The events of 2011-2013, which gave rise to many illusions in the Arab world, brought Islamists to power instead of democracy, i.e. the dominance of authoritarian (and mainly military) modernizers was replaced by the dominance of the most extremist faction of traditional clerics. The political and other inconsistencies of the latter quickly became clear, and their lack of control and unpredictability gradually deprived (or is depriving)them of their rights. their support from the West. That is why they have lost power in Egypt, are losing it in Tunisia, have not gained it and are forced to retreat in Syria, and are at a crossroads in a defeated and virtually disintegrated Libya. Throughout the Arab world, the situation is unstable, sometimes semi-anarchic. The most difficult state of the economy makes the countries that survived the " Arab Spring "dependent on financial, technical and any other assistance from the West and the" jeftekrati " of the Persian Gulf. The latter, not content with this, continue to encourage the Islamists, whose numerical and purely military power does not decrease.

The machinations of Islamists also concern Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon and Russia. They have a complex "friend—enemy"relationship with the United States. This was used by Russia in the summer of 2013 to prevent a long-planned Western strike on Syria. However, the unsettled nature of the entire complex of East—West relations and the instability of the situation in the Arab world leave room for any changes in the situation in the region.

Keywords: Islamism, "political spring", Arab world, "Al-Qaeda", Wahhabi tandem, jihadists, Salafists.

The radical changes that began in most Arab countries at the turn of 2010-2011 are continuing. But less and less they are called "political spring". Because before the eyes of the whole world, the socionolytic content of these changes, their orientation and ultimate goals are undergoing very significant changes.

At the very beginning of the events, the role of their initiator was played by the most Westernized groups of society, who are well acquainted with the culture (including political) of the West, with the common Western ideas of liberalism, individual freedom and democracy. These groups - the intelligentsia, students, and students in general - have long longed for the democratization of governance, the abolition of strict control of the authorities over political life, general liberalization of regimes, and dictatorial and other traditional methods of leading society that are not alien to authoritarianism. However, this fact was obviously poorly understood by the rulers who became victims of the Arab "political spring": Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. Their long tenure in power (30 years under Mubarak, 42 years under Gaddafi, 24 years under Ben Ali) lull them into forgetting that updating their methods of government is one of the secrets of political survival. In addition, they were all military leaders, for whom command style and concern for discipline are axioms.

But, of course, the above-mentioned shortcomings of the Arab regimes, swept away by the "political spring", were not the main reasons for their fall. Fundamental information

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A role in their disappearance was played by the fact that it was the result of a long, stretching more than half a century of Arab attempts to escape from the captivity of dependence on the West. This attempt can be called the "Nasser era" after the leader of the Egyptian revolution, Gamal Abd al-Nasser, who was called the "champion of Arab nationalism" (for more details, see [Landa, 2012, pp. 51-61]).

The July 23, 1952 revolution in Egypt was the first in a series of Arab revolutions of the twentieth century to achieve political independence or replace the monarchy with a republic in Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan. Moreover, their specificity was their military character1. It was the officers, as the most active and organized part of the intelligentsia of these countries, who led these revolutions and largely determined the nature of the post-revolutionary regimes. Revolutionary officers were patriots and progressive fighters who sought radical transformation. In Egypt, for example, about 500 officers formed the basis of the new administration, and according to eyewitnesses, working 10 hours a day, they managed the country with difficulty but effectively [Lacouture, 1962, p. 180-183]. Officers of other countries that have made revolutions took their example from them. It was these officers who were attracted to key positions in the state apparatus by people from their midst who led Arab countries in the post - revolutionary period-Gamal Abd al-Nasser (and then Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak) in Egypt, Houari Boumedien and Shadly Benjedid in Algeria, Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, Abd al-Kerim Qasem in Iraq, Abdullah Sallal in Yemen, Hafez al-Assad in Syria.

But all the transformations they carried out-agrarian reforms, the nationalization of enterprises of foreign and then domestic capital, the development of education and culture — could not solve the main problems: the elimination of mass unemployment, the lack of the latest technologies and necessary capital, as well as qualified personnel, without which it was impossible to modernize the economy and spiritual life. Therefore, to a certain extent, the post-revolutionary countries remained economically, technologically and in terms of training specialists dependent on the West, as well as dissatisfaction with this dependence.2 This discontent was reinforced by the replacement of the charismatic leaders of the 20th-century revolutions in the Arab world by their successors, who were not always popular (like Ben Ali in Tunisia). or simply by betraying revolutionary ideals (like Anwar Sadat in Egypt).

Another important point is the negative attitude towards post-revolutionary regimes on the part of the monarchies that remained in the Arab world, usually theocratic, which were ideologically hostile to secular Republican revolutionaries who stood on the positions of nationalism and even in some places socialism (even if in their own way understood). Arab monarchs were naturally wary of the officers who ended the rule of kings in Egypt, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen. Therefore, they were always scheming against the counter-revolutionary regimes, arranging plots, sabotage and other subversive actions against them. Secularism, republicanism, anti-monarchism and anti-imperialism were seen by the monarchs as the sword of Damocles, as a constant threat of overthrow.

