Russian orientalists have written a large number of works on the specifics of traditional domination and the process of modern regime transformations in the countries of the Middle East (BV) and North Africa (SA).1 The Arab Spring revealed the depth of the crisis of the authoritarian modernization model. A comparative analysis of existing theoretical approaches in Russian Oriental studies is the subject of a separate study. Here we will consider the features and causes of the methodological crisis in modern foreign comparative country studies on the fate of various types of political domination and political regimes in the countries of the Middle East and the Maghreb. This crisis was revealed by the events of the "Arab Spring" in 2011, which refuted the thesis about the strength of hybrid regional regimes and their ability to partially modernize their societies.

Key words: political regime, authoritarianism, modernization, hybrid society, "Arab Spring", patrimonialism, neo-patrimonialism, Sultanism.

THE ARAB SPRING AND THE CRISIS OF AUTHORITARIANISM

Both Russian and foreign researchers recognize that authoritarianism is a socially and politically heterogeneous phenomenon. It is a separate type of political regime with its own internal logic of development, internal dynamics and contradictions, and not an "intermediate" state [Kramer, 2012, p. 27-28]. Twentieth-century authoritarianism has demonstrated a certain vitality, successfully transforming its institutional foundations and social base, taking various forms depending on the special conditions of specific societies and states, sometimes successfully solving problems of their development. At the same time, in the modern era, both traditional and "modernized" types of authoritarianism are experiencing a deep crisis, becoming less and less able to cope with the challenges that arise within the modern public space. A certain chance for modern authoritarianism is given by its ability to implement modernization, the possibility of which, in relation to non-Western societies, has been described by such researchers as D. Lerner, P. Heinz, and others since the late 1960s (Lerner, 1958; Heintz, 1962; Zapf, 1969). Modernization required the authorities to move to a more advanced technological order. However, it is modernization that becomes a trap for authoritarianism, because changing the social base of the regime creates large-scale challenges that it cannot cope with. The situation of the regime is aggravated by the use of modern information technologies by protest groups.

The events dubbed the "Arab Spring" are a wave of demonstrations and protests that began on December 18, 2010. Unrest broke out rapidly in a large macro-region of the world. They affected Tunisia, Egypt, Libya (where the Gaddafi regime had previously fallen), Bahrain, Syria and Yemen. Mass protes-

1 In this regard, the works of V. M. Akhmsdov, P. V. Gustsrin, B. V. Dolgov, A.V. Malashenko, V. V. Naumkin, B. G. Skiranyan, A. O. Filonik and others should be especially revenged. [Akhmedov, 2008 (1); Akhmedov, 2008 (2); Gustsrin, 2008 (1); Gustsrin, 2008 (2); Gustsrin, 2011; Dolgov, 2009; Kosach, 2012; Malashsnko and Musikarzh, 1991; Naumkin, 2007; Naumkin, 2008; Ssyranyan 1992; Ssyranyan, 2000; Seyranyan, 2007; Ssyranyan, 2008; Filonik, 2008(1); Filonik 2008(2) 1.

2 Which was accelerated by external intervention, as in Iraq.

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Attacks occurred in Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and Oman, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Western Sahara. The term "Arab revolutions" is also often used in scientific literature and the media, which is controversial. However, it is obvious that the end of the "authoritarian era" represented by a number of well-known names has come (Landa, 2012). Among the possible results of this process is the replacement of old forms of authoritarianism with new ones, and a cascade of state failure is also possible [Wolff, 2011, pp. 951-972].

The phenomenon that accompanied the "Arab Spring" is the transformation of the" public " into a significant political figure, 3 the entry of new political players into the arena, such as youth and women's organizations, religious associations, the emergence and strengthening of Islamic movements and parties, and the transition to political and economic instability with unpredictable consequences [Cohen, 2012, p. 34-36].

