history of international regional organizations provides a basis for making forecasts. This becomes especially relevant in connection with the epidemic of mass socio-political protests that unfolded in most Arab countries in late 2010 and early 2011. The subsequent reaction of the international community and splits within the ruling elites of the Maghreb and Middle East states led to significant internal political transformations in Tunisia and Egypt. In these circumstances, the League of Arab States (LAS), established more than half a century ago, is undergoing a serious "test of strength".

Keywords: Arab League, Egypt, Nahhas Pasha, Greater Syria, Fertile Crescent.

October 7, 1944 at the Antoniades Palace (Alexandria, Egypt) Representatives of the five Arab States that participated in the Preparatory Committee signed the Alexandria Protocol.2 The first signature under this document when-

1 The Arab League summit, previously scheduled for the end of March in Baghdad, has been postponed to the end of May 2011.

2 The Alexandria Protocol was signed by representatives of the following States: the Kingdom of Egypt - Naguib Al-Hilali (Minister of Education), Mohammed Sabri Abu-Alam (Minister of Justice), Mohammed Salah Al-Din (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs); the Kingdom of Iraq-Hamdi Al-Bajaji (Prime Minister, Head of delegation), Arshad Al-Umari (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Nuri al-Said (former Prime Minister), Taghain al-Azhari (Authorized Minister of Iraq in Egypt); Syria - Saadallah Al-Jabari (Prime Minister, Head of delegation), Jamil Mardam (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Naguib Al-Armanazi (General Secretary of the Presidential Service), Sabri Al-Assali (representative of Damascus); Emirate of Trans-Jordan-Tawfiq Abu Al-Huda (Prime Minister, Head of delegation), Suleiman Al-Sukkr (Financial Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs); Lebanon-Riyad Al-Sulh (Prime Minister, Head of delegation) Salim Tukla (Foreign Minister), Musa Mubarak (Head of the Presidential Cabinet).

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It was due to Nahhas Pasha, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Egypt. The Alexandria Protocol served as the basis for the agreement signed on March 22, 1945. The Charter of the League of Arab States (LAS), the oldest international regional organization in the world, currently comprising 22 Arab countries3, with its headquarters in Cairo.

After the Free Officers ' Revolution, King Farouk was deposed on July 23, 1952, and Egypt became a republic in 1953. [4] Four years later, Gamal Abdel Nasser, one of the most prominent figures of pan-Arabism, came to power in it. Under his leadership, Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958. In 1961, Syria seceded from the UAR, but Egypt continued to be referred to as the UAR until 1971.5
Nasser persecuted the opponents of his regime, was unwavering in his desire to implement the idea of Arab unity, and the Arab League played an extremely important role in this regard. He skillfully used the League as an effective tool to achieve his goals, in particular to put pressure on the foreign policy of other Arab States. Following the principle of" Egypt first", Nasser de facto turned the Arab League into one of the departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Within the walls of this organization, the foreign policy of Arab countries was conducted in accordance with the foreign policy of Egypt. As much as Nasser was implacable toward his opponents inside Egypt, he was also ruthless toward his enemies in other Arab countries. During his rule, until 1970, the Arab League adopted many resolutions initiated by Egypt and directed against Governments whose policies did not coincide with Nasser's position. Thus, in 1955, in response to Iraq's accession to the Baghdad Pact, the Arab League adopted a resolution that initiated a boycott of Iraq by the Arab States. The 1958 conflict between Egypt and Lebanon is even more vivid. Official Cairo was accused by the Lebanese leadership of interfering in the internal affairs of this country. The Arab League Council met in Benghazi, Libya, to consider Lebanon's complaint, and rejected all of Lebanon's claims against Egypt. Arab League Secretary General Abdel Halek Hassouna reported on this at the subsequent session of the UN General Assembly. Several times after that, Nasser managed to resolve the contradictions between Egypt and other Arab countries in his favor.

There are a number of reasons why Egypt has such a powerful influence on the League's decisions and policies. These include the location of its headquarters (Cairo), the resulting noticeable predominance of Egyptians among the secretariat staff, the contribution of Egypt in terms of membership fees, and the fact that the League's general secretaries were mostly Egyptians. 7 However, these are consequences, and the main question is: how did Egypt manage to achieve all this?