Nor were post-revolutionary regimes favored by Western countries, for the Arab revolutions of the twentieth century were sometimes openly and sometimes objectively directed against their domination of the Arab East. However, gradually the Western powers managed to restore, albeit with some losses, their positions, for example, in Egypt under Anwar Sadat or in Tunisia under Ben Ali (where this began even under his charismatic predecessor-

1 An exception was Tunisia, where Monarch Bey was removed in 1957 without the participation of the army by the decision of the politburo of the ruling New Dustur party and the National Constituent Assembly. The "Husseinid dynasty", which had ruled for 250 years, fell like a dead tree, no longer enjoying any support in the country. "Tunisia got rid of itself as a worn-out dress" [Vidyasova, 2007, p. 76].

2 Military, financial, technical, cultural, and personnel support to the USSR and other socialist countries in 1955-1985 was relatively short-lived and clearly insufficient, although it played a role. It is enough to recall the actions of the USSR in saving Egypt from external aggression in 1956 and in defending the freedom of Iraq in 1958 and Algeria in 1954-1962.

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shestvennik Habib Bourguiba). The penetration of foreign capital also took place in other post - revolutionary countries, but with varying success, under different conditions and with constant restrictions, which increasingly irritated the West, especially after the collapse of the USSR and the countries of socialism, which had a restraining influence on the West. The actions of the United States, which after 1991 became not only the leading power in the West, but also the only superpower in the world, began to show elements of voluntarism, aggressiveness and disrespect for international law. And if the US strike on Afghanistan in 2001 and its subsequent occupation (as it turned out later, incomplete and ineffective) If the United States could have been justified by the response to the large-scale terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington by Al-Qaeda-linked militants, then an identical operation in Iraq, which raised a wave of Muslim indignation and armed resistance, can not be justified by anything, although the United States accused Iraq of storing radioactive, chemical and biological weapons, which was a blatant fake, repeated in different versions 60-80 times [Kudelev, 2009, p. 9].

Reveling in its role as the sole superpower, the United States decided to reshape the "Greater Middle East" in its own way, in order to make it more convenient to dispose of it. However, they were still hindered in some places by the surviving leaders of the "Nasser era", i.e. independent rulers who did not want to obediently follow the pro-Western path, as well as by the serious changes that took place in the Arab world during the half-century of the "Nasser era": an increase in the level of industrialization of most Arab countries with a natural increase in the share of industrial workers, literate employees in almost all Arab societies, a general increase in the literacy rate of the population, including women, which contributed to their social activation, and a significant increase in the number of students, including students who are or have been studying abroad, mainly in Western countries. In addition, the mood of the middle strata, the intelligentsia, employees, and the lower strata of entrepreneurship, which grew quantitatively in the second half of the twentieth century, gradually changed. At first, freed from the stranglehold of TNCs and other large foreign capital, and from the oppression of their "fat cats", as the Egyptians put it, they supported the post-revolutionary regimes and believed in their promises. However, many of the promises were not fulfilled for objective reasons, and as for the rest, they were not all fulfilled, sometimes by half, and often not brought to the end.

That is why the social support of the Arab revolutions of the twentieth century began to erode, weaken, and divide into an increasingly impoverished mass of the unemployed, lumpen and other marginalized, on the one hand, and those who benefited from the processes of globalization, the growth of education, skills, and modernization of technology, on the other. The contradictions between the former and the latter naturally increased. Moreover, the first ideas of socialism after the compromise in 1991 on a global scale increasingly turned to religion, because they were looking for the lost postulates of equality and brotherhood, close to Muslims, community solidarity contained in the Islamic concept of "sadaqa", and zealously began to look for "bad Muslims" among the rulers who allowed deviations from Islam in the practice of governance..

At the same time, the upper strata of Arab societies, faced with the difficulties of economic construction and other social problems (the growing number and uncontrollability of the increasingly alienated lower strata, the weakness of financial, technical and personnel equipment), returned from the former "revolutionary" slogans to the time-tested traditional authoritarian methods and increasingly relied on the army (especially since it was most often a supplier of the political and other elite), the police and bureaucracy, in the ranks of which pre-revolutionary old-timers and" post-revolutionary "newcomers quite" harmoniously " merged. In this situation, social elevators did not work, and the stagnant sea of marginals sometimes reached 35-40% of the amateur population [Eastern Society..., 2009, p. 7-8; The Middle East..., 1992, p. 73-84].

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Naturally, all this contributed to the weathering of the ideals of the revolutionary past, the oblivion of many of its achievements and the growing discontent of the broadest strata of the population. The lack of external assistance after the collapse of the socialist countries or the provision of it on bonded terms by Western countries also did not improve the situation. At the same time, the policy pursued by the West was perceived and is perceived in the East as a policy of inequality, disregard for the peoples of the East, and ignoring their problems. And this is causing more and more rejection and hot indignation among the residents of the East, whose cultural level and awareness of their own historical and national identity have grown significantly. And it is not surprising that by the end of the 20th century, about a third of Muslims from West Africa to Southeast Asia were ready to support Islamic radicals, since in Pakistan about 75% of citizens were out of work, in Iran-1.5 million people, in Lebanon - up to 35% of the amateur population, in Tunisia-17 in Algeria - 22%, in Morocco - 20%. Only in the capital of Egypt, 56% of the population belonged to them, and at least a third of them-in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan [Middle East and Modernity, 2002, No. 14, p. 193; ibid., 2003, No. 18, pp. 161-193; Kepel, 2004, pp. 154-164; The Palestine Question, 1980, p. 16; Intifada: Facts and Figures, 1989, p. 10-12].

