Over the past decade, i.e., as early as the twenty-first century, more than half of African countries have been in a state of political crisis for a longer or shorter period of time, and some are still in it. The instability and conflicts in Africa generated by such a situation, in turn, inevitably affect the world order as a whole due to the increase in the number of refugees, the growth of the international army of unemployed and homeless, the threat of terrorism, etc. As conflict resolution in Africa has been and remains complex for a variety of reasons, the very nature of conflicts and how they can be resolved are the subject of constant political debate and academic research.

As the American political scientist Guy Martin [Martin, 2002] points out in his book Africa in World Politics: a Pan-African Perspective, conflicts in Africa, as elsewhere, but perhaps more so than in other regions of the world, are part of the social dynamics and everyday life of people, because there is a constant struggle between individuals, families, clans, ethnic groups, and countries for control of natural, economic, and political resources. Conflicts have become an integral part of the African reality and should be considered in a specific historical context. As a result of conflicts, Martin argues, such basic principles of statehood as sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of existing borders are undermined [Martin, 2002, p. 188].

In contrast to the long-held view that the main prerequisites for conflict are the poverty of certain groups of the population, as well as inequality and unfair distribution of resources, in the first decade of this century, Western scientists began to believe that the cause of the emergence and duration of conflicts and wars in Africa is more often the thirst for profit than poverty. For example, the American researcher Joan Nelson, in her work" Poverty, Inequality and Conflict in Developing Countries", argues that the link between poverty and conflict is" elusive, unstable and should be largely supported by a wide range of non-economic factors " [Nelson, 1998, p. 24]. That is, the plight of some, even a significant part of the population in a particular African country rarely becomes the cause of a political conflict.

The well-known British economist and political scientist Paul Collier, in his book" Billions at the Bottom " (Collier, 2007), suggests a more thorough investigation of the origins of conflicts. Rebel leaders, he says, are fond of recounting their sufferings, including repression, exploitation, exclusion from political decision - making, etc., and some scholars tend to succumb to these "provocations" and view the rebels almost as national heroes. According to Collier, the complaints of the instigators of conflicts serve to calm their own complacency and create an image of "defenders of the fatherland", and in the eyes of both the local population and the world community. However, it is not always easy to identify the true motivations for conflict. Many conflicts are multi-layered: personal hostility between politicians, hatred between ethnic and social groups, mistakes made by one side or the other, and the inability of Governments to act fairly

allocate natural, geographical, economic, and social resources. Of course, according to Collier, it is possible to trace the link between the possibility of conflict (war) and the low level of income of the population, but this raises a legitimate question: does war make the country poor or does poverty become a prerequisite for war? According to the author, these processes take place in parallel.

Among the reasons for the conflict, Collier points out weak economic growth, economic stagnation or recession. On average, he estimates that the probability of civil war in the least developed countries is 14% over a five-year period. In turn, economic growth of at least 1% immediately reduces the risk of conflict by 1%. Conversely, as soon as the possibility of military action becomes apparent, foreign investors leave the country, and economic indicators go down. Thus, on the one hand, an economic downturn causes war, and on the other hand, the fear of war causes an economic downturn [Collier, 2007, p. 20].

The dependence of various population groups on the export of valuable minerals, oil, gas, timber and other minerals also increases the risk of civil war. In addition, the practice of providing foreign companies with financial and technical assistance to the rebels in exchange for contracts and concessions if they win, or even for the opportunity to develop valuable mineral deposits in rebel-controlled areas, has become common in unstable areas of Africa [Collier, 2007, p. 21].

The book Greed and Discontent in Civil Wars, co-authored by Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2000), notes that insurgent movements often fight not to gain access to natural resources and areas rich in minerals, but to increase their production and expand their markets, with the subsequent expansion of the country's natural resources. using the proceeds to purchase weapons and continue military operations.

A number of Western researchers confirm that the emergence of insurgent movements and the outbreak of hostilities between rebel groups and the central government, as well as the escalation of conflicts in neighboring countries, are usually associated with the possibility of profiting from the exploitation of natural resources, the smuggling of valuable raw materials, weapons, drugs and the use of cheap labor. A similar point of view is shared, in particular, by the English scientists Mats Berdal and David Malon, who in their work "Greed and Discontent: the economic background in civil wars" [Berdal and Malon, 2000] argue that, although most wars in Africa arise from inefficient public administration, the continuation or resumption of conflict occurs from the fact that the majority of wars in Africa are caused by poor governance.- for the developing "war economy" [Berdal and Malone, 2000, p. 11]. Some rebel movements, such as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, and the Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast, did not even make specific political demands.