One of the key problems of authoritarianism in the Maghreb and Third world countries in modern conditions is the lack of internal regulators that would prevent the premature transformation of " development authoritarianism "(aimed at modernizing non-European societies) into "stabilization authoritarianism" (aimed at preserving the status quo) and "parasitic authoritarianism" (meaning parasitizing the elite at the expense of the country's resources). Authoritarian modernization in the countries of the Arab East has been "drifting" in an inertial phase for at least the last twenty years, as a result of which the authoritarian system has been unable to cope with the weakness of the economic structure, the lack of civil political culture under the dominance of the idea of Arab exclusivity, and the lack of a consolidated political nation [Magen, 2012, p.15-16]. As a result, the attempt at liberal political reforms in the Arab world was unsuccessful, and "authoritarianism of development" was often replaced by regressive forms of authoritarianism [Kedouri, 1992].

Authoritarianism in the inertial phase was characterized by the desire of authoritarian leaders to simplify and" routine " the management system. The latter did not allow the regimes they led to adequately respond to modern complex challenges and resolve conflicts that arose in society, which destroyed the system from within. The situation was aggravated by the rigidity of the authoritarian power structures, the lack of effective feedback loops and the weakness of horizontal structures, as well as large-scale corruption, which consistently destroyed the very foundation of the authoritarian system. The latter made it particularly vulnerable to mass discontent, which was confirmed by the events of 4 2011.

As a result, changes of a deep nature and scale became possible. The region has not experienced such a shock in the last fifty years. However, it is premature to characterize them as revolutions [Schluemberger, 2012, p. 72]. The events of the "Arab Spring" should also be viewed cautiously within the framework of the concept of democratization of the Arab world. For example, in Morocco, there was only a cosmetic reform of the constitution, which very little limited the power of King Muhammad V. In Tunisia, the political system is currently being reorganized in the direction of creating a pluralistic party landscape, accompanied by large-scale political crises [Wistrich, 2012, p. 23-32]. The process of transformation in Egypt after the removal from power in July 2013 by the military of M. Morsi, who was elected a year earlier, is far from over.

At the same time, the traditional oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar)remain almost unchanged,

3 This phenomenon was closely studied in the twentieth century by Marxist-Leninist theory. The alternative study "Revolt of the Masses" belongs to X. Ortsga-i-Gassstu.

4 At the same time, one should not discount such a factor as the international policy of the leading Western powers, which are implementing the idea of universal democratization.

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also faced in 2011 with massive long-term protest actions. It is highly likely that the monarchical regimes of the Gulf with a rent-based economy will retain their formats, since key global players are more interested in maintaining the status quo here than in large-scale democratization [Burnell and Schlumberger, 2010, p. 1-15].

THE ARAB SPRING AND THE OUTCOME OF POLITICAL DOMINATION

The events of the "Arab Spring" raised a number of conceptual and methodological issues for scientists studying the political development of the Middle East countries in addition to political ones [Schluemberger, 2012, pp. 75-78]. Has the potential of authoritarian modernization in the countries of the Second World War and the third world as a whole been fully exhausted today? Are there any prerequisites for the establishment of stable institutionalized democracy in the BW countries? And if not, what type of political regime is most likely to emerge from the collapse of authoritarian regimes?

When asked what forms dominance in the BV will take, one should take into account the political heterogeneity of this region, which includes twenty States. Among them are the traditional monarchies of the Persian Gulf (with Saudi Arabia at the head), presidential regimes with a socialist past in the spirit of Arab socialism or pan-Arabism (Egypt, Syria, Algeria, to a certain extent Tunisia and the Republic of South Yemen in the early period of its political development), as well as states that are difficult to talk about the existence of a certain form of political domination, since it is not obvious that they meet the criteria of functioning statehood (Libya, Iraq, Yemen, Palestine).

In the future, as a result of the collapse of national states with an authoritarian type of government, open or closed military regimes, regimes of "Islamic democracy"5, and mixed-type regimes may arise in BV, in which forms of traditional tribal domination will be combined with elements of modernity, rather decorative. At the same time, monarchies that adapt to the peculiarities of modern development will remain [Kramer and Kleinwachter, 2011, p.11].

