Tropical Africa Keywords:, demography, population forecasts, population explosion, ways to reduce the birth rate

A. V. KOROTAEV

Doctor of Historical Sciences

Yu. V. ZINKINA

Candidate of Historical Sciences

Institute of Africa, Russian Academy of Sciences

According to ^the latest UN average prediction1, published in 2012, the population of relatively small East African countries such as Kenya and Uganda will exceed the population of Russia in the second half of this century; Tanzania will reach the level of Russia by 2050, and by the end of this century will exceed it by more than twice. The population of Nigeria will exceed the current number of Russians by almost 5 times (see figure 1).

Such explosive population growth is undoubtedly capable of turning into a large-scale humanitarian catastrophe for these countries and for the world community as a whole.

Figure 1. UN average forecast for population dynamics (in thousands) in the 21st century for some countries in Tropical Africa ².

Figure 2 shows the UN population forecast for countries in Africa with the highest socio-demographic risks of large-scale humanitarian disasters.

Especially impressive is Malawi, a very small country in south-eastern Africa (with an area of just over 100 thousand square kilometers, i.e. less than, say, the Vologda Oblast), whose population, according to the average UN forecast, should approach the population of Russia. On the other hand, it is obvious that the largest socio-demographic collapse - up to large-scale, bloody civil wars, or even the collapse of the state after a prolonged period of conflict and violence, with tens of millions of deaths, can occur in Nigeria (if adequate measures are not taken there in the very near future to prevent explosive population growth).

It is important to emphasize that the average UN forecast assumes that the birth rate in Tropical Africa will decrease-

Figure 2. African countries with the greatest risks of large-scale humanitarian disasters in the XXI century - where the population (in thousands) in 2100 will approach or exceed the current population of Russia ³.

Figure 3. Dynamics of the total fertility rate in sub-Saharan Africa, 1960-1995

Moreover, the rate of decline is expected to accelerate compared to what has been observed in recent years. However, it is clear from population growth forecasts that even the UN-predicted acceleration of the birth rate decline in Tropical Africa will not be enough to prevent large-scale humanitarian disasters.

The situation is further compounded by the fact that many countries in Tropical Africa have not yet managed to escape the so-called "Malthusian trap"*, which makes the probability of socio-demographic collapses in these countries particularly high4.

Indeed, in about half of the countries in Tropical Africa, per capita food consumption barely reaches or is significantly below the World Health Organization (WHO) norm. Such a situation in the past has often led to socio-political upheavals, including prolonged and bloody civil wars, in different countries.

* The Malthusian trap is a formal consequence of Malthus ' theory, according to which countries where population growth outstrips production growth "fall" into it. It follows that their populations are doomed to unemployment, starvation, and poverty if they do not resort to birth control.

Figure 4. Dynamics of the total fertility rate in some countries of Tropical Africa, 1990-2005

However, it is not possible to increase per capita food consumption in Africa, largely because extremely rapid population growth is now literally "eating up" productivity growth, especially in the agricultural sector, where a significant part of the African population is still employed. If the population is expected to grow several times over the next decades, this could lead to widespread famine and a humanitarian catastrophe.

THE SEVERITY OF THE PROBLEM IS STILL UNDERESTIMATED

However, despite the urgency of the situation, the problem of explosive population growth in Tropical Africa has been overlooked by international development assistance agencies. The fact is that the peak of alarmist moods ⁵ in the world community regarding the demographic explosion in Tropical Africa occurred in the 1970s and early 1990s. ⁶ It is noteworthy that it was at this time that the birth rate in most countries of sub-Saharan Africa began to decline, and at an increasingly rapid pace (see figure 3).

By the early 2000s, information about the decline in the birth rate in Tropical Africa had spread to the world community. UN experts predicted that the population of sub-Saharan Africa would stabilize at relatively safe levels (see chart 5). And the world community more or less calmed down7-it seemed that the decline in the birth rate would continue ^{continuously.} However, the calm was premature. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the decline in birth rates slowed or stopped in most countries of Tropical Africa, and in some countries the birth rate even began to increase. Moreover, it is "frozen" at very high levels, in most cases-5,5-6 children per woman (see figure 4).

Given the period when the birth rate has been stagnating at a high level, UN experts have had to revise their forecasts for many Tropical African countries a decade ago to increase the projected population values to such values that indicate very real risks of large-scale social and humanitarian disasters in these countries (figure 5).

