Keywords: Africa, least developed countries, poverty, unemployment, migration, brain drain

Despite significant economic growth in many of the least developed countries (LDCs) in Africa over the past decade, these countries remain on the sidelines of global progress in terms of basic indicators of social development (per capita income, poverty, unemployment, health, education, etc.), causing increasing concern to the international community. There is also a significant lag in the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set out in the 2000 UN Declaration.

But this does not mean that Africa has not made some progress.

Most African LDCs are moving at different rates, but they are making progress towards achieving the MDGs, and many of them have made significant progress in combating malnutrition, increasing primary education coverage, and improving a number of health indicators. However, the problems of poverty, maternal mortality and unemployment remain extremely acute in all the least developed countries, the vast majority of which are located in Africa.

An analysis of the data (see Table 1) leads to a disappointing conclusion: the level of key human development indicators in LDCs at the end of the first decade of this century was lower than that achieved by developing countries 20 years ago.

poverty

As noted earlier, during the so - called boom years (2000-2007), Africa's LDCs grew at an average rate of more than 7% per year, which was even higher than the pan-African rate (about 5%). However, this impressive increase has had little impact on the extent of poverty in these countries and has even exacerbated social inequalities, especially between rural and urban populations. The fight against poverty remains one of the most pressing social development challenges in Africa. The main characteristic of poverty in LDCs is its massive and chronic nature: in 2007, 53% of the population of these countries lived on an income of less than $1.25 per day, and 78% - less than $2 per day. This means that, after seven years of sustained economic growth, 420 million LDC residents were still living in extreme poverty. Moreover, UNC-TAD estimates that even during this period, the number of poor people in LDCs actually grew by more than 3 million ^per year1. The fact is that after a long period of negative economic growth (1970s-1990s), LDCs entered the third millennium with the level of per capita GDP in the early 1970s. Although GDP per capita in these countries grew significantly in real terms in the 2000s, the gap between LDCs and other developing countries continued to widen. The number of people living in extreme poverty in LDCs is expected to reach 439 million by 2015, compared with the MDG target of 255 million.²

Extreme poverty is most acute in African LDCs (59% of the population vs. 41% in Asian LDCs).³. Almost 60% of the population of these sub-Saharan countries live on less than $1.25 a day. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is the only region where the number of people living in extreme poverty is constantly growing, from 290 million in 1990 to 414 million in 2010, representing more than a third of the world's poor. The World Bank predicts that by 2015, SSA will account for 40% of the population in all developing countries living in extreme poverty.⁴

With regard to MDG implementation, it is in achieving the first and main MDG - halving the proportion of people with incomes below $1.25 per day-that African LDCs, as well as SSA countries in general, lag most behind. At the same time, progress is clear at the global level, and,

Ending. For the beginning, see: Asia and Africa today. 2013, N 11.

Table 1

Comparative MDG implementation rates in LDCs and developing countries

Source: UNCTAD / PB / 2011 / 8 (N 20/E. May 2011).

According to the UN MDG Report 2013, the MDG target of halving poverty has been met ^{five years ahead of schedule in the world as a whole (2015), from 47% in 1990 to 22% in 2010.5}

Thus, poverty remains a key obstacle to social development in Africa's LDCs. Its eradication is a long-term challenge that depends primarily on the ability of these countries to maintain the high growth rates achieved for a significant part of the previous decade. There is also a need to actively address the factors that contribute to the spread of extreme poverty: poor health and lack of education, which deprive people of productive work; depletion or mismanagement of natural resources; and corruption, conflict, and poor governance, which lead to waste of public resources and discourage private investors.

