After the United Nations Military Command in the Congo (ONUC) refused to provide the central Government with transportation facilities for the transfer of national troops to eliminate separatist forces in Katanga in mid-August 1960, a new stage in the political process of the Congo began.

PERSECUTION OF PATRICE LUMUMBA'S GOVERNMENT

Belgium relied on the elimination of the Lumumba government with the assistance of the United States and the United Nations, as well as relying on Congolese leaders loyal to Belgium, primarily J. Kasavuba, A. Kalonji and M. Tshombe. September 5, 1960. President J. Kasavubu announced the removal of P. Lumumba from the post of prime Minister, formed his own government headed by Joseph Ileo and ordered "the immediate arrest of P. Lumumba for inciting the population to overthrow the established government"¹. However, the Parliament of the Congo recognized the actions of J. Kasavubu as illegal and expressed confidence in the Government of Lumumba, who was under house arrest, and at a meeting on September 13, 1960 granted him emergency powers. To prevent Lumumba from exercising these powers, the ONUC command closed the airfields and seized the radio station. UN Secretary-General D. Hammarskjold, in turn, did not allow representatives of the Lumumba government to attend a meeting of the UN Security Council in New York, while at the same time aiding and abetting supporters of Zh. Ileo.

In September 1960, at an extraordinary session of the UN General Assembly, a resolution (A/RES/1474//E-IV) was adopted, in which the Secretary-General was recommended to assist the central Government of the Congo in restoring order in the territory of the Republic of the Congo, ensuring territorial integrity and political independence. Contrary to the decisions of the UN Security Council, D. Hammarskjold did not take appropriate measures. He sought to deprive P. Lumumba of the ability to manage and control the country. In the statement of the USSR delegation to the XV session of the UN General Assembly dated October 21, 1960, it was noted that the command of the UN forces had concluded an agreement with the provincial authorities of Katanga on the division of the so-called "spheres of defense" in this province and regarded this step as contrary to the legitimate government.²

Taking advantage of this situation, on September 14, 1960, the Chief of Staff of the Congolese Army, Colonel Sese Seko Mobutu, launched a coup d'etat. Mobutu's troops occupied the capital city of Leopoldville, paralyzing the government's activities. Following the instructions of Belgian advisers, Mobutu "neutralized" both the Lumumba government and the Kasawubu-Ileo "government", transferring power to the "college of Commissars general". The vagueness of the name of this body, as well as its functions, meant, in fact, the establishment of a puppet regime within the framework of the policy of the United States and Belgium, supported by D. Hammarskjold, aimed at removing P. Lumumba from power.

In response to these actions on the part of Mobutu, the supporters of P. Lumumba moved to the administrative center of the Eastern province of Stanlyville (modern day). Kisangani). On December 12, 1960, this city was declared the seat of the central Government and the temporary capital of the republic. During the absence of P. Lumumba, the cabinet was headed by his deputy Antoine Gizenga. Thus, the situation in the country has become even more complicated. As La Libre Belgique noted, "at that moment there were three Congos, three armies, three governments in Leopoldville, Elizabethville, and Stanlyville. The strategy of the politicians of each of them was to crush one opposition to another. " ³

Such a "triple power" could not last long. Mobutu, with the support of the United States, prepared a plan to eliminate the country's patriotic forces stationed in Stanlyville. The movement in support of a charismatic leader, such as P. Lumumba, inspired his political opponents with obvious fears. As a springboard for the attack, neighboring Rwanda-Urundi, which was under the guardianship of Belgium, was used. At the same time, the UN command did not prevent the airlift of Mobutu troops from Luluaburg (present-day Kananga) to Rwanda-Urundi on December 31, 1960. Although this operation failed, Mobutu and his supporters showed a desire to act by force, regardless of the opinion of sensible politicians.

In solidarity with the fighters for the true independence of the Congo, a group of African countries, including Morocco, the UAR, Ghana, Mali, Guinea and Algeria, convened a conference in Casablanca in early January 1961, which adopted a resolution in support of the legitimate Government of the Congo. In February 1961, at a meeting of the UN Security Council convened at the request of Ceylon, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, the SAR and Yugoslavia, the situation in the Congo was again on the agenda. During the meeting, it was noted that the UN's actions do not contribute to stabilization in the country and thereby undermine the international authority of this organization.