Despite the variety of forms of political structure of its member states, BV has traditionally been considered by foreign researchers as a zone of undemocratic rule. This allowed researchers to consider the existing regimes there as authoritarian, based on the definition of authoritarianism proposed in 1964 by X. Linz. At the same time, Linz noted the existence of semi-traditional forms of domination in the region, which he did not include in the list of modern authoritarian regimes [Chehabi and Linz, 1998]. Modern processes in the BW countries require expanding the research methodology, including relying on classical theories of political domination.

A number of researchers consider the current processes of transformation of North African and Middle Eastern societies and states within the framework of the concept of neo-patrimonialism. It develops M. Weber's idea of a special type of patrimonial domination that combines elements of traditional and legal-rational types of domination and is accompanied by a quasi-discrete system of distribution of political resources (Eisenstadt, 1973). As a result, until today, authoritarianism, patrimonialism, and sultanism (see below) have been three separate concepts that have been used to study the political regimes that exist in the countries of the Middle East and the Maghreb.

5 Among which fundamentalist states are likely to be the exception.

6 Refers to the" inclusion " of the ruling elites in transnational structures.

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To understand the phenomena of patrimonialism and Sultanism, it is necessary to explain what the traditional regime is. Traditional regimes are dominated by a single person, whose power is based on tradition and on the command and control headquarters or military headquarters. Highlighting various variants of traditional domination, M. Weber, in particular, spoke about paternalism (Patriarchalismus) at the micro level and patrimonialismus (Patrimonialismus) at the macro level. As a special form of patrimonialism, Weber considered sultanism (the sultanic regime).

According to Weber, paternalism and patrimonialism differ from each other in the ways of their organization (Weber, 1980, p.580). The sociologist considered paternalism as an ideal type, understood as a way of exercising dominance within the family-home community. Patrimonialism, on the other hand, is a second form of traditional domination that develops at the level of a macro-social community as a result of state-building, bureaucratization, and social stratification. Its characteristic feature is the creation of special political instruments of coercion used by the personal headquarters of a particular suzerain. In a similar characteristic way, vertical client structures are formed within patrimonialism, with their characteristic relations between patrons and clients regarding the distribution of benefits and the provision of mutual support [Eisenstadt, 1973, p.16-18].

The patrimonialist regimes of the BV and Maghreb countries, according to a number of researchers, did indeed have many similar features. The holder of power has traditionally positioned himself as an exponent of the will of the people. The people themselves were considered as a whole, relatively homogeneous mass, guided along the right path, which left very little space for articulating interests [Eikelman, 1998, p.328]. The ruler acted as the bearer of ideological power, occupying "a double position in the system of vertical ties as given from God and from the forefathers of the clan as the head of the patriarchal family "(Roth, 1968, p. 194-206).

In addition, patrimonialism is characterized by the presence of a bureaucracy, which, although permeated by personal relations of the client type, is the result of the modernization of the traditional type of political domination. At the same time, patrimonial relations are relatively less personalized and therefore less reliable than those that arise on the basis of mutual feudal obligations [Lemarchand and Legg, 1972, p. 149-178].

As a result, instead of firmly established areas of competence, the patrimonial bureaucracy is characterized by a changing set of assignments and powers granted and bestowed on a particular occasion by the overlord. In the absence of clear areas of competence, some degree of assignment of official functions and responsibilities is unavoidable. In extreme cases of decentralized patrimonialism, all government powers can be treated as private ownership, which ultimately reduces the overall effectiveness of the management system.

At the same time, patrimonialism is not a static political model at all, but in its various forms it can act as a mechanism for the transition from a traditional society to a modern one. Maghreb societies are a good example of how the historical legacy of pre-colonial political and social structures and their transformation under various models of colonial rule can influence political development after independence, creating prerequisites for the formation of patrimonialist and neo-patrimonialist regimes.

According to E. Hermassi, who compared the results of political and economic development in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, colonial rule often strengthened traditional social structures and institutions and at the same time encouraged new social forces to join the struggle for independence (Hermassi, 1972). In the XIX century. all the countries of the Maghreb have passed through patrimonialism-use

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for private military and police purposes, lack of transparency regarding career appointments. At the same time, the personal exercise of power was limited by religious and traditional norms, and above all by the tribal basis of society, which challenged the territorial and social integrity of States.