With regard to the fight against hunger, although many African LDCs have recently experienced a decline in malnutrition rates, this positive trend is threatened by rising global food prices (just recall the sharp jump in prices in 2008), periodic natural disasters (droughts, floods, etc.), as well as those that have not yet been overcome consequences of the global crisis. The proportion of the population in Africa with a caloric intake below the minimum allowable limit has generally decreased from 30% to 24%, with the exception of North Africa, where this proportion is less than 5% of the population. In the least developed countries of Africa, however, about 34% of the population is undernourished, which is twice as high as in other developing countries (16%) and almost one and a half times as high as it was two decades ago (1990)^.6

It is poverty that is one of the main factors determining the extent of hunger and the lack of adequate access to food. Low-income households tend to spend the vast majority of their income on food, and most of them, including many small farmers, are net food buyers. The inability to consume sufficient food affects productivity and the ability of people suffering from malnutrition to earn the income they need to support themselves, thereby further squeezing the grip of poverty.⁷

EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT

Poverty reduction cannot be achieved without full, productive and decent employment for all. However, the situation in this area in all countries of the continent, including the least developed countries, has been one of the most acute and intractable problems for several decades. Huge losses-

Table 2

Share of vulnerable employed and working poor in LDCs (% of total employment)

Источник: Growth, Employment and Decent Work in the Least Developed Countries. ILO. Geneva, 2011, p. 8, 9.

the headquarters of unemployment, informal and precarious employment, and working poverty have no analogues in other regions of ^the world8.

Despite impressive economic growth rates in the 2000s, the overall unemployment rate in African LDCs in 2011, although it declined compared to 2000, remained at the highest level (7% of the labor force) for the group of countries under consideration (all LDCs -5.7%, Asian countries-4.1%).⁹. This means that the significant economic growth achieved by many of Africa's LDCs over the past decade has not been accompanied by an increase in employment in high-performance and labour-intensive sectors of the economy (such as manufacturing), but mainly in the low-productive informal services sector and extractive industries. As a result, these countries have not been able to create enough decent jobs for their fast-growing working-age populations. As noted in the Istanbul Programme of Action adopted at the last United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries (2011), improvements in economic performance in most least developed countries have had little effect in terms of job creation and, consequently, poverty reduction. Despite the importance of the unemployment indicator, it is not sufficient to take into account this indicator alone, defined as the share of unemployed persons in the labor force, in order to comprehensively assess the unemployment rate in Africa's LDCs. We are talking about full or so-called open unemployment, which includes only those who are registered on the labor exchange as unemployed. However, in Africa, labor exchanges do not exist everywhere, and where they do exist, they do not cover all those who need work, especially in rural areas. Often, the work of the poor is irregular with low levels of productivity and wages, which does not fall under the strict definition of unemployment. In view of this, all estimates of total unemployment tend to be grossly underestimated. ¹⁰

It seems that it is more appropriate to use indicators of official unemployment, which are generally low in developing countries where poor people cannot afford not to work at all and seek any means of livelihood (in particular, in the informal economy), rather than indicators of employment opportunities (or rather lack of them). vulnerable employment and the "working poor" * (see Table 2).

As can be seen from table 2, the majority of the population of LDCs, including Africa, is classified by the ILO as unprotected or vulnerable (Africa has the highest percentage).

These are self - employed workers who work in unsafe and unstable jobs in the informal sector, and unpaid family workers. Vulnerable employment means the absence of labor agreements, social guarantees, low wages, and work in dangerous conditions. Everywhere, the share of vulnerable employment among women is significantly higher than among men. Thus, in 2009, the share of unprotected employment among women reached almost 90% in LDCs in Africa and 85.2% in Asia, compared with the same indicators for men (75.2 and 78.3%, respectively).¹¹.

As for the working poor (in LDCs, this category includes those with incomes below $1.25 a day), Africa also has the largest number of them-126 million people, or 63.7% of the total employed population (10% more than in Asia). At the same time, the dynamics of the share of the working poor over the past decade shows its decline, albeit at a slow pace (74.4% in 2000)¹².

The global financial and economic crisis has further exacerbated the employment situation in African LDCs. Due to the reduction of jobs, all

* The concept of "working poor" was first introduced at the 87th Session of the International Labour Confederation (ILC) in 1999.

more Africans were forced to accept unsafe and precarious jobs and join the ranks of the working poor. At the same time, as of 2011, unemployment among women was higher than among men (7.5% and 6.3%), and among young people it was twice as high as among adults (10.5% and 5.3%). Thus, women and young people have taken the brunt of the crisis, and so far, according to ILO experts, there are no real prospects for improving the situation in the foreseeable future.

