The religious situation in Nigeria is marked by significant tensions as a result of the growing influence of Muslim fundamentalism in the country after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Forms of religious conflict in Nigeria include mass demonstrations, armed clashes, and riots involving thousands of people. Religious unrest was accompanied by numerous human casualties, the destruction of religious and public buildings, and violent attacks on the symbols of "foreign" religions. Nigerian fundamentalists have already fallen under the influence of global Islamism, whose role is constantly growing, and receive political, military and moral support from outside.

Keywords: Nigeria, Maitatsine, Boko Haram, religious conflicts, Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism.

Religiosity, religious diversity and sectarian divisions have a major impact on the life of Nigerian society. Currently, the number of Muslims in Nigeria is roughly equal to the number of Christians; about 10% of the population1 remain adherents of traditional beliefs ("traditionalists").

Across the country, different faiths are spread unevenly: in the northern states, Muslims predominate, in the south-western states, their number reaches a little more than half of the population, and in the south-east - less than 1%. That is, the vast majority of Christians live in the south-east and south-west, while in the north Christians make up no more than 10% of the population. Traditionalists are scattered throughout the country, but most of them are preserved in the west and east of Nigeria [Nigeria, 2013, p. 29].

Nigeria ranks first in Africa in terms of the number of Muslims (about 80 million people). Three-quarters of the country's territory consists of states where at least half or the majority of the population is Islamized, for example, in the states of northern and northwestern Nigeria, Muslims make up about 80% of the population. Many adherents of Islam live in the so-called Middle Belt, i.e. in the central part of the country. Islamization remains a constant factor in the development of Nigerian society.

Muslims, like Christians, are not united in Nigeria. The most widespread is Sunni Islam of the Maliki madhhab (tolka). In addition, Sufi orders (fraternities, tariqas)have gained a great influence and spread Tijaniyah, Qadiriyah and Ahmadiyyah. Individual tariqas and branches of Islam compete for influence among the population. Along with this, the current state of Islam in Nigeria is characterized by integration processes, the expression of which is the creation of Muslim organizations in Nigeria, the active involvement of Nigerian Muslims in the discussion at the national level of problems of relations between church and state, school and church, the issue of introducing Sharia courts throughout the country, the demand for an ethical revolution, etc. [ibid., pp. 39-40].

1 The population of Nigeria reaches 170 million people [Nigeria, 2013, p. 19].

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The establishment of closer ties with the Muslim world outside of Nigeria and Africa is a prominent feature of the development of Nigerian Islam since the late 1970s.Another important trend that emerged in the post - colonial period, i.e. after the country gained independence in 1960, is the increase in the number of Muslims with higher Quranic and higher Western education at the same time. But the most important thing that has characterized Nigerian Islam in the last few decades is the emergence and growth of Islamic fundamentalism.

In accordance with the basic principles of this movement - the destruction of innovations and the preservation of Islam as it appears in the Koran and Sunnah, Nigerian Islamic fundamentalists believe that the preservation (or introduction) of Islam in its "pure" form will help solve the social, economic and political problems of modern Nigeria. They denounced the Qadiriyah and Tijaniyah tariqas as heretical organizations, forbidding their imams to read sermons and say prayers. Since the late 1980s, the Christian-Muslim rivalry has also become noticeably more acute. Until the early 2010s, riots and other unrest rarely spread beyond the northern states of Nigeria and were mostly a struggle between different sects and trends within the Muslim community. The situation changed when the Islamist organization Boko Haram, which in some aspects became the successor of the Maitatsine sect, came to the forefront of the religious and political confrontation between the North and South of the country.

MAITACINE

In December 1980, under the leadership of a Cameroonian Muslim preacher, Alhaji Mohammed Marwa, riots broke out in the northern Nigerian city of Kano, where participants, mostly young people from the city's lower classes and madrasah students, advocated the purification of Islam and against adherents of other religions. Organized by the Maitatsine sect, they continued until 1987.The largest riots were observed in the states of Kaduna (1982), Iola (1984) and Bauchi (1985) [Adesoji, 2011, p. 101].

"Maitatsine" is a Hausa word meaning "one who curses". It became the nickname of the leader of the movement, M. Marwa (his associates also called him "Mahdi", i.e. the Messiah), who constantly publicly cursed and criticized the central government of Nigeria, followers of other religions, modern education, Western scientific achievements, etc. [Stock, 2004, pp. 415-417]. Marwa himself declared himself a prophet (lsichei, 1987, p. 197).

