Keywords: Senegal, armed conflict, Casamance, separatists

The southern Senegalese province of Casamance remains his pain point. It covers part of the territory connected to the rest of the country by a narrow corridor in the northeast.

The province has a natural potential for agricultural development due to favorable climatic conditions and land fertility. Casamance is an almost flat lowland plain located along the river of the same name, richly covered with dense tropical forests, as well as plantations of rice, cassava and other crops. This part of the country has opportunities for the development of tourism, woodworking industry and marine fishing.

However, the economic development of the region is very complicated due to the difficult political situation. There is an active separatist Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (DDSC), which since 1982 has been waging an armed struggle for broad autonomy of this territory, the majority of whose inhabitants - about 600 thousand out of 1 million - belong to the Diola people, adhere to Catholicism and traditional beliefs, mainly animism.

The FARC rebels have opposed and continue to oppose the Senegalese Government's policy of settling the region with Muslims, who make up 95% of the country's population (13.4 million out of 14.1 million). Several thousand people have been victims of the conflict, which has been going on for almost three decades. This conflict has deep historical, ethnic and socio-political roots.

THE SEPARATISTS: WHO ARE THEY AND WHERE DID THEY COME FROM?

Historically, the problem is primarily related to the ethnic factor. The fact is that most of the Diol have settled in Lower Casamance, areas on the border with Guinea-Bissau and in a number of large quarters of Ziginshor, the main city of the province. The Diola people are not only geographically isolated, but also characterized by a special way of life, which is largely different from neighboring ethnic groups, which made assimilation processes in Casamance difficult or even impossible.

The main feature of the organization of diol life is the system of autonomous self-government, up to the level of the smallest communities or settlements. Large villages are divided into peculiar quarters, governed by their own leaders. Such autonomy of the community-settlement is necessary in order to fulfill a specific task that requires joint efforts at the right time.

But such a system, which was determined only by force majeure, could not guarantee the stable protection of the Diola people in the face of external enemies. However, France's harsh policy of trying to suppress the resistance movement of the country's indigenous peoples, especially the Diol, with the help of regular armed forces, led to increased resistance and hatred of the colonial administration.

In 1918-1924, French troops managed to suppress the armed resistance of the titular local population. However, this was not a true military victory. Rather, as the Governor-General of French West Africa, William Pontius, acknowledged, " ... the policy of Paris in relation to the small Senegalese province, even if it were crowned with a direct military victory, would not have led to the pacification of local combatants, but would have ended only with the establishment of a fragile peace between the colonialists and the fighters for independence."¹

Even the first European colonizers, both Portuguese and French, were struck by Diol's strong commitment to his land. Indirectly, this was manifested in fetishism - the worship of material objects, such as trees in the forest, which were recognized as "sacred". The protection of places of worship was entrusted to the" king " of the tribe, whose role had nothing to do with secular power, but was purely religious.²

The culture, the whole way of life of the Diola people is complex and peculiar. They are distinguished by a pronounced inner solidarity, a heightened sense of self-awareness, and a desire for autonomy and independence. But the inter-confessional factor is still decisive.

An additional impetus to inter-confessional and socio-ethnic contradictions in this region was given by the fact that lower Casamance became a zone where the Bainuks (pro-ethnos of the region) and representatives of the dio-nese people alternately found refuge and permanent residence.

people who are forced to move to the Guinea region under the pressure of strong migration flows from southern Mauritania.

Casamance was officially incorporated into Senegal as part of French West Africa at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. In 1904, the French colonial authorities decided to transform Casamance into a single territorial unit divided into 8 administrative districts. When dividing, the colonialists were guided not by the borders of the main ethnic groups, but by the presence of 8 large settlements, from which, as they believed, it would be most convenient to manage. At the same time, the French authorities put a military administration at the head of the 3 western districts with centers in Ziginchor, Bignon and Ussuye, which were dominated by the Diola people, who had already begun to resist them. Over time, dissatisfaction with the colonialists and resistance to them turned into an open form and especially intensified by the beginning of the Second World War.