3 As of 2011, the League of Arab States consists of 22 countries: Algeria, Bahrain, the Union of the Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, the Palestinian Authority, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia.

4 The infant Ahmed Fouad I became King in 1952, and Mohammed Naguib, who later became the first president of Egypt, became regent.

5 Since then - the Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE).

6 CENTO - The Central Treaty Organization (CCP). The Central Treaty Organization (The Baghdad Pact), in 1955-1958.the name Baghdad Pact (Baghdad Treaty) was often used. A military-political grouping in the Middle East, created on the initiative of Great Britain, the United States, and Turkey, and existed in 1955-1979. The agreement on its creation was concluded between Iran and Turkey in Baghdad on February 24, 1954. It was subsequently joined by the United Kingdom, Pakistan and Iraq. In 1959, Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact.

7 Of the six Arab League Secretaries - General, only one was not Egyptian-Shadly Klibi (Tunis).

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GREAT SYRIA AND FERTILE CRESCENT 8

In 1941, British political circles discussed the need to support the Arab leaders of Syria, Iraq and Lebanon and the creation of a regional alliance in the Middle East. On May 29, 1941, a day after the suppression of the R. A. Gailani rebellion in Iraq, British Foreign Secretary Anthony M. Lee announced the introduction of a new policy in the Middle East. "The Arab world has made great strides since the end of the last war, and many Arab thinkers did not even think about the degree of unity that it seems possible to achieve now. They hope for our support in achieving this unity. I think it is natural and correct that cultural and economic ties between Arab countries, as well as political ties, should be strengthened. His Majesty's Government9 will therefore give all necessary support to any management scheme that is approved" [The Times, 1941].

A month and a half after Eden's speech, on July 14, 1941, the British representative in Amman received a letter from the Emir of Transjordan, Abdullah. In his letter, he reported on the decision of his Cabinet to ask His Majesty's Government to appoint him as a negotiator with the national Governments of Syria and Lebanon on the creation of a "Greater Syria". Abdullah proposed to form this "Basic Arab Federation", which would consist of four states: Transjordan, Syria, Palestine and Lebanon. It was proposed to appoint Abdullah himself as its head for the huge contribution of the Hashemites to the cause of the Arab Revolution of 1915. Subsequently, the " Basic Arab Federation "was to be transformed into the" Arab Federation "after the unification of Iraq and" Greater Syria", and in the future, other Arab countries. The letter suggested appointing the President of this federation on a rotating basis. However, the British side preferred not to force events and postpone consideration of this issue. Emir Abdullah's meeting with Oliver Lutelton on August 13, 1943, was also unsuccessful. The aim of the Emir's negotiations, in addition to those indicated in the mentioned letter, was the declaration of independence of Palestine. The British Minister of State in Cairo, referring, in turn,to the White Paper of 1939, considered it impossible to fulfill the conditions set by the Transjordan side10.

In early 1943, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said drew up the Blue Book, a memorandum for the British Minister of State in Cairo, in which he justified the following idea: all the problems of the Arab world will find their solution as soon as a "Greater Syria"is created. From his point of view, the confederation of four Arab states - Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine - could remove many issues from the agenda of Great Britain and France in the future 11 in the Middle East. He believed that the population of these Middle Eastern states should independently choose the type of government, Jerusalem should become a free city, and for Maronite Christians in Beirut and Jews in Palestine, it is necessary to create a special state.-

8 Fertile Crescent ( English) - The Fertile Crescent. In this context, it refers to one of the plans for the unification of the Arab Middle East from Basra to Beersheba in the first half of the 20th century.

9 George VI.

10 White Paper of 1939-Report of the British Colonial Secretary M. MacDonald to Parliament on the British mandate in Palestine.