The prospects for traditional, particularly patrimonialist, regimes are ambiguous. Over the past 20 years, according to researchers, there has been not the disappearance, but the adaptation of various forms of traditional domination to modernity. This applies equally to semi-traditional regimes (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia), neo-patrimonialism in the form of kleptocracy (Mobutu's regime in Zaire), the phenomenon of the "provisional state" (Somalia), and others. Similarly, the traditional monarchies of the Gulf countries have demonstrated a high ability to adapt to modernity, which allowed them to survive.

However, patrimonialism inevitably reveals a certain limit to its modernization capabilities - the threshold of rationalization of the power-management and political systems, low efficiency of the patrimonial bureaucracy, and low mobilization capabilities. Patrimonialism has failed to meet the development goals due to the lack of necessary development resources in Arab societies and the inevitable activation of traditionalist elements that reject the very idea of transformation. It was unable to overcome the heterogeneity that hindered the reform of Middle Eastern societies, and gave way to neo-patrimonialism as a modification.

NEO-PATRIMONIALISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE MODERNIZATION STRATEGY

A specific modification of patrimonialism is neo-patrimonialism, which acts as a tool for overcoming the lack of development resources existing within patrimonial regimes. In the German-language literature, the patrimonial character of most Middle Eastern and Arab political regimes has been virtually unquestioned since Pawelka's analysis [Pawelka, 1985]. Similarly, in Anglo-Saxon literature, most studies consider neo-patrimonialism as the main form of political domination in Middle Eastern societies (Bill, 2010). Among the characteristic elements of neo-patrimonialism, it is customary to distinguish: 1) the dominance of informal institutions and processes over formal ones; 2) the concentration of power in the hands of a single patron (patrimon); 3) the distribution of benefits through direct or indirect interaction between the patron and his clients; 4) the particular use of public funds and benefits [Erdmann, Engel, 2007, p. 95-115].

In my opinion, neo-patrimonialism is an attempt to overcome the weakness of initially patrimonial states, to compensate for the insufficient level of economic and social development by strengthening and consolidating the actual political factors of development. For these purposes, the institution of the presidency is being strengthened, cartel-type ruling parties are being formed or strengthened, trade unions and new social movements are being created from above. The main goal of neo-patrimonialism is to maintain such a balance of traditional and modern elements in the structure of society and in the system of power, which would contribute to the progressive process of modernization while maintaining relative social stability and political manageability.

Many African and Asian presidents have embodied political and symbolic power in their respective States, offering their own blueprint for transformation to society. All of them have established themselves in power through numerous changes made over certain periods of time to the constitution and political structure of their countries, while achieving some success. Some of the problems that have occurred-

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These regimes managed to achieve a pragmatic perception of authoritarian practices and order by using rapid economic growth and effective governance as positive arguments, as well as references to the traditions of national culture, which, being based on the values of social harmony and order, allegedly made the model of Western democracy unacceptable for them [Thompson, 2012, pp. 42-45].. As a result, the "hybrid society" regime gained a fairly high degree of strength. At the same time, the synthesis of traditional and modern elements has not been fully successful in a number of countries in the Arab East, where local authoritarian rulers have not achieved such large-scale economic success and have not shown the necessary political flexibility.

Meanwhile, the effects of incomplete modernization were also felt in the context of neo-patrimonialism. These include disconnected commodity-based and semi-agrarian economies with significant non-monetarized sectors, underdeveloped communication systems, low literacy rates, and a general lack of resources, including skilled labor [Diamond, 2005, p. 98].