The followers of Marwa-yan tatsine ("one who feeds in the dry season") - mainly belonged to the gardawa-groups of madrasah students, mullahs, imams and other Koranic scholars whose task was to spread and strengthen the influence of Islam in society, and the Yancirani (yancirani) - young rural-urban labor migrants. In the cities where they arrived in search of a "better life", recent farmers and pastoralists began to engage in small - scale trade, building and repairing cheap housing-mud houses, painting fabrics, working as domestic servants, often with the very "Koranists" from whom they received basic religious knowledge. The most capable of them sought to improve their social status, including in the religious sphere, and material well-being. The least successful, losing their jobs, became vagabonds, members of criminal gangs, drug dealers, smugglers and "cannon fodder" for various armed groups. Representatives of the " Gardava "often found themselves in the leadership of religious movements, tariqas, sects, and from the urban poor and "Yancirani", who were distinguished from the" Gardava " by the complete absence of any political elements.

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In addition to the desire for survival and the thirst for profit, combat units of religious movements were formed (Adesoji, 2011, p.101-102).

Arguing that it was poverty that motivated young people to join Maitatsina, American researcher P. Clark notes that not only the inequality in the situation of certain groups of the population of the north, but also the gap in the standard of living of the majority of residents of the most industrially developed south of the country, on the one hand, and the northerners who are in a marginal position, They predestined the growing hatred of Muslims for "pagans" and Christians, whom they began to view as enemies and "supporters of Satan" (Clarke, 1987, p. 93). The poor strata of the population became the fertile ground on which the seeds of Marva's demagogy fell, cursing the "nouveau riche" and promising salvation to the faithful.

A special category of Maitatsine fighters were immigrants from neighboring states of Nigeria, primarily from Chad and Niger, who were represented both by Muslims who responded to the call of Marwa, and religious fanatics who found space in the Northern Nigerian region to implement their views, and experienced participants in armed African conflicts who roamed from country to country in search of "work", i.e. mercenaries, and not necessarily Muslims [Denisova, 2013, p. 165]. This explains the strong "foreign presence" in the ranks of Nigerian extremists.

Thus, the main reasons and prerequisites for the unrest were the growth of social inequality and, consequently, tension in the country as a whole and in the northern states in particular, the growth of unemployment among educated and uneducated youth, and the lack of access to secular education. Other reasons for the rise of Islamism included the refusal of Marwa's fanatics to recognize the secular nature of the Nigerian state. Since the 1979 Constitution and all subsequent ones proclaimed the separation of church and State, Shiite extremists, who were a minority compared to the Sunni majority, consistently rejected the basic law and openly defended the idea of creating an Islamic State. The fundamentalists argued that the federal government was unworthy of the loyalty of devout Muslims, and called for attacks on police stations and other public institutions, and encouraged their supporters to withdraw from secular schools and the civil service. It was the Shiite movement that inspired Maitatsine and Boko Haram.

But the Maitatsine movement did not have a clearly defined program and ideology, sectarians only called for a struggle for the "purity of Islam", thus expressing a protest against the existing order of things. The practice of followers of the sect included the temporary seizure of mosques in order to punish mullahs, public and state figures-Muslims for deviating, as the adherents of Maitatsine believed, from true Islam. They also smashed pubs, hotels, large shops and similar "outposts of Western bourgeois culture", destroyed cars. Part of the ritual and ritual activities of sectarians were abductions, mutilations and murders of people, trade in human organs, manufacture and use of magic potions, that is, what was typical of pre-Islamic pagan beliefs [Adesoji, 2011, p. 103].

If some researchers, for example And. While the Isichei were considered a paramilitary religious movement (Isichei, 1987, p.202), others, in particular R. Hickey and P. Clarke, considered it a Mahdist (Messianic) sect, the main centers of which were Kano and Borno (Hickey, 1984, p. 252; Clarke, 1987, p. 96). However, the un - Islamic practices that Marwa was involved in - using human organs to make amulets to ward off enemy bullets, and consuming human blood to gain greater power-made it difficult to categorize him. However, the ideas of Mahdism, which are widespread in West Africa and presuppose

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the appearance of a descendant of the Prophet, who would give Islam a new impetus and establish a just order of things, attracted many followers. Marwa considered himself a Nigerian mujaddid, i.e. a reformer of Islam, following in the footsteps of Osman dan Fodio (1754-1817) - the founder of the Sokoto caliphate in 1809, a religious figure who led a bloody jihad in the territory of modern Nigeria-the fight against social vices, social injustice, lies, deception, crime. In essence, Marwa was a political adventurer seeking power. At the same time, he used popular suffering to justify violence and the need for a radical transformation of society through open rebellion.

The main centers of the movement were suppressed in 1985, but in 1986-1987 the main instigators of religious unrest (clashes between Christians and Muslims, as well as individual Islamic communities among themselves) were students, not only madrasas, but also Northern Nigerian universities. The mass nature of the unrest continued to be achieved through the participation of urban grassroots and unemployed youth. Public accusations against adherents of other faiths from the largest associations of Nigerian Christians (the Christian Association of Nigeria) and Muslims (the Victory of Islam Society) have escalated.