The author of the book" African Security Policy Revisited", Norwegian researcher Karin Dokken [Dokken, 2008] does not consider it accidental that the most violent conflicts in Africa in recent decades were observed in the most resource - rich countries-Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Moreover, the natural resources here could be exploited using the simplest technology available to both large opposition movements and small rebel groups. It is known that the initial price of extracted minerals was also set during the conflict, creating additional opportunities for enriching its participants.

Dokken emphasizes that even a small improvement in the living conditions of those groups that supported the rebels and participated in the extraction and smuggling of diamonds, oil and rare earth metals has led to the fact that a large part of Africans began to see civil wars as a way to improve, rather than to worsen the economic situation, especially since comfort and financial stability are the stability of the middle class is simply unknown to them, and their lives have long since become a daily struggle for existence. In our view, this generalization is questionable when one considers the enormous civilian casualties of armed conflicts. At the same time, the author rightly asserts that the lack of political goals among militant leaders in some cases negates the difference between wars "for justice" and ordinary criminal showdowns.

Paul Collier considers another possible cause of civil wars - ethnic contradictions. If you believe the newspaper reports, he notes, then this problem may seem almost the main one for all African conflicts. At the same time, many multi-ethnic societies coexist peacefully, and a country as ethnically homogeneous as Somalia has been in a state of political instability and a war of all against all for many years. If we analyze the statistical data, it becomes clear that, on the one hand, the link between ethnic diversity and the likelihood of inciting conflict is not so pronounced, and, on the other hand, in those societies where one ethnic group makes up the majority of the population ("ethnic dominance"), but there are also other fairly large groups that you can not ignore the fact that the risk of armed conflict is quite high. Examples of such situations include armed clashes between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi. However, there are relatively few such cases, because most African countries are too multiethnic to allow one group to dominate [Collier, 2007, p. 25].

Collier's question: "Why do civil wars last so long?" - it becomes especially important in cases when the conflict subsides, but soon flares up again. Does it count as one war or two with a short peace in between? As a rule, this question is not easy to answer, but in any case, the lower the economic indicators of a country on the eve of a conflict, the longer it drags on. In addition, if national exports become more demanded on the world market, the war lasts longer, since in these cases it is easier to finance it. A typical example was provided by Angola, where the rebel group UNITA existed and continued to fight thanks to the sale of" conflict diamonds", and the Government, in turn, used the oil revenues. The possibility of a truce only emerged when oil prices soared, boosting central government revenues, and rebel leader Jonas Savimbi's access to the diamond mines was curtailed by international intermediaries.

If conflicts between States last on average about six months, then internal civil wars last much longer. As the conflict develops and its participants enrich themselves, they get a "taste for war". Given the high cost of military action, both in terms of money spent and in terms of loss of life and destruction, it can be assumed that a ceasefire agreement is quite easy to achieve, but often the rebels are so afraid of being left with nothing immediately after signing a peace treaty with the government that they prefer to continue military operations.

The end of the war does not mean the end of the conflict, says Collier. Moreover, the very fact that the country has already experienced conflict doubles the possibility of its resumption. Only about half of the countries that managed to overcome the political crisis were able to "survive" in a relatively peaceful state for more than a decade.

Governments in post-conflict countries tend to operate in an environment where their very existence is constantly threatened. They usually respond to this situation by pushing military spending to an extremely high level. The government army in the years after the settlement of the conflict looks as if the war never stopped. And the accumulation of various weapons in the country (in Somalia, for example, the number of firearms exceeds the population), accessible to everyone from small to large, makes the situation extremely explosive.

From the point of view of state-building, civil war is a "reverse development": it destroys not only the country in which the conflict occurs, but also neighboring states, it reduces economic growth by an average of 2.3% per year. War is "worse" than a normal economic depression, also because it kills people not only in armed conflicts, but also from epidemics, which are aggravated by mass movements of the population. Paradoxically, disease and death overtake people mainly on the very "islands of security" that they find so difficult to reach - in refugee camps [Collier, 2007, p. 27].