In other words, the conditions for a" political spring " in the Arab world are long overdue. And it exploded with mass unrest at the turn of 2010-2011 in almost all Arab countries. They quickly stopped only in Morocco, Jordan and Bahrain. In the first two kingdoms, the authority of the monarchs as descendants of the Prophet and the highest religious arbitrators affected, in the third case, the Sunni ruler was saved from the wrath of his Shiite subjects by Saudi troops urgently landed on the island [Izvestia, 23.11.2011]. In Algeria, the demonstrations failed because they were just a manifestation of narrow Berber ethnocentrism. In all other cases, the performances deserve careful analysis.

The Arab "political spring" of 2011 only at the very beginning seemed to be a process of liberation of the Arabs from the domination of authoritarian rulers and military-bureaucratic dictatorships. In fact, this process, which, according to many Arabists, began almost everywhere with a somewhat new phenomenon for the Arab world - the " revolution of educated youth "(cited in [Zinin, 2011, p. 150]), has a number of fundamentally important features. One of them is the close connection of the "Arab political spring" with the processes of globalization, which are inseparable from the inevitable modernization and even a certain Westernization of the entire life of the East - its economy and political orientation, its culture and everyday life. The positive aspects of globalization are quite attractive - multiculturalism (although now disputed), the polyphony of spiritual life, pluralism in politics and art, and an unprecedented increase in the level of awareness of Easterners about everything that is happening in the world. But it should be borne in mind that all this is realized mainly by the educated part of the population, primarily by young people. For the majority of Arabs, globalization is perceived as a gross invasion from outside for the purpose of economic and political subordination, as an attempt on their ethno-cultural and religious identity. They view globalization as "a continuation of imperialist and colonial policies by other means" (Arab Countries of West Asia..., 2007, p. 60).

The younger generation is more sensitive and responsive. Therefore, people aged 15-30, who in Arab countries make up 40-50% of the population, are the first to respond to problems that concern society. Not all of them have secondary, especially higher education, but today, as a rule, most of them are covered by primary education. Young people suffer more than the older generation from unemployment, low wages, the inability to realize their ambitious dreams, which arose as a result of getting acquainted with Western life through the Internet, social networks and other media, as well as during contacts with people coming to the East from the West and during visits to Europe and America (only in the United States). In Europe, for example, up to 1 million Tunisians work and study,

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And Tunis itself is visited by several million Europeans and Americans every year (Vasiliev, 2009, p. 2-6). The same applies to Algerians, Moroccans, Egyptians, Syrians, and Lebanese.

But, having played a major role in the beginning of the Arab Spring, the youth then either lost their momentum, or was pushed back, in short, ceased to be the leader of the movement, giving way to more organized and clearly oriented forces. The background of the events is still hidden from us. But something is already clear. For example, the fact that Islamists, who have gained strength in all Arab countries in recent years, initially kept a low profile and clearly waited for the reaction of both their governments and the West. It seemed that their task was not to "frighten" the West and not provoke it to support the overthrown regimes, on the one hand, but on the other - not to "call fire on themselves" and not allow themselves to be defeated. But maybe it was just a fantasy. And the calculation of the organizers of the events is to hide behind disorganized and mostly emotionally excited crowds of young people, move behind their backs more united and purposeful Islamists in order to deal with the power of secular nationalists and Republicans who are hated by both monarchies and the West.

This is exactly what happened in Tunisia and Egypt, where the West actually supported the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes, but was too well informed about the growing discontent with them. And perhaps, in an effort to prevent the Islamists from playing a decisive role in their overthrow (which was easily predictable), he stimulated the long-overdue protests of young people, especially those who were educated in the West, in particular at Columbia University in the United States and at universities in France, through the Internet and social networks. To everyone's surprise, the top military leaders in both Tunisia and Egypt did not protect their governments, taking an unexpectedly "neutral" position [Kuprin, 2011(2), p. 127]. This is more than remarkable, given the close ties of the military elite of these countries with the United States and NATO states, where all this elite was trained and educated.

There is no doubt that the success of these "Internet" or "Twitter revolutions" was also determined by their broad support from the "people of the street". Everyone wanted change, everyone wanted reform. But the spontaneous moods of discontent were curbed and used to their advantage by Islamists who were generously funded and supplied from outside, who had a well-developed underground in almost all Arab countries, as well as connections with various segments of the population through formally non-political charitable, cultural, professional and financial-economic organizations, especially in Egypt, but also in other states [Kuprin, 2011(1), pp. 142-162; Evkochev, 2007, pp. 116-124].

It is interesting that the mass demonstrations in Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Bahrain that took place almost simultaneously with the coups in Tunisia and Egypt did not lead to the same results. This seems to have been due to the West's disinterest in regime change in Morocco, Jordan, and Bahrain, where the will to change was suppressed without receiving external support. Algeria was affected by the loss of political and simply physical energy during the 1992-2002 civil war, fatigue from the endless disputes of numerous (including various kinds of Islamic) groups, and distrust of the United States that has been persistent since the liberation revolution of 1954-1962. The aggravation of the Berber problem and the flexibility of Bouteflika's policy also played a role [Kuprin, 2011(1), pp. 27-28; The Middle East Journal, 2005, vol. 59, No. 3, p. 460].

