Moscow: LIBROCOM Book House, 2012, 128 p. (in Russian)

Events in North Africa and the Middle East attract the close attention of Russian Africanists and Orientalists. In 2011, the Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences hosted a conference on "Revolutionary events in Arab countries: causes, driving Forces, possible consequences", organized on the initiative of the Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies. The meetings were attended by experts from various scientific and educational institutions - the Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Cairo University, the Institute of Asian and African Countries of the Lomonosov Moscow State University, the Russian State University for the Humanities, the Peoples ' Friendship University of Russia, and the National Research University - Higher School of Economics. Following the forum, a collection of articles was published

Looking at various aspects of the emergence and development of protest movements in the countries of North Africa and the Middle East, researchers rightly point out that over the decades of authoritarian regimes in these regions, not only has there been an accumulation of protest movements in the Middle East, but also in the Middle East.

There are many socio-economic, demographic and political problems, but also due to globalization, the development of information technologies, the promotion of the Western strategy of "forced democratization", on the one hand, and the transforming Islam, on the other, the socio - cultural environment of anti-government protests has changed. At the same time, authors often differ in their assessment of their nature: some define them as "revolutions", others as "uprisings", "riots" , etc. Opinions also differ about the future of the Arab countries, which is not surprising, since today it is difficult to answer with a sufficient degree of confidence the question of whether trends towards political democratization will prevail in the region or whether they will become decorative and will be reduced to a regrouping of forces in the ranks of the ruling elite.

Paying tribute to the role of Islam as the civilizational basis of the Arab-Muslim world, some researchers associate its future with the secularization and democratization of all spheres of public life, especially in such states as Turkey, Iran, and Egypt. Others believe that despite the pronounced tendency to democratize the processes taking place in this part of the world, Islam will retain its position, and possibly strengthen it. In fact, the process of change in this part of the world is far from complete, and it is quite possible for revolutions to deepen, as well as their definite "rollback".

Academician A. M. Vasiliev, in his article "Revolt in the Arab world: crops and sprouts", describes the events that took place in Egypt as the reasons for the "true revolution": the predominance of young people aged 15-30 in the age structure of the population-the most passionate part of the population; new opportunities for social communication and information exchange via the Internet, Social networks; unemployment among educated youth, lack of money for kalym and marriage, etc., as a result of which critical protest accumulated, according to the scientist, fueled by purposeful American and generally Western propaganda.

Another aspect that the author focuses on is the position of the Muslim Brotherhood, which opposes violence, even violence against the police. "If it hadn't been for our participation," Saad Husseini, a member of the Brotherhood's Governing Bureau, said in a conversation with A.M. Vasiliev in Cairo, " there would have been even greater sacrifices. Among the demonstrators were police agents who tried to provoke clashes. We believe that our position predetermined the success of the revolution, because it took place all over the country, and not just in Al-Tahrir Square. It was a revolution of the whole country... This is the revolution of all Egyptians " (p. 13).

In turn, B. V. Dolgov, noting in the article "Reasons for the rise of protest movements in Arab countries" that the protests everywhere had their own specifics, due to the peculiarities of the historical development of the region, the peculiarity of the religious, socio-economic and political situation, shows that the causes of unrest - against the background of aggravation of socio-economic problems - were nepotism and the corruption of the ruling groups. This was particularly evident in Tunisia, for example, where up to a third of the national economy was controlled by the family of the aging President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, who had ruled the country continuously since 1987, and the clan of his wife Leila Trabelsi, who owned a capital of 7 billion euros. As the author notes, Tunisia "was a typical example of quasi-democracy-behind the facade of formal democratic institutions... there was an authoritarian regime of personal power " (p. 19).

The impact of external factors was manifested primarily in the aggravation of socio-economic problems in the Arab world as a result of the global financial and economic crisis, which affected the economies of all Arab countries to varying degrees and led, in particular in Tunisia, to a sharp reduction in exports focused on EU countries.

One cannot but agree with Boris Dolgov's statement that the political changes that took place in Tunisia affected only the upper echelon of power. Meanwhile, as the author rightly points out, the existing socio-economic problems in Arab countries cannot be solved in a short time, even the formation of a democratic power structure in itself will not solve all issues, and a balanced political course with a social orientation is necessary.

Most researchers point to the demographic component as an essential part of the crisis. Indeed, 20-30 years ago, thanks to the success of medicine, child mortality sharply decreased while maintaining the same level of fertility, i.e. the number of children per woman. V. I. Gusarov in the article "The most important factors of the "Arab Spring"" noted-

It is noted that at present, in the Afro-Arab world, "on average, 6.5 children per one female mother, of which only one can be "put on his feet", taking the place of the father in the shop or in the field...". As a result, a huge part of young people join the faceless mass of marginals, lumpens and beggars. In the event of crisis situations, it is the marginalized youth who take to the streets and form the basis of the rioting and often violent ones, as happened in North Africa.