Collier notes that economic decline and epidemics do not stop with the end of the war. The biggest price for a conflict, perhaps even double, is paid after it ends. Sometimes the war is worth it - if after its termination comes the "era of social justice", but this happens very rarely. Insurgency is a very precarious way to achieve positive change. Rebel leaders who claim to have started a civil war with

with noble goals, they usually deceive both themselves and others. As for ordinary soldiers, they usually don't have a choice. For example, the leader of the Sierra Leonean rebels, Foday Sankoh, preferred to recruit drug-addicted teenagers to the ranks of his movement. The Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, whose stated mission was to create a state based on the Ten Commandments, recruited "warriors" by surrounding and setting fire to local schools. The boys were given a "choice": join the Army or be shot. Those who joined were forced to commit murder, looting and violence in their native villages. And these types of mobilizations were not exceptions to the rule.

Of course, volunteers who truly believe in the struggle for social justice also join the rebels, but others, and unfortunately most of them, are attracted by the opportunity to flaunt weapons and kill with impunity. According to psychiatrists, approximately 3% of the population of any country has psychopathic disorders, African countries are no exception, and many "unhealthy" people join the rebel movements; there are some among the leaders. Many people are attracted to the possibility of getting rich. Naturally, ordinary members of the movement can't expect real wealth in the future, but even a small chance to get a little rich, despite the high risk of death, seems more attractive than the prospect of a beggarly existence.

Often, a neighboring State is forced to pay a high price for a conflict in the adjacent territory. Epidemics know no borders, and economic collapse also tends to spread. Since most countries share borders with several others, the total cost of a conflict for their neighbors often exceeds its cost for the territory where it began. And the price is not limited to a specific geographical region: 99% of the global production of hard drugs, for example, is in conflict-ridden countries (not just in Africa). There is an explanation for this: during the conflict, the territory that is not controlled by the legitimate government is outlined, and it becomes subject to rebel leaders engaged in illegal activities. Thus, countries that are in a state of civil war have a kind of "advantage" in committing various crimes. Even AIDS is spreading in parallel with the escalation of war as a result of mass violence and population migration.

The average cost of a typical civil war for a conflict-ridden country and its neighbors as a whole is $ 64 billion. In recent decades, developing countries have experienced about two wars a year. In other words, the global cost of wars exceeds $ 100 billion annually, which is about twice as much as is allocated for humanitarian aid to the same regions. These figures should be taken into account when assessing the benefits of external intervention in the conflict, which can reduce the risk of military action [Collier, 2007, p. 32].

The war is eroding the country's peacetime economic growth. But even worse than economic collapse is the possibility of renewed conflict. Crimes have already proved profitable for those who carried them out. For many former rebels, killing is not only the only job they can do for a living, but also the only thing they are capable of doing. But the cities and villages of the DRC and the Republic of the Congo, Angola and Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda, Sudan and Chad are full of recent armed rebels! And what to do with all these weapons? A study of the prices of the Kalashnikov assault rifle-the weapon of "every self-respecting rebel" - in different countries showed that during the conflict, due to the huge volumes of its import into war zones through official, semi-official and illegal channels, it becomes so cheap that it is practically available to everyone.

One of the issues that has recently been raised by Western authors when considering security issues in Africa is the changing status of national armies on the continent. As violence spreads and the number of small pockets of conflict increases, State armies are increasingly being replaced by groups and groups of mercenaries. Karin Dokken notes that "cooperation" between private foreign paramilitary companies that specialize in protecting political leaders and helping them during military operations, and mining corporations in conflict zones not only contributes to their prolongation, but also affects the level of security in the region as a whole. The purchase and sale of "security" itself as a specific product blurs the boundaries between politics and business, and the "privatization of security" in the conflict zone contributes to its escalation as in the territory

both within and outside the country. Moreover, according to Dokken, the more extensive and diverse the structure of "private security" in a war-torn region, the more bloody and unmanageable the conflict becomes, as mercenaries "successfully" transfer their "experience and skills" to local militants [Dokken, 2008, p. 194].