In Lebanon, the situation is too diverse, both politically, socially, demographically, and confessionally. In other words, it is almost unpredictable and, given the close ties of various Lebanese forces with Syria, Iraq and Iran, the long tradition of Christian-Muslim confrontation (with a gradual change in the balance of forces in favor of Muslims) and the "Shiite factor" supported by the Iranian influence, any interference in Lebanon's affairs can threaten both Israel and its positions The West. Especially after Israel's unsuccessful war with the group-

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the Hezbollah feasting in July-August 2006 and the statistically determined dominance of Muslims (76.7%) over Christians (23.3%) in the ranks of young people - the most combat-ready part of the country's population [Zinkina, 2009, pp. 113-119], when, according to the Israeli author A.D. Epstein, a serious blow was dealt "to the Israeli state". deterrence potential" [Epstein, 2006, p. 112].

The example of Libya and Syria most clearly revealed the desire not only of the United States, but of the entire West in general, to put an end to the "Nasser era" in the Arab world, when the ideas of Arab nationalism, Arab unity and anti-imperialism were axiomatic for the Arabs, and revolutionary patriotic regimes led by popular charismatic leaders were born during liberation wars and mass movements who pursued an emphatically independent policy from the West.

So they tried to remove Hafez al-Assad in Syria in the late 1970s and early 1980s (by the way, like his son now, also with the help of Islamists), so they did with Saddam Hussein and Gaddafi, so they hope to get rid of Bashar al-Assad. The only thing that can be said about the accusations made against them (and often false ones, such as Saddam's alleged plans to use nuclear and biological weapons that he did not have) is that they did not prevent the West from cooperating with these politicians when it was profitable, for example, when Saddam Hussein fought with Iran in 1980-1988., and Gaddafi gave French President Nicolas Sarkozy money for his election campaign. Lies, hypocrisy and demagoguery have never been used by the leaders of the West against the leaders of the East so brazenly, on a large scale and openly. The reason for this is the really increased influence of the United States, especially in the Western world, after 1991. increased confidence in their own power and impunity, reaching the thirst for world domination.

A blatant manifestation of this new US policy, which is extremely dangerous for the world community, was the gross interference in the internal affairs of Libya and the brutal defeat of this state. Arbitrarily interpreting the not very clear UN resolution, the West and its Muslim allies (it's time to openly call them that) used it to actually destroy one of the richest states in Africa, which "did not listen" to them, defending its sovereignty and independence. Under hypocritical statements about "freedom" and" human rights " allegedly violated by the Libyan authorities, 14 NATO countries and their partners - Qatar, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Sweden - carried out tens of thousands of combat airstrikes and special forces operations of Great Britain and Qatar, as well as the French Foreign Legion, killing up to 50 thousand Libyans (including the country's leader Gaddafi, but not counting those who died in prisons and dungeons) and destroying almost all the energy and transport infrastructure of one of the prosperous countries in north Africa [Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16.04.2012]. In Libya, Egypt, Tunisia "from prisons... many jihadists were released, and the military arsenals accumulated by previous governments were left virtually unchecked " [Izvestia, 06.09.2011]. Of course, both of them were thrown together with Al-Qaeda militants and other participants in the defeat of Libya against the Syrian regime.

And what happened in Libya itself after that? Devastation, disease, and the destruction of one of the most powerful Arab economies, which attracted tens of thousands of migrant workers from all over Africa and the Middle East to Libya. Economically, the country has not yet emerged from a period of recovery, and politically it is in a state of chaos, disputes between various movements, of which there are at least seven, as well as endless conflicts between the provisional authorities and non-recognizing armed detachments and brigades, often consisting of mercenaries (or even criminals) of non-Libyan origin. Under their pressure, ministers resign, and the composition of the government changes. And increasingly, these semi-bandit groups are clashing with civilians who are tired of their lawlessness, requisitions, arbitrariness and violence. In June 2013, from the city of Benghazi (the former center of the anti-Gaddafi uprising)

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The largest brigade of ex-rebels, the Shield of Libya, was forcibly expelled after many hours of fighting (more than 30 people were killed and about 100 were injured) [Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10.06.2013].

Other Arab countries that have experienced the "political spring"are also in a state of semi-anarchy. They argue about the future path of development. And obviously, the United States is quite happy with this result: the disputants are separated and "listen" to instructions from Washington or are inclined to do so, while Western companies are still setting up oil production in Libya, without waiting for either the revival or reorganization of the country's economy.

In the Arab League, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, especially Qatar, which forms an alliance with the Saudis, called the "Wahhabi tandem", set the tone (thanks to their oil capital and the full support of the West). As for Egypt, not everything is going as well as the tandem would like. After the overthrow of Mubarak, the country went through a difficult period mainly of a secret struggle for influence over the masses between the military and Islamists, but also with the participation of other forces - Mubarak's supporters who were thrown out of power, young democrats who started the "Arab Spring", Coptic Christians, who are about 10% (approximately 8 million people) in the country. By the way, just before the parliamentary elections in October 2011, 35 Copts were killed and 300 injured during the dispersal of their demonstration demanding equal rights for Copts with Muslims [Komsomolskaya Pravda, 13-20.10, 2011].