The problem of employment is closely linked to demographic and structural factors. Let's note some of them.

In terms of population growth, LDCs are far ahead of all other countries in the world. Thus, in 2011, the corresponding growth rate of 2.2% was about twice that of other developing countries (1.2%) and five times that of developed countries (0.4%). Furthermore, since almost 60% of the LDC population is under the age of 25, the number of young people entering the labour market each year is constantly increasing. By 2050, the largest increase in the working-age population is expected in African LDCs, in particular in the DRC, Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania, where this growth will exceed ¹ million people per year13.

The vast majority (about 70%) of the economically active population of Africa's LDCs is engaged in agriculture, where labor productivity is very low and the size of farms is small, which forces many rural residents to involve environmentally vulnerable land in economic turnover. In its current state, the agricultural sector of the continent's least developed countries is unable to provide productive employment for the ever-growing working-age population. This forces villagers, mostly men, to move to urban areas in search of work.

As already noted, manufacturing and services in the cities of most LDCs are not able to provide sufficient productive employment opportunities for rural migrants. As a result, the majority of Africans, mostly young, who migrate to cities in search of work, find it in the informal sector with its low level of productivity, low and irregular earnings, and lack of social protection. The paradox is that thousands of migrants are trying to escape rural poverty and unemployment, adding to the already huge army of urban beggars and vulnerable workers. Thus, the latent overpopulation of the countryside turns into apparent unemployment or underemployment in the city.

MIGRATION

In addition to internal population migration (mainly from rural areas to cities), there is a wide range of voluntary and forced cross-border and transcontinental movements ^of people14.

According to UNCTAD experts, population migration in African LDCs is mainly an intraregional phenomenon, often forced, in contrast to Asian countries, where economic motives for migration prevail.¹⁵

A high level of forced migration to neighboring African states is associated with significant movements of refugees (during various conflicts, natural disasters, etc.), for which distance becomes a critical factor. In addition, the higher mobility of migrants within the region, compared to the rest of the developing world, is partly due to the large number of land borders, which move over small distances and in most cases are not controlled in any way.

Thus, African refugees now represent a significant, though declining, share of the total number of migrants living in LDCs. After peaking at 44% in 1995, their share of the total number of migrants in LDCs has fallen sharply, as a result of the reduction in the number and severity of conflicts, political tensions and instability, as well as improvements in the functioning of public authorities in many countries of the continent.

Voluntary migration outside the country to African LDCs is driven by the same reasons as domestic migration: seeking employment opportunities to generate income and improve living standards. Most of the movements take the form of temporary (seasonal or circular) migration: the migrant remains a member of the household, sending money transfers home.

African migrant workers move from country to country, from one sub-region to another within the continent. The bulk of these migrants are unskilled agricultural workers, as well as workers in the mining industry. As in the case of forced mass migration, voluntary labor migration causes countries of origin to lose significant human and financial capital.

Where do migration flows from African LDCs go? According to available data, about 80% of migrants from all LDCs migrate within the South

(South-South migration), with LDCs and other developing countries becoming the main destination countries. However, while people in Asian and Pacific LDCs are more likely to migrate to non-LDC countries, the main migration corridors of African LDCs are located in Africa itself. (The exception is Sudan, where 34% of migrants go to countries in the Middle East, mainly Saudi Arabia and Yemen.)

According to UNCTAD data, 42% of all LDC migrants lived in Africa in 2010, with the proportion of African migrants being the highest among migrants living in other LDCs. The main sources of migration among LDCs were SSA countries such as DRC, Sudan, Eritrea, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Senegal, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Niger, Chad, Central African Republic and some others.¹⁶ In most cases, these countries were also destinations for migrants from neighbouring LDCs.

