthusian trap again, all three countries will need to reduce their birth rates to at least the level expected by the UN average forecast (and preferably even lower) in the coming years.

page 114
on the logistic trajectory of urban dynamics, while maintaining the linear growth trajectory of the share of urban population observed in the country over the past 30 years

(Table 3).

Table 3

Scenario projections of urban population dynamics in East Africa ( % ) to 2030: Logistics Scenarios (UN) and linear growth scenarios

Kenya

Tanzania

Uganda

Years

UN logistics scenario

Linear scenario

UN logistics scenario

Linear scenario

UN logistics scenario

Linear scenario

2010

22.2

22.2

26.4

26.4

13.3

13.3

2015

24.1

23.6

28.9

28.3

14.4

14.0

2020

26.6

25.0

31.8

30.2

15.9

14.8

2025

29.6

26.4

35.1

32.1

18.0

15.5

2030

33.0

27.8

38.7

34.0

20.6

16.3

Table 4

"Logistic" and "linear" scenario forecasts of the dynamics of the relative growth rates of urban youth in East Africa until 2050 (% over the five-year period)

Kenya

Tanzania

Uganda

Five-year plan

According to the UN logistics scenario

Using a linear scenario

According to the UN logistics scenario

Using a linear scenario

According to the UN logistics scenario

Using a linear scenario

2016-2020

25.5

20.6

28.2

25.4

29,4

23.2

2021 2025

30.5

23.5

30.5

26.7

32.7

23.5

2026 2030

24.5

17.6

27.4

23.1

32.5

21.,5

2031-2035

16.0

9.9

20.6

16.7

28.3

17.8

As we can see, the trajectory of the key indicator in this scenario in all three countries passes at a fairly safe distance from the critically dangerous level of 30% over the 5-year period, and by 2030 it reaches a level that (of course, subject to significant results in reducing the birth rate) can allow us to move away from the policy of a certain containment adaptation of urban growth rates to the policy of stimulating them.

It should be emphasized that the policy of regulated urbanization does not mean that there is no need to reduce the share of the population employed in agriculture. Indeed, the extremely high proportion of the population employed in agriculture in East African countries has the downside of extremely low levels of labor productivity in their agriculture. For example, if Tanzania's agricultural productivity reached the level of Algeria or Syria, the same amount of agricultural products that are currently produced in this country could be produced ten times less

page 115
the number of employees, and when reaching, say, the level of Slovenia, and even a hundred times smaller number [see, for example: Korotaev et al., 2010, p. 316].

The extremely low level of agricultural productivity in East African countries (where the vast majority of the population is employed) is responsible for the extremely low income of most East Africans, a level so low that it does not even allow most East Africans to avoid malnutrition. It is precisely because of low agricultural productivity that East Africa is still struggling to escape the Malthusian trap. Thus, a sustainable exit of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda from the Malthusian trap is impossible without a radical increase in labor productivity in agriculture, and therefore without the most significant reduction in the share of the population employed in agriculture, and, consequently, without a significant increase in the share of the population employed in non-agricultural sectors of the economy - in industry and the service sector. services. This means that East African countries need to significantly increase the share of people employed in non-agricultural sectors of the economy in the next twenty years, but to prevent falling into the zone of high structural and demographic risk, this should be done primarily by developing non-agricultural production in rural areas and in small towns, avoiding their concentration in large cities in every possible way, in the largest (metropolitan) East African cities - Nairobi, Dar es Salaam and Kamiala.

The dynamics of economic development in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in recent years suggest that the economic prospects of these countries in the coming years will be quite favorable. The global financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009 somewhat slowed the growth of their economies, but no sharp decline was observed (unlike most developed Western countries, for example).