Although 35 other parties and groups participated in the elections in Egypt along with Islamists, the actual victory was won by Islamists - 37% of the votes on party lists and 36 out of 54 seats from single-member electoral districts. But the military, which has not yet released the levers of power, began to challenge the election of "those who threaten their interests, economy, security and relations with the international community." Vice-Minister of Defense General Mukhtar al-Mullah stated that "the parliament does not represent all Egyptians" and there are no representatives of "workers, farmers, engineers and doctors" [Izvestia, 23-29.11.2011; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 09.12.2011]. In addition, there are still elections for the upper house, and the military announced that "due to lack of time", the old constitution will be used as a basis for drafting a new constitution.

In the end, Islamist leader Mohammed Morsi removed the military from power, taking advantage of their compromised ties with Mubarak and the suppression of demonstrations against the military regime in Cairo's Tahrir Square in the spring of 2011. However, when Morsi became president, he (like his associates) demonstrated an inability to improve the country's economic life and solve its pressing problems. In addition, Morsi proved to be politically untenable, placing radical Islamists in all positions, who dealt with supporters of democracy even more harshly than their predecessors. The growth of corruption, crime, constant and widespread conflicts between the new authorities and the population led to a mass protest movement. One of its leaders, Mohammed al-Baradei, said:: "We have allowed Morsi to lead the country forward, but he is incapable of doing so. The country is falling into decline, this is not a revolution." On June 30, 2013, mass demonstrations began, demanding that Morsi: "Go away!" 8 people were killed and 600 wounded in clashes with the police. The youth movement Tamarrud (Riot) collected 22 million votes in two months (instead of the expected 15 million) for the resignation of Morsi. On June 23, the Defense Minister gave Morsi a week to reach an agreement with the opposition. At the same time, it became known that Morsi was able to reach an agreement with the top of the army, but almost all junior officers and soldiers were against him [Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20.06-01.07.2013].

On the night of July 3-4, the army ousted Morsi from power and imposed a state of emergency on August 14, promising new presidential and parliamentary elections in early 2014. The legacy of the military and interim President Adly Mansour was the hardest hit: 570 businesses closed, foreign investment declined from $ 1 billion to $ 1 billion.

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From $ 13 billion to $ 2 billion, the external debt reached $ 38.4 billion, and youth unemployment was 77% (according to August 2012 data). It is impossible to fix all this in a short time. Moreover, the Islamists ' protests continue, despite the arrest of almost all of their elite and up to 8 thousand people. supporters in August-September [Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 05.09.2013].

Now it is difficult to predict who will win in Egypt: the military or the Islamists? And what course they will follow after the victory. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates continue to provide financial assistance to Egypt, hoping to succeed in this country in any outcome of the struggle.

The uncertainty of the situation in Egypt, political strife, unrest, unrest and armed clashes in other Arab countries have seriously destabilized the situation in the Middle East and North Africa. "The Arab revolutions provided the Islamists with an ideal springboard for attacks on the Old World," the world press wrote in the fall of 2011. [Izvestiya, 06.09.2011]. After the events in Libya, it became clear that all this is largely the work of not only the Islamists and the "Wahhabi tandem" that helps them, but also the Western countries that stand behind this tandem.

But why does the US need it? The most likely assumption is that Washington would like to remove the Arab national leaders who "hinder" it with the hands of Islamists and, thereby creating a threat to Europe, and at the same time to Russia (!), make them more "obedient"3.

In order to achieve its goals, the United States, like its subsequent NATO allies, has apparently decided to use formally hostile Islamists in a new way. They finally realized that Islamism is a powerful force and a completely independent factor in the international arena, which cannot yet be eliminated by force and is unlikely to be eliminated, at least in the near future. In this regard, the West, apparently, would like to use Islamists, including Al-Qaeda and other Salafi groups fighting against it, as a battering ram to crush common enemies-nationalists, socialists (for example, from the Baath Party in Syria), liberals, and the military everywhere influential in the Arab world.

This is not surprising, given the long-standing cooperation of the United States with the Wahhabis of Arabia and with Islamic monarchies in general. But now, it seems, we are already talking about a new strategy, about moving away from focusing on the former secular allies who have compromised themselves and getting closer to Islamists who have penetrated into various strata of society, who, on the one hand, will cope with all the above-mentioned competitors, equally hated by the West, and on the other, will become a barrier against any of them (including those coming from the same West) "imported" exercises, especially of a leftist and generally "subversive" nature.

Something similar was actually outlined in the writings and statements of Tunisian Islamist leader Rashid al-Ghannouchi, who, rejecting "the Western model of development, capitalist or socialist", advocated "democracy and human rights" at the same time in the 1980s and 1990s and for freeing himself from " the hegemony of Western culture and the Western image to build a modern Islamic society that could draw everything valuable from Western culture to the bottom, without getting lost in it " [Guchetl, 1999, p. 71]. But, of course, al-Ghannouchi is perhaps the most "pro-Western" Islamist, hiding from the Tunisian authorities not just anywhere, but in ...Great Britain and the USA. Back in 1981, he said that his program is "methods of political and cultural influence" and that he "rejects violence and coups d'etat, adheres to political and ideological pluralism" [Kuprin, 2011(1), p. 15].

3. It is increasingly common to hear that after Syria, it will be Iran's turn, which will create a real danger of involving Russia and its Muslim regions in the" redrawing of the Greater Middle East".