The model of a rentier state that grew rich with petrodollars provided the ruling elite with some semblance of independence from internal groups (Moaddel, 2002, p. 359-386). At the same time, significant areas of the third world economies were beyond the control of the state, which made their GDP dependent on oil and gas, rather than on the producing economy and individual taxation. These countries fell into a vicious cycle of underdevelopment, as their ability to consolidate resources was seriously hampered by administrative weakness. Weak governance was compensated for by the hypertrophy of personal power, which takes on the functions of ensuring the development and integration of heterogeneous societies. As a result, the country's leader was viewed as an all-powerful and unlimited (personally or institutionally) lord [Bessinger and Young, 2002, p. 222].

A key function of these types of States has been to mobilize resources to invest in their own stability. The latter was made possible by the interaction between formal and informal institutions (Zuercher, 2004). Within the new system of relations between the state and society, client networks were formed that included various segments of the elite and differed from country to country [Koehler and Zuercher, 2003, p.1-22].

As a consequence, under the formal supremacy of constitutional and legal norms, the constitutional and civil legal foundations of the neo-patrimonialist regime were reproduced only to the extent that the relevant norms received a value justification and were applied in practice. And if the imperativeness of the rules depended on situational agreements on the possibility and necessity of their application, then the reality of formal legal norms turned out to be conditional.

At the same time, the local effectiveness of informal structures for coordinating political practices created a barrier to institutional universalization. At the same time, not only economic, but also political (electoral, partisan, etc.) practices have fallen into an institutional trap. Persistent efforts of the state, including the introduction of new rules, meant the redistribution of rights and powers in favor of the authorities, which contributed to the expansion of routine, rather than rational behavior, stimulating traditionalist motivation, and strengthening the relevant norms. The processes of legalization, legitimation, institutionalization and consolidation of the political order have become disjointed, and the institutional order is not becoming universal and generally accepted.

Thus, neo-patrimonialism, despite its ability to solve some problems in the development of transitional societies, gradually exhausted its modernization potential, since it allowed ignoring such principles as the separation of powers, the non-use of power resources for personal enrichment,

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autonomy of civil society structures in relation to the authorities, etc. The limitations of neo-patrimonialism, like its historical predecessor, consisted in internal instability, in the susceptibility to political upheavals as a result of the emergence of competing centers of power.

When society as a whole or its individual segments began to move, a crisis of any kind of ironic monialist regime became inevitable. The forms of this crisis are mass actions with the seizure of power by one or another segment of the elite, violent revolution with the breakthrough of counter-elites to power, and a number of others. This revealed the general crisis of patrimonial regimes as a kind of authoritarianism.

SULTANISM AS AN ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME THE CONTRADICTIONS OF NEO-PATRIMONIALISM

A specific subspecies of the authoritarian and iatrimonialist regime is considered to be the sultanic regime. Linz himself argues in some parts of his writings with the statement that Middle Eastern regimes can be classified as authoritarian, and says that in this case there is another, independent type of political regime - sultanism [Linz, 2009, p. 121-122].

The author of the concept is M. Weber. On this basis, X. Linz together with X. Chehabi developed the theory of the sultanic regime [Chehabi and Linz, 1998]. Linz distinguishes sultanism "in many respects" from the actual authoritarian regime [Linz, 2000, p. 111]. However, the difference between Sultanism and patrimonialism is found in the works of S. Eisenstadt [Eisenstadt, 1973], R. Theobald [Theobald, 1982, p. 548-559], P. Pawelka [Pawelka, 1985], and later in G. Erdmann and W. Kessler. Engel [Erdmann, Engel, 2007, p. 95-119] is not expressed clearly enough.

According to H. Linz, the unlimited power of sultanic leaders is similar in form to the arbitrary exercise of power. However, in contrast to the totalitarian regime under Sultanism, ideology is only a facade that hides the sole exercise of power [Linz, 2009, p. 113].

