Cambridge a.o.: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 188 p.*

Wars have occupied a significant place in the life of African peoples since ancient times. Whatever study of the history of individual states or regions of the Black Continent we take, it always says something about wars. However, the study of the history of wars does not always come to the fore. Among Russian works on the history of Africa, first of all, one can recall the monograph by G. V. Tsypkin [Tsypkin, 1988], and from the history of African armies - the book by G. I. Mirsky concerning the Third World as a whole [Mirsky, 1976].

There are works devoted to wars in Africa in separate periods [Reno, 1998], but as far as I know, such a "cross - cutting" study as the peer-reviewed book by Professor R. J. Reid, one of the leading African historians at the London School of Oriental and African Studies, is the first one devoted entirely to wars in the history of Africa.

Prior to writing it, the author had come a long way, exploring the history of wars and power in pre-colonial Buganda [Reid, 2002], then throughout East Africa in the pre-colonial period [Reid, 2002], and then in North-East Africa [Reid, 2011]. This book is much broader both in terms of research area (the whole of Africa) and in terms of chronology - it covers the history of the African continent from ancient times to the present day.

At the beginning of the study, the author makes a number of interesting theoretical propositions. In particular, he emphasizes the importance of wars in the history of mankind, while at the same time noting that the military history of the Ecumene remains Eurocentric (p. IX-X). As for the African wars and warriors, there are quite stable myths around them (for example, about "noble savages" with bows and arrows), which the author tries to refute in his research.

R. Reid analyzes such important general theoretical problems as the factors that contributed to military actions in the history of Africa: environmental, economic and political. As for the first factor, he makes the interesting observation that the lack of natural harbors on the ocean coast of Africa made it impossible for Africans to conduct military expeditions outside the continent. The spread of the tsetse fly in some regions, in turn, did not allow wars to be waged there.

* R. J.'s raid Wars in African history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 188 p.

It is extremely important that in all epochs the author considers wars as a socio-cultural phenomenon.

He makes a number of important points that sometimes seem self-evident but are not really clearly understood - for example, he emphasizes that the main type of traditional African armies was infantry.

Considering the wars in Africa in the 1st-early 2nd millennium AD, the author notes that the armies were unprofessional and the cost of conducting military operations was minimal. He considers the thirteenth century to be a breakthrough, when the Mande in West Africa and the Shoans in Ethiopia formed the rudiments of standing armies and strong military states. Many African states, the author concludes, were created as a result of wars, but in the end, as a result of a number of factors, they fell apart (p.45).

In the military history of Africa in the period from the beginning of the 2nd millennium to 1600, the author singles out the state of Songhai and Ethiopia. He believes, not without reason, that these states reached the pinnacle of development, since they had cavalry in their armies. Speaking about the many State and pre-State formations of the Bantu peoples of this period, he notes that some of them were characterized by stability, dynamism and compactness.

Another important feature of the era - the beginning of Africa's contacts with the outside world, which had far-reaching consequences-was not left out of the author's attention. By the beginning of the 17th century, he notes, attempts to establish military control over distant territories and trade routes began to play a significant role. By the same time, firearms were also being distributed in Africa - from Europeans, mainly from the Portuguese.

Reid defines the period 1600-1800 as the years of "destruction and construction", when there is more military activity, which is primarily associated with the Atlantic slave trade. The author clearly shows how the slave trade caused the expansion of hostilities, which in turn increased the slave trade. The growth of the slave trade led to the growth of states in West Africa, in particular Oyo and his cavalry (p. 80).

Quite a lot has been written about Buganda and its army in world literature, but R. Reid makes an interesting remark that the soldiers of this state were not faceless - Baganda's heroes were sung in songs. He focuses on the religious wars for "pure" Islam waged by the Fulbe in Western Sudan in the 18th century and their impact on the Hausa states.

In general, between 1600 and 1800, the author notes, new forms of military organization appeared and conflicts over land and the growth of statehood became more acute. West Africa, caught up in the Atlantic slave trade, was different from the rest of the continent, having a special military energy and ferocity.

R. Reid highlights the general features of the period: reforms and innovations in military organization and state-building, changes in social organization, began almost everywhere. The political leadership was distinguished by successful command and heroism in battle. Social mobility made military professionalization possible. However, the military states were unstable due to inattention to internal problems and the merging of war with politics.