11 In 1940, the north of France was occupied by Nazi Germany, and in the south, in the town of Vichy, a collaborationist government was formed under the leadership of Marshal Henri Philippe Petain. The Vichy regime managed to retain control of almost all the French colonies, most overseas territories did not recognize the openly pro-British "Free (Fighting) France" of General de Gaulle. In September 1940, Gaullist forces, with the direct support of Great Britain, attempted to capture Dakar in Senegal, which ended in complete failure. In 1941. Great Britain, under a formal pretext, occupied Syria and Lebanon, which France owned under a League of Nations mandate.

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social autonomous okrugs. Subsequently, Iraq was to join the" Greater Syria", as well as all interested Arab countries. N. al-Said saw the supreme executive authority as a Permanent Council consisting of representatives of the listed states, which would deal with issues of defense, foreign policy, protection of minority rights, education, communications, as well as customs and currency affairs. It is interesting that Nuri al-Said used the verb "reunification" rather than "unification" in relation to the creation of a unified Arab state in his Blue Book [Nuri al-Said, 1943, p. 19]. Thus, he emphasized the fact that the Arab world was already united during the existence of the Arab Caliphate.

Perhaps one of these plans for the unification of the Arab world would have been realized if it had not been for one person - Mustafa al-Nahhas, the Prime Minister of Egypt.12 It was from the moment of its involvement in the creation of the Arab Union that the process began to unfold in a different scenario.

BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS

On March 20, 1943, al-Nahhas, as head of the Wafdist government, made a statement in which he expressed his interest in the unification of the Arab peoples. In the same statement, he announced his plan of action on this issue, which was as follows. He believed that it was necessary first to find out the positions of each of the Arab countries on this issue, and then to hold an informal meeting with representatives of all Arab States in Cairo under the Egyptian chairmanship, during which it was supposed to reach a compromise on this issue. At the end of the informal meeting, a conference should have been held to sum up the results of the negotiations [Egyptian Gazette, 1943].

In the future, everything turned out exactly as planned by Nahhas Pasha. Bilateral meetings of the Egyptian Prime Minister with representatives of six Arab States-Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Yemen-played a significant role in this process. These meetings were of an introductory nature and were held in Egypt in an atmosphere of secrecy. The first meeting took place with the Prime Minister of Iraq Nuri al-Said, who arrived in Cairo on July 23, 1943. Nahhas Pasha immediately pointed out to his counterpart the main position of the concept of the Arab Union proposed by him - the central government. After several meetings, Nahhas Pasha managed to achieve an extremely important success in negotiations with Nuri al-Said: the latter began to lean away from the idea of a confederate Arab union to create a federation with a single policy (defense, foreign policy, minority policy), economy (communications, trade, currency and customs) and culture (education and technology).

The negotiations ended with N. al-Saeed putting forward the idea of creating an Arab federation headed by an Executive Committee, which would consist of representatives of Member States in proportion to their population and contributions. If this idea was rejected, an Executive Committee was supposed to be formed in accordance with the principles of equal representation from each State, but then its decisions would not have to be binding.

12 Nahhas Pasha was born in 1897 in Egypt. He received a law degree from the Khedive's School of Law and served as a judge in the National Court of Tanta. In 1919, he became a member of the Wafd party, and five years later became Minister of Communications. In 1928, Mustafa al-Nahhas was appointed Prime Minister of Egypt for the first time. Subsequently, he held this position four more times (1930, 1936 - 1937, 1942 - 1944, 1950 - 1952). After becoming Prime Minister in 1942, Nahhas Pasha began to persecute those who had ousted the Wafdist government in 1937.Abdel Rahman Azzam, who served as Minister of Waqf Affairs and later became the first Secretary-General of the Arab League, also took over.

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Following the Iraqi delegation, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, Prime Minister of Transjordan, arrived in Cairo on August 28, 1943. In this regard, it is noteworthy to note that two days before the meeting, Nahhas Pasha held a press conference at which he stated that he already foresees how events will develop during the negotiations with his Transjordan counterpart, and that he is clear about Egypt's prospects in the event of the creation of an Arab union.