As a result, we are now dealing with the risk of large-scale humanitarian disasters, which is incomparably more serious than it seemed even, say, 10 years ago. Meanwhile, the world community does not realize the revival of the terrible threat of large-scale socio-demographic disasters in Tropical Africa. And there is a risk that when it finally realizes this, it will be too late.

So what can and should be done to prevent the threat in question?

WOMEN'S EDUCATION COMES FIRST...

Among the factors influencing the birth rate, the level of female education is very significant. A well-established female education reduces the actual birth rate and the desired number of children per woman. More educated women marry later (which is a strong predictor ^of a significant decline in fertility in traditional societies where contraception is not widely used, and socio-cultural differences between women and men).-

Figure 5. Comparison of two UN average projections (2000 and 2012) for some Tropical African countries (in thousands)⁸.

legal norms suppress out-of-wedlock births), have more information and access to family planning, and use contraception more frequently and more effectively.¹⁰ However, in Tropical Africa, the effect of higher education on lower birth rates has long been noticeably weaker than in other regions ^of the world, possibly due to the weaker prevalence of women's education in this region11.

A number of studies have convincingly shown the impact of the spread of women's education in Tropical Africa on the decline in the birth rate. For example, the prominent American demographer John Bongaarts studied a collection of data from 30 African countries during the 2000s and concluded that in all these countries, the total fertility rate (TFR)¹² was lower for women with secondary and higher education than for women with primary education. At the same time, in 27 countries, the number of de --

Figure 6. Correlation between the proportion of women over the age of 15 with at least incomplete primary education and the total fertility rate in Tropical Africa.

There were fewer tes per woman with primary education than for women without education ¹³.

The international community has now recognized the need to spread education in Tropical Africa. As you know, one of the" Millennium Development Goals", a program ^proclaimed by the UN14, is to ensure universal primary education in all countries and for all peoples. However, this goal is set regardless of the impact of its implementation on the birth rate-both in individual countries and on the Earth as a whole.

Let's look at how achieving 100% primary education coverage will affect the total birth rate in Tropical Africa. To do this, we will perform a correlation-regression analysis ¹⁵ and analyze the scatter plot ¹⁶, which reflects the relationship between the proportion of women over the age of 15 who have at least incomplete primary education and the total birth rate according to censuses conducted at different times in 35 countries of Tropical Africa (most countries conducted more than one census) (see diagr. 6).

Our analysis allows us to draw an important conclusion-the simple elimination of female illiteracy (i.e., one hundred percent of the female population's coverage of incomplete primary education) is not enough to bring the birth rate in Tropical Africa to the level of replacement of population reproduction (2.1 children per woman). The analysis shows that if 100% of sub-Saharan African women have at least incomplete primary education, the birth rate should be slightly more than 5 children per woman.

Let us now consider the impact of the expansion of secondary education on fertility in sub-Saharan Africa (figure 7).

Our analysis showed that if 70% of the female population over the age of 15 has at least an incomplete secondary (or higher) education, the birth rate in Tropical Africa should reach approximately the level of reproduction of the population - 2 children per woman.

We emphasize that preventing the risks of socio-demographic catastrophes in Tropical Africa by increasing the proportion of women over 15 years of age with secondary education to 70% is not as easy as it may seem at first glance. After all, it is not a question of ensuring that 70% of all African girls attend secondary school (although this result is not easy to achieve, but in principle, with the political will and sufficient funding, it can be done quickly enough). The fact is that the majority of African women who do not have secondary education have long since left school, and the task of providing secondary education to illiterate African women in their 30s is not realistic. Although, in our opinion, it has long been necessary to expand the opportunities for secondary education for adult Africans. But, first of all,

Figure 7. Correlation between the proportion of women over the age of 15 with at least incomplete secondary education and the total fertility rate in sub-Saharan Africa (Scatter plot with superimposed regression line ¹⁷).

We should strive for one hundred percent coverage of secondary education for school-age children in general and girls in particular.

To prevent the risks of socio-demographic disasters in Tropical Africa, it is necessary to introduce universal compulsory secondary education in these countries as soon as possible. But even in this case, a noticeable increase in the proportion of women over the age of 15 with secondary education will occur only after 8-12 years, when the contingent of students who started studying in the year of the introduction of universal secondary education will finish secondary ^school18. This measure will help to reduce demographic pressures in Tropical Africa in two ways: both by reducing the birth rate and by accelerating economic growth (and at the same time, both through the "demographic bonus" mechanism⁾, and by increasing labor productivity, since educated people almost always work more efficiently and have higher qualifications).

The introduction of universal compulsory secondary education in Tropical Africa is, of course,an extremely expensive measure, and it is impossible for African countries to cope with this on their own. The international community in general and developed countries (including the United States and Russia) in particular need to provide support to the countries of this region, including significant financial assistance.²⁰ If this support from economically developed countries is not provided in the near future, they will be required to spend incomparably more for the same purposes in the future, not to mention the problems associated with almost inevitable socio-demographic catastrophes in these countries.

...AND ON THE SECOND - FAMILY PLANNING

In general, it is the increase in women's secondary education that seems to be the main way to reduce the birth rate in Tropical Africa. This area should be a priority in the planning of national budgets and in the allocation of international aid flows. However, raising the level of education of women in a particular region is essentially a long-term measure, the effect of which will gradually affect as girls who have completed secondary education enter the active reproductive age. Meanwhile, the forecasts of UN experts indicate the need for the most urgent measures aimed at reducing the birth rate, and too long (at least 8-10 years) time lag is strongly unacceptable. Therefore, in parallel with the development of secondary education (which, we repeat, should be an absolute priority for governments), it is necessary to take other measures to reduce the birth rate, which can have a faster effect.

To do this, we will consider the experience of countries that, with a relatively small (less than 10%) share of women with incomplete secondary and higher education, were able to achieve significant success in reducing the birth rate.

These include, for example, Ethiopia and Rwanda.

In Ethiopia, TFR has declined in just 10 years from 5.9 children per woman in 2000 to 4.8 children in 2010, or 1.1 children per woman. It is important that the birth rate declined steadily in both urban and rural areas.²¹ While maintaining (or slightly accelerating) the current rate of decline in the birth rate, Ethiopia should approach the level of simple reproduction of the population approximately by 2030, reaching the level of approximately 2.5 children per woman. The same forecast for this country is given by the UN Population Bureau. It is worth noting that due to a significant decline in the birth rate, Ethiopia is the only major country in Tropical Africa that has a chance of avoiding a demographic catastrophe; the population here will double by 2050, and then its number will stabilize.

The Health Extension Program, adopted by the Government of Ethiopia in 2003, played a huge role in the demographic success achieved. The main goal of the program is to provide the rural population with universal access to primary health care ²² and preventive measures, including family planning practices (to a large extent by raising public awareness about the harm to the country and society of too many children in the family). Within the framework of the program, so-called health centers were created in each kebel²³ at the rate of 1 point per 5 thousand population. These locations employ 30,000 health extension workers from among local young girls and women who have received special training. They visit families in their district and teach newly born women about family planning, newborn care, and hygiene skills. They also talk about healthy nutrition, prevention of infectious diseases, and so on. ²⁴ This program is largely responsible for the level of contraception among Ethiopian women (i.e., the rate of birth control among women).the proportion of women using contraceptives in relation to the total number of women aged 15-49 years increased from 3% in 1997 to 29% in 2010, while in urban areas it was 52.5%, and in rural areas-23.4%²⁵.

Rwanda's demographic progress in recent years is even more remarkable. Here, from 2005 to 2010, it was possible to reduce the birth rate at a record rate for Tropical Africa and very high by world standards - by 25% in 5 years - from 6.1 to 4.6 children per woman. At the same time, the birth rate decreased in all population groups - among urban women (from 4.9 children per woman in 2005 to 3.4 in 2010) and rural women (from 6.3 to 4.8), among women without education (from 6.9 to 5.4), with primary education (from 6.1 to 4.8), with secondary and secondary education. higher education (from 4.3 in 2005 to 3 in 2010) ²⁶.

Rwanda achieved such a brilliant result thanks to the implementation of a large-scale government program to promote family planning practices using the developed infrastructure of mutu - elles, a health insurance system funded by insurance premiums and the State budget.²⁷ As early as 2007, Rwandan President Paul Kagame said that he was aware of Rwanda's significant lag behind the global average in the distribution of contraception.²⁸ He set a goal to increase the rate of contraception use among married women from 17.4% in 2005 to 70% in 2012 (however, since the population survey takes quite a long time to complete, Rwanda has not yet published an official report on the achievement of this goal).

Rwanda has achieved a phenomenally rapid increase in the prevalence of contraception among women aged 15-49 who are married (both registered and unregistered), from 17.4% in 2005 to 51.6% in 2010, with rapid increases in both urban areas (from 31.6% to 53.1%) and rural areas. rural areas (from 15.2% to 51.4%). Impressive progress was also made in other areas: for example, in the 10 years from 2000 to 2010, Rwanda managed to reduce infant mortality by more than 2 times (from 107.4 to 50 per 1000 population) and child mortality (from 196.2 to 76 per 1000 population) ²⁹.

* * *

In conclusion, it is necessary to say once again that the estimated rate of decline in the birth rate in Tropical Africa, included in the UN forecasts, is clearly insufficient, and therefore there is a need for a radical acceleration of the decline in the birth rate. The main way to solve this problem should be to increase the coverage of women in secondary education and bring it to at least 70% of the female population over the age of 15. This can only be achieved if universal compulsory secondary education is introduced immediately in the countries of the region. In addition, it is necessary to simultaneously take other measures to reduce the birth rate, which can have a faster effect. In particular, it is necessary to introduce large-scale programs for the distribution of contraception, ensuring the availability of services (and information about them) for the population, especially in rural areas. Combination of strategic (universal secondary education) and tactical (mass distribution of contraception)

This is, of course, very costly, but for most African countries it is the only way to avoid a dramatic slowdown in development and a host of other problems, including major humanitarian disasters and social upheavals.

¹ The term "average forecast" means that there are at least two other forecasts - the maximum and minimum. Naturally, the "average forecast" seems to be the most reliable.

² See: United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 2012. Population Division Database. World Population Prospects - http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm

³ Ibidem.

^{Korotaev A.V., Khalturina D. A., Bozhevolnov Yu. V.} 4 Zakony istorii [Laws of History]. Secular cycles and millennial trends. Demographics. Economy. Wars. 3rd ed. Moscow, LKI/URSS, 2010; Khalturina D. A., Kopomaee A. B. Demographic pressure and political upheavals in modern Tropical Africa. 2006. N 2, pp. 52-69.

⁵ Alarmist sentiments (from the French alarm - alarm! to arms!) - moods characterized by anxiety, an extremely gloomy, pessimistic view of the future, and a demand for urgent, emergency measures to stop or delay the approaching catastrophe.

⁶ См.: Ehrlich P.R. The Population Bomb. New York, NY: Ballantine, 1968; Ehrlich P.R., Ehrlich A.M. The Population Explosion. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1990.

^{Cohen J.} 7 Population and planet: the twentieth century and the twenty-first // Harvard Magazine. 1999. Vol. 102, No. 2, p. 38 - 40; его же - The future of population // What the Future Holds: Insights from Social Science, ed. Richard N. Cooper & Richard Layard. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002, p. 29 - 75; United Nations. 2012. Population Division Database. World Population Prospects - http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm

⁸ See: United Nations. 2012. Population Division Database...

⁹ Predictor (from the English predictor - "predictor") - a predictive parameter, a means of forecasting. Originally a purely mathematical term (in the field of extrapolation functions), it is now also used in other fields of knowledge.

¹⁰ См., например: Caldzeell J.C. Mass education as a determinant of the timing of fertility decline // Population and Development Review. 1980. Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 225-255; also known as The global fertility transition: the need for a unifying theory // Population and Development Review. 1997. Vol. 23, No. 4, p. 803 - 812; Jejeebhoy S. Women's Education, Autonomy, and Reproductive Behaviour: Experience from Developing Countries. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995; Kirk D., Fillet B. Fertility levels, trends, and differentials in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s and 1990s // Studies in Family Planning. 1998. Vol. 29, No. 1, p. 1 - 22; Uchudi J.M. Spouses' socioeconomic characteristics and fertility differences in sub-Saharan Africa: does spouse's education matter? // Journal of Biosocial Science. 2001. Vol. 33, No. 4, p. 481 - 502; Fertility behaviour in the context of development: evidence from the World Fertility Survey. United Nations, New York, 1987.

¹¹ See, for example: Cleland J. G., Rodriguez G. The effect of parental education on marital fertility in developing countries // Population Studies. 1988. Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 419 - 442; Cochrane S., Earid S. Fertility in sub-Saharan Africa: Levels and their Explanations. Washington DC: The World Bank, 1986; Rodriguez G., Aravena R. Socioeconomic factors and the transition to low fertility in less developed countries: a comparative analysis // Proceedings of the Demographic and Health Surveys World Conference. Columbia, Maryland: IRD/Macro International, 1991.

¹² This indicator shows the average number of children that a woman of a certain generation will give birth to over her lifetime, while maintaining the current birth rate at each age, regardless of mortality and changes in age composition.

^{Bongaarts J.} 13 The Causes of Educational Differences in Fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa // Poverty, Gender, and Youth Working Paper. Vol. 20. Population Council, New York, 2010.

¹⁴ См.: The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010. United Nations, 2010.

¹⁵ Correlation-regression analysis is a more general concept in relation to another common statistical and mathematical term-correlation analysis - a method of processing statistical data that measures the tightness of the relationship between two or more variables.

¹⁶ Diagram of dispersion - a two-dimensional graphical representation of the correlation between two measurement series; in this case, between the birth rate and the level of education of women. The more points in the scatter plot, the higher the probability that the correlation results (as well as the results of the study as a whole) will be reliable.

¹⁷ is a line that most accurately reflects the distribution of experimental points on the scatter plot and the slope of which characterizes the relationship between two interval variables.

¹⁸ This period will be 6 to 8 years, respectively, in those countries where universal primary education has already been effectively introduced.

¹⁹ High proportion of the working-age population in the age structure of the population. This phenomenon is usually observed in a country at the end of a demographic transition - as the birth rate decreases to the level of reproduction of the population, and new generations are noticeably less numerous than the last generation, which was born at a relatively high birth rate. At the moment when this large generation enters working age, the country begins to receive a "demographic bonus" - a lot of productive labor with a small number of children and the elderly.

²⁰ It should be noted that mathematical modeling of the interaction between the center and the periphery of the World-System, carried out by us in the framework of the project of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences "Complex system Analysis and mathematical modeling of world dynamics", showed that the amount of aid sent by developed countries to the development of education in Tropical Africa is a parameter of prevent socio-demographic disasters in these countries.

²¹ Ethiopia Demographic and Health Survey 2011. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Calverton, Maryland, USA: Central Statistical Agency and ICF International, 2012; Ethiopia Demographic and Health Survey 2005. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Calverton, Maryland, USA: Central Statistical Agency and ORC Macro, 2006; Ethiopia Demographic and Health Survey 2000. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Calverton, Maryland, USA: Central Statistical Authority and ORC Macro, 2001.

²² That is, basic medical care in case of sudden injury, exacerbation of a chronic disease, etc.

^Kebele is the smallest administrative division in Ethiopia.

²⁴ Federal Ministry of Health [Ethiopia]. Health Extension Program in Ethiopia Profile. Addis Ababa: Health Extension and Education Center, Federal Ministry of Health, 2007.

²⁵ Ethiopia Demographic and Health Survey 2011..; Ethiopia Demographic and Health Survey 2005..; Ethiopia Demographic and Health Survey 2000...

²⁶ Rwanda Demographic and Health Survey 2010. Calverton, Maryland, USA: NISR, MOH, 2012; Enquete Demographique et de Sante Rwanda 2005. Calverton, Maryland, U.S.A.: INSR et ORC Macro, 2006; Enquete Demographique et de Sante, Rwanda 2000. Kigali, Rwanda et Calverton, Maryland, USA: Ministere de la Sante, Office National de la Population et ORC Macro, 2001.

^{Lu C., Chin B., Lewandowski J.L., Basinga P., Hirschhorn L.R., et al.} 27 Towards Universal Health Coverage: An Evaluation of Rwanda Mutuelles in its First Eight Years // PLoS ONE. 2012. Vol. 7, N 6, p. e39282; Sharing the burden of sickness: mutual health insurance in Rwanda // Bulletin of World Health Organization. 2008. Vol. 86, N 11, p. 823 - 824.

^{Kinzer S.} 28 After so many deaths, too many births // New York Times, 11.02.2007 - http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/11/weekinre view/11kinzer.html?_r=0

²⁹ Rwanda Demographic and Health Survey 2010; Enquete Demographique et de Same Rwanda 2005; Enquete Demographique et de Sante, Rwanda 2000.

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