After Senegal's independence in 1960, the inhabitants of Casamance, which was an enclave in the Gambia, painfully perceived their marginal position and dreamed of their own autonomy. Isolated from the main part of the country, they considered themselves ignored by the central government. And the independence promised by the country's president, L. S. Senghor, was never granted to this region during his rule. Moreover, the fertile land of Casamance began to be settled and then appropriated by Muslim settlers coming from the north of the country, especially during the dry years in the rest of Senegal. They were on their way here to grow peanuts, which are poorly cultivated and not suitable for this climate zone. Gradually, Muslim settlers began to establish their own control over the trade and tourist infrastructure of Casamance. All this increased the discontent and protest moods of the indigenous people of the region, which turned into armed resistance.

The first serious incident occurred at the end of 1982. On December 26, separatist demonstrators armed with cleavers filled the main city of Casamance-Ziguinchor. Special forces of the security forces suppressed a spontaneous anti-government protest, several people were killed, dozens were arrested and put on trial.

After Red December, the rebels realized that the struggle for independence would be long and difficult and that one-time mass actions would not achieve much. It was considered pointless to oppose State power structures in a peaceful way. This gave rise to a conflict that for many decades created extremely difficult problems for the Senegalese leadership, which did not pay enough attention to this region.

ORIGINS AND ROOTS OF ARMED SEPARATISM

The separatists were grouped around the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance, whose spiritual leader and ideologue for almost a quarter of a century - until 2004-was Abbot Augustin Senghor Diamacun.

The movement itself dates back to the colonial era, and was founded in March 1947 by Victor Diatma, Ibu Diallo, and Emil Budian. At that time, the activities of the DDSC were peaceful and socio-cultural in nature. After Senegal gained independence, it began to acquire more and more radical properties and separatist ideology. To a large extent, this transformation is due to subjective reasons and, mainly, to the personal qualities of those who found themselves at the head of the movement at that time. But still, the main objective factors were the dominance of the northerners in the leadership of the province, the economic difficulties associated with the severe drought in the central regions of Senegal and caused a massive relocation of non-indigenous people to Casamance.

Internally displaced persons used illegal, often violent means to seize housing and land they cultivated from residents of the southern province. Along with this, the indignation of indigenous people was caused by the actions of the authorities aimed at completely burning out the crops of Indian hemp and other traditional crops, the cultivation of which is inextricably linked to the existence of the local population.

At the first stage of the Movement's activities, the Senegalese Government did not pay attention to this organization and did not properly assess the threat that arose. However, quite soon the DDSC acquired a more flexible organizational structure, its top management level was the National Bureau, which was headed by the Secretary-General-the Abbe Augustin Senghor Diamacun, already mentioned. The DDSK had three "working groups", one of which formed a military wing to fight the central government.

The governor of Casamance, Brigadier General Dieng, gave the following description of the separatist organization in 1990: "It is necessary to distinguish between the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance, which was originally created as a kind of cultural and political movement, and the DDSK as a radical separatist organization built on a tribalist and confessional basis. The extremist trend prevailed, where the role of ideologue, inspirer and organizer is Abbe Augustin Senghor Diamancun. Within this movement, there is a military wing responsible for organizing violent acts. DDSK in its current form is a tool of a certain group of people, on the content of which it is located. In its actions, the Movement is guided by considerations of protecting the interests of the population of a particular denomination. The beginning of the radicalization of the movement is the jacquerie of 1982, which was caused by the problems associated with the re-establishment of the movement.-

land ownership issues. This process has led to the fact that the current leaders of the FARC directly, including by armed means, seek the independence of the province. " ³

We can agree with General Dieng's point of view. Indeed, the events of 1982, which he calls the "jacquerie", were the detonator of all subsequent armed conflicts in southern Senegal.

There were not so many militants - by the early 1990s, the core of the DDSK military wing, called Attica, did not exceed 300 people. ⁴ The militants were trained in three camps by former Senegalese soldiers from the Diola nation, who had experience of fighting as part of the French army in Algeria and Indochina. Sidi Badji, Leopold Sanga, and Maurice and Martin Diapas were in charge of combat training and spot operations. The militants were heavily armed. They had modern weapons, including heavy weapons, which came to Casamance from Liberia and other countries in the region.

Activists of the other - political-wing of the DDSK were engaged in propaganda, fundraising, purchasing weapons, and recruiting young people into their ranks. They operated illegally and had their own cells in many towns and villages in Senegal. It is believed that this structure in the late 1990s. after a series of defeats of the military wing, which caused its demoralization, began a "mine war" on the country's roads and turned the best beaches of Senegal into minefields.