"BRAIN DRAIN"

As for the migration of highly skilled professionals, the so-called brain drain, the majority of migrants from LDCs who have completed higher (usually university) education at home migrate to developed countries (South-North migration). These are primarily doctors, engineers, scientists, managers, and lawyers. At the regional level, the main sources of brain drain from LDCs are Asia (45.9% of all migrants with higher education) and Africa (40.4%)^.17

The main drivers of the brain drain are higher incomes, favorable working conditions, and professional growth prospects in the host country*. Unfavorable political or economic conditions in the country of origin and selective immigration policies of developed countries to attract foreign educated personnel also contribute to the spread of this phenomenon.¹⁸

In 2000 (the latest year for which relevant data are available for LDCs), the share of highly skilled migrants accounted for a quarter of the total number of migrants from LDCs, which is 11 times higher than their share among the economically active population of these countries (2.3%)^.19 An estimated 1.3 million people with university degrees left LDCs by 2000 (including more than half a million from African LDCs), and the number has continued to grow since then, now approaching 2 million. ²⁰

Almost two-thirds of all highly skilled migrants from LDCs settle in developed countries (25% of them in the United States, followed by Canada, the United Kingdom and France), and a third - in other developing countries (these are usually oil - exporting countries or neighboring States). North America accounts for approximately one third of highly skilled migrants from Africa's LDCs. Other destinations for African migrants are Western European countries (mainly the United Kingdom, France and Belgium, and in recent years Spain) and, to a lesser extent, other developing African countries (mainly Ivory Coast, South Africa and Kenya).²¹.

At the regional level, the problem of brain drain is most acute in African and Pacific LDCs, as well as in Haiti. In 21 of the 34 LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa, more than 20% of highly qualified personnel live abroad. In two of them (Gambia and Sierra Leone), the number of such specialists working abroad exceeds their number at home, while in eight others (Liberia, Eritrea, Somalia, Rwanda, Uganda, Mozambique, Togo and Guinea-Bissau) 30% of highly qualified specialists live abroad. Most of these countries are post-conflict States22.

The brain drain from Africa's LDCs is fraught with serious adverse consequences for them. First of all, it leads to a reduction in the accumulated human capital in these countries, which can lead to (and does lead to) reduced economic growth and labor productivity, as well as a decline in science, technology and innovation. At the same time, the" brain drain " is particularly acute in sectors that are in dire need of qualified personnel, primarily in the areas of health, education and research.

Paradoxically, it is a fact that Africa's LDCs, which have the lowest number of doctors in relation to the population, have the highest rates of "brain drain" among medical professionals in the world (according to some Western researchers, the median level of such leakage for Africa is 39% ).²³. This tends to lead to higher infant and child mortality rates, lower levels and quality of health care, and a weakening of national health systems.

Because of the "brain drain", the state in the LDC is deprived of taxes that highly qualified specialists could pay if they stayed to work in their homeland. In addition, the software is numerous-

* For example, according to UNCTAD data, the pay gap for highly qualified professionals in developed countries and LDCs is sometimes 20 times larger [The Least Developed Countries Report 2012. UNCTAD. N.Y. and Geneva, 2012, p. 88].

Evidence suggests that the country's training costs are not offset by the remittances they send from abroad. ²⁴ Finally, the departure of the most skilled workers undermines the institutional development opportunities of LDCs.

Thus, the ongoing migration of skilled workers from African LDCs has become a major challenge to their socio-economic development, while complicating the implementation of many of the MDGs. For example, a significant obstacle in the fight against HIV/There is still a shortage of doctors, nurses and municipal workers in many African countries, and the distribution of aid and benefits during famines and epidemics often required the involvement of foreign qualified personnel due to a lack of in-house staff.

Recently, the question has been increasingly raised in Western international circles: is it possible to turn the "brain drain" from LDCs into an"influx of minds"? While concerns remain about the negative effects of brain drain, the focus of recent discussions has increasingly shifted to how to engage with the diaspora and maximize its potential contribution to the development of LDCs, thus turning the brain drain into an influx of them.

Relatively more developed LDCs, in terms of structural transformation and growth, tend to find it easier to achieve the voluntary return of skilled migrants, who then set up new businesses and introduce economic and social innovations in the fields of science, health, education, services and industry (such examples are already available in Burkina Faso and Uganda). However, the use of diaspora opportunities is not automatic. The ability to tap into its potential depends on a range of institutional, economic and political conditions that are still lacking in most of Africa's LDCs. In this regard, policy responses from countries of origin and host countries, as well as the international community, play a critical role in developing and strengthening the positive impact of diasporas on LDCs. The key to the success of these measures is the mobilization and coordination of all stakeholders (at the bilateral, regional and international levels) to enhance international cooperation on migration and development in LDCs.