Nevertheless, our consolidated forecast of the dynamics of political instability for these countries for the period up to 2050 looks rather unfavorable. First, they will have to make a huge effort to significantly reduce the birth rate. Even so, population growth will be huge by 2050. If a significant reduction in the birth rate is not achieved, population growth will become literally catastrophic, and countries are likely to fall back into the Malthusian trap, since even the relatively stable economic growth achieved in recent years will not be enough to feed the rapidly expanding population. Indeed, the economic success of recent years has not yet been able to provide the population of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda with a sustainable per capita food intake at the level recommended by the World Health Organization. If the birth rate is not radically reduced, countries may be on the verge of widespread famine.

It seems that it is the increased development of non-agricultural production in rural areas and small towns that is the main route that can allow East African countries to avoid both falling into the "exit trap" and applying some of the overly stringent measures to curb the pace of urbanization that were applied in the People's Republic of China. Accordingly, it is advisable for Governments of East African States to allocate a significant part of the income received from the most rapidly developing areas of the economy (for example, tourism) to the modernization of agriculture and the development of non-agricultural industries in rural areas and small towns. In addition, since East African countries receive significant international financial assistance, it would be wise to allocate a significant portion of it to the same purposes.

page 116
list of literature

Grinin L. E., Korotasv A.V., Malkov S. Yu. Mathematical models of socio-demographic cycles and exit from the Malthusian trap: some possible directions for further development // Problems of mathematical history. Matematicheskoe modelirovanie istoricheskikh protsessov [Mathematical modeling of historical processes].

Grinin L. E., Korotasv A.V., Malkov S. Y. History, Mathematics and some results of the discussion on the causes of the Russian Revolution // On the causes of the Russian Revolution / Ed. by L. E. Grinin, A.V. Korotasv, S. Yu. Malkov, Moscow: LKI / URSS, 2010.

Grinin L. E., Malkov S. Yu., Gusev V. A., Korotasv A.V. Nekotorye vozmozhnye napravleniya razvitiya teorii sotsial'no-demograficheskikh tsiklov i matematicheskie modeli vykhoda iz "malthusianskoi pitushki" [Some possible directions of development of the theory of socio-demographic cycles and mathematical models of the exit from the "Malthusian trap"] / Malkov S. Yu., Grinin L. E., Korotasv A.V. Moscow: LIBROCOM / URSS, 2009.

Zinkina Yu.V. Sotsial'no-demograficheskoe razvitie stran Vostochnoy Afrika (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda) [Socio-demographic development of East African countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda)]. 2012. № 6.

Korotasv A.V., Bozhsvolnov Yu. V., Grinin L. E., Zinkina Yu. V., Malkov S. Yu. Trap at the exit from the trap. Logical and mathematical models // Projects and future risks. Concepts, models, tools, forecasts / Ed. by A. A. Akaev, A.V. Korotasv, G. G. Malinsev, S. Yu. Malkov. Moscow: Krasand / URSS, 2011.

Korotasv A.V., Malkov A. S., Khalturina D. A. Laws of history: Mathematical modeling of the World-System development. Demography, Economy, Culture, ed. 2. Moscow: URSS, 2007.

Korotasv A.V., Khalturina D. A. Investments in basic education as a measure to prevent socio-demographic catastrophes in developing countries / / System monitoring of global and regional risks / Ed. by D. A. Khalturin, A.V. Korotasv, Yu. V. Zinkina. Moscow: LKI / URSS, 2010.

Korotasv A.V., Khalturina D. A., Kobzsva S. V., Zinkina Yu. V. Trap at the exit from the trap? On some features of the political and demographic dynamics of modernizing systems // Projects and future risks. Concepts, models, tools, forecasts / Ed. by A. A. Akaev, A.V. Korotasv, G. G. Malinsev, S. Yu. Malkov. Moscow: Krasand / URSS, 2011.

Korotasv A.V., Khalturina D. A., Malkov A. S., Bozhsvolnov Yu. V., Kobzsva S. V., Zinkina Yu. V. Zakony istorii [Laws of History]. Mathematical modeling and forecasting of global and regional development. 3rd ed. Moscow: LKI / URSS, 2010.