However, neither the UN Secretary-General nor the Western governments listened to the opinion of African countries. Moreover, they connived at the collusion of the authorities of Leopoldville and Elizabethville, which resulted in the assassination of the political leader of the Congo P. Lumumba on January 17, 1961. As defined by the Director of the CIA

Ending. For the beginning, see "Asia and Africa Today", 2010, No. 1.

According to A. Dulles, Lumumba "was like Castro or even worse." ⁴

5^{History has failed to justify the murder of P. Lumumba and his associates. Almost half a century later, the central Congolese newspaper Le Potanciel wrote:: "The murders that took place between 1960 and 1970 concerned the best African politicians. They were orchestrated by Western colonialists for a clear and precise purpose: to decapitate Africa and make it a victim of Francophones, who could turn this state into a ghost ship, devoid of purpose and shelter."}

The time of P. Lumumba has sunk irrevocably into oblivion, but his tragic fate still concerns people. Ludo de Witt, in the aforementioned book (see the beginning of the article in No. 1, 2010), written on the basis of the archives of the United States and Belgium, writes: "The CIA documents allow us to conclude that too many people were involved in the upcoming plot against Lumumba."⁶ The murder, he said, was committed as a result of coordinated actions by the American and Belgian governments. The initiative came from Washington. At that time, two contradictory messages were sent from the CIA to the US Embassy in the Congo. One official statement calling for the end of all initiatives concerning P. Lumumba. Another secret message that was intended personally for Larry Delvan, the head of the American residency in Leopoldville: "Do not follow the official message in any case" and that the "operation" should be accelerated. To carry out the "operation" of the CIA, it was decided to attract a professional assassin. This man, recruited by the Belgian security services, "Agent QJWIN", arrived in the Congo before the planned escape of P. Lumumba from Kinshasa. But it was withdrawn due to Mobutu's actions in detaining the national leader. From mid-October 1960, the initiative again passed to the CIA. High-level negotiations are underway between Brussels and Washington, and in January 1961, the coordination of actions is reinforced within the framework of NATO.

The Pentagon insists that the Keaton and Kamin military bases remain in Allied hands. By the beginning of 1961, the number of ONUC troops in the Congo (25,000) exceeded that of the National Congolese Army.⁷

The new facts and names that surfaced caused a lot of noise at the beginning of this decade, and a real scandal broke out in political circles in Brussels, prompting the creation of a commission to investigate the charges. At the end of 2001, the Belgian parliamentary commission, having found no evidence that it was Brussels that ordered the murder of P. Lumumba, recognized only the" moral responsibility " of the former metropolis for this atrocity. The clarity of the wording was not very consistent with the facts presented in the report, for example, about direct intervention of Belgium in the internal affairs of the Congo or the recruitment and dispatch of mercenaries there. Although Belgian Prime Minister Marc Eiskens, the son of former Prime Minister G. Eiskens, noted about the new investigation that "this is an incomplete and one-sided report, which only partially restores the truth" ⁸.

Such smoothing of sharp corners has become an object of criticism in the world press. For example, the New York Times wrote that the atrocity was not committed without the participation of Belgian officers who were in the service of the CIA, and therefore Belgium cannot escape moral responsibility. V. G. Solodovnikov, a participant of the XV session of the UN General Assembly (in 1960), wrote on this occasion: "Belgium, with the support of the United States, interfered in the internal affairs of the Congo (Zaire). They opposed the legitimate government headed by P. Lumumba, who, with the support of their special services, was not only removed from power, but also killed.9

A year later, the wording changed and became more precise. In 2002, the Belgian Foreign Minister, L. Michel, delivered a speech in Parliament in which he expressed "deep and sincere regret" to the DRC Government "that some members of the Government and ordinary Belgians of that time were responsible for the death of Patrice Lumumba"¹⁰and announced the establishment of the Lumumba Foundation with a capital of $ 3.25 million. United States dollars. The sons of P. Lumumba, Francois and Rolland, who were present at the meeting, behaved nobly. They said they were ready to close this sad page of history.