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By promoting such views, his Ennahda (Renaissance) party was able to win 40% of the vote in the October 2011 Constituent Assembly elections, taking into account the high level of education of Tunisians, their knowledge of Europe and Europeans, their close ties with France and Italy, and the influence of political practices and political culture of these states on many residents countries, including young people and women. But even the limited success of Ennahda has led to protests under the slogans "We don't want to go back 14 centuries", "Better the secular regime of Ben Ali". Ghannouchi's daughter, Yusra Khrighi, hastened to explain that " what is specifically Islamic in the party is only that it is based on the Muslim values of freedom and justice." This is also evidenced by the subsequent consent of Ennahda to a broad coalition with the centrists and even some leftists, as well as respect for the "national consensus", for which the Islamists even ceded (even for one year) the post of president to the pro-French center-left Mansif al-Marzouki [Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 26.10.20 And]4.

Such a (not entirely sincere, in my opinion) version of "Islamic democratization" can be considered relatively soft and really acceptable for all parties. But there are other examples. "Secular Arab autocracies," says political analyst Yevgeny Satanovsky, president of the Middle East Institute, "are collapsing one by one, Islamists are strengthening their positions throughout the Middle East, and the Gulf monarchies that provoked this "sweep" are increasingly openly taking advantage of Washington, London and Paris, not even hiding where they are." this is where the tail that turns the NATO "dog" is located." Of course, this picture will seem to many to be a very excessive exaggeration of the existing danger. But it generally confirms the information about the very real interaction of the West with Islamist forces. And maybe the quoted author is right in many ways, claiming that "Saudi Arabia and Qatar are a Wahhabi tandem that played a key role in the Arab Spring"? [Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 26.10.2011].

I would not agree with Nikolai Surkov's statement: "Washington has made a bet on moderate fundamentalists." It seems to me that the new US tactic is not limited to this. In Libya and Syria, they openly help not the moderates, but the most extreme extremists and terrorists who openly lie, like the leader of the Libyan Islamists Abd al-Hakim Bel Hajj (by the way, a protege of Qatar): "There is nothing to be afraid of, there is no extremism in Libya." But do not forget what he and his alleged "moderates" did to 69-year-old Gaddafi, whose terribly mutilated corpse was shown to the whole world! What happened in 2011 in Libya (where the" trend of murder, looting, and other abuses "among the rebels was officially recorded by international organizations), what is happening in Syria, and even in Yemen, where al-Qaeda has been gaining new ground, suggests that the United States, as well as its allies, is trying to get a better understanding of the situation. The main ally, the "Wahhabi tandem", is not at all opposed to the involvement of Al-Qaeda in the Arab Spring process and may have planned its participation in advance [Izvestia, 14.09.2011, 11.10.2011; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12.12.2011; Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 26.10.2011].

It is well known that the Qatari troops stormed Tripoli together with the military formations of England and France, and the Saudis "restored order" in Bahrain5. These are the scans-

4 However, in addition to Ennahda in Tunisia, there are also radical Islamists from the Ansar al-Sharia party (supporters of Sharia), who tried to convene their congress on May 18, 2013 in Kairouans, which was banned by the authorities. The result was clashes with the police, a black Al-Qaeda banner over the crowd, which threw stones and bottles at the police. One person was killed, 14 injured, and hundreds were arrested [Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21.05.2013].

5 The events in Bahrain in March 2011 contrasted the Baharna Shiites (60% of the population) with the ruling al-Khalifa dynasty, which is based on the Sunni Azan (25%). Therefore, the suppression of the Baharna movement did not solve anything. In November 2011, Baharna riots broke out again in Bahrain, supported by local Persians (15% of the population), who are backed by Iran. The crisis of ethno-confessional relations in Bahrain threatens to become permanent [Izvestiya, 23.11.2011].

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These circumstances are direct evidence of outside interference in the internal affairs of sovereign Arab countries, and the use of military violence by the NATO-Islamist coalition caused by both socio-political and confessional reasons, because it was not only about the Sunni-Shiite conflict in Bahrain, but also about the blow of the Wahhabi monarchists against the anti-monarchist and enemy of the Islamists Gaddafi. The above-mentioned coalition, as soon as it emerged, immediately demonstrated its disregard for the UN Charter, and in general its unwillingness to take into account international legitimacy.

Published in late 2011 in France, a book by Bernard Henri Levy (a personal friend of French President Nicolas Sarkozy) "The Unloved War" reports that Levy personally prepared this war for "eight months", establishing contacts between Sarkozy and rebel leaders in March 2011, when no one knew them yet. The book contains many facts and quotes exposing Sarkozy's role in the Libyan tragedy. The main thing that concerned the French president at that time was the hesitation of the Americans (US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates then said that supporters of "a military action in Libya belong in a madhouse"). Therefore, Sarkozy was in a hurry to "get ahead of the whole world" and ran ahead of the American locomotive on the Libyan issue. As early as April, rebel leaders gave Sarkozy orders for thousands of Kalashnikovs, hundreds of missiles of various types, and other weapons, and asked for support not only by air, but also by ground forces (see the translation of excerpts from B. A. Levy's book: [Komsomolskaya Pravda, 1-8. 12. 2011]).

According to the unanimous opinion of experts, the rebels, i.e. a temporary association of Al-Qaeda militants, defectors, American and other mercenaries, as well as tribes offended by Gaddafi, were powerless against Gaddafi's troops and could not have done anything with them without outside support. However, Gaddafi lost time and could not resist the NATO air force and the Anglo-French-Qatari invasion. But even then it lasted 10 months.