The sale of weapons by private companies to anyone who pays, predetermines the entry into the conflict of more and more new participants. Often, the local population simply groups around a stronger leader, regardless of their goals and interests. Thus, Dokken notes, there is a phenomenon of multiple and shifting centers of power in Africa.

The authors of the paper "Conflict and Poverty in sub-Saharan Africa", prepared under the supervision of the British scholar Robin Luckham and co-authors (Ismail Ahmed, Robert Muggah, and Sarah White) [Luckham, Ahmed, Muggah, and White, 2001], agree with K. Dokken, who believe that instead of an administrative entity with fixed borders and geographical boundaries, it should be considered that the state should be able to With the stable centers of power typical of Western political systems, African States have transparent borders and shifting centers of power, and the evolving "privatization of security" reinforces this phenomenon. In an effort to clarify its nature, Luckham's team points out that in the first two or three decades after independence, African leaders controlled access to natural resources, revenues from their exploitation, and channels of economic patronage. In addition, they had a more or less unlimited monopoly on violence, which was mainly carried out from the top down and took the form of repression directed against dissenters.

Later, due to the financial and economic crisis resulting from the reduction of foreign aid, the government's control over the patronage system and violence in most African countries noticeably weakened. Politicians were forced to seek other sources of power and wealth. In many cases, they have moved their activities beyond State structures and established a power base by organizing private armies and using them to control the export of valuable minerals, oil, and timber. At the same time, State instruments of violence were privatized, and armies were partially denationalized. Thus, elite control over national resources caused a kind of destabilization, and individual leaders, hungry for their "piece of cake", often became the leaders of the rebels. Moreover, the ability to generate significant funds from such controls has increased markedly as insurgents ' access to global markets has expanded (Luckham and all, 2001, p. 11).

Like Collier, Luckham argues that conflicts in Africa rarely subside after the conclusion of a peace treaty. In the last 10 to 15 years, African wars have generally ended only to flare up again a few years later. According to Luckham, there are at least two possible explanations for this: on the one hand, conflicts are being renewed due to the inability of Governments to solve public problems, and on the other, violence itself is becoming an integral part of economic, social and political processes in Africa. Pointing to the existence of a" political economy of war", the author argues that many armed groups, both opposition and remaining on the side of the government, are interested in continuing the war, as they have invested in it, so the escalation of the conflict is vital for them. Whichever explanation is more correct, it is clear that the duration and resumption of wars on the continent is a characteristic feature of African reality: the pattern of behavior of the warring parties is reproduced from time to time with enviable consistency [Luckham and all, 2001, p. 11].

Luckham raises the question of the relationship between conflict (civil war) and the weakening or collapse of an African State. In many countries in political crisis, Governments were unable to perform their functions. This has been the case at various times in Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Chad, Uganda, Congo (Brazzaville), DRC and Guinea-Bissau. Luckham notes that it is not always possible to say with certainty whether the weakening of the state is a prerequisite for the emergence of a conflict or its result, since "the arrow points in both directions", i.e. there is an interaction between these processes [Luckham and all, 2001, p. 14].

The well-known American political scientist William Zartman, in his article "Intra-African negotiations and the reforming Political Order", published in the collection "Africa in World Politics" [Zartman, 2009], considers the process of resolving political conflicts through negotiations between representatives of African countries as involved in the conflict resolution process.-

conflict resolution, as well as acting as "arbitrators". He notes that negotiations are necessary both for establishing order on the continent as a whole or in the region, and for regulating bilateral relations and stabilizing the situation in a particular country. Negotiations as a way to resolve conflicts are used in cases when the conflict itself reaches a deadlock, the conflicting parties are not able to continue it, but controversial issues remain unresolved. At the same time, direct negotiations between warring factions in a conflict without mediation, as a rule, remain ineffective. In contrast, the participation of a third party or several intermediaries in negotiations often leads to successful results.

Zartman points out four reasons for the ineffectiveness of direct negotiations.

First, the conflict often becomes personal, and the "discussions" between the parties become so emotional that they leave no room for rational decision-making. Thus, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, personal hostility between Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe) and Nelson Mandela (South Africa), Laurent Kabila (DRC) and Ioweri Museveni (Uganda), and between Laurent Kabila and Mandela, Joseph Kabila (DRC) and Paul Kagame (Rwanda) significantly hindered political integration. stabilization in the region.

Secondly, African conflicts often become a political space for competing powers for local allies, i.e. initially bilateral conflicts do not remain such, but attract external participants. This circumstance hinders the resolution of the crisis through direct negotiations, strengthening the role of mediation.

Third, often the parties to the conflict are not interested in resolving it, either because of the economic benefits they receive from its continuation, or because of its locality. Usually, the central government turns a blind eye to armed clashes on the outskirts of the country, if the conflict does not directly affect its interests. Only the intervention of the international community, which is concerned about the growing number of human casualties and violations of human rights, can force the parties to sit down at the negotiating table.

Fourthly, when observing unsuccessful attempts to resolve the crisis through negotiations in neighboring countries, the parties seem to be "convinced" of the ineffectiveness of the process itself and do not even try to take any steps.

Zartman gives a number of examples of the ineffectiveness of direct negotiations. Thus, the conflicts that broke out in different years between Angola and Zaire, Somalia and Ethiopia, Sudan and Ethiopia, Mali and Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Cameroon, Senegal and Mauritania were not resolved at bilateral summits. Progress in their resolution was achieved only with the participation of intermediaries. Even in internal wars that are particularly difficult to mediate, conflict resolution has been achieved with the help of a third party: in Angola in 1990 and 1994, Liberia between 1991 and 1996, Ethiopia in 1991, Mozambique in 1992, Rwanda in 1993, and Sierra Leone in 1996 Burundi in 1998, Lesotho in 1994 and 1998, etc.

The author notes with some irony that Africa does not lack its own intermediaries. This may be a cultural phenomenon, but African leaders are always ready to help resolve conflicts, even if they are unable to maintain political stability in the territory they control. First of all, such zeal is explained by the presence of a particular leader's own interests in resolving this conflict, especially if it has broken out on the territory of a neighboring country. Such mediation can be useful when it comes to a conflict between the central Government and an insurgent movement whose forces are deployed by a neighboring State that has provided part of its territory. Then the leader of this neighboring state can, for example, notify one or another party about a possible truce, thus acting as a mediator even before the start of negotiations. Mediation is often carried out personally by one head of State between two other heads of State, and personal relations in this case play an extremely important role. Of the three roles usually performed by a mediator - ensuring communication between the parties, drafting the terms of an agreement, and manipulating the negotiators - African heads of State usually succeed in the first two, helping the rivals find mutually acceptable ways out of the impasse and forcing them to overcome the distrust that hinders reaching an agreement.

Zartman points out that the condition for effective mediation is the emergence of a stalemate in the conflict, when the resources of the parties are so depleted that they are no longer able to continue military operations, but they are still afraid of "losing face" and therefore cannot take the first step towards reconciliation. It is the dead end that makes mediation possible, since without it

the parties are not interested in being" pulled out " of the conflict by an outsider. Thus, the attempts made by the Zaire President Mobutu to act as an arbitrator in the Angolan conflict in 1989 failed due to the absence of a deadlock in its development, which appeared somewhat later. The main weapon of African mediators is persuasion of the parties: it happens all the more effectively, the more authority and respect enjoyed by the head of state who has assumed this role. In internal conflicts, which is the main type of conflict in Africa, effective mediation is based on the ability of the arbitrator to guarantee both sides fair treatment and a worthy place in the new political structure after the agreement is signed. Zartman notes that African mediators are becoming more adept at negotiating, but they are more able to push for the signing of an agreement than its implementation.

One of the recognized leaders in the study of African conflicts and the role of the United States in their resolution is rightly considered to be the American political scientist Donald Rothschild, who believes that third-party intervention in the conflict resolution process is often not only important, but also paramount. In the article "The role of the United States in ensuring peaceful relations in Africa", published in the aforementioned collection "Africa in World Politics" [Rothchild, 2009], he points out that the United States has repeatedly acted as the most important "arbiter". Washington's involvement in negotiating processes in countries such as Liberia and Sudan, for example, has greatly contributed to the success of peacemaking, or at least to the willingness of the parties to sit down at the negotiating table.