Artzrouni М., Komlos J. Population Growth through History and the Escape from the Malthusian Trap: A Homcostatic Simulation Model // Genus. 1985. Vol. 41. № 3-4.

Bcrcovitch J., Jackson R. International Conflict: A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management, 1945-1995. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1997.

Century of Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views. / Ed. by S. Tottcn. N.Y.: Garland Publishing, 1997.

Chcsnais J.С. The Demographic Transition: Stages, Patterns, and Economic Implications. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.

Clodfeltcr M. Warfare and Armed Conflict: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1618-1991. 2 vols. L.: McFarland, 1992.

Fuller G.E. The Youth Crisis in Middle Eastern Society. Clinton Township, Ml: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2004.

Goldstonc J. Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991.

Goldstonc J. Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent Conflict // Journal of International Affairs. 2002. Vol. 56. №. 1.

Hcinsohn G. Söhne und Weltmacht. Terror im Aufstieg und Fall der Nationen. Zürich: Orell Füssli Verlag, 2003.

Korotayev A., Malkov A., Khaltourina D. Introduction to Social Macrodynamies: Compact Macromodels of the World System Growth. M.: URSS, 2006.

Korotaycv A., Zinkina J., Kobzcva S., Bogcvolnov J., Khaltourina D., Malkov A., Malkov S. A Trap at the Escape from the Trap? Demographic-Structural Factors of Political Instability in Modern Africa and West Asia // Cliodynamics: The Journal of Theoretical and Mathematical History. 2011. Vol. 2. № 2.

Malthus T. Population: The First Essay. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1978 [1798].

Mcsquida C.G., Weiner N.I. Male Age Composition and Severity of Conflicts // Politics and the Life Sciences. 1999. Vol. 18. № 2.

Our Times: The Illustrated History of the 20th Century. / Ed. by G. Lorraine. N.Y.: Turner, 1995.

Palmowski J. Dictionary of Twentieth Century World History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Project Ploughshares. 2008. Armed Conflicts Report. URL: http://www.ploughsharcs.ca/librarics/ACRTcxt/ ACR-TitlcPage.html. Accessed on 01.08.2012.

Rummcl R.J. Death by Government. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994.

Small M., Singer J.D. Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars 1816-1980. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982.

SPSS. World 95 Database. Chicago, IL: SPSS Inc., 2012. Accessed on 15.08.2012.

page 117
Stcinmann G., Prskawctz A., Fcichtingcr G. A Model on the Escape from the Malthusian Trap // Journal of Population Economics. 1998, Vol. 11, N 4.

The Cambridge History of Africa. / Ed. by M. Crowder, J.D. Fagc, R. Oliver. Vol. 8. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

UN Population Division. 2012. 'United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division Database. World Population Prospects', available at <http://www.un.org/csa/population>. Accessed on 20.07.2012.

UN Population Division. 2012. 'United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division Database. World Urbanization Prospects', available at <http://www.un.org/csa/population>. Accessed on 20.07.2012.

Wallechinsky D. Twentieth Century: History With the Boring Parts Left Out. N.Y.: Little Brown, 1995.

White M. 2010(1). Death Tolls for the Man-Made Megadeaths of the Twentieth Century. URL: http://users. erols.com/mwhitc28/warstatx.htm. Accessed on 15.08.2012.

White M. 2010(2). Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century. URL: http://uscrs.crols.com/mwhitc28/20ccntury. htm. Accessed on 20.07.2012.

Wood J.W. A Theory of Prcindustrial Population Dynamics: Demography, Economy, and Wcll-Bcing in Malthusian Systems // Current Anthropology. 1998, Vol. 39, N 1.

World Bank. 2012. World Development Indicators Online. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2012. URL: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator. Accessed on 15.06.2012.

Zhao Zhong. Rural-Urban Migration in China: What Do We Know and What Do We Need to Know? Peking: China Center for Economic Research, Peking University, 2003.

page 118

Permanent link to this publication: