For several years now, Islamist sentiments have been noticeably strengthening in a number of countries in Southeast Asia (SE) and the influence (but we can also say pressure) of Muslim leaders on society has been increasing. Islamism, which is considered by a number of researchers of this problem as a political trend that aims to make Islam the center of the political system, became a noticeable global phenomenon after the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. Southeast Asia is no exception. The region has become an object of intense attention of a movement that is very aggressive in its efforts to restore "authentic" Islam and introduce its tenets and principles into literally all spheres of life.

Islamism did not pose a real threat to the existing regimes for quite a long time. But its supporters persistently, actively and purposefully promoted it as an alternative to the existing political, economic, social and cultural systems, and in the end - it must be admitted - they achieved some success.

RADICALIZATION IS EVIDENT

The events of September 11, 2001 had a huge impact on the development of Islamism in the countries of the region. This tragedy and its aftermath, including the U.S. counterterrorism campaign in Afghanistan and the war effort in Iraq, not only intensified the debate around Islamism, but also further radicalized its content. Thus, in Indonesia, the rhetoric of a global holy war-jihad-against the secret "world conspiracy of Zionists", calls for it become one of the main topics of speeches by a number of Islamic politicians. On this basis, they earn considerable political dividends. These demonstrations have largely contributed to a series of bloody pogroms with a large number of victims in various cities of the country, as well as mass demonstrations demanding the introduction of Sharia law.

In Malaysia, numerous posters and banners with the words "We love jihad" and portraits of bin Laden are becoming a permanent fixture of Malay youth gatherings.

There is a clear radicalization of the Muslim movement in the Philippines as well. It is reflected in the growing armed struggle in all provinces of the Muslim south, the resumption of military activity of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The Abu Sayyaf group, linked to al-Qaeda, has recently carried out kidnappings for ransom and as a demonstration of a kind of protest against the" anti-Islamic " policy of the West, many foreign tourists.

Meanwhile, back in the 70s and 80s, the ideology of the Philippine Muslim movement, which was dominated by the separatist movement, was far from orthodox political Islam and fundamentalism. The program of the MILF does not contain clear wording about the submission of the future social and social structure of the Moro Republic to Sharia ^law1 . As the Muslim movement radicalizes in the Philippines, sectarian conflict is intensifying ^.2

The peak of Islamist terrorist activity was an explosion in Indonesia, on the island of Bali in October 2002, when more than 200 people were killed and more than 300 were injured. Most of the victims were foreign tourists, mostly from Australia. The trail leads to a regional terrorist underground - the Jamaa Islamiya group, which seeks to create a pan-Islamic state at the expense of the territories of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Brunei. In March 2003, there were two explosions with a large number of victims at Davao Airport on the Philippine island of Mindanao. This summer, there was another explosion that claimed lives near the Mariot Hotel in Jakarta.

In these circumstances, it is important to find out-what and how strong impact does militant Islam have on the state of society in the Southeast Asian countries? Such a statement of the question is legitimate, since manifestations of extremism, as a rule, cause a response from the authorities and the population.

MODERATES AND ORTHODOX

Moderate Muslims are noticeably more interested in religion. Concerned about the decline in moral standards, corruption and the resulting social consequences, moderate Muslims see religion and its organizational structures as a means to solve these problems and, willingly or unwittingly, become to some extent a "reserve" for joining the ranks of radical Islamists.

page 35

Religious leaders and religious organizations in Indonesia enjoy significantly more trust in social and domestic matters than the police and courts, according to a study by the U.S.-based Asia Foundation. Azumardi Azra, rector of the State Islamic University and a leading theorist of Islam in Indonesia, finds it quite reasonable that many people turn to religious organizations because the state is not able to solve their problems. It is also necessary to state that the democratization of a society that was not prepared for such a process, which followed the fall of the Suharto regime (which prevented the spread of Islam), resulted in an increase in the process of its Islamization.

The Jakarta-based Center for the Study of Islam conducted a survey showing that 61 percent of respondents approve of the introduction of Sharia law in everyday life. But the overwhelming majority of them categorically rejected such draconian measures prescribed by Sharia law as punishing thieves by amputating limbs and stoning unfaithful wives. ³

Muslim hierarchs have already made an unsuccessful attempt to pass the "sharia law" of the country's constitution through parliament.

In a number of districts and provinces seeking greater autonomy, the idea of increasing the role of sharia law in these territories is openly discussed. Not so long ago, the governor of East Java disturbed the peace of Indonesian society by trying to introduce the mandatory wearing of head coverings by girls in state gymnasiums on Fridays and religious holidays. However, this initiative was not supported by the majority of residents of the province, and the number of supporters of the innovation was not enough to finally legalize it.