However, as Rothschild notes, the role of the United States in resolving political conflicts has now begun to decline. And this is due not only to the depletion of the US state budget and military resources due to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the aggravation of domestic economic problems, but also to the emergence of a new strong rival - China, which is actively searching for African allies and conducting extensive trade and economic expansion of the continent, thus undermining the US position here. The author rightly points out that while the Americans still have the opportunity to significantly influence the internal political situation in Sudan, but even here we can assume a certain weakening of their role due to the need for the American government to concentrate fully on its internal affairs. In addition, at present, apart from oil from Nigeria, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea, the United States has no other economic interests in Africa that are sufficiently serious to spend money and risk American lives in ongoing conflicts, such as in Darfur.

Indeed, in the last 10 to 15 years, essentially since the end of the Cold War, US leaders and public opinion have been torn between their commitment, largely formal and ostentatious, to the protection of human rights, the principles of democracy, and political stability anywhere, on the one hand, and their desire to protect the rights of others. avoid active participation in peacekeeping operations - on the other hand. Public opinion polls in the United States show that American society as a whole is ready to support multilateral and non-military actions in Africa, such as diplomatic initiatives, rather than unilateral actions with the threat of a military clash. In shaping its foreign policy, the United States has become a proponent of selective intervention in crisis situations in Africa, only rarely taking an active position to establish order and political stability. According to Rothschild, in the foreseeable future, more prominent place in conflict resolution will be given to such forms of participation as condemnation, diplomatic pressure, political support for African allies and sanctions.

The tactic of denouncing the Government and accusing it of human rights violations was used by the Americans in connection with the events in Darfur, as well as in Zimbabwe, Liberia and South Africa, mainly because critical statements were relatively easy to make and, in fact, did not cost the United States anything. Such ways of resolving conflicts and ensuring stability should not be overestimated: if accusations and exhortations are not accompanied by more active and weighty actions, the possibility of using criticism and appeals to change the situation is doubtful. When censure, soft diplomatic pressure, and support from one side or the other proved ineffective, the United States resorted to military, political, and economic sanctions. Sanctions (or simply the threat of them) dramatically increase the cost of military action or just survival for the parties to the conflict and often lead to positive results. Rothschild recalls that the introduction of economic reforms in the corresponding years of

Sanctions imposed on Rhodesia, apartheid-era South Africa, Liberia, and Sudan have isolated these regimes, dramatically reducing their business and investment opportunities. Although the impact of sanctions, as well as other soft forms of intervention, cannot be overestimated, it should be recognized that they have had some impact on changing the behavior of parties to conflicts.

Moderate economic and trade sanctions were also imposed on the Taylor regime in Liberia due to its inability or unwillingness to end the illegal transportation and smuggling of weapons and "conflict diamonds" through the country. Sanctions imposed in 2001 and expanded in 2004 prohibited the import of Liberian diamonds into the United States, extended the arms embargo on Liberia, and restricted the ability of Taylor and his team to travel, make money transfers, and open bank accounts abroad. In Liberia, however, the sanctions had limited effect: the Taylor regime continued to receive weapons.

But, as Rothschild admits, sanctions are not the most effective means of resolving conflicts. First of all, because they affect the interests of exactly those people who should be protected and satisfied in the end - that is, the population of the country affected by the conflict. Moreover, long-term experience shows that sanctions negatively affect the interests and populations of countries that impose sanctions. That is why the Clinton team has become especially cautious about imposing sanctions on the supply of weapons to African countries: American business circles have expressed dissatisfaction with the possible loss of economic profits in importing countries. They also expressed concern that foreign rivals will only benefit from US sanctions, and the Americans will look like unreliable suppliers. Finally, it became clear to American politicians that sanctions can be imposed only after careful calculation of all the consequences.: they can raise the opposition "at home" and at the same time strengthen those regimes in Africa whose leaders can shift the burden of blame for the economic consequences of sanctions to Western countries.

Rothschild believes that the most effective way to resolve conflicts is through peacemaking and humanitarian actions, which often involve the use of military force: in the form of traditional peacemaking aimed at a cease-fire, forcing the parties to peace talks or creating a kind of buffer between warring groups, as well as multilateral peacekeeping initiatives that include not only creating conditions for the cessation of hostilities military actions, but also disarmament or, conversely, reorganization of the army with the participation of former opponents.

The most difficult part of the peacemaking process is bringing the most numerous and most notoriously violent factions to the negotiating table. In such difficult situations, it is necessary to actively use international assistance authorized by the international community in the person of the UN or regional organizations. Examples include the United States providing military assistance to UN peacekeeping forces in Angola, Western Sahara, DRC, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia (Eritrea), Burundi, Liberia, and Sudan.

With the exception of Somalia, American peacekeepers have never been involved in active military operations anywhere else, at best forming part of a" buffer " force. As for the unsuccessful operation in Somalia in 1992-1994, which showed that the US military was not ready for independent "hard-core" actions in Africa, it was undertaken in the wake of the American military victory in the Persian Gulf and reports about the terrible suffering of Somalis (the so-called CNN effect).

The" intervention " in Somalia differs from the usual practice of soft intervention by Americans in conflicts in Africa in that here the US military found itself on the territory of an almost completely collapsed state and that from the very beginning it was not clear what the successful outcome of the mission should be and when it would be possible for the Americans to leave the country. In a sense, Rothschild notes, the situation is similar to what happened in Iraq. Questions have been raised about the mission's ability to disarm the militants and restore order in Mogadishu, avert the threat of eventual national disintegration, and begin negotiations necessary for political recovery, but approaches have not been worked out and serious steps have not been taken. The only thing that the US military has managed is to secure the use of major transport highways and pacify certain areas of the country.

The United States has used various forms of "soft" intervention in African conflicts: diplomatic pressure, condemnation, threats, official or unofficial mediation.-

Secondly, the latter is necessary to provide the parties to the conflict with the necessary information, clarify this information, reach consensus on the principles and goals of peace negotiations, determine the agenda and key issues of the dispute, form compromises and adaptations, manipulate external pressures, and establish an atmosphere of mutual trust between the opponents during negotiations.

In general, as Rothschild points out, the prospects for resolving conflicts in Africa through negotiations and mediation are rather limited and are possible only if there are a number of conditions, including: the formation of a deadlock that both sides in the conflict have reached due to their lack of political goals and the means to continue armed actions; the presence of leaders ready for political settlement; strong external pressure to reach an agreement. In such circumstances, a third party can successfully mediate.

The United States prefers indirect mediation, but also uses a form of direct mediation when it is related to its interests in a particular region or reflects Washington's "moral responsibility" for everything that happens in the world. In particular, the United States used a form of direct mediation in the successful 2002 ceasefire negotiations in the Nuba Mountains province of Sudan.

Rothschild asks: why does the US prefer a form of indirect mediation when involved in conflict resolution in Africa? In his opinion, after the end of the cold war, the stakes in the game were relatively low, and the difficulties of resolving intra-state conflicts increased. Not wanting to get involved in costly diplomatic initiatives that could also affect the country's reputation as a mediator if they failed (as was the case in Angola, when UNITA leader Savimbi resumed military operations after the agreement was signed), the United States preferred to participate in political actions under the auspices of regional and international organizations. Indirect mediation is the support of direct mediation efforts undertaken by other parties. The line between indirect and direct mediation may be blurred. For example, in Somalia in 1992-1993, American diplomats mediated a number of local conflicts at their own risk, but in the most important negotiations in March 1993. When 15 factional leaders agreed to create a Transitional National Council, the UN and the Ethiopian government played the most important role, while American diplomats worked behind the scenes.

Rothschild notes that researchers often overestimate the influence of Americans in Africa. In his opinion, modern American weapons are not always suitable for African conditions, and the armed units of the US Army on the continent, as a rule, do not have the support of the local population. Perhaps this is because Washington has shown little willingness to sacrifice its soldiers and resources to protect weak nations, especially if the country in conflict is not an important strategic target and the United States has no economic interests in it.

list of literature

Berdal M., Malone D.M. Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 2000.

Collier P., Hoeffler A. Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 2000.

Collier P. The Bottom Billion. Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc. 2007.

Dokken K. African Security Politics Redefined. Palgrave Macmillan. N.Y., 2008.

Luckham R., Ahmed I., Muggah R., White S. Conflict and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Assessment of the Issues and Evidence. IDS Working Paper 128, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, UK, 2001.

Martin G. Africa in World Politics: a Pan-African Perspective. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Inc., 2002.

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