The author considers the 19th century in a very special way. First, it significantly expands its chronological framework-from about 1790 to 1920. Secondly, he puts forward the concept of a" long-term military and political revolution "that took place during this" long " century. In this regard, he puts forward a number of new provisions, in particular this: "the battle for Africa" was made possible due to the actual African military innovations, and not least due to the numerical superiority of the Africans, their tactical skills and knowledge of the terrain and the enemy. Europe has taken advantage of military conflicts between African states. With smaller troops, but better weapons and skills, European countries fought for Africa. Thus, R. Reid considers the division of Africa as a continuation of the military revolution of the XIX century.

In the concept of "military revolution", the author includes the professionalization of wars, new models of command and organization of military operations, as well as the growth of the use of firearms in tactical innovations. In the 19th century, he points out, approximately 16 million firearms were imported to Africa (p. 108). They were effectively used by the Yoruba, Nyoro, Nyamwezi, Asante, and Amhara.

The military revolution in Africa, according to R. Reid, includes an increase in the degree of political violence and the culmination of the process of state formation. In this regard, he sees the 19th century in Africa as a kind of "golden age", when the restrictions of previous centuries were relaxed, which led to the emergence of a new era.

it led to great changes: new forms of war emerged, a new military organization, and the power of the state expanded. The author emphasizes that the military revolution that occurred on the African continent did not occur anywhere else.

Reid does not forget to mention the well-known facts: the 19th century in Africa was a century of illegal slave trade, which was associated with the growth of a number of states, for example, Oyo, Dahomey, Ashanti. The slave trade and ivory trade in the Sultanate of Zanzibar and a number of inland areas of East Africa played a major role.

However, the well-known facts for him are only a background for the development of his concept of a military revolution. In this context, he analyzes the role of Europe on the continent during this period. For example, he emphasizes that before the 19th century in Africa, Europeans did not have a clear advantage either in weapons or tactics. Only when they were pushed by the need for industrial expansion did they gain a decisive advantage in military technology over the Africans. Since the 1820s and 1830s, European military activity in Africa has been increasing, but only since the 1870s has it been supported by the respective Governments (p. 132). The Europeans were much better armed, in particular, since the 1860s with rear-loading rifles, and since the 1880s with machine guns (p. 133). European machine guns were effective only in frontal attacks, but they were useless in the African jungle. The use of artillery against the Africans in 1870-1900 had rather a psychological effect.

The success of the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II in the Battle of Adua in 1894 was, according to R. R. Tolkien. Raid, the result not only of military skill, but also of luck (p. 134). In general, he emphasizes, Africans were inferior in military skills to Europeans, and even firearms in their hands were less effective than in the hands of the same Africans under European command. For many years, the Africans did not have enough resources for guerrilla warfare.

However, the main advantage of Europeans over Africans was, according to R. Reid, the African military revolution itself is one of the components of his concept.

The author argues with the established view of two waves of anti-colonial resistance in Africa: "primary" (1870-1880s) and "secondary" (1890-1900s). He believes that the Afro-European conflicts between 1870 and 1920 should be considered in continuity, many of them having roots as early as the beginning of the 19th century (p. 138). In fact, new factors were added to these roots (such as the imposition of taxes or the seizure of land), but the wars themselves were mostly fought in the same way and with the same result as before. Of course, they were led by a new generation of African leaders, but based on traditional values and beliefs, such as maji maji.

The European "battle for Africa", the author insists, should be understood as a continuation of the military transformation taking place on the continent, a process of change that gave Europeans many opportunities. Not only was there no African unity, but there were internal wars that Europeans took good advantage of. Africans saw Europeans as allies and drew them into their wars (for example, Baganda).

R. Reid rightly emphasizes a fact that many researchers have forgotten and are forgetting: European officers were completely dependent on African soldiers. There was no European government that could afford to spend so much money and use its own soldiers in so many African campaigns. Without African soldiers, there would have been no "European" division of Africa, the author insists, and concludes: Africa's own military revolution of the nineteenth century made European imperialism possible, since African soldiers at the end of the nineteenth century demonstrated a high level of military skill and belligerence to European commanders. They were cheap to operate, better protected from disease, and mostly loyal.

By the early 1920s, the "scrum" era was over, and African soldiers returned to their barracks and were mostly used as police forces. In general, emphasizes R. Raid, the maintenance of internal order rather than external adventurism, was the main task of the colonial forces after the First World War.

So, according to R. Reid, the 19th century for Africa is an era of military revolution, when the old states tried to modernize and reform their armies. Professional armies sprang up, and social mobility grew at the expense of violence. But, emphasizes R. Reid, the military revolutions were fragile and limited: the emphasis in the new states was more on war than on production. Peoples could not be completely incorporated into such systems, living on the armed and hostile borders of empires - this was the dark legacy of the military revolution of the XIX century.