Nahhas Pasha faced great difficulties when trying to organize bilateral negotiations with the delegation of Saudi Arabia. King Abdulaziz refused to send a representative to Cairo to negotiate the establishment of an Arab union. Firstly, the Saudi side considered the consideration of this issue premature, and secondly, it did not want to participate in the meeting, which was held in an atmosphere of secrecy. However, Nahhas Pasha still managed to get a meeting with a representative of the Saudi Kingdom under the pretext of consolidating the positions of both countries on international issues. In September 1943, the King's personal secretary, Sheikh Yusuf Yassin, arrived in Cairo. For a long time, the parties could not find a common language on the issue under discussion, and only at the end of the meeting did the Egyptian Prime Minister find a lever that turned the outcome of the negotiations in his favor. They were caused by Saudi Arabia's rejection of the" Hashemite " project of uniting Arab countries. And since its leadership did not see any other serious options for uniting Arab countries other than creating an Arab federation based on "Greater Syria" before negotiations with Egypt, King Abdulaziz's unwillingness to participate in the creation of an Arab union seemed quite logical. An important outcome of the Egyptian-Saudi negotiations was that Yusuf Yassin saw Nahhas Pasha as a possible opponent of the Hashemites. Subsequently, at the general conference in Cairo in 1944, it was the support of Saudi Arabia and Yemen that helped Nahhas Pasha persuade the meeting participants to create the League of Arab States.

Following Yusuf Yassin on October 13, 1943, Syrian Prime Minister Saadallah al-Jabari arrived in the Egyptian capital. His position on the creation of the Arab union was based on three main principles: the form of government-a republic, the capital-Damascus, and the freedom of choice for each Arab state to join the union. "The Syrian problem concerns four countries: Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan. There are political elements that require the creation of this union, but there is no agreed form of this union... This alliance was necessary in the past... But after 20 years, during which each of these countries went its own way and took on a unique character, the situation requires adaptation to the agreed path of development "[Arab League, S. M. B. C., 1944, p. 26]. In this regard, Nahhas Pasha identified a fundamental contradiction between the Syrian and Lebanese plans for unification into a "Greater Syria", on the one hand, and the ideas of Emir Abdullah, on the other. The former insisted on a republican form of government, and the calls of Syrian Prime Minister Saadallah al-Jabari to adapt to the agreed path of development were addressed specifically to official Amman, which insisted that the form of government of a united Syria should be a constitutional monarchy.

The visit of the Lebanese delegation to Egypt was complicated for two reasons. First of all, because of the problems associated with the confusion regarding the French mandate of the League of Nations for Lebanon. After France was occupied by nazi Germany, the Vichy Government abandoned the Syrian mandate of the League of Nations, which included Lebanon. However, later Charles de Gaulle and General Katru invaded Lebanon, declaring the illegality of the previous regime's actions in relation to the Syrian mandate. Further complicating matters was the August 1943 elections, which were contested by two main groups: the Constitutional National Front, led by Bishim al-Khoury, and the Sunni-Maronite alliance, led by Riyad al-Sulh and Emil Iddi, respectively. At a meeting with representatives of Lebanon, Nahhas Pasha tried to agree on their position on the issue of pops-

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denmark of the Arab Union with the classification proposed by Nuri al-Said. As a result, it turned out that even considering the possibility of unification with Syria, official Beirut is not ready to go beyond economic and cultural cooperation. That is, Lebanon preferred to solve defense and foreign policy issues independently.

The same position was confirmed by the Yemeni Imam Yahya, who arrived in Cairo in February 1944, stating that Yemen would accept any form of cooperation with Arab countries, except that which encroached on the sovereignty of the imamate. This was the end of a series of bilateral talks between Nahhas Pasha and representatives of six Arab States. As a result, Egypt became the owner of complete information about the mood prevailing in the Arab world, which gave it a tangible advantage in negotiating on this issue in the future. Another important aspect was that Nahhas Pasha never once expressed his point of view on the Arab union: in conversation with his opponents, he only discussed their positions.

Having studied the situation, Nahhas Pasha was able to place the most favorable emphasis for himself when drawing up the agenda of the general meeting.