The influence of the age composition of the population and the structure of food consumption on the rise of protest actions is clearly shown in the article "Structural and demographic factors of the Arab Spring "by A. V. Korotaev and Yu. V. Zinkina. While they disagree that the protests are conditioned by the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the region, the authors argue that poverty and inequality levels in Egypt are not the highest in comparison with other developing countries, and that even in the face of rising world food prices, the Government took measures to improve the situation of the poorest segments of the population, and the employment rate higher than in fairly prosperous countries of the world. In addition, Egypt experienced a sharp drop (especially in 1975-1990) in mortality in general, and in infant and child mortality in particular. If in the early 1960s the average per capita consumption of food by Egyptians was below the level recommended by the WHO (2300-2400 kcal per person per day), then after 1973 this indicator went up sharply, already in 1982, i.e. a year after the arrival of X. Mubarak to power, exceeding the threshold of 3000 kcal and no more going down. The death rate has almost halved in just 20 years (1970-1990). As a result, population growth in Egypt reached explosive proportions and could not but create serious structural stresses.

N. A. Filin, in his article "Socio-demographic factor of mass unrest in Arab countries and Iran", also points out the relationship between the level of political stability/instability and such variables as the growth rate, birth rate and death rate of the population. Thus, in 2010, the unemployment rate in Iran reached 13% of the working-age population, the inflation rate - 12%, and the degree of social tension here is similar to the situation in Egypt. The situation is aggravated by economic sanctions imposed on the country by the UN, the United States and the European Union. The author does not rule out a surge of social instability in this country as well.

According to L. M. Isaev (Social Network Technologies and the revolutionary Process in Egypt)," the most active youth movement that became a skirmisher of the revolutionary events in this country was the network group "April 6"", whose Facebook page was used to distribute primary information and coordinate the actions of activists of protest movements. The level of Internet penetration in Tunisia and Egypt was enough to bring the masses of people to the streets, paralyze the response of the authorities and create conditions for a relatively peaceful overthrow of the ruling regimes. Among the factors that influenced the development of the revolutionary situation in Egypt, the author notes the relatively large information openness of Egypt (despite the presence of political censorship), easy access to the Internet, the average price of which in an Internet cafe is 3-5 Egyptian pounds per hour, and a fairly high level of education and information literacy of local youth (p. 43).

One cannot but agree with the author's conclusions concerning the contribution of Internet technologies to the development of the revolutionary process in Egypt, which for the first time in world history convincingly demonstrated their capabilities as an effective means of mass mobilization and turned into the most important source of information and transmitter of revolutionary appeals.

In turn, A. D. Savateev, in his article "Anti-authoritarian actions in Arab countries in the light of the interaction of globalization and Islamic culture", proves that in the mass media - the Internet, television, newspapers and radio - Western socio-cultural images and behaviors run counter to the attitudes, morals, beliefs and worldview that have developed in the Arab environment. At the same time, "Western political and legal culture is most consistent with the ideals and aspirations of the young, educated part of Arab society, especially those people who, often having higher education, including those obtained abroad, remain unclaimed at home due to unemployment and blame this, first of all, on traditional orders and the authorities, do not appreciating them as specialists and people" (p. 47). They associate their future with going beyond the dominant socio-political and cultural conditions. Therefore, many values of Eastern society are rejected, which are beginning (partly rightly) to be perceived as backward, incompatible with development - in particular, with the development of the world.

primarily economic. The supreme ruler becomes the embodiment of stagnation, the ideal is the Western system of power.

In his article "Morocco against the background of the "Arab revolutions": factors of stability of power", V. V. Orlov shows that although this country has not been spared such problems typical for modern Arab societies as poorly controlled demographic growth, hidden unemployment, low efficiency of the education system, housing crisis, etc., it has quite successfully survived the " turbulence zone"and the" threshold of sustainability " of Moroccan society was significantly higher than in Tunisia, Algeria or Egypt. The impact of crisis trends here is weakened or neutralized by effective social policies, subsidizing prices for essential products and natural gas, partial financing of small and medium-sized businesses, etc.

A significant contribution to Moroccan stability is also made by the much higher legitimacy of the supreme power than in the Arab republics. At the same time, the stability of the Moroccan monarchy makes it possible to better understand the immediate causes of the "Arab revolutions", the main ones of which were the ideological and political decrepitude and the dead-end nature of the ideological efforts of the Egyptian, Tunisian and Yemeni regimes, which for many years have not been able to solve the current national problems.

E. I. Zelenev in the article " Turmoil? Anarchy? A revolution? Arab political culture is on the way... into the future?"he makes a number of interesting suggestions regarding the essence of what is happening in the Arab East: 1) unrest and unrest, which in some cases develop into an armed struggle, have purely internal prerequisites, and their coincidence in time in a number of Arab countries is an accident; 2) there is a general systemic crisis in the model of public administration; 3) the most important factor in what is happening is the external factor that gives all revolutions some similarity; 4) speech This is not a crisis of public administration or a regional problem, or even an international conspiracy against the Arabs, but one of the stages of the "reset" of the system of international relations at the global level, the initiative of which comes from areas that are not directly related to the national interests of individual countries. All four assumptions have a right to exist, but the last assumption, according to the author, "suggests that the beginning of qualitative changes on a proto-global scale in world politics is very close" (p. 57).

R. G. Landa ("Political unrest in the Arab World: Visibility and Essence") He does not consider the events in North Africa and in a number of countries in the Middle East to be either the work of Islamists or revolutions in the true sense of the word. Since, as the author notes, "there is no question of a change in the social or even political system in any of the Arab countries affected by the unrest," he points out that "it is a stretch to call the personal changes in leadership that have taken place there "semi-revolutions", rather even "under-revolutions" (p. 63).

In his article "The Political Crisis in the Arab East: Dynamics and Prospects", A. A. Tkachenko proves that the political upheavals in the region were not unexpected and that experts have long predicted an inevitable explosion. The ruling regimes made one or two systemic mistakes, but this was enough for a social explosion. First, when corruption suppresses small and medium - sized businesses, which are the only ones capable of mitigating the problem of mass unemployment, the state's efforts aimed at supporting them have been insufficient, and measures to combat corruption have been ineffective. Second, efforts to smooth out glaring social contrasts were not consistent with the current situation. Third, authoritarian regimes used a powerful administrative resource to suppress opposition parties and movements, which in the context of a systemic crisis led to a political vacuum filled by the most active and most organized irreconcilable opponents of the regime (p.72). Under these conditions, as A. A. notes. Tkachenko, there are more than enough grounds for skepticism about the immediate and more distant future of the region, and the peak of protest moods and movements has not been passed.

Abu Al-Hassan Mahmoud Bakri in his article "Egypt after January 25, 2011" focuses on the results of the events, noting the politicization of the role of spiritual and religious leaders, lack of security, paralysis of production, resistance of representatives of the former regime to the revolutionary process, slowing down the adoption of necessary decisions, etc. Meanwhile, the author is encouraged by the political discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood, especially their actions involving the inclusion of other forces in the program of joint political activities, and by the fact that they are not directly involved in it.

not to displace competitors. The Egyptian author proudly claims that the people of his country changed the face of history, sacrificing much during and after the revolution.

Researchers consider global and regional factors of the ongoing processes. Thus, L. L. Fituni ("The Arab Spring in global and regional dimensions") believes that at the global level, this is the expansion of the international positions of political Islam (interregional level); point "energy emissions" outside the region (China, Russia, Tropical Africa, etc.); the emergence of a new vector of confrontation "NATO-antiNATO"; ousting rival Euro-Atlantic forces from the region; bringing new players to the forefront (Turkey); indirectly stimulating mass movements in other countries and regions inspired by the Arab example. At the regional level, the Arab Spring led to a sharp acceleration of social and political dynamics in North African countries, an increase in regional instability, a change in political regimes, a strengthening of the position of political Islam, a deterioration in the economic situation, and a strengthening of the positions of the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula.

According to L. L. Fituni, "the role of the external factor in the formation of objective prerequisites in each country is minimal, but much more significant at the regional level; in the formation of subjective conditions, its role is quite significant; and in ensuring the fall of regimes, it is decisive" (p. 77).

The wave of anti-government protests that swept across Arab countries has resonated in many countries around the world, including on the continent. Yu. N. Vinokurov's article " How far are revolutions in North Africa to Sub-Saharan Africa?". According to the scientist, the spread of mass protest movements that have emerged in North Africa to AYUS is impossible for a number of reasons. First of all, "the Arab North and the Negroid South ... represent two different civilizational worlds that do not coincide with each other" (p. 91). The author rightly points out significant differences in the degree of cultural and confessional homogeneity of these regions. Compared to North Africa, where Islam is absolutely dominant, the population of Tropical Africa is mostly multi-confessional. Despite the high level of unemployment in this region, it does not encourage the population to revolt. The gap between rich and poor is deeper here than in the Arab world, but this fact is not seen as a reason for social protest. In addition, the spread and consequent impact of new information technologies on Tropical African societies remains much smaller to this day than in the North. The difference is that the events in the Arab countries matured gradually, in a relatively calm political and socio-economic environment, which is why they caused the effect of a bomb exploding. Tropical Africa has been seething throughout the postcolonial period, but this does not result in mass anti-government movements, maintaining a local character.

R. S. Bobokhonov ("The crisis of authoritarian regimes in Arab countries and the experience of democratic changes in the modern Muslim world") believes that the events in North Africa and the Middle East not only played a major role in the fate of millions of people, but also created conditions for the emergence of new models of socio-economic and political development in the Muslim world. "All of them emerged as a result of the crisis of authoritarian regimes, the emergence of new generations on the political stage, and the social aspirations of society for democratic transformation" (p.97).

Considering the peculiarities of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1978-1979, the researcher points out that the establishment of a strong Islamic power there had many ideological and foreign policy consequences: a fundamental rejection of secular paths, opposition to world political blocs, state support for the spread of Islamist ideas, etc. The Ayatollahs 'regime offered the Muslim world its own democratic model of development, called "religious democracy", which is based on the values of social justice and Islamic ideals. However, the implementation of this model of democracy in practice has faced great difficulties. The gap between the principles of "popular justice" and the authoritarian practices of the Iranian authorities became clear during the mass protests in 2009, which, according to the author, can also be considered revolutionary, but are directed against the model of Islamic authoritarianism.

E. F. Kisriev, in his article "Arab revolutions in a globalizing world and the new Islam", also admitting that the events in Tunisia and Egypt can be called" revolutions", asserts that their revolutionary character is due to the fact that" the overthrow of the ruling regimes of the Arab World and the new Islam".-

The MOU in them was achieved thanks to the efforts of the broad masses of the people. In addition, far from complete processes of socio-political transformation are carried out in these countries with the active participation of self-organizing public structures" (p.104). The author focuses on two aspects of globalization, which, in his opinion, cannot be dispensed with in understanding the phenomenon of Arab revolutions: the gradual loss of political sovereignty by modern states and the emergence and spread of a new type of war. He believes that the weakening of the principle of state sovereignty is associated with two opposite and resonating trends: interstate integration and intra-State fragmentation of social spaces. Global integration makes borders between States more transparent, and fragmentation creates new pockets of political self-sufficiency within the State. As a result, a new network configuration of social spaces and political borders is emerging and growing in the world.

The essence of the new type of war is that at least one of the belligerents is not the state, but other entities that do not have a legitimate state status: insurgents or individual groups of terrorists. The phenomena of desuverenization and a new type of war are mutually conditioned.

In the context of these trends, the author also examines the growth of adherence to Islam observed in recent decades and, in connection with this, the growth of trends and organizations of so-called Islamic radicalism. According to E. F. Kisriev, the current growth of "religiosity" in Islamic countries is not an increase in interest among the broad masses, especially among young people, in spiritual issues, but a " new Islam "that" fills the voids of the decaying moral order of the civilized world, is irreconcilable and extremely aggressive, it is a modern societal phenomenon, a product and an integral part trends in globalization, in which the theological component is not the producer, but the occasion and means" (p. 109)

A. G. Suleymanyan ("Will Arab societies remain united?") believes that the actions of the Arab peoples and the fall of the ruling regimes cannot be considered" revolutions " (social or political), since these events did not lead to a change in the social and political foundations of societies. But these are not popular "riots" either, since they do not contain the absolute signs of spontaneous indignation of the broad masses of the people, but rather a dissident-type turmoil, the organizers and participants of which are representatives of the middle class. According to the researcher, the overall dynamics and prospects of changes in the Arab world will be determined by a combination of various external and internal factors: external interference, including armed interference (like Libya), and the possibility of reaching a compromise between various political forces.

The authors of the collection agree that it was internal causes that gave rise to unprecedented intensity, depth and scale of upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East. The "Great Arab Spring" went beyond the Middle East region and acquired a global sound. Scientists call the events "coups", "turmoil", "riots", "mass protest", "revolution"... Meanwhile, it seems that if the announced reforms, including the constitutional reform, as well as socio-economic and political changes, are actually implemented, they will lead to such profound transformations in the Arab world that the events in North Africa and the Middle East can be called "revolutions"with good reason.

One of the authors ' conclusions is that the depth and scale of the problems exposed during the "Arab Spring" are so great that they cannot be expected to be quickly resolved. Moreover, a second wave of protest movements may begin with unpredictable consequences, especially since many countries lack reliable socio-political shock absorbers, without which it is extremely difficult, and sometimes impossible, to prevent the erosion of statehood and the collapse of society. However, the successful implementation of the announced reforms, first of all the electoral system and the constitutional one, which will result in the election of new, legitimate authorities, will restore the confidence of the masses in them and positively affect the mood of the "street". The current situation in the region can be described as "tense waiting".

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