It should be noted that elements of Sharia law have always been present in the daily life of residents of Indonesia and Malaysia. Its norms are reflected in certain acts of family law, in particular, when resolving issues of guardianship, inheritance, and division of property. Appeals are considered by religious courts, of which there are 330 in the country. These courts have their own representation in the Supreme Court of the country.

In Malaysia, which inherited legislation mainly from its former metropolis - Great Britain, issues of family, marriage, and morality in relation to Muslims are also resolved in accordance with Sharia law. Religious courts pass sentences for drinking alcohol, refusing to visit places of worship, and violating marital status.-

page 36

coy fidelity, homosexuality, and so on. However, the punishments are mild, rather educational in nature in order to deter the guilty from repeated sinful offenses.

In fact, the issue in these countries is not the legalization of Sharia law, but the scope and scope of its application. There are big differences between moderates, or "nominal" Muslims, and radicals.

The principled position of moderate Muslims is that sharia law should be applied in practice selectively and on a purely voluntary basis, without invasion of privacy. Religiosity does not automatically combine with too strict adherence to the canons of Sharia law. For moderate Muslims, there is no future in a society that is the ideal of fanatical Islamic Orthodoxy. Meanwhile, the proponents of radical Islam insist on strict observance of all the canons of Sharia law and on evaluating all events in public life only through its prism. But adherents of such views in Indonesia are by no means the majority.

The rebellious province of Aceh, which demands secession from the country in order to create an Islamic state, is becoming a kind of laboratory for the legalization of Sharia law in a wide scope. In this province, measures are being taken to sharply limit the use of alcohol, the wearing of head coverings has become mandatory for women, the separation of men and women in public places has been introduced, and gambling is prohibited.

But even here, the initiators of stoning unfaithful wives and amputating the limbs of thieves have few supporters. In addition, the active promotion of such punitive measures may cause an undesirable international response.

SHARIA LAW WON'T PASS?

The Governor of the province, Abdul Puteh, has drafted a law that would extend the powers of religious courts to deal with criminal and commercial matters. But according to local analysts, in particular the rector of the Aceh-based State Islamic University, this measure is rather political in nature, and its implementation is unlikely to be successful.

Although the province has sent representatives to Malaysia and Egypt to study their experience in implementing Sharia law in full, the head of the religious court in Aceh, Sofiane Saleh, notes that this process is long and complex, and it can only be resolved if there is a consensus among the four million people of Aceh. Meanwhile, since the beginning of the separatist uprising here, that is, since the mid-70s of the last century, the number of victims of the conflict has increased by many thousands. In 2001, violence in Aceh claimed more than 1,500 lives. Meanwhile, the main separatist leaders are hiding abroad. So the issue is still waiting to be resolved...

In Malaysia, the solution of religious issues is closely linked to the complex ethnic and political situation. The opposition Islamic party PAS builds its policy in the struggle for power, playing on the age - old problem of Malaysia-the economic backwardness of Malay Muslims, who represent the majority of the country's population, and uses Islam as a weapon in the confrontation with the main party of the ruling coalition - the United Malay National Organization (UMNO). Both parties claim a monopoly on the correct interpretation of Islam in relation to the conditions of the country. PACE insists on the introduction of the so-called Islamic criminal code (hudud) in the country, as the only correct principle not only in passing sentences in court, but also in regulating the entire life of society, including the most severe penalties for apostasy from the canons of Islam.

But even though hudud has been proclaimed for 11 years as the official criterion for determining guilt and punishment in the states of Kelantan and Terengganu, located in the so-called "Muslim belt" in northern Malaysia, where Islamists completely control the situation and PAS is the ruling party, it cannot implement it. OMNO stated that the introduction of an Islamic criminal code is unconstitutional. Kuala Lumpur has instructed the police of these states not to cooperate with local authorities in cases where the proposed penalties for offenses are contrary to the provisions of the country's Constitution.

However, the Chief Minister of Terengganu State and PAS President Hadi Awang stated that there is only one solution to this problem, namely, in favor of PAS, and this decision will be made at all levels within a year. In an interview with a newspaper, he noted that the disclosure of this intention had produced "striking results" in the fight against crime, as offenders "became intimidated" ^.4

The history of the very emergence of Islamic radicals in Malaysia is rather unclear. The fact that they exist is indisputable. It is also clear that at the moment they do not pose a threat to the country's security. But the situation that has emerged in Malaysia is yet another confirmation that in the context of the growing role and politicization of Islam, its radical offshoot, its very presence, despite its insignificance in the political sky, can have a very big impact on the balance of power in the country.