KATANGA IS BACK ON THE AGENDA

Rich in natural resources, Katanga, which was included in the calculations of almost all former metropolises and the United States, was not quite an amorphous body, as it might seem. Its leader, M. Tshombe, who had a gendarmerie and police, agitated the Katangans to resist. In clashes with UN soldiers, the initiative sometimes went to his side. So, in September 1961, the Indian General Raja, who led the Blue Helmets contingent during Operation Morton (translated from Hindi - "final throw"), was forced to recognize the resilience of the Congolese. A single Katanga plane, a small Fuga Magister, "hurled bombs left and right," striking UN positions and terrifying its soldiers. " ¹¹

D. Hammarskjold, dissatisfied with the course of affairs in the province, decided to personally hold talks with M. Tshombe. The meeting was scheduled for September 17, 1961, in Idola, Rhodesia (now Zambia). But it did not take place.

According to one version, the plane with Hammarskjold on board was shot down, presumably, by a"volunteer" pilot from the Tshombe service. An international commission established later to investigate the circumstances concluded that the cause of the crash was, most likely, a malfunction in the landing gear exhaust system and erroneous actions of the pilots in a critical situation. There are other guesses. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which investigated crimes committed in South Africa under apartheid, made another sensational announcement in 1998. The chairman of this commission, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, after the final meeting of the TRC in Cape Town, told reporters that when studying one of the cases, "there were

accidentally discovered papers that relate to the death of the Swede Daag Hammarskjold"¹². The documents found allegedly confirm the involvement of the special services of South Africa, the United States and Great Britain in the plane crash that killed the UN Secretary-General at that time. If you believe these data, the aircraft was doomed to death - before departure, saboteurs planted an explosive device in it. However, a representative of the Swedish Embassy in Pretoria said that his government has no information about the plot, and the US and British diplomatic missions in South Africa, in turn, categorically denied the involvement of their special services.

Meanwhile, a "cunning Burmese diplomat"¹³, U Tan, was elected head of the UN, and the UN Security Council instructed him to take measures to prevent the crisis in Katanga. The head of civil operations ONYUK M. Hiari held talks with M. Chombe. They ended with the signing of an armistice agreement. But it was soon broken. At the end of 1961, military operations began again in Katanga.

The Congolese Parliament met in Leopoldville and elected a government headed by Cyril Adula. A. Gizenga became Deputy Prime Minister. This did not correspond to the alignment of political forces within the country, since S. Adula, who represented the "moderate" parties, enjoyed less authority in the country than A. Gizenga, and was also seen in behind-the-scenes negotiations with leaders of opposition groups in neighboring countries, in particular in Angola. Nevertheless, with the formation of the Adula-Gizenga Government, a kind of compromise between African countries, an opportunity was opened for a peaceful solution to the Congolese issue. This did not suit the United States and other NATO countries. They sought to create a more "right-wing" government with the participation of Katangese separatists.

In connection with the critical situation in the Congo, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 5002 of November 24, 1961, in which it condemned the separatist activities illegally carried out by the Katanga administration with the help of foreign mercenaries; recognized dangerous and unacceptable armed actions against UN troops and personnel; invited the UN Secretary-General to take measures to prevent the import of weapons, equipment and materials to support such activities. But those to whom it was addressed did not seem to be in a hurry. The letter of the USSR Permanent Representative to the UN V. A. Zorin to the President of the UN Security Council dated January 25, 1962 noted that there was no real progress in the implementation of this resolution, and, most likely, it is a matter of collusion of interested parties to ensure their interests in the Congo.¹⁴

There really was such a collusion. During a meeting in Bermuda in December 1961, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of England reached a gentleman's agreement, according to which England and Belgium were to abandon plans for an open secession of Katanga and support the American plan to turn the Congo into a federation. The result of this compromise was an agreement in Quito between S. Adula and M. Tshombe, who promised to recognize the central authority provided that a federal constitution of the Congo was drawn up. Tshombe, like Adula, went along with this agreement without much enthusiasm, succumbing to US pressure.