The events in Libya have revealed something else in common with what is happening in neighboring countries (the rejection of the too-long ruling leader and his authoritarian methods of governance) - the West's readiness for open military intervention if it is unable to achieve its goals in any other way. And the point, of course, was not only in the desire to get rid of Gaddafi himself, who had information about the Libyan financing of the election campaigns of Nicolas Sarkozy, Silvio Berlusconi and the British Conservatives, which, of course, could have harmed both N. Sarkozy and D. Cameron [Izvestia, 22.11.2011]. The point is the counter-offensive of Western neo-colonialism that has begun before our eyes in the new conditions of the economic crisis, but also at the same time the military-technological breakthrough of the West at the next stage of development.

Few people remember that the attack on Libya began after Gaddafi announced that he would focus on Russia, India and China. Unlike him (who has repeatedly flirted with the West), the Syrian leadership has always focused on Russia and even provided it with a naval base on its territory. This is why the United States has sought to isolate Syria and accuse it of "State terrorism"since the 1970s. Of course, this also took into account Syria's conflict with Israel over the Golan Heights, its desire to control Lebanon-a kind of "gateway of the West" to the East, and especially its rapprochement with Iran since the 1980s. Obviously, this is why the United States no longer disguises its desire to overthrow the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, in fact the latter, along with the Algerian one, is independent of the United States. Having no influence in Syria, the United States has not been able to form any serious pro-Western groups here, including military or youth groups. The emphasis was placed on confessional contradictions. But the authorities quickly suppressed the insurgency in the south, in areas dominated by the Druze sect (long ago, back in the 1960s and 1970s). which lost decisive positions in the army and the ruling Baath party to the Alawite community that now dominates the country), as well as in the coastal district of Latakia in the north-west of the country, where the calculation was carried out.

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It is aimed at inciting hostility of the Christian minority towards the majority Alawites [Rassadin, 2010, p. 26].

The desire to speculate on the religious diversity of Syrians has led the United States to a dead end. The Syrian authorities have always pursued a well-thought-out policy on this issue. Maneuvers to encourage intra - communal divisions among Alawites, Shiites, Druze and the country's main Sunni Muslim community have also failed. Such attempts have occurred before, but with the same result [Traboulsi, 2007, p. 114]. Then the emphasis was placed on using the opposition of Sunnis, i.e. the majority of the population, to the rule of the secular Baath party, and even adhering to the" imported", according to clerics, socialist ideology. The government responded to reform demands in 2011 by declaring freedom of the media, lifting a decades-old state of emergency, and promising to repeal the Baath Party's leadership chapter in the Constitution. In response, opponents of the regime unleashed a campaign of lies against Syria: the American and British TV companies CNN, BBC and others, as well as the Qatari channel Al-Jazeera reported about the blown-up mosques in different cities, which in fact were intact, staged shootings and massacres, attributing them to the authorities They conducted targeted propaganda against the Ba'ath Party and President Bashar al-Assad personally. All this was accompanied by street marches under Islamist slogans and provocations against the troops and police. The killings of military personnel provoked a response from the authorities. There was an atmosphere of fear that freed the hands of both the opposition and simply criminal elements. The American media did not even hide the fact that many people who go out to anti - government demonstrations receive $ 60 each, while those who take a poster get $ 100, and a vending machine gets $ 300.! The last figure is three times higher than the minimum wage in the country [Izvestia, 19.08.2011; 23.09.2011].

And in Syria itself, and beyond its borders, there is little doubt that the actions of the anti-government underground are mainly carried out by the hands of Islamists, but are directed by the United States and its allies-Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The United States even openly published information about the costs of subversive activities against Syria, which uses both the Muslim Brotherhood, once expelled from the country, and the most marginal part of Palestinian refugees who have become religious fanatics, and the most "Islamized" groups of Kurds (most Kurds are for Assad, who granted them autonomy), who are forced to leave the country. leave Iraq and Turkey, not to mention the "jihadist volunteers" who fight against US forces in Iraq, but are ready to do it everywhere and are often forced to retreat to the territory of Syria. There is practically no organized opposition. Selim Kheirbek, a well-known dissident in Syria, says of its various representatives in exile: "They are US collaborators working for American money. The same applies to numerous attempts to create a National Salvation Council for Syria in Istanbul "[Izvestia, 21.09.2011].

To explain their impotence, the oppositionists in every possible way inflate rumors about "victims of the regime", including soldiers and policemen killed in battles with terrorists. It is not surprising that the number of victims is growing, and the opposition under this pretext refuses to negotiate with the authorities, following the instructions of the United States, Saudi Arabia and Qatar behind its back. The last" know-how " of the opposition is to build up the so-called people's army out of soldiers captured or defected to it (mostly under pressure of bribery, blackmail, and threats to cut out their families). At the same time, methods of intimidation, various provocations, attributing various crimes to the authorities, imposing drug addiction, recruiting criminal elements for a fee, direct deception and spreading panic rumors are used [Izvestia, 23.09-18.12.2011].

The presented version of events is often objected to, either denying Western interference in the affairs of the Arabs at all, or considering it insignificant, and most importantly, taking on faith the propaganda claims of the United States.

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and the media associated with the "Wahhabi tandem" about the alleged struggle of the Syrian opposition for "civil rights" and "democratic freedoms", against the "dictatorship" of Assad.