In general, turning the "brain drain" into its "influx" in African LDCs is a very distant future. According to the famous Indian scholar J. R. R. Tolkien,Bhagwati, who has long dealt with the issue of brain drain from developing countries, said that" the return of specialists from the diaspora will begin as soon as positive changes take place in African countries, such as the mass return of Indians to India has now begun. "²⁵

One cannot disagree with this opinion. The brain drain from Africa's LDCs is likely to continue to increase in the coming years, driven by both internal and external factors.

¹ The Least Developed Countries Report 2010. UNCTAD. N.Y. and Geneva. 2010, p. 3.

² The Least Developed Countries Report 2011.., 2011, p. iv.

³ Ibidem.

⁴ The Millennium Development Goals Report 2013. UN, N.Y., 2013, p. 7

⁵ Ibid., p. 4.

⁶ Poverty Reduction and Progress towards MDGs in the LDCs: Encouraging Signs but Much Remains to be Done. Unctad/PB/2011/8 (N20/E. May 2011).

⁷ The Millennium Development Goals Report 2013.., p. 10 - 11.

^{Abramova I. O.} 8 Rynok truda v stranakh Afrika: kachestvennye i kachestvennye kharakteristiki [Labor market in African countries: quantitative and qualitative characteristics]. 2013, N 4, с. 152 - 157. (Abramova I.O. Rynok truda v stranakh Azii i Afriki: kolichestvennye i kachestvennye kharakteristiki // Problemy sovremennoy ekonomiki. 2013, N 4) (in Russian)

⁹ Growth, Employment and Decent Work in the Least Developed Countries. ILO, Geneva. 2011, p. 7.

^{Bragina E. A.} 10 Invisible labor in the economy of Asian and African countries. 2013, N 11, с. 53 - 61. (Bragina E.A. Nevidimy trud v ekonomike stran Azii i Afriki // World Economy and International Relations. 2013, N 11 (in Russian)

¹¹ Growth, Employment and Decent Work in the Least Developed Countries.., p. 9.

¹² Ibid., p. 8.

¹³ The Least Developed Countries Report 2013.., 2013, p. 4.

^{Abramova I. O.} 14 African migration: a regional issue or a global problem? // Problems of the modern economy. 2007, N 4, pp. 86-93. (Abramova I.O. Afrikanskaya migratsiya: regionalny vopros ili globalnaya problema? // Problem sovremennoy ekonomiki. 2007, N 4) (in Russian); Gromova O. B. Migrations in Africa / / Asia and Africa Today. 2008, N 4, с. 15 - 22. (Gromova O.B. Migratsii v Afrike // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. 2008, N 4) (in Russian)

¹⁵ The Least Developed Countries Report 2012..; 2012, p. 28.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 91.

^{Runov B. B.} 18 Sub-Saharan Africa: features of the problem of brain drain / / Asia and Africa today. 2006, N 2, с. 43 - 47. (Runov B.B. Subsakharskaya Afrika: osobennosti problemy utechki umov // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. 2006, N 2) (in Russian)

¹⁹ The Least Developed Countries Report 2012.., 2012, p. viii.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 90.

²¹ Ibid., p. 92; Abramova I. O. Spain - a new center of attraction for African migrants / / Asia and Africa today. 2010, N 6, с. 18 - 24. (Abramova I.O. Ispaniya - novy tsentr prityazheniya afrikanskikh migrantov // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. 2010, N 6) (in Russian)

²² The Least Developed Countries Report 2012.., 2012, p. 94, 117.

²³ Ibid., p. 101.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 106; Abramova I. O. Money transfers of migrants: the role in the socio-economic development of Africa. 2009, N 7, с. 82 - 90. (Abramova I.O. Denezhnyeperevody migrantov: rol v sotsialno-economicheskom razvitii Afriki // World Economy and International Relations. 2009, N 7) (in Russian)

^{Bhagwati Jnr} 25 It is time for rethinking / / Finance and Development. The IMF. September 2010, p. 15.

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