The religious riots of the 1980s were sparked by political debates about the nature of the future Nigerian State. They included demands from Muslims to expand the scope of Sharia courts, government support and partial funding for the Hajj, i.e. pilgrimage to Mecca and other Muslim holy sites, different approaches to the problem of secularization (separation of church and state), etc. At the same time, there was a noticeable politicization of religion, which was used by various political forces or to oppose one another. groups of the population to others, or to obtain the support of a particular part of the population. The first step towards sectarian division in Nigeria was a heated debate in the Constitutional Assembly over the introduction of sharia law in the northern states, which began in the late 1970s. At that time, the disputes did not result in armed clashes, but created the basis for inter-confessional separation and aggravation of the situation in the 1980s.

Religious riots under the auspices of the Maitatsine movement, which began in 1980, were the first manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria, relying on Shiite groups, one of the leaders of which was the future leader of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf. At the heart of Nigerian fundamentalism is an uncompromising attitude towards Islamic faith, practices, methods and doctrines and the politicization of religion.

External factors also contributed to the rise of fundamentalism in Nigeria. Maitatsine was partly influenced by the success of the 1979 revolution in Iran. A commission of the Nigerian government investigating the circumstances of the Kano riots in 1980 considered the possible involvement of the then leader of the Libyan Jamahiriya, Muammar Gaddafi, in instigating the riots, but found no irrefutable evidence [Federal Government..., p. 36]. It should be noted, however, that the Libyan leader has repeatedly stated the expediency of dividing Nigeria into two states - Muslim and Christian. This would fit perfectly with his plans to create an Islamic belt across Africa from the east coast to the west coast.

It is known that fundamentalism implies exclusivity, moral rigor, adherence to the holy scriptures and a righteous life, opposition to religious and cultural liberalism in defense of orthodoxy, and as a social movement - organizational and ideological uniqueness. It can be said that since the 1980s, Nigeria has been in a state of constant religious crisis caused by the rise of fundamentalism. The crisis culminated with the rise of Boko Haram.

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BOKO HARAM

The group that gave rise to the Boko Haram sect was formed in 1995 under the leadership of Abubakah Laun. In December 2003 It has claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on intelligence officials in Yobe and Borno states. After temporarily seizing a police station in the small town of Kanamma, the militants hung banners with the word "Afghanistan" written on them in Hausa, thus earning the group the name of the Nigerian Taliban [Waldek and Jayasekara, 2011, p. 168]. However, this was more evidence of ideological similarities, rather than real connections with the Afghan Taliban. Under this name, the group carried out attacks on law enforcement officers. In October 2004, 15 police officers were killed. A brutal organized response by the police of both states led to the exodus of militants to Niger, Chad and the capital of the Nigerian state of Borno - Maiduguri. It was mainly from rioters who ended up in Maiduguri that Mohammed Yusuf later formed the Boko Haram paramilitary wing [Crisis Group Africa].

The origin of the Hausan word "boko" can be translated as "deception", "misleading" and is a designation of a playful action, traditionally played out at Hausan weddings, when the grandmother dresses up as the bride to laugh at the groom. The word can also be associated with an expression related to the field of European education in the colonial period - "Boko Ilimin" (Boko Ilimin), as opposed to Islamic education - Ilimin Islamiyya (Waldek and Jayasekara, 2011, p. 169).

What these different interpretations have in common becomes clear when the word is combined with the Arabic "haram" - "forbidden" or "sin". Together, the phrase can be translated as "Western education is forbidden" or"Western education is a sin." This is in line with a long-standing dispute in northern Nigeria over education in general and religious instruction in particular. Even during the colonial period, the British policy of non-interference in the backward Islamic north of Nigeria and the Christianization of the southerners by European missionaries led to differences between the principles of education and teaching methods in these regions. In turn, this has led to unequal employment opportunities, increased social status and improved material conditions for northerners and southerners. To this day, in northern Nigeria, Western education is associated with evangelical efforts to convert Muslims to Christianity and the intention of southerners to consolidate their economic and political dominance in the country. In principle, the members of the sect were not only "against", but also directly denied any right to the existence of Western education, Western culture and modern science.

But it would be an oversimplification to see the group's goal only as an opposition to Western education. Like Maitatsine, Boko Haram rejects all forms of secular power and seeks a State governed entirely by Sharia law. The sect was not satisfied with the introduction of sharia law in 12 of the 19 [Federal Military Government] states of Northern Nigeria in 1999.2 and accused the central government of corruption, deception of the population and excessive ambition. These views found support among the population, which was daily confronted with the facts of corruption. One of the things that undermined the importance of sharia law and the status of its laws in general was that some politicians, governors, and civil servants who sought Sharia law in northern Nigeria were later tried on charges of corruption and other law-and-order violations.

To a certain extent, the introduction of sharia law was an attempt by the central government to appease those northern politicians who constantly called for refusal

2 This meant the simultaneous existence of two legal systems in those states.

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because of the secular nature of the country, they were seen as a threat to the positions of the Southerners. But the introduction of sharia law was not strong enough to appease those elements who might not have joined the fanatics, but would not have stopped them. This ambivalence was not due to a lack of faith in the extremists ' goals: rather, it was a matter of different methods. Both advocated the transformation of Nigeria into an Islamic state governed by Sharia law. For them, all Muslims are members of the community (ummah), and the statement of the secular nature of the state is an insult to a significant part of the Nigerian population, and given the concentration of political power and material wealth mainly in the Christian south, and the reduction of northerners to the category of second - class citizens. It should be noted that such views are not shared by liberal, moderate Muslims, who do not see the need for Islamization of Nigeria, although they do not seek secularization of the state.

Muhammad Yusuf was born on January 29, 1979 in Girgir, Yobe State. After finishing primary school in Nigeria, he received Quranic education in Niger and Chad. He had four wives and 12 children (Abimbola, 2010, p. 98).

Until 1990, M. Yusuf was a member of the Shiite all-Nigerian organization Islamic Movement of Nigeria, founded in 1979, which was headed by the famous Muslim scholar and preacher Ibrahim al-Zakzaki 3. Due to disagreements in the leadership of the movement, Yusuf left it and joined the Jamaatul Tajidi Islam (DTI) organization operating in Kano, headed by Abubakar Mujahid and was appointed head of its cell in Borno State. Under Yusuf's leadership, the group quickly became radicalized and adopted violent methods of struggle. Later, the DTI branch was transformed into what became known as Boko Haram (Suleiman, 2009, p. 19-23). Yusuf's break with other leaders and organizations may have been due to the desire for sole power in the Islamist movement, the desire to realize the long-standing dream of creating an Islamic state in all or part of Nigeria, which was prevented by more moderate and cautious leaders.

In the late 1990s, Yusuf was a member of the Council for the Introduction of Sharia Law in Borno State and an active participant in debates on this issue on radio and television. Even then, his oratorical abilities and knowledge of the Koran were revealed. However, without detracting from the extent of Yusuf's commitment to Islam, it should be noted that, apparently, he was more concerned with the seizure of power and his own well-being than with the "true" goals of the movement: rejecting everything "Western", he used cars of the most expensive brands and the latest communication equipment. In addition, when preparing for jihad, he sent his most trusted associates abroad to train as military instructors, specialists in weapons, tactics and strategies of insurgency, field surgeons, etc. [Madunagu, Shobiye, Chiedozie, 2009, p. 2]. The inconsistency of the Boko Haram leader alienated him from more orthodox members sects.

M. Yusuf participated in the preparations for the parliamentary elections in Yobe State in 2003. It is possible that his close contacts with some northern politicians were due to his willingness to help them gain power, which he could then use for his own purposes. The election did not take the direction he needed, and his group was asked to leave the state. Later, however, it was his connections with the local political elite that helped him avoid a long prison sentence. In turn, politicians who patronized religious radicals in order to enlist their support and protection, used the movement as a tool for seizing power.-

3 Ibrahim al-Zakzaki was the best graduate of the Faculty of Economics at Ahmadu Belo University in Zaria, Kaduna State, in 1979. He gained a reputation as a radical Islamist during his student years as the head of the Muslim Students ' Society.

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then they would pull away from them, letting them off the leash on innocent people. Politicians patronized criminals if they needed to use violence to achieve their goals.

In 2006 and 2008, M. Yusuf was arrested on suspicion of inciting violence and supporting terrorism, but in both cases he was released without charge. It is not known when exactly he created and led Boko Haram, but the first serious clashes between government forces and the sect's detachments occurred on July 26-30, 2009 in the states of Bauchi, Kano, Yobe and Borno (the movement's headquarters were located in Borno). The immediate cause of the clashes was the discovery of one of the Islamist hideouts in the Datsen Tenshin area (Bauchi) by a joint group of members of various security agencies on July 26, 2009. During the clash, 9 militants were arrested, a large amount of weapons and materials for making explosives were seized. After learning of the battle, other Boko Haram groups launched attacks on police stations in all four states. The riot was suppressed on July 30 after the capture and subsequent murder of M. Yusuf (most likely to prevent him from betraying sponsors and supporters of the movement from the headquarters administrations) in the premises of the police station and a fierce battle with his followers, some of whom were arrested. Members of the group declared Yusuf an "Islamic martyr" [http://www.bbc.со.uk/news/world-africa-16678098].

The number of victims of the July clashes, mostly members of the sect, exceeded 700 people. Many public buildings, police stations, prisons, schools and churches were destroyed. Residential buildings, shops, and workshops were also damaged. It was from the documents seized by the special services that it became clear that the movement existed for more than 10 years and operated under different names - the Nigerian Taliban, Yusufiya, etc. Already known as Boko Haram (although this was not a self-designation), after the events of 2009. It began calling itself a Sunnah and Jihadist Group and spoke of its proximity to Al-Qaeda's North African branch in the Maghreb.

After Yusuf's death, the leadership of Boko Haram passed to Mullah Sani Umar. In a statement to the Nigerian media, he vowed to continue fighting for the implementation of the Islamic revolution in Nigeria, but in July 2010, Abu Mohammed Abubakar bin Muhammad Sheko (former deputy of Yusuf) became the leader of the movement [Waldek, Jayasekara, 2011, p. 170].

In 2010, sectarian violence spread not only to northern but also to central Nigeria. Thousands of Plateau State residents, mostly living in and around Joey, were killed or made homeless during the riots. In September 2010, there was a sharp activation of the sect's combat wing. On September 7, 2010, about 50 members of the organization attacked the prison in Bauchi, where extremists arrested during the 2009 uprising were being held. On October 1, 2010, during the celebration of Nigeria's Independence Day, an attack occurred on an army barracks in the capital, Abuja [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17286020].

In 2011-2012. The Nigerian government faces the danger of splitting the country into a Muslim north and a Christian south. This was partly due to the victory of the People's Democratic Party candidate Goodluck Jonathan Christian (IJO)in the 2011 presidential election4. His election to the highest state post was not unexpected, as due to his illness and the subsequent death of his father, he was forced to leave the country.-

4. Jonathan was born in 1957 in what is now Baislsa State in the oil-rich Niger Delta region, graduated from university with a degree in zoology, worked as a lecturer for the Environmental Protection Agency, became Deputy Governor of Baislsa State in 1999, Governor in 2005, and Vice - President of Nigeria in 2007. In this position, he, in particular, was actively involved in resolving the conflict in the delta, held a series of successful negotiations with the rebels-members of the Movement for the Liberation of the Niger Delta (MLN) - his fellow countrymen.

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After the death (May 5, 2010) of the previous head of State (2007-2010), a Muslim, Umaru Yar'Adua, in February 2010, Vice-President G. Jonathan actually served as President, and on May 6, 2010, in accordance with the Constitution, he was sworn in as head of State. However, such claims of Jonathan did not suit the inner circle of U. Yar'Adua-Muslim politicians of the north, who did not want a southerner to become head of state, thus violating the established principle of alternating southerners (Christians) and northerners (Muslims) as head of state: the term of office of Yar'Adua at the time of his actual removal from office and subsequent death. the conflict did not end, and the presidential chair was supposed to belong to the Northerners for more than a year [Denisova, 2012, p.429].

In 2011, a new wave of terror swept through the country. On March 14, Ibrahim Ahmed Abdullah Bolori, a Muslim religious figure known for his criticism of Boko Haram, was shot dead in Maiduguri. On May 29, three explosions near an army barracks in Bauchi killed, according to various estimates, from 5 to 10 people. In June, the police headquarters and the UN office building were bombed in the capital, Abuja. On July 12, Boko Haram militants killed about 40 people in Maiduguri, leading to a mass exodus of residents. On November 4-5, several explosive devices were detonated in the town of Damaturu, after which the militants attacked an area of the city inhabited by Christians. Police and military personnel were attacked. In total, about 150 people were killed. "Christmas" terrorist attacks, which have become almost traditional in Nigeria, occurred in December in Abuja, Azar (Bauchi State), Maiduguri, Damaturu, Potiskum, Jos and other cities. In total, at least 465 people were killed in Boko Haram attacks in 2011 [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16678098].

Terrorist attacks did not stop and in 2012, on January 6-7, there were several attacks on Christian communities located in Adamawa State (29 dead), and on January 20, in Kano, six explosions killed more than 120 people. On January 25, a police station in Kano was stormed, on February 10, two explosions occurred in Maiduguri, on February 17, a prison in Coton Karifi (Kogi State) was attacked and 119 prisoners escaped. On February 20, 20 people were killed in an explosion at the Maiduguri city market. On June 17, suicide bombers blew up three churches in Kaduna State, bringing the death toll to 50. On June 20, a shootout between government forces and Boko Haram militants in Damaturu killed 40 people [http://www.unhcr. org/refworld/docid/4f6718ec2.html].

In 2013, the UN Department for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that more than 1,200 people had been killed in clashes since May 2013. On January 31, 11 Christians, including Pastor Hannania Sini Kwajipwa, were killed in Sabon Garin Yamdula in Adamawa State, and on January 26, 43 Christians were killed in an attack on St. Paul's Catholic Church in the village of Waga Chakawa in the same state in northeastern Nigeria [http://rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=64958]. The militants arrived in several trucks, opened fire on residents and burned down several houses [http://www.rg.ru/2014/01/28/nigeria-anons.html]. In January 2014, Islamists attacked the town of Konduga in Borno State. As a result of the attack, 51 people were killed, several dozen were taken hostage. [http://www.rg.ru/2014/02/12/boko-anons.html], and in February, 29 boarding school students were killed by Boko Haram [http://newsru.com/world/25feb2014/niger.html].

Currently, one of the main tasks of Boko Haram is to "squeeze" Christians out of the northern regions of Nigeria and forcibly relocate them to the south of the country. The Christian Association of Nigeria (HAN) accused the President and security officials of failing to ensure the safety of citizens. In addition, Boko Haram's activities undermine the economy, hinder trade in the northern areas, which cargo carriers deliberately avoid; southern traders prefer not to conduct business in these territories. As a result, "bottlenecks" appear in supply chains [Denisova, 2012, p.436].

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The number of Boko Haram members is unknown. Moreover, the surprise of the group's attacks and the rapid retreat after the terrorist attacks prevent the identification of the size of its rank and file and, possibly, make it believe that it is larger than it really is. However, it remains incontrovertible that the sect is able to carry out acts of violence simultaneously in different locations located at a great distance from each other, and has explosive devices that operate by remote control.

The sect receives its main funding from local donors, the most famous of which was the former Commissioner for Religious Affairs in Borno State, Alhaji Ban Fon, who died during the 2009 riots [Waldek and Jayasekara, 2011, p. 173]. Financial support is also provided by Northern Nigerian religious leaders and businessmen, who are motivated by religiosity and hope for change. The sponsors could be students, followers and assistants of M. Yusuf.

Assistance, mainly in the form of arms supplies, also comes from abroad. Thus, when questioned by the police immediately after his arrest in December 2009, M. Yusuf admitted that he had received weapons from Niger, Cameroon and Chad [Ibid., p.174]. Since these countries themselves are not arms producers, it can be assumed that they shared with the Nigerians their stocks formed in these States as a result of local armed conflicts, or international terrorist groups used the territory of the countries of the region to transport weapons to Nigeria.

Like any other rebel movement, the sect experienced leadership differences, splits, and secessionist sects. Thus, as early as 2009, a group led by M. Yusuf's closest associates, Aminu Tashen - Ilimi and Mola Umar, broke away from Boko Haram and established a base in Kanama in Kano State, near the border with Niger, from where it also carried out attacks on police stations and other facilities [Ibid.].

MAITACINE AND BOKO HARAM: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

The main similarity between the two fundamentalist movements is the high level of intensity of terrorist actions, the large number of followers and the brutality of violence, including directed against Muslim civilians. In both cases, among the causes and prerequisites for the riots were increasing socio-economic inequality, discontent with the rapid growth of corruption, uneven distribution of state revenues from oil exports by state, widespread unemployment and the emergence of a huge army of young people unable to get an education or find work. Despite the 20-year period between the most active period of Maitatsine activity (mid-1980s) and the rise of Boko Haram (2009), factors of conflict escalation, such as the impoverishment of a significant part of the population and the spread of social evils (bribery, etc.), not only did not lose their significance, but also became more important. As a rule, it is socio-economic problems that turn into riots and take the form of tribal, political or, as in the case of Nigeria, sectarian conflicts. In Nigeria, the situation has been aggravated by the high level of religiosity of Nigerian Muslims, which, in situations of worsening socio-economic differences, is in principle fraught with increased extremism and growth of fundamentalism.

The groups were also linked by another circumstance: Yusuf's father began preaching the ideas that Boko Haram had been putting into practice in the 2000s, back in the 1960s, for which he was expelled from Geshua (a settlement in Yobe State) for denouncing Western education by Emir Umar Suleiman, a European-educated man. During the Maitatsine riot in Kano, Yusuf's father arrived to participate in jihad, but was killed in a shootout [Omipidan, 2009, p. 5-6]. That is, Yusuf continued his father's efforts.

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Both organizations had large branches in Kano and Borno, two centers of Mahdism in northern Nigeria, and it was from here that riots spread throughout the region. Bauchi State, where both groups also operated, is strategically located between the two centers.

Maitatsine and Boko Haram activities were mostly confined to northern Nigeria. However, this can be explained by the dominance of Islam in these areas, the presence of the largest part of the country's Muslims and the existence of many radical Islamist groups and moderate tariqas (brotherhoods), which made the region susceptible to extremism, as well as the sharp deterioration of the nomadic pastoral and sedentary agricultural population as a result of desertification and, accordingly, the reduction of fertile land, droughts and This, in turn, provoked an increase in rural-urban migration and an increase in unemployment in both cities and rural areas. Interestingly, the activity of sects had no ethnic coloring. The movements were organized almost exclusively on the basis of their members ' commitment to Islam.

Fighters from both organizations were trained in Niger and Chad, while Boko Haram fighters were also trained in Burkina Faso, Somalia, Mauritania, Algeria and some other countries. Interesting parallels can be drawn between the June 2011 Boko Haram attack on the Abuja police headquarters and the February 2011 attack on a police station in Mogadishu, Somalia by the Somali Islamist organization Al-Shabaab. In both cases, cars filled with explosives, bypassing checkpoints, broke into a supposedly protected area, where they exploded with detonators. Perhaps the assumptions made in the Nigerian press about the activities of groups such as the Salafi Preaching and Struggle Group (Algeria), the Tablighi Jamaat religious organization (Pakistan), Wahhabi Missionaries (Saudi Arabia), as well as representatives of the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda in northern Nigeria are not without reason [Ali, 2009, p. 1; Oyegbile and Lawal, 2009, p. 69; Soboyede, 2009, p. 14].

Both sects saw outsiders as enemies. The indecision or indifference of the central government helped to strengthen the fanatics. But here the differences begin. Marwa's proclamation of himself as a prophet distinguished him from Yusuf, who only called for the strengthening of Islam. Marwa was a reactionary Islamist who called for a return to the past. Yusuf, in contrast, was eager for change. If Marwa was a pawn in the hands of the orthodox "Koranists", Yusuf was a player on the political scene: in addition to serving on the Council for the Introduction of Sharia Law in Borno State, he was involved in several Islamic movements.

Thus, Maitatsine and Boko Haram are fanatical Islamic sects whose faith differs from that of most Nigerian Muslims. Both organizations have waged (and are waging) a war with the State, the intensity of which has almost threatened its security. Both movements were distinguished by careful planning of military operations. However, if for Maitatsine the most active period, when the number of its victims reached about 1000 people, lasted 5-7 years, then Boko Haram achieved the same "results" in the first five days of open demonstrations. Among the reasons for the greater effectiveness of this sect are the good training of militants, the participation of foreign mercenaries, the possession of modern weapons and communications equipment, strict discipline requirements, and support from local politicians.

CENTRAL AUTHORITIES ' RESPONSE TO THE RISE OF TERRORISM

Even before the rise of Maitatsine and later Boko Haram, there were fundamentalist groups in Nigeria - the Shiites (also known as the Islamic Movement of Nigeria), Izala, and others who did not recognize secular authority, but did not resort to violence or rarely resorted to violence. Shia influence on extremist groups

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The Government did not discount these groups, but its response to their activities was weak and indecisive. Apart from the brutal suppression of riots and the creation of commissions to investigate individual terrorist acts, the authorities have not actually taken any steps to resolve the conflict. Moreover, after the Maitatsine riot of 1980 and the trial of the arrested followers of Marva, many of them were released "because of the lack of evidence of their crimes." The last group of 923 people was pardoned on October 1, 1982, and the unrest immediately intensified [Isichei, 1987, p. 197]. After clashes with Boko Haram in 2009, prisons were once again full, and there was a debate about what to do with extremist prisoners, who by this time had become known as terrorists. The militants themselves were sure that if they did not die during the suppression of one rebellion, they would certainly be able to take part in the next. This impunity has contributed to an upsurge in violence and has exacerbated the religious and political crisis in Nigeria.

The spirit of impunity also permeated the structures responsible for security in the country. The commissions of inquiry either did not submit their reports at all, or did not do so on time. The same applies to State investigative and judicial bodies. All this caused the population to feel a deep distrust of the government.

Law enforcement agencies were unable to track the emergence of terrorist organizations and armed gangs, which became a source for recruiting their ranks. There were also problems of poor intelligence funding, inadequate and untimely responses to information provided, outdated tactics to suppress hotbeds of extremism, and unwillingness to expose influential sponsors and patrons of fundamentalists.

The situation changed somewhat after Mr. Jonathan came to power. On July 31, 2011, the Government announced that it planned to start negotiations with Boko Haram. A negotiating committee consisting of 7 members, including the Minister of Defense, was set up and prepared a report on security issues in Borno State. Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo led the talks on behalf of the Government. The dialogue was interrupted after the murder of one of the members of the sect representing it in the negotiations. On January 26, 2012, Jonathan invited Boko Haram to formulate its demands on the Government. On March 14, the organization agreed to negotiate, offering Sheikh Ahmed Datti, the leader of the Supreme Council for Sharia Law in Nigeria, as a mediator, but on March 19, negotiations were stopped [http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-africa-17286020].

As the conflict escalated, the policy of its "peaceful settlement", which was followed by U. Yar'Adua, gave way to tougher measures to combat terrorism. On December 31, 2011, Jonathan declared a state of emergency in several parts of the country. The land borders with Cameroon, Chad and Niger, adjacent to the affected areas, were closed to prevent cross - border terrorist attacks and attacks on Nigerian targets, followed by retreating beyond the reach of the country's law enforcement agencies.