Sultanism has many similarities with an authoritarian regime. The compulsion and fear that exist under Sultanism bring it closer to the totalitarian type of domination. However, the origins and features of the functioning of this regime are fundamentally different. Under sultanism, it is personalism that makes it" normatively acceptable " to inherit power, whereas under totalitarianism, the latter is not legitimized in any way from the point of view of ideology.7
According to the conclusion spread among researchers, the sultanic regime is a special form of" modern tyranny", which manifests itself in excessive abuse of power and a large-scale amount of personal power. Among the signs of the Sultan's regime are usually called: 1) targeted terror against the opposition to the traditional elite; 2)" protection " of the masses, brought to a state of "rest" through targeted "charity"; 3) complete disenfranchisement of the country's population; 4) lack of power in traditional institutions; 5) confusion of public and private principles, manifested primarily in the economy, which leads to a strong cult of the ruler with a pronounced dynastic tendency; 7) the creation of paramilitary formations as a counterweight to the cadre army; 8) massive external support [Kramer, 2011, p.86].

In my opinion, Sultanism is an attempt to overcome the internal contradictions, splits and dysfunctions inherent in neo-patrimonialism by creating a hyper-personalized type of power that rises above society and forced labor.

7 This reasoning is not extrapolated to the situation in other regions, as the reader may wonder whether the" sultanic " regime in North Korea is not.

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methods of ensuring its unity, as well as the normal functioning of the state. Under sultanism, the rudiments of the family type of power are consolidated at the level of national administration, when national interests are replaced by corporate and clan interests. There seem to be insufficient resources for deep modernization in society, ideological mobilization is almost impossible, and partial reliance on traditional legitimacy and established power archetypes in the national consciousness provides only a relative effect. Personalized authoritarian power rises above traditional institutions of a family-paternalistic and tribalistic nature and tries to weaken their influence on the public administration system as much as possible.

The Sultan's regime, having made a predominant bet on the tools of violence and coercion, narrows the possibilities of political maneuvering for itself. As a result, it pushes itself into a political impasse, from which there is no way out with the help of legitimate political means. Discontent that simultaneously accumulates in both traditionalist and transformative social groups, as well as conflicts that line up along the same line (against the authorities) and reinforce each other, inevitably lead to a large-scale social explosion.

Examples of sultanic regimes in the countries of the BV and SA region are the regimes of H. Mubarak in Egypt and M. Gaddafi in Libya. With certain reservations, the Assad father and son regimes in Syria and the regime of A. A. Saleh in Yemen, who left power in 2011, but retained a significant influence on the political process, were close to them [Gusterin, 2011].

The prerequisites for the emergence of sultanic regimes did not develop in all Middle Eastern societies (Hermassi, 1972). In fact, the transition from patrimonialism to sultanism could have different political consequences for them. So, in the case of Algeria, where the French colonialists destroyed the structures of the "inner society", the patrimonial regime did not take root. The atomized, fractured society was easily dominated by the military, which sought to implement a large-scale project in the spirit of Arab socialism. Traditional elites were weakened, and Islamists were the only challenge to the authorities. The leaders of the National Salvation Front canceled the victory of the latter in the 1992 parliamentary elections, which led to a civil war, the consequences of which Algerian society is still experiencing today.

In the case of Tunisia, the direct French influence and the weakness of the Bey (traditional elite) power led to the formation of some forms of civil society, which were formed and supported simultaneously by the mobilization regimes of X. Bourguiba and Ben Ali, who were able to expand their social base in this way. The resources of the mobilization regime, which implemented the strategy of liberal modernization, were sufficient to suppress the resistance of the Islamists, and the transition to Sultanism was not required. The manipulative political regime was overthrown as a result of mass protests in 2011, assessed in the West as a desire for democratization.

In Morocco, where the French helped the Sultan's government to form structures of state sovereignty, but did not allow it to create its own vertical of power, there was a situation of unstable balance between the central government and the traditional tribal elite, which enjoys support at the local level. As a result, with the help of a national movement based on urban strata, the Sultan managed to achieve de facto independence, rising above the traditional elite and tribal divisions. The Moroccan monarchy has become an institution that guarantees the strength of the patrimonial regime, successfully combining elements of traditional and legal-rational legitimacy and retaining the status of a national arbiter. This allowed her to stand firm during the events."

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spring" 2011, limited to partial liberalization in the form of limited changes made to the country's constitution.