The agreements reached in Bermuda were continued in January 1962 in Brussels, where the former US Ambassador to Belgium, Admiral A. Kirk, arrived for negotiations. He was the head of the Belgen-American Development Corporation, a company created by representatives of the Bank of America financial group and the Belgian Societe Generale, which owned a stake in Union Minier in the Congo. A. Kirk's tasks included plans to persuade the "Union Minier" to support the Keaton Agreement. Later, discussions were held with the Adula Government to divide a portion of the proceeds of the Yunon Minier between the recognized Government of the Congo and the Katanga authorities.

Along with the US-Belgian consultations, the US-British negotiations on the Congolese issue were conducted. In January 1962, a meeting of representatives of the United States and England was held in Washington, as a result of which the parties agreed to create a coalition government of Adula-Tshombe on the basis of the Keaton Agreement.

However, the implementation of this agreement faced opposition from French diplomacy, which developed its own approaches to resolving the Congolese problem, which were supposed to be implemented in long-term custody of the Congo. There was also the so-called "U Tan plan" to transform the Congo into a federation, taking into account the requirements of M. Tshombe.

The situation in the eastern Congo region remained critical. Negotiations between the Leopoldville and Katanga authorities to restore the unity of the Congo were difficult. Katanga has become a hotbed of permanent clashes between the Katanga gendarmerie and UN troops using tanks and artillery. Having found himself practically under military occupation, M. Tshombe was no longer capable of further resistance. As a result, on January 14, 1963, "independent" Katanga again became part of the Republic of the Congo. With the help of French advisers in neighboring Congo (Brazzaville), Tshombe was temporarily transferred to France, and then to Spain for "treatment". About 15 thousand Katangese gendarmes refused to lay down their weapons and took refuge on the territory of Angola ¹⁵.

The issue of Katanga came up unexpectedly in 2005, during the run-up to the country's first democratic elections in the DRC. The son of the rebellious Moiz Tshombe, Andre Tshombe, began to demand the separation of Katanga, claiming leadership in this province. Local media tried to "inflate" the conflict that had barely begun, but the sensation did not work out. The statement of the" new " Tshombe was not taken seriously either in government circles of the DRC, in business circles, or among the diplomatic corps in Kinshasa. At the same time, the former "Katanga gendarmes"declared themselves already of advanced age. They applied to the security agencies of the DRC with a request to accept them into the ranks of the DRC Armed Forces as veterans of the Congolese army.

Katanga's return to the Republic of the Congo did not mean national reconciliation. The country was still in a deep political and economic crisis. Anti-government protests began. In the fall of 1963, a conference of patriotic forces was held in Leopoldville and the National Liberation Committee was established. At the end of 1963, a large rebel army was formed in Kwilu province, led by P. Mulele, an associate of Lumumba, who launched military operations in the south-west of the country. In early 1964, in the east of the country, in the provinces of North Katanga and Kivu, Sumialo, also an associate of Lumumba, created a second rebel army, which led offensives in the southern, where the Belgian air base was located, and in the northern directions. A third front has emerged in the Equatorial Province. By the summer of 1964, almost the entire country was engulfed in civil war.

In connection with the events in the Congo, the USSR mission to the UN issued a statement saying: "It does not take much insight to see the true reasons for this situation in the Congo. ...As in the years of colonial rule in Belgium, in the Congo there is an endless stream of all sorts of military, economic and other mercenaries of foreign monopolies who have gained a hand in colonial robbery and robbery... News has spread all over the world that US Central Intelligence Agency mercenaries are being used for punitive operations against Congolese patriots. Apparently, the colonial and military departments of the Western powers would like to use the Congo as a kind of springboard for practicing their planned new colonial operations against other freedom-loving peoples of Africa."¹⁶

At this time, due to the new alignment of political forces in the country, the Americans "returned" M. Tshombe from Spain to Leopoldville as a "champion" for national unity. The former Katangese separatist led a "transitional government" surrounded by Belgian and French advisers. At the same time, he began to strengthen the power bloc, relying on loyal Katanga gendarmes who had returned from Angola, and various kinds of mercenaries.