In turn, on January 3, 2012, Boko Haram's representative Abul Kuaka issued an ultimatum giving Christians living in northern Nigeria three days to leave the region. He threatened to commit genocide against Christians if they did not immediately leave some areas. The intentions of the sect's leaders were sharply criticized by representatives of the Islamic clergy, who said that the methods used by the militants are unacceptable and have nothing to do with the precepts set out in the Koran. [http://top.rbc.ru/politics/23/06/2012/656471.shtml].

The intensification of terrorist activities forced the President to raise the issue of personnel and strategic transformation of the security forces responsible for the country's security. So, in June 2012, Minister Oboro was dismissed.-

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New President of Nigeria Bello Mohammed and National Security Adviser to the President Owoye Azazi.

June 21, 2012 The US State Department has designated several members of Boko Haram who organized a series of attacks on Christian churches and had close ties to al-Qaeda-Abubakar Sheko, Abubakar Adam Kambar and Khalid al-Barnawi-as international terrorists and put them on the wanted list, although it did not call the sect a "foreign terrorist Group" (FTG) [Denisova, 2012, p. 439].

In May 2013, Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa and launched a military operation against the Islamists, sending additional troops, including units of the air force. Law enforcement agencies, with the help of American specialists, managed to prevent a number of terrorist attacks; hundreds of militants were arrested. However, the ongoing bombings of Christian churches and the growing number of civilian casualties indicate that the measures taken were insufficient.

It is known that the conflict can be resolved only in a situation where at least one of the parties has reached a dead end, that is, it no longer has either the strength or the means for a military confrontation. As the socio-economic situation in northern Nigeria continues to deteriorate, the number of followers of Boko Haram ("the force") is likely to grow. The same can be said about the "means": Nigerian fundamentalists have already fallen into the sphere of influence of global Islamism, whose role is constantly increasing, which means that they are guaranteed political, military, material and moral support.

In turn, the Nigerian Government has failed to take advantage of the situation in an era of growing terrorist threats and international outrage against extremist groups operating around the world to gain support in uncovering the international connections of Nigerian fundamentalists.

The measures taken by the Nigerian authorities do not correspond in their parameters to the degree of influence of Islamism in the north of the country, nor to the level of threat hanging over the unity of the state. Hasty, superficial and uncoordinated actions of government structures, along with the politicization of religion, hinder the fight against a powerful threat to national security.

list of literature

Denisova T. S. Nigeria after the presidential elections of 2011 / / Year of the Planet: yearbook. Issue 2012: Ekonomika, politika, bezopasnost', Moscow, 2012.

Denisova T. S. Konfliktsii v afrikanskikh stranakh: formirovanie "ekonomiki voiny" [Conflicts in African Countries: Forming the "Economy of war"].
Nigeria. Siravochno-monografichesksskos izdanie, Moscow, Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2013.

Abimbola A. The Boko Haram uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria // Africa Spectrum. 2010. № 2.

Adcsoji Abimola O. Between Maitatsinc and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State // Africa Today. 2011, № 57(4).

Alii Y. Revealed: Boko Haram Leaders Trained in Afghanistan, Algeria // The Nation. August 2009. № 2.

Clarke P. The Maitatsinc Movement in Northern Nigeria in Historical and Current Perspective // New Religious Movement in Nigeria. Lcwiston/Quccnston, 1987.

Crisis Group Africa. Northern Nigeria: Background to conflict. Report № 168, 2010, December 20.

Federal Government of Nigeria. Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry on Kano Disturbance. Lagos, 1981.

Federal Military Government. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Promulgation Decree), № 24 of 1999 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. 1999.

Hickey R. The 1982 Uprisings in Nigeria: A Note // African Affairs. 1984. № 83.

Isichei E. The Maitatsinc Risings in Nigeria, 1980-1985: A Revolt of the Disinherited // Journal of Religion in Africa. 1987. № 17(3).

Madunagu E., Shobiyc H., Chiedozic 1. Wc Did Nothing Wrong, Says Boko Haram Leader in His Last Moments, Group Planned Ramadan Bomb Attack-Borno // The Punch. 5 August 2009.

Omipidan I. Why North Is on Fire // Sunday Sun. 2 August 2009.

Oycgbile O., Lawal A. Shielding Patrons of Boko Haram // Tell. 17 August 2009.

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Soboycdc A. The Boko Haram in All of Them // The Punch. 13 August 2009.

Stock R. Africa South of the Sahara/ A Geographical Interpretation. N.Y., 2004.

Suleiman T. The Plot to Islamisc Nigeria // Tell. 30 November 2009.

Waldck L., Jayasckara S. Boko Haram: the Evolution of Islamist Hxtrcmism in Nigeria // Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism. 2011. Vol. 6. № 2.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/ncws/world-africa-16678098.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/ncws/world-africa-17286020.

http://rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=64958.

http://top.rbc.ru/politics/23/06/2012/656471.shtml.

http://www.unhcr.org/rcfworld/docid/4f6718cc2.html.

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