In Egypt, the left-wing socialist mobilization regime of H.-A. Nasser, which overthrew the unpopular monarchy, was replaced by the regime of A. Sadat, focused on truncated liberal modernization with the support of the West. The latter caused widespread discontent among the Islamists, whose assassination attempt killed the head of the regime. It was replaced by the regime of H. Mubarak, which, under the conditions of a controlled multi-party system, evolved in the direction of sultanism with all its characteristic features. It also lost the support of both traditional and more modernizing social groups and was overthrown by the unconsolidated mass movement of spring 2011, while Egypt remains in a state of political uncertainty with no clear prospects for resolving the situation [Hasche, 2012, p. 65-73].

In Libya, the weakness of the monarchy in an ethnically and tribally divided country opened the way for the mobilization regime of Colonel Gaddafi's chieftain-charismatic type to come to power. After failed attempts at left-wing modernization and impromptu speeches on the theme of world revolution, he conserved a specific type of political system, gradually reorienting himself to a truncated liberal modernization. Noticeably weakened ideological legitimacy of the government prompted Gaddafi to form his own version of the Sultan's regime with its characteristic costs and references to some traditional national and religious values. The blurred social base of the regime under conditions of repression and the decline in socio-economic efficiency led to mass demonstrations in the spring of 2011, which ended with the fall of the regime with the active participation of the international community. The country has plunged into a state of civil war, accompanied by an increase in the influence of tribalist and local-regional players, which calls into question the preservation of Libya as a single state.

Thus, Sultanism, which initially appeared as a variant of a forced political way out of the crisis of neo-patrimonialism, found itself in a social and political impasse, summing up a peculiar result of the existence of traditional and authoritarian forms of political domination in the countries of BV and SA.

conclusion

Pagrimonialism is a dualistic structure based on a combination of modern (legally rational and formalized), mostly resulting from borrowing and informal (related to traditional national culture and social structure) institutions, which predetermined the hybrid nature of political regimes in most countries of the BV and SA.

The sultanic regimes that existed in the Maghreb countries in many cases were the product of a crisis of the social foundations of the patrimonial order, when the institutions of patrimonial domination could not reconcile and consolidate both the modernization-oriented and traditionalist strata of society. The reasons for the failures of the modernization project are the resistance of the social environment, the lack of social, cultural and economic capital, which the system of personalized power could not compensate for. The sultanic regime, which tried to stabilize a hybrid society by creating an extraordinary type of personalized power and refusing to further modernize, only worsened this crisis, narrowing the space for political maneuver, becoming the main object of public discontent.

As a result, neither the neo-patrimonialist nor the sultanic regimes managed to resist the struggle, articulating various social interests. Actually

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all segments of society were dissatisfied with the authoritarian style of government, corporatism, corruption, inefficiency of social policy, low standard of living and lack of social prospects. The stability of neo-patrimonialism and sultanism proved elusive.

As a result, the patrimonialist or sultanist regime, which was unable to cope with the internal crisis, was weakened or overthrown due to the discontent of a very narrow stratum of supporters of modernization and democratization. At the same time, in the later stages of the revolution, traditionalist-oriented social and political figures came to the fore, which threatened to turn the transitional societies from the path of modernization. In an extreme scenario, the State itself was destroyed (in the case of Libya). And even a situation where there is a consensus among the main elite groups on the country's development path did not guarantee stability. The post-authoritarian situation itself has become a major challenge for a number of BW states (Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen).

At the same time, the Arab Spring, with all the uncertainty of its final results, destroyed the social foundation of patrimonial and sultanic regimes. States that have experienced the Arab Spring face an institutional vacuum. The creation of a stable authoritarian regime (of a secular or religious type) is hardly possible in the foreseeable future. The establishment of one version or another of the Islamic order will inevitably face resistance both within the Middle Eastern societies themselves and from Western countries. Even successful attempts to form a consensus-based transition regime (a kind of "co-public" democracy) They do not yet guarantee political stability and solutions to the accumulated (and recently aggravated) socio-economic problems. Long-term instability, in turn, can turn many countries of the BW and SA into a vast field of tension and provoke new ethno-confessional conflicts.

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