By the end of the 1980s, the DRC's military wing controlled large areas in the Casamance region bordering Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia. It was in these countries that his rear bases were located. The two main groups of the military wing were named the Southern and Northern Fronts. The tactics of the armed detachments of the DDSK at that time consisted in holding the occupied territories and forcing the population living there to provide them with everything necessary. In other areas of Casamance that they had not yet captured, they tried to disrupt the activities of the local administration and disrupt economic life.

By the late 1990s and early 2000s, the military wing consisted of the" general staff " and the headquarters of three battalions that controlled individual companies and detachments. The total number of units of the Southern Front with trained reservists in the refugee camps in Guinea-Bissau was estimated at 2 thousand people. Approximately the same number of "bayonets" were in the Northern Front, which had stopped fighting by this time. In addition to these organized detachments, in Casamance there were and still are numerous gangs that hide behind the sign of the DDSK. They are usually in the service of tribal authorities.

Thus, Casamance became a prominent arena of guerrilla warfare. The DDSK attracted many young people, natives of the province, who, experiencing material deprivation and being in a certain spiritual and cultural vacuum, saw their future only in an independent Casamance. The collective consciousness of the inhabitants of the region is strongly influenced by the still fresh memory of the liberation struggle of the people of Guinea-Bissau against the Portuguese colonialists. Ordinary residents of the province supported the PAIGC fighters*, while the official Dakar helped the puppet Front for the National Liberation of Guinea.

The armed wing was replenished exclusively by recruiting young people. Its methods and the subsequent transformation of young people into DDSK fighters were recently described by the magazine "Gen Afrik", which published an interview with one of the rebels, who became the commander of the detachment and returned home after 22 years.:

"In 1986, I was 17 years old. One day, as I was leaving a school in Ziginshor, I was stopped by strangers who, as I later learned, belonged to the DDSK. They said they needed young people like me to continue fighting for independence, for a better future for Casamance. Indeed, at that time, I and a few others were obsessed with the idea of doing something for ourselves and our families. When I came to ask my parents for permission, they didn't tell me anything, just as they didn't tell me anything when I returned 22 years later, in 2009. It's just that people are afraid to talk about it.

Since 1986, my comrades and I left Ziginshor and went with these people to the border with Guinea-Bissau. They found themselves in a camp commanded by Sidi Badji. Life in it was hard: there was no sanitation, in order to get food, you had to hunt. But there we got real military skills - retired instructors helped us; we studied military strategy and tactics... At first I was just a fighter, then a platoon leader, and at the time when I was arrested, I held the position of one of the commanders.

Still, I was tempted to give it up, but I was afraid. We swore by blood to lead our region to independence, and I could have been killed for betraying our common interests. But even if this had not happened, when I returned to the city, to a peaceful life, I could have been arrested for participating in anti-government hostilities. But one day, a former fighter I knew told me about a non-governmental organization that helps people like me.

I "burned out" my life in the woods, but I didn't know what to do to get out of there. In the beginning, I was full of desire to fight for independence, but now I don't want to talk about it anymore. 22 years is not two days or even two years. And in general, this is a conflict that I don't want to say anything about. Personally, I participated in battles. But it wasn't

* African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde.

not a drunk, not a drug addict. In 1986, because of Salif Sadio, who declared himself the leader of Attica, a split occurred in our ranks, as a result of which some members of the Movement killed others. There are also skirmishes these days, because people don't see the same things differently, but there is no more carnage. Life in the camp is well organized. Every two months there are meetings with one of the leaders of the DDSK - Cesar Badiateh. They discuss the situation. He is calm and wants to have a dialogue with the state. " ⁵

However, not all the leaders of the rebel movement shared the same opinion. There was no consensus within the DDSK, and often there were excesses related to the struggle for power, which led to an escalation of the conflict.

The final split in the PDSK occurred in 1993. The head of the Northern Front, Sidi Badji (died in 2004), who was then chief of the so-called General Staff of the Movement, called on his supporters to stop the armed struggle. Although this front maintained its armed formations for a long time, its detachments were in a state of positive neutrality and even often together with government troops conducted operations to suppress the activities of gangs in the northern part of Casamance.