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

After analyzing all the points of view expressed during the bilateral negotiations, Nahhas Pasha sent invitations to representatives of Arab States to participate in the work of the Preparatory Committee in July 1944 in Cairo. As a result, representatives of Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt took part in the work. Delegations from Libya, Palestine and Yemen arrived as observers. Representatives of Saudi Arabia initially refused to participate. King Abdulaziz said that before deciding to send his representative to work on the Preparatory Committee for the creation of the Arab Union, he needs to consult with the leaders of other states of the Arabian Peninsula. Only after developing a unified position would he be able to engage in a dialogue on Arab unity. However, first of all, King Abdulaziz wanted to demonstrate to Transjordan the fallacy of its chosen path to achieve Arab unity. Thus, in his letter to Mustafa al-Nahhas, Yusuf Yasin wrote:: "The king replied that he is unwavering in his position, and if Nahhas insists on creating a Committee, then he [the king] refuses to participate... because he believes that the time for this has not yet come "[Khair al-Din al-Zirikly, vol. 1, p. 1203-1204].

However, after Nahhas Pasha sent a second telegram of invitation to King Abdulaziz, signed by representatives of four other Arab States, the latter agreed to send Yusuf Yassin to Cairo as an observer. "The King agrees, as he foresees that the enemies of the Arabs may explain his absence by a quarrel between him and the leaders of other Arab countries, such as Egypt" [Khair al-Din al-Zirikly, Vol. 3, p. 1204]. The presence of the Yemeni and Saudi delegations only as observers can be explained by the fact that Yemen has been developing in isolation for a long time, hence the low integration activity of this country, and the isolationism of Saudi Arabia is due to its specific political and religious status.13
During the work of the Preparatory Committee Nahhas Pasha adhered to one rule: never repeat or support someone's point of view, or express your position. No one present even suspected that he had a project of his own. This put Egypt in an advantageous position in relation to the other participants of the meeting, because, first, they had confidence in the other participants of the meeting.

13 The King is the custodian of two Muslim holy sites, Mecca and Medina, which gives him a special status in the eyes of all Muslims. In addition, Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia is the ideological basis of the state.

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Secondly, they delegated the right to arbitration to the Egyptian delegation, and thirdly, they looked to Nahhas Pasha as a guide to the goal of creating an Arab union. Thus, before the start of the work, Egypt seized the political leadership in achieving Arab unity.

Initially, Nahhas Pasha relied on the support of two countries: Syria and Saudi Arabia, hoping that the loyalty of the former would entail the loyalty of Lebanon, and King Abdulaziz would persuade the Yemeni Imam Yahya. Then there was a real prospect of forming a powerful coalition of five influential Arab countries, which could impose its point of view on Iraq and Transjordan, rejecting two Hashemite projects: "Greater Syria" and Fertile Crescent.

However, the participants of the meeting were divided into three blocks. The first bloc consisted of traditional conservatives: Iraq and Transjordan. The second is the supporters of the republic-Syria and Lebanon. The third is for the religious Orthodox-Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Nahhas Pasha understood that Egypt's annexation to the Hashemites entailed a dynastic rivalry with Saudi Arabia. Accepting the position of Syria, which insisted on the establishment of a republican system, could seriously shake the position of the Egyptian King Farouk. This was also opposed by Great Britain, who feared that Egypt might fall under French influence under this set of circumstances. There remained the third, most preferred option in this situation, which rejected any form of a single Arab state.

At the same time, it should be taken into account that Syria was extremely negative about removing the issue of forming a federal Arab state from the agenda in favor of other forms of cooperation, mainly due to the desire to achieve unification with Lebanon. In his speech, Syrian Prime Minister Saadallah al-Jabari noted:: "The majority of Lebanese people, including many Christians and all Muslims, especially in the areas that fell to Lebanon as a result of the last war, hope for unconditional unification with Syria. ...this hope of unification gives us peace" [Arab League, S.M.B.C., 1944, p. 26]. In this regard, it was unwise to count on the simultaneous support of both Syria and Saudi Arabia. At the beginning of the third session of the Preparatory Committee, Nahhas Pasha made a proposal to move gradually, starting not from the top, but from the bottom. He realized that in order to preserve Egypt's position as the "mother of Arab countries", it was necessary to abandon the idea of an alliance in favor of cooperation. Achieving this goal allowed him to remove Iraq and Syria from the leading positions in the issue of Arab unity. And here the involvement of the delegations of Saudi Arabia and Yemen in the orbit of negotiations played an important role, thanks to which Nahhas Pasha was able not only to persuade the Committee members to the idea of cooperation, but also to reject the various types of central government and political cooperation proposed by Syria, Iraq and Transjordan.

Realizing that the leadership was slipping out of his hands, Nuri al-Said proposed two options for the federation, within which it would be possible to raise the question of the future format of Arab cooperation. The former was similar to the United States in its early years, the latter to the European free market, which allowed different regimes to co - exist. The first draft was rejected unanimously, and the second one was supposed to create a confederation of Arab countries. However, the perception that the situation was getting out of their control and deviating more and more from the ideas of Arab unity caused more and more indignation among the countries of Fertile Crescent. Representatives of Iraq and Syria began insistently demanding that Egypt state its position.

Then Nahhas Pasha for the first time spoke out with the position of creating the League of Arab States. "The League of Arab States will be formed from independent Arab States that want to join it. It will consist of a Council, which will be called the "LAS Council", where all member countries will be equally represented. Its responsibilities will include: monitoring the execution of agreements that you have entered into-

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The above-mentioned countries will conclude periodic meetings to discuss the main issues of the Arab countries and strengthen mutual understanding between them and coordinate their political plans in such a way as to guarantee their interaction. The decisions of the Council will be binding on those who make them, except in cases where there is disagreement between the two countries; then the decisions of the "LAS Council" will not be binding. Sub-committees will be formed by the Preparatory Committee for drafting the charter of the LAS Council, as well as for considering political issues that may be included in the agreement between Arab countries" [Arab League, M. P. C. G. A. C. A., S. 4, 1944, p. 35].

It was in this speech that the phrase "League of Arab States"was first used. The very term "league" is more outraged representatives of Iraq and Syria. Everyone understood that a unified Arab state was a mirage, but they certainly counted on something more than just a "league". Even Egypt's Deputy Foreign Minister, Mohammed Salah al-Din, said that the League is not what most of those here expect. However, Nahhas Pasha managed to defend his position that the confederation is a concept that unites countries that are foreign to each other. As a result, the Alexandria Protocol was signed, consisting of three parts: a decision on the establishment of the League of Arab States, a special resolution on Palestine and a special resolution on Lebanon.

Two days after the signing of the protocol, its main ideologue and mastermind, Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha, was removed from the post of Prime Minister of Egypt by King Farouk. A similar fate befell Syrian Prime Minister Saadallah al-Jabari and Lebanese Prime Minister Riyad al-Sulha. The official reason for such a decision on the part of King Farouk is " betrayal of the interests of the Arab nation and perversion of the idea of an Arab union."

Thus, on March 22, 1945, at the solemn ceremony dedicated to the signing of the Charter of the League of Arab States, there was no person to whom it owed its subsequent existence.14 Of course, the Arab League is not an alliance, but simply a regional organization that includes Arab countries. But first and foremost, the Arab League is a compromise, the only possible solution that takes into account all Arab problems and differences. This is the main achievement of Nahhas Pasha. He still managed to implement the concept of "Arab unity", which became the" sacred cow " of the League, which so far no one has dared to encroach on.

list of literature

Arab League, M.P.C.G.A.C.A., Session 4, 1944.

Arab League, S.M.B.C, 1944.

Egyptian Gazette. 31 March 1943.

Khair al-Din al-Zirikly. Shibh al-Jazirah fi al-Malik Abd al-Aziz (Kheir Al-Din Al-Zirikli. The Arabian Peninsula and King Abdul Asia). Vol. 1, 3. Beirut, 1970 (in Arabic).

Nuri Al-Said. Istiqlal al-Arab wa Wihdatuhum Mudhakkira fi al-Qadiyya al-Arabiyya (Nuri Al-Said. Arab independence and unity in the memorandum on the Arab problem. Baghdad, 1943 (in Arabic).

The Times. 30 May 1941.

14 The characteristic description of Nahhas Pasha's activities in the TSB article, which does not mention this page of his biography, is significant in this regard.

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