Although some (very small) part of the opposition did indeed demand regime liberalization from the very beginning (and the regime partially agreed to this, and later agreed to negotiate with this "sane part" of the opposition), yet the main part of Assad's opponents in Syria are supporters of Al — Qaeda and other Salafists, thugs who have shown their support for the Syrian regime. and now, like one of their leaders, they are cutting out the hearts of Syrian soldiers and gnawing them in front of the TV lens. "I swear, we'll eat your hearts and livers, you Bashar dogs," this bandit who has lost his human form yells. According to the American magazine "Time", Syria is flooded with video clips with severed ears, fingers "and even worse "(cit. by: [Mirsky, 2013]). Fighters of the most aggressive Salafi organization Jabhat al-Nusra admit that they are fighting not for any country, but "for the Ummah (community) of the entire Muslim people, "emphasizing that" the West wants to destroy Syria." In their opinion, all "kafirs" (infidels) should be punished." This is not just about non-Muslims. Salafis are being candid: "Even those Sunnis who want democracy, as well as all Shiites, are kafirs for us" [Mirsky, 2013]. Comments, as they say, are unnecessary. Moreover, even earlier, in May 2013, experts from Belgium and Germany testified that the majority of the Syrian opposition is not aimed at solving the problems of Syria, but at "destroying the secular system and building a caliphate on the territory of the SAR (Syrian Arab Republic), the Middle East and the world as a whole" [Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 31.05.2013].

This also applies to us. Already in 2011, radical Islamists in Russia formed the Jaish Muhajirin wa Ansar (an Army of emigrants and adherents) led by Chechen warlord Abu Umar Shimani. According to the FSB, in May 2013, about 200 Russians fought against the legitimate government of Syria. And some of them, seizing Syrian homes, wrote on their walls in Russian and Arabic: "Today Syria-tomorrow Russia" [Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 22.05.2013]. In September 2013, the press reported about 4 thousand people. militants from the former USSR operating in Syria - North Caucasus, Tatars, Kyrgyz, Azerbaijanis. There is alarming information about their infiltration from Russia to Syria and back, their integration into the "global jihad", and the scope of their operations, from the bombings in Ingushetia, the underground organization in Kazan in the summer of 2012 and in the Khanty-Mansiysk district in May 2013 to the Tsarnaev brothers ' terrorist attack in Boston on April 15, 2013. [Nezavisimaya gazeta. 22-29.05.2013].

The actions of radical extremists have finally attracted the attention of the US ruling circles, who are concerned not only about terrorist attacks on their territory, but also about the growing influence of Salafists in those regions where the US seems to dominate. It's not just about Afghanistan, which I don't think the United States knows what to do with, but also about Iraq and Turkey.

According to the Iraqi authorities, Al-Qaeda and its branches in Iraq are not only taking revenge on the Kurds of Iraq for supporting Assad in Syria, but also interfering in Sunni-Shiite contradictions in order to undermine the position of the Iraqi government, which is also inclined to help Assad. In September 2013 alone, 979 people were killed in countless terrorist attacks in the country. Moreover, the most violent organization is the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, which is actually part of Al-Qaeda. Islamists in every possible way undermine the fragile balance of inter-religious relations in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, acting as a "new force" that subordinates all other groups. Moreover, since May 2013, they have also been exerting pressure on the Turkish authorities to open passages on the Turkish-Syrian border for them. As always, they accompany their threats (including personally to Prime Minister Erdogan) with terrorist attacks. In particular, in May 2013, they killed 52 people in Reichland. "Erdogan knows what it is

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the boldness of a shaheed of the Islamic State, " the Salafists threaten. In September 2013, it was reported that Hizb ut-Tahrir (the Islamic Liberation Party), which has been based in Crimea since 2003, is recruiting volunteers and sending them to fight in Syria, while simultaneously activating its supporters in Russia, Uzbekistan, and Lebanon [Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 02.10-07.10.2013].

All these events proved that the benefits of "cooperation" with the Salafists for the United States are more than doubtful. In this regard, the United States abandoned the long-planned strike on Syria and responded to the peace initiative of President Vladimir Putin regarding the destruction of all stocks of toxic substances in Syria. The United States, of course, knew before that both the Syrian government and the opposition had these reserves. So the unilateral accusation of their use only by the Syrian government is biased and unfounded. But the behavior of the Salafists, as well as, apparently, the development of the internal political and economic situation in the United States itself, led them to make a joint decision with Russia that "a military scenario in Syria is unacceptable" [Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 08.10.2013].

Radical Islamism, which has become a significant force on the world stage, is actually waging a war against the rest of the world (including Muslims who disagree with it). And it will enjoy the covert, and in some places even open, support of an ever - growing number of 1.5 billion Muslims, as long as their lot is poverty, unemployment, economic and cultural backwardness, low standards of living, and especially religious, national and racial inequality, the path to overcoming all this is incredibly difficult. But it must be passed, otherwise the search for a Middle East settlement will become eternal, and the very existence of humanity, at least in its civilized form, may be called into question.

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Landa R. G. Arab world the end of the "era of Nasser" / / Orient (Oriens). 2012. № 6.

Mirsky G. I. Summer of the Islamic East // Nezavisimaya gazeta. 19.06.2013).

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Rassadin P. A. Confessional minorities in the socio-political life of Syria and Lebanon. Moscow, 2010.

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Traboulsi F.A. History of Modern Lebanon. L., 2007.

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