ISLAMISTS HELP CONSOLIDATE POWER

The government of Mahathir Mohamad turned out to be interested in the appearance of certain extremists in the political arena, which gave the authorities a propaganda tool in the fight against terrorism.

page 37

the Islamic opposition. The son of religious leader Pasik Aziz is the head of the radical Islamic organization "Mujahideen Brigade of Malaysia", which the authorities have accused of extremism and terrorism. Together with the son of one of the PAS leaders, a dozen more Islamists were sent to prison, and the PAS was discredited. Along with suspected terrorists, political opponents of the Prime Minister were arrested on the basis of the Law on Internal Security.

In his strong condemnation of Islamic extremism, Mahathir Mohamad enlisted not only moderate Muslims, who are the majority, but also representatives of other ethnic groups and faiths. As a result, he managed to consolidate his political base, which was undermined during the parliamentary elections in late 1999. Political stabilization allowed for a number of measures aimed at boosting the economy, which were impossible in other conditions.

For Malaysia, which is heavily dependent on foreign trade, the normalization of relations with its main trading partner, the United States, has become a very significant factor against the background of its anti - terrorist actions and statements by government officials.

Naturally, the presence of extremism in the political spectrum does not always produce such favorable results. Often it is quite the opposite. The main thing is that almost everywhere extremism in any ratio to the overall balance of power is the cause of concentration of tension and political manipulation. In the southern Philippines, for example, MILF fighters are fighting to establish an independent Islamic State throughout Mindanao, even though only four of the island's fourteen provinces are Muslim-majority.

The outbreak of violence by the radical wing of Muslims allowed the country's openly pro-American President, Gloria Arroyo, to resume large-scale military cooperation with the United States. Reactions to the return of American soldiers to the Philippines after a ten-year hiatus were mixed. There were violent demonstrations of protest, and not only from the Muslim community. But as the results of an independent public opinion poll conducted in Manila showed , there was also strong support for the president's policy, which decided to rely on the help of the United States in the fight against terrorism ^.5 The president skilfully played on these sentiments and, as subsequent events showed, did not lose out.

WHAT IS "TRUE TRADITIONALISM"?

In general, most Islamic groups in Southeast Asia are not violent. The largest and most influential among them are either political parties or organizations that advocate the "revival of Islam". One such group is Nahjatul Ulama, Indonesia's and the world's largest Islamic organization with 30 million followers. It supports "traditional" Muslim values, but its "traditionalism" means a tolerant and pluralistic approach to the observance and practice of Islam. Along with Nahdatul Ulama, the other largest multi-million-dollar Muslim association in Indonesia, Muhammadia, also condemned the terrorist action on the island of Bali.

In fact, Islamic fundamentalism and extremism have always been present in Indonesia since independence in 1945 and even earlier, but they did not determine the mood and motivation of the Muslim community that forms the basis of Indonesian society. Supporters of rebuilding the entire way of life on the basis of Sharia law and turning Indonesia into an Islamic state have always been a minority of the population. The deepening of social differences as economic development progresses, and the widening gap between the rich and the have-nots - these are the reasons that lead to the intensification of religious sentiment in the most deprived strata of society ^.6

An aggressive minority can have a decisive impact on the state of society. It becomes an extremely active material under the influence of various kinds of Islamic ideologues pursuing their own interests. This includes Osama bin Laden, who is trying to draw extremists from Southeast Asian countries into the orbit of his influence on the wave of religious solidarity, the leaders of the separatist movement in Aceh and other provinces of Indonesia, who are trying to solve their problems under the flag of the Islamic state, and the leadership of the extremist Muslim group Jama'a Islamiya.

The already mentioned Philippine MILF insurgents can be included in this list with good reason.

"THE AFGHAN FACTOR"

Speaking about the origins of extremism in South-East Asia, it should be noted that no matter how fashionable it is in modern Russian political science thought, the root cause of this phenomenon is to see the radicalization of religious feelings among the disadvantaged as social inequality deepens, we should not forget about other very significant factors. In particular, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the collapse of the Soviet Union served as an incentive for the activation of Islamic extremism, whose ideologues claim that by crushing a great power with the support of Allah in the fight against the "infidels", the Islamic world can and should defeat the United States - the only remaining superpower that seeks to dictate its will to the whole world.