The" feeding " of military personnel and related instructions came from the permanent military commission established by the United States in the Congo shortly before these events. Military equipment, weapons and equipment were provided by Belgium, the United States, Germany and Portugal to support the puppet regime of M. Tshombe.

The National Congolese Army, led by General Mobutu, was in need of a major reorganization at that time. It was assumed that Belgium, Italy, Israel, Norway and Canada would retrain ground, air and parachute units, as well as the fleet and communications, and the United States would equip them.

The situation was further complicated by the fact that ON June 30, 1964, the withdrawal of ONUC troops from the territory of the Congo was scheduled, which to some extent could have played the role of a deterrent in the confrontation of internal opposition forces. However, no one insisted on the presence of UN units and participation in the settlement of the conflict. The mission to stabilize the situation was taken over by Belgian and American military advisers.

To contain the onslaught of insurgents in the area of the Kamina military base, a brigade was formed in August 1964, mainly consisting of Belgian officers, police detachments and the Katanga gendarmerie. After defeating the rebels in the eastern region of the Congo, their efforts were aimed at capturing Stanlyville, the cradle of Congolese democracy. On November 24, 1964, Belgian paratroopers using the British base on Ascension Island in the Atlantic Ocean and American Air Force aircraft landed at Stanleyville. A few hours later, they were joined by groups of mercenaries and Katanga soldiers who destroyed rebel positions in Katanga. The military offices of the Embassies of the United States and Belgium were the headquarters for coordinating military operations. The massacre of the rebels caused a wave of partisan movement, which lasted until 1968.

Against the backdrop of military upheavals and social disasters, Leopoldville was in a tough battle for leadership. Despite all the attempts and foreign aid, M. Tshomba failed to stay in power. Its main opponent was the "Congolese Democratic Front", created within the framework of the" Congolese National Army " (KPA) in October 1965, which actively maintained ties with the intelligence services of Western countries. By this time, the KPA had become stronger and more disciplined.

On the night of November 24-25, 1965, Lieutenant-General Sese Seko Mobutu, who rose from the position of correspondent of the newspaper "Avenir" to supreme commander, carried out a new coup d'etat, establishing a military dictatorship in the country for many years.

^{Heinz G., Donnay H.} 1 Lumumba Patrice: Les cinquante derniers jours de sa vie. Bruxelles. 1966, p. 33.

² Statement of the USSR delegation / / Pravda. 23.10.1960.

^{Kestergat Jean.} 3 Juillet 60: de mutineries en secessions - См.: Congo - Zaire. GRIP, Bruxelles, 1989, p. 70.

⁴ Jeune Afrique. Tunis, 05.12.1975.

⁵ Le Potentiel. Kinshasa, 15.01.2009.

⁶ Un complot des gouvernements americain... 17.02.2009 - www.ptb.be/scripts/article.phtml?lang=2&obid+6419

⁷ Cit. by: Subbotin V. A. From the declaration of independence to the death of Patrice Lumumba (see ch. 4, p. 220-Asia and Africa Today, 2010, N 1).

^{Braeckman Colette.} 8 Congo apres la Commission Lumumba. 17.02.2009 http://users.sskynet.be/wihogora/lumumba-lsoir-191101.htm

^{Solodovnikov V. T.} 9 At the XV Session of the UN General Assembly in 1960 / / Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, 2006, No. 6.

¹⁰ The New York Times. 06.02.2002.

^{Kestergat Jean.} 11 Op.cit, p. 73.

¹² Nevskoe vremya, N 154 (1796), 26.08.1998.

¹³ Ibid., p. 74.

¹⁴ Pravda, 28.01.1962.

¹⁵ Cit. by: Subbotin V. A. (see sn. 4, p. 230-Asia and Africa Today, 2010, n 1).

¹⁶ Pravda, 7.07.1964.

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