The war's connection to the slave trade made violence uncontrollable and the situation unpredictable. The military revolution of the nineteenth century led to the swelling of the manpower that could be used for military purposes.-

use it in the imperialist armies of the time of the struggle and in the colonial armies afterwards. Similarly, the Africans included Europeans in their nineteenth-century war struggles. But the Europeans did not understand the essence of what was happening in Africa.

Another consequence of the military revolution of the 19th century, according to the author, was the confirmation and consolidation of the role of force in politics for Africans. Thus, he believes, colonial rule did not interrupt, but continued the military revolution and was part of it.

R. Reid considers the entire period from 1920 to the present day as a single epoch, and this is also a completely new approach. "Unfinished Revolutions, old and New in the modern era" is the title of the last chapter of the book devoted to this period. In the twentieth century, Africa experienced dramatic and traumatic changes in the methods of warfare and military organization. But the twentieth century, the author believes, was in many respects a continuation of the revolution of the nineteenth century in military culture and the practice of wars, although with a large number of new elements. Here he makes a point that we cannot disagree with, and which goes far beyond the actual military history of Africa: "Few things in the recent history of the continent can be understood more deeply without a study of the more distant past "(p.147).

So, according to R. Reid, in the XX century, the African military revolution continued, and its key processes once again declared themselves. Coups d'etat, liberation struggle, civil war, insurrection, people's militia - all this is the continuation of the military revolution by other means.

The author emphasizes that during the colonial period, the armies on the continent continued to be Afro-European. At the same time, colonial regimes sought to maintain a monopoly on the use of force, so they tried to create more permanent armies and train representatives of African elites in European military affairs. The African armies themselves performed mainly the functions of maintaining internal security and control.

This section contains, of course, well-known, but extremely important facts and provisions: colonial armies were increasingly formed on an ethnic basis, belonging to them raised the social status of Africans, after 1945 the number of colonial armies decreased again, after decolonization, the Africanization of the officer elite took place.

However, the author also emphasizes not so well-known points: the coups of the 1970s were often welcomed by the population and were bloodless. Military leaders of states, "politicians in khaki", were, according to R. Reid, a continuation of the African tradition, when soldiers were significantly involved in politics, protecting the state from external and internal attacks.

The author does not forget about the reasons for numerous military coups in post-colonial Africa: the weakness of political regimes, especially the rapid failure of the parliamentary system and civil society, created many opportunities for ambitious military personnel. The image of a military ruler, not without irony, notes R. Reid, evolved from the saviour of the country from schism (Mobutu in Zaire, present-day Democratic Republic of the Congo, J. Gowon in Nigeria) to the predator (Idi Amin in Uganda, Bokassa in the Central African Empire) (p. 154-155).

It is interesting to note that most military regimes relied to some extent on civilian officials (p.155). The ambitions of the lower ranks led to the emergence of new military adventurers and the formation of often harsh military authoritarianism.

Postcolonial armies, notes R. The raid varied considerably in size and armament, with some having the most advanced weapons. But in most post-colonial countries, armies were corrupt, incompetent, and poorly trained. As a result, armies became ineffective and wars between states were quite rare. Inside the country, the opponents of these armies were as well armed and often had the moral superiority and support of the population. Armed borders within countries have emerged , another trait inherited from traditional African societies.

The presence of large white communities with political power in the settlement colonies gave an additional reason for military conflicts (Kenya, Rhodesia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa). This remark of the author is very important (p. 159).

R. Reid makes a number of observations, including original ones, about the reasons for the success of anti-colonial uprisings: internal cohesion and organization, military skills and access to weapons, the strength and determination of a hostile regime, and the availability of external support bases.

Also interesting are his arguments about the armed opposition already in independent countries: in some cases, it was about secession (Biafra in Nigeria, Ogaden in Ethiopia-these are well-known things). But the author considers well-organized guerrilla wars as a continuation

traditions of the armed border (p. 163). Nor does he forget that these conflicts intersected in various ways and to varying degrees with the processes of the Cold War, which particularly affected Africa in the 1960s and 1980s (p. 164).

Opposition movements, which were particularly numerous in the mid-1970s and mid - 1990s, were most often formed on an ethnic or confessional basis. Almost always led by an educated urban elite, they relied on the rural population. Militarily, the author characterizes them as low-level guerrilla actions, attacks on representative State targets, and raids on security forces. Sometimes, he notes, there were more extensive military operations, the creation of liberated zones (p. 166).

Often it was a complex struggle between different groups-ethnic, religious, cultural, seeking to secure access to political and material resources. More violent, R. emphasizes. A raid, military action was where there were white settlers or environmental disasters. Such wars were particularly devastating for societies living on the periphery of rational economies, with pastoralists being particularly vulnerable (p. 168).

The author's general conclusions on postcolonial Africa up to the present day are as follows: despite the trend towards demilitarization and demobilization, whether it was the result of external influences, peace treaties, military fatigue, or the strengthening of civil society and the civilian political sector, the military presence, whether covert or overt, remains strong across Africa. States remain fragile, and too many Africans are not sufficiently integrated into them, moreover, they are actively excluded from States and often abused. It is still too early to judge the last two decades and to understand whether the general direction of movement has moved away from the military (p. 178).

The author insists on his concept of the continuum of African military history, the cornerstone of which is the military revolution of the XIX century, and once again emphasizes that the colonial era did not abolish the old patterns of war in Africa, but in many respects prolonged violence, since the military transformation of the XIX century led to a longer, stable and authentic structure of society. During the colonial period, violence continued. Ironically, postcolonial states were generally less stable and less legitimate than their nineteenth-century predecessors. The very nature of colonialism, he argues, has shown that violence works (p. 179).

R. Reid's monograph is an indisputable contribution to the study of wars in Africa on a broad diachronic cross-section. Such a deep historical context allows him to analyze the relationship between continuity and discontinuity. He emphasizes that in the second half of the 20th century there was a convergence of two long-term processes-the establishment of the soldier in the political leadership and the establishment of the armed border as a creative and destructive factor.

The author's concept of a military revolution led him to conclude that by the end of the 20th century, this revolution had turned into a military crisis. It was caused by a number of processes: economic decline, rapid population growth, and the chronic political instability of post-colonial African States. Violence, the author believes, has been privatized again. Colonialism has left Africa with new parameters and new structures of military competition. They were reinforced by natural disasters, but war, the author emphasizes, has never been held in high esteem, it is the product of special circumstances.

Speaking about the post-colonial era, R. Reid also makes a number of interesting points. In particular, that the violent element had its own political and economic logic with historical roots. Or that African violence is incompatible with Western concepts of modernism and the use of force and military affairs in general. Here, he emphasizes, it is necessary to analyze deeper historical processes.

R. Reid also draws paradoxical conclusions: violence and militarism in African history, for all their deplorable humanitarian influences, have often been expressions of political creativity. This is especially true, he points out, of the nineteenth century, the violent "golden age" of African political development (p.181). And one more thing: the war in African history is not an anomalous and marginal byproduct that has nothing to do with the main direction of development. Rather, the role of war in Africa's past shows how violence fuels creativity in the most visible and horrific ways, and how the political, economic, and cultural consequences of militarism can be both creative and destructive.

In the long run, the war in Africa should be understood in a global context not as a primordial and eternal deviation, but as a representative struggle for development in one of the most complex ecological zones of the earth, which is not yet over - this is one of the main conclusions that the author comes to as a result of his fundamental research.

I didn't use the word "fundamental"for nothing. This is exactly what a peer-reviewed paper is. To write it, it was necessary to know the history of Africa from ancient times to the present day, clearly demonstrated by R. Reid. At the same time, the book is quite compact, it has only 188 pages with an index, and its six chapters have a fairly convenient internal heading. Each chapter is followed by a list of additional literature.

Not all of R. Reid's ideas can be considered indisputable. In particular, one of the cornerstones - about the military revolution of the XIX century and its continuation in the form of the colonial division of Africa - may cause objections from experts. Nevertheless, the author offers his own view of the place and role of the war on the African continent in historical retrospect. His book can be called groundbreaking, and it certainly enriches our knowledge of African history.

list of literature

Mirsky G. I. "The Third World". Society, Power, Army, Moscow: GRVL Publ., 1976.

Tsypkin G. V. Ethiopia in Anti-colonial Wars, Moscow, 1988.

Reid R.J. Political Power in Pre-Colonial Buganda: Economy, Society and Warfare. Oxford, 2002. Rcid R.J. War in Pre-Colonial east Africa: The Patterns and Meaning of State-Level Conflict in the Nineteenth Century. Oxford, 2007.

Rcid R.J. Frontiers of Violence in Northeast Africa: Genealogies of Conflict since с. 1800. Oxford, 2011.

Reno W. Warfare in Independent Africa. Boulbery, 1998.

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