Salifa Sadio, the head of the Southern Front's radical military wing, Attica, held the opposite position, and to a certain extent still does. He and his associates continue to see armed struggle as the only solution to the Casamance problem.

Hope for a solution to the long-running Casamanian crisis emerged in December 2004, when a peace agreement was signed in Ziguinchor between the Senegalese Government and the leadership of the DDSK, represented by its leader, Abbe O. Senghor Diamaikun. ⁶ Dakar's promises to promote the province's socio-economic recovery by allocating budget funds (105 million euros) and attracting foreign aid to the province were instrumental in this process. foreign investment. Laws were passed to grant amnesty to militants and abolish the death penalty.

After the signing of the agreement, a relative calm was established in the country, only occasionally spontaneously disturbed in certain areas of Casamance. The process of demining the territories previously covered by military operations has begun. But in 2006, a new round of bloody clashes began, provoked by disagreements within the DDSK and the struggle for power. The impetus was the illness, and then - in 2007 - the death of Fr. Senghor Diamankun. Many separatists took refuge in the forests after his death, some of them fleeing to the Gambia.⁷

Despite the peace agreement signed, the conflict continues to negatively affect the lives of the population of southern Senegal. Outbreaks of hostility were again reported in 2009 and 2010. Civilians and military personnel continue to die. The Senegalese armed forces spent two months in 2010 combing the forests in the south of the country in search of the Kasselom camp, led by Cesar Attoute Badiateh, head of the Attica military wing of the DDSK. The rebels suffered casualties, with some attempting to flee to neighbouring Gambia or take refuge in villages in Guinea-Bissau.⁸

The Bennoo Siggil Senegal coalition, which opposes the military wing, together with a number of civil society organizations, supports the need for "broad discussions" and advocates "... a negotiated solution to the armed conflict in Casamance"⁹. To this end, they propose to involve neighboring countries - the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau-in the peace process.

At the end of March 2010, Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade expressed his readiness to conduct a dialogue with the separatists in the south of the country. According to him, in the leadership of the rebel group ."..there are those who hide in the woods and don't want to talk, but there are also those with whom you can negotiate. " ¹⁰

A little later, speaking in Ziguinchor, Senegalese Prime Minister Suleiman N. Ndiaye said that the government is ready to start the negotiation process with the separatists from the FARC, so that peace can finally reign in this part of the state. In turn, the commander of the Attica S. A. Badiateh agreed to start a dialogue with the government, noting, however, that it should take place in one of the neutral countries. He stated that he supported the idea of negotiations " ... for the sake of establishing a final peace in Casamance, since many innocent people were killed during the conflict."¹¹ It is for this reason that the DDC "...wants to put an end to this problem."¹²

If the problem is not resolved through negotiations in the near future, taking into account the positions of both sides, the situation may worsen and become explosive. This is due to a slowdown in economic growth in the country as a whole, a significant increase in unemployment (according to official data, 13%, and according to unofficial data - several times more), caused, among other things, by the negative consequences of the global financial crisis.¹³

HOW TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT?

One of the reasons that led to the protracted conflict in southern Senegal is the policy of the authorities of this country, carried out for several decades in the province of Casamance. Insufficient attention to the problems of the region and to the fate of its inhabitants, encouraging the resettlement of the Muslim population there, and suppressing peaceful protests by force ultimately led to armed resistance by the main Diola people, who see their future in secession from Senegal and gaining full independence.

On the one hand, the conflict in Casamance has a negative impact on the internal situation in Senegal. In this province of praktiches-

economic and political activities are paralyzed. It is a heavy burden on the country's economy as a whole, and only direct French aid in arms and ammunition allowed until recently to conduct operations against the separatist FARC.

In Casamance, the tourism industry, which previously brought considerable income, is paralyzed. The remaining population in the villages is involved in the production and primary processing of Indian cannabis by drug traffickers acting on behalf of the DDSK. In all likelihood, the interest of the bigwigs of the international drug business in maintaining instability in southern Senegal is one of the important factors for the survival of the separatist movement in Casamance.

On the other hand, the solution of the Casamance problem is complicated by the political and economic situation of Senegal. Political passions are flaring up in the country. Opposition leaders accuse President Abdoulaye Wade of trying to bring to power his son, Karim, 41, who is gradually gaining political and administrative weight. On May 4, 2009, he joined the government.

Human rights groups have repeatedly said that "...Senegal's carefully varnished image as a bastion of democracy in troubled West Africa is increasingly tarnished as the country's 83-year-old leader, A The Wad is increasingly showing authoritarian tendencies. " ¹⁴ According to Wade's critics, political maneuvers to make the current president's son his successor, arrests without trial of journalists critical of the government, and restrictions on the powers of Parliament all point to a worsening situation in Senegal. Although the aging president has expressed a desire to run in the 2012 elections, his opponents have too many reasons to say that he is preparing a successor.

Perhaps before the election, the president will pay attention to the situation in Casamance, which still remains explosive. A. Wad obviously did not forget that in the presidential election of 2000, he was ahead of A. Diouf in the capital of the country, as well as in Casamance, where residents expected positive changes from him ¹⁵.

From time to time, conflicting parties engage in negotiations, which, as a rule, come to an impasse due to the position of the government, which wants to preserve the integrity of the country's territory. The question of belonging to the southern province of Senegal, in the opinion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Neither is "non-negotiable". He also stated that "...Casamance is an integral part of the country and will remain so until the sun goes out. " ¹⁶

If we take into account that there is no consensus among the rebels themselves about whether Casamance should be an autonomous part of Senegal or become fully independent, such statements by the country's leadership will not be able to contribute to a quick settlement of the conflict. Apparently, in this case, it is necessary to take into account the opinion of all the conflicting parties.

In his book "The Casamanian crisis: problems and Solutions", a well-known lawyer, former Prime Minister of Senegal Idris Seka-Me Bukunta Diallo ¹⁷ draws attention to the need to" engage " the cultural factor. According to him, "...the solution to this conflict will be neither legal, nor political, nor military, it will be cultural, because most of the rebels swore by blood to lead their region to independence. Breaking this oath implies retribution that will come "from above." ¹⁸ "And if you don't speak to them using the same means, it will all be in vain. The fact is that this agreement has a ritual meaning, meaning that as long as you are partners in it, you will not be able to betray, if you betray, you will be punished from above. " ¹⁹

* * *

Apparently, in the near future, at least until the next presidential election in the country, we can not expect any significant changes in the solution of the Casamance conflict. In our opinion, one of the acceptable options would be to implement the plan of the moderate wing of the PDSK, which consists in transforming the Movement into a political party, establishing a federal system of government in Senegal in order to gain greater autonomy for the region.

¹ Cit. by: Harry Bubaka. Topical issues of the foreign policy of the Republic of Senegal in the 1990s. Avtoreferat, Moscow, 1999, p. 19.

^{Jourain Marisol} 2. Le bouleversemnt du monde diplomatique du XXI necle. P., 1995. P. 821.

³ Le Regard. Ouagadougou. 8.06.1990.

⁴ Letemoin. Dakar, 12-18 juin, 1990.

⁵ Jeune Afrique. Novembre, 2009. P. 34.

⁶ At a meeting of the DDSC held in Ziginshor in September 2004, a collective decision was made to remove the leader of the Movement, Abbot O. Senghor Diamankun, from the post of chairman and appoint J.-M. F. Biaga to this position. However, the military wing of the Attica Democratic People's Movement issued a statement in which it refused to recognize the changes in the leadership of the Movement and confirmed its support for Abbat as the rebel leader. Representatives of Attica refused to engage in a dialogue with the new General Secretary of the DDSK, J.-M. F. Biagi, especially after the latter announced his intentions to transform the DDSK into a political party.

⁷ http://Fr.wikipedia.okg/wiki/Conflit et Casamance.

⁸ Pulse of the planet. March 30, 2010. AD-8.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Pulse of the planet. March 28, 2010 AD-8.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹³ Pulse of the planet. February 13, 2010. AF-5.

¹⁴ Pulse of the planet. ITAR-TASS. December 27, 2007. AF-7.

¹⁵ Compass. ITAR-TASS. N 17, 27.04.2000.

¹⁶ Pulse of the planet. ITAR-TASS. 1.04.2010.

^{Me Boucounta Diallo} 17. La crise casamanciere: problematique et voies de solutions. P. L'Harmattan, 2009.

¹⁸ Ibid. P. 11.

¹⁹ Ibid. P. 112.

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