These views fell on fertile ground in

page 38

South-East Asia, where anti-American sentiment is very stable. Radicalism, which has recently played a significant role in the political life of the region, has lost its basic foundation after the collapse of Marxist ideology. The surge of aggressive Maoism in Indonesia in the late 1960s, and the large-scale actions of the Khmer Rouge and insurgent groups in Malaysia, Thailand ,and the Philippines are now history, and their repetition is unlikely, since the role models of "revolutionary" China and the "socialist" Soviet Union have been discredited and disappeared. ⁷

A new super-goal was required-one more important than life, in the name of which violence is permissible and even necessary. Terrorism needs an ideological foundation in order to justify self-sacrifice, justify the killing of civilians, mass repression, and so on. The ideological vacuum that emerged after the weakening of leftist radicalism began to fill extremist fundamentalism. The rise of the Islamist movement in Southeast Asia is part of this process.

It involves the poor and destitute, who see it as a way to solve their problems, just as actively as in the promotion of Marxist ideology. Some radical Islamic paramilitary groups are a cross between criminal gangs and insurgents. Examples include Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and the Jihadist Army in Indonesia, where political actions are "mixed" with criminal acts such as extortion and racketeering. In Indonesia, these gangs were used as paramilitary groups against East Timor's independence in the 1990s. The Jihadi Army group recruits fighters from the unemployed male population of cities and pays salaries to their families during their service.

IN THE RANKS OF TERRORISTS - NOT ONLY THE POOR AND DESTITUTE

The composition of adherents of radical Islam on a social basis presents a very motley picture. It is obvious that the mass character of this movement, at least in Indonesia, is provided by the poorest strata of society, forming the lowest link in the hierarchy of the rebel movement. But a significant role is played by professional terrorists who come from well-to-do families. They can afford to live abroad, appear in the region only to commit terrorist acts, or even carry out leadership from abroad.

Thus, the perpetrator of the August 2001 bombing of a major shopping mall in Jakarta was a Malaysian citizen, originally a member of the Mujahideen Brigade of Malaysia and then infiltrated Indonesia to act as part of the" Jihad Army of the Moluccas". The Indonesian police believe that the leaders of the military wing of the "Aceh Independence Movement" and the son of former President Suharto Tommy are the direct inspirers and organizers of this action. Children of prominent Malay political figures are also suspected of involvement in the extremist Muslim group Jama'a Islamiya in Malaysia.

Both Jama'ah Islamiyah and the Mujahideen Brigade of Malaysia - the only terrorist groups in the region that have demonstrated the ability to carry out large-scale terrorist attacks-are made up of educated middle-class individuals who benefit from globalization, rather than being victims of it. Both groups failed to gain electoral support among the poor. Poverty alone cannot explain the existence of such a transnational terrorist network as Jama'ah islamiyah.

Islamist groups themselves form several distinct categories: movements for the cultural and spiritual revival of Islam; political parties; armed and unarmed organizations fighting for autonomy or secession of Muslim areas; radical paramilitary groups and transnational terrorist cells and networks.

The religious factor does not always play a unifying role. A clear example of this is the situation in the largest country in the Muslim world - Indonesia, where 90 percent of the country's 220 million people practice Islam. If adherence to one religion does not contribute to, then at least it does not prevent prolonged bloodshed in Aceh, which is essentially a conflict between parties who differ in their understanding of Islam.

Supporters of "liberal Islam" present an equally mixed picture, in particular with regard to extremists. In their midst, different strata of society, for all their demonstrative commitment to Islam, show a multiplicity of often contradictory interests related to religion. This also applies to such an acute issue in Indonesia as the Sharia constitution.

In addition, it is obviously necessary to clearly distinguish between sincere and heterogeneous aspirations related to religion, various strata of society, and often " PR " statements of politicians that are opportunistic or frankly ambitious in nature. Islam in Southeast Asia is increasingly becoming a weapon in the struggle for power. Its unprecedented politicization is taking place to the detriment of its true purpose: political involvement in religion causes deep wounds to its spirituality.

-----

¹ South-East Asia in 2001, Moscow, 2002, p. 182.

² Ibid., p. 183.

³ Far Eastern Economic Review, 22.08.2002, p. 12.

⁴ Ibid., p. 14.

⁵ ITAR-TASS, Hanoi, 23.01.2003.

⁶ Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16.09. 2001.

⁷ South-East Asia in 2001, Moscow, 2002, p. 40.

Permanent link to this publication: