"The fact that we have strengthened and improved macro - regulation and macro - control in a timely manner during the international financial crisis, corrected market deviations and closed the gaps that appeared due to market inactivity-in order to avoid sharp fluctuations in the economy-is, as practice shows, absolutely correct."

(From the report of Premier Wen Jiabao of the State Council of the People's Republic of China at the March 2011 session of the National People's Congress)

During periods of global financial and economic crises, the lack of balanced assessments of current events is particularly acute. It is very important that the logic of fire measures does not lead to a loss of a strategic view of the situation, and calm planning of one's own actions - whether it is a corporation or a state - instills confidence in the future. Deliberately sharply placing some accents in the article offered to the reader, we just expect to receive this kind of view and ratings. Therefore, we will immediately make one reservation: contrasting the "mainstream"1 We do not believe that there is any antagonism between the two models. Whether China has absorbed the "mainstream" or will eventually become a part of this phenomenon is not the most important thing. More importantly, the entire rating system that politicians and businessmen are used to using is now in a semi-emergency state. This may be to the benefit of those who can conduct a realistic self-assessment in a changed global environment.

Key words: world economy and China, globalization, regionalization, Beijing Consensus.

The beginning of the twelfth five-year plan in China (2011-2015) coincided with the state visit of the Chinese leader to the United States. The significance of this visit was, among other things,that the American side was forced to ask for a delay in payments. 2 The era of US economic dominance ended on 3.

The discussion materials of this article are planned to be published in N 1-3 for 2012-Ed.

1 By "mainstream" in this article, we mean mainly neoliberalism, which has become the dominant trend in American politics since the time of M. Friedman. In part, it can be attributed to the concept of post-industrial society by D. Bell.

2 We refer to paragraph 32 of the joint statement of the parties, which contains the following provision:: "The American side has promised to provide enterprises that are supported by the government with sufficient funds and abilities to fulfill their financial obligations." We are talking, of course, about Fanny-Mai and Freddie-Mac, who are heavily indebted to Beijing.

3 In fact, the Fed does not meet its statutory objectives. The main goal of the US Federal Reserve is formulated as follows: "To maintain the long-term growth of the volume of money and loans commensurate with the economy's ability to increase industrial production so that

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Accordingly, in the" post-American world", the mainstream space will significantly narrow. Numerous fictions born out of this direction will have to be archived, significantly updating the study of the economy of Asian countries. The key points of the review of the" mainstream " will be questions about the role of the state in the economy, the unity of the world economy, ideas about production factors, and much more.

Apparently, there will also be a significant devaluation of all kinds of derivatives of the "mainstream": indices of economic freedom and competitiveness, investment and climate measurements, a significant part of the products of "world" rating agencies, etc. Everything now looks both a little simpler and a little more complicated-if we keep in mind the extreme inertia of "modern economic science" in explaining the phenomena occurring on the planet.

As the" world's workshop "and the world's largest lender, China has implicitly adopted an investment development model that is fundamentally different from the"mainstream" one. The efficiency of the economic system of this country, and it is better to use the physical term exergy (from the Greek ex - and ergon-maximum efficiency), in the last thirty years has been very high. This analogy is reinforced by the fact that the process began in semi-isolation, and now, perhaps, is moving towards equilibrium with the environment - the world economy and neighboring farms.

If the previous Asian crisis of 1997-1998 convinced the Chinese leadership of the country's foreign economic usefulness, the" global " crisis of 2008-2009 clearly showed China's ability to develop at the expense of domestic factors. The heterogeneity and complexity of the economy, with the leading role of the public sector and the center, provide the world's largest industrial power with the necessary "depth of development", with the loss of which some of its neighbors in East Asia also lost high growth rates. The People's Republic of China, on the other hand, does not face such a loss in the foreseeable future - both in the country itself and abroad, there is quite enough space for continuing industrial and infrastructural development, i.e., the work of capital in the traditional, still Marxian understanding of this term.

The emphasis on industry is absolutely justified - this part of the global and Chinese economy has been and probably will continue to be the sector with the highest labor productivity4 for a long time to come. The "mainstream" thesis about services as a qualitatively higher sphere or stage of economic development is apparently inadequate. It is based only on short-term breakthroughs in certain narrow areas (for example, information and financial services), which gave temporary advantages to the leaders or monopolies of the West - also, as it turned out, temporary. Moreover, the growth in the share of the service sector in world GDP and the decline in the share of industry in it in recent decades have just indicated the extensive nature of the development of the tertiary sector, taken as a whole.5
effectively contribute to the achievement of maximum employment, price stability and moderate interest rates on long-term loans." The People's Bank of China is another matter. In the third article of the NBK Law, its goal is formulated as follows:"maintaining a stable purchasing power of money in order to promote the country's economic growth."

4 The share of industry in China's GDP is 47%, compared to 27% in India and Japan, 43% in Malaysia, 37% in the Republic of Korea, etc.

5 "Of course," G. K. Shirokov noted, " the service sector is extremely diverse: it covers industries from finance to cleaning and landscaping, because most of the employees work in personal services, supermarkets, gas stations, hotels, cleaning, home appliances repair, etc. Therefore, the transition to the servisization of the economy was accompanied by a decline in the qualifications of the majority of employees and stagnation of their incomes. An indicator of the extensiveness of the expansion of this sphere is an increase in the share of services, especially financial services, in the price of goods " [Shirokov, 2002, p. 66]. A similar example is given by P. Krugman, comparing the average salaries in the largest US companies in 1975 and 2005, taking into account inflation. General Motors paid $ 40,000 a year (1975), and Wal-Marts paid $ 18,000 a year (2005).

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Table 1

Macro indicators of China and the United States, trillion yuan

Indicator/Year

2000

2005

2010

2015**

2020**

US GDP

91.1

102.0

98.5

100.0

100.0

GDP OF THE PRC

9.8

18.2

39.8

65.0

105.0

Industrial production

23.5

22.4

21.6

20.0

20.0

USA*

Industrial production

4.6

8.6

18.6

30.0

45.0

China*

Yuan to dollar exchange rate

8.2

8.2

6.7

5.0

4.0

* Including construction.

** Forecast.

Source: [World Development Indicators. WB database].

In China, however, the share of industry (from 43% to 48% of GDP) and the share of services (from 32% to 40%) increased simultaneously between 1990 and 2005, while the share of industry in employment changed slightly (from 22% to 24%). Employment in services grew significantly, from 18% to 31%. As a result, the value added per employee in industry increased from 5.2 thousand yuan to 48 thousand, and in services - from 4.6 thousand to 30.6 thousand yuan [Zhongguo tongji..., pp. 20-21, 43]. Given the growing mass of rural industries with low labor productivity, we can conclude without any reservations that the main reason for success is industrialization, including the development of large-scale industry (and not just market reforms and openness, which in 1990 already had a ten-year experience).

China, however, has its own financial and other services sector that is sufficient for the national economy, as well as - unlike the United States-a completely competitive industry (whose products are still being purchased on a growing scale by average Americans). Therefore, comparing the economies of the two countries in terms of GDP (which in the United States is mainly represented by services that the average Chinese will not buy at their current price) is in a certain sense a convention.

However, we will give a few series to illustrate not so much the scale of farms as their dynamics-just according to the official exchange rate and current prices, obviously underestimating (in our opinion, approximately twice) the volume of China's GDP in physical terms. This dynamic shows a fundamental difference between the investment model and the practical implementation of the "mainstream" in one of the richest countries in the world (Table 1).
We will not bore the reader with figures of the US trade deficit and other facts that indicate the lack of competitiveness of American industry in the modern world. Let's add that the "unique" services of this country, including software and cinema, have quite satisfactory and cheap alternatives. Nevertheless, the optimistic scenario of the US economy growing at 3% per year, which is included in our forecast 6, gives it at best only the opportunity to maintain its current price in yuan.

6 Average annual GDP growth rate of China - 10% until 2020 It is taken as an average between the 7% proposed for the 12th five-year plan by the center and approximately 13% required by the regions. Inflation in both countries, we

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Table 2

China's foreign trade with selected countries in 2010

A country

Export

Import

Balance, USD billion

USD billion

growth rate, %

USD billion

growth rate, %

Total

1577.9

31.3

1394.8

38.7

+ 183.1

Japan

121.1

23.7

176.7

35.0

-55.6

Republic of Korea

68.8

28.1

138.4

35.0

-69.6

Taiwan

29.7

44.8

115.7

35.0

-86.0

USA

283.3

28.3

102.0

31.7

+181.3

Germany

68.1

36.3

74.3

33.4

-6.2

Source: [customs.gov.cn].

The lack of competitiveness of American corporations is well illustrated by data on China's foreign trade over the past year (Table 2). It can be seen, among other things, that the Chinese domestic market and at the same time the "export springboard" are successfully used by its neighbors who are skilled in industrial development. Companies in these countries are more likely to adopt a cost-saving strategy , in contrast to American corporations that rely on capturing foreign markets.

The new structure of the world economy will thus be increasingly shaped by China. At the same time, the previous division into "developed" and "undeveloped" ("catching up") worlds is creatively destroyed. This is a kind of response to the attempt to consolidate this division in the course of financial globalization, initiated and promoted by the United States. Recall that the sharp rise in the cost of credit in the late 1970s, caused by the actions of the Federal Reserve, was accompanied by numerous payment crises. There have been about a hundred such crises in the last quarter of a century. The massive debt crisis that began in Latin America in the 1980s kept the loan interest rate at a high level, with direct and indirect losses borne by all parties, including producers. Credit risks and capital overaccumulation in developed countries grew, and its further transformation into loan capital and "hot money"became significant.

But the effective demand for capital at high interest rates was insufficient, and borrowers often had to take very high risks. Many developing countries and some socialist countries were drawn into debt bondage. The rise in the cost of credit disrupted the long-term investment programs of nation-states on the periphery. In fact, "containment of development" was carried out - including through the IBRD and the IMF.

In the mid-1980s, China abandoned the huge IBRD loan, both because it was too expensive and because the condition for granting the loan was to limit the country's specialization in the production of labor-intensive industrial products.

An extensive literature is devoted to the emergence of crises. Most authors note the theoretical illegality and practical harm of raising the interest rate as a standard measure used by the IMF in the event of payment problems. This policy again caused an increase in the cost of domestic and foreign goods.

we assume it is equal. The yuan exchange rate will increase by 40% in 10 years-approximately the difference in relative prices of the two markets.

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external borrowing, not to mention the enormous damage caused by the activities of speculators during periods of" stabilization " measures. More generally, the problem was that the increase in the price of credit occurred in the last quarter of a century with a deterioration in the quality of monetary resources in the form of so-called hard currencies.

It is also generally accepted that after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, exchange rate fluctuations further worsened the position of producers compared to major financiers, and developing countries that were then suffering from a lack of capital were also less advantaged. Their currencies were devalued. The flip side of this phenomenon over time was the loss of many markets for Western industrialists in developing countries, especially large ones.

The connection between the high loan interest rate and the monopolization of the financial services sector in developed countries is quite obvious. Again, we emphasize, temporary. It is equally important to understand that the rapid growth in the set of such services, the number of financial intermediaries and the so-called capital markets did not mean that credit conditions improved. Among the victims in the developed countries themselves, small and medium-sized credit enterprises that directly worked with individuals often found themselves. The collapse of the savings and Loan Industry of the US banking system back in 1987 (shortly before the October "black Tuesday") is indicative in this sense: these institutions were mainly engaged in mortgage loans.

Since the capacity of the financial market often increases due to derivatives, including insurance instruments, it seems at first glance to be broader than the sphere of application of productive capital. However, the flip side of the "financial revolution" is the separation of the monetary sphere from the real economy, "bubbles" and ultimately "money spoilage". In addition, in the context of increasing economic and political risks, the replacement of own capital with borrowed funds has been outlined, even in the productive sector, including during mergers and acquisitions - a process that sharply intensified in the mid-90s of the last century.

Two main motives contributed to the spread of the "mainstream": the West's fear of rising resource prices in the course of further industrialization of the East (the alarmist forecasts of the Club of Rome also came in handy) and the attempt to "rip off" developing countries by using high loan interest rates and opening their markets for Western TNCs.

However, in contrast to the established ideas about the harmonious combination of Western capital and labor of the periphery countries on a global scale as the future of the world economy (based on the "mainstream"), by the beginning of this century the picture looked completely different. The largest developing countries (not to mention oil exporters) have reached the phase of self-sufficiency in capital, recorded selective use of foreign capital and actually brought down the monopoly price of credit. The money of developed countries (on the same terms of provision) has become superfluous in the ongoing globalization. Their "self-devouring" began within finansomiki itself. Hence, in particular, the decline in interest rates observed at the beginning of the new century, a kind of revenge of the real sector.

Considering capital savings as a sign of "modern" or "intensive" growth, "mainstream" theoretically and practically does not solve the problem of converting "extra" money back into real productive capital. The application of the "mainstream" to economic policy leads to a decrease in real wages and / or an increase in unemployment (which is proved by statistics). Meanwhile, an increase in the capital-labor ratio simultaneously with an increase in employment (meaning the need to increase the rate of accumulation and an "extensive" path of development) is a vital need and opportunity for most countries of the world.

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Table 3

Increased capital intensity in Asia in 1999-2007

Country/Year

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

China

4.8

4.2

4.4

4.2

4.1

4.3

4.2

3.8

3.4

India

4.0

5.5

3.9

6.6

3.3

4.3

3.8

3.8

4.4

Indonesia

14.3

4.5

5.8

5.0

5.3

4.8

4.3

4.5

4.0

Vietnam

5.8

4.4

4.5

4.7

4.8

4.6

4.2

4.5

4.9

Thailand

4.7

4.8

11.0

4.5

3.5

4.3

7.0

5.6

5.6

Republic

3.1

3.6

7.7

4.2

9.7

6.5

7.2

5.8

5.9

Korea

Malaysia

3.7

3.0

49.0

4.6

3.9

3.4

4.0

3.5

3.5

Calculated from: [Key Indicators..., 2008, p. 146, 151].

Table 4

Average economic indicators for 2001-2009

A country

Accumulation rate

GDP growth

Capital intensity of GDP growth

Price increase

Bank interest rate

China

42.5

10.4

4.1

2.1

5.9

India

32.0

7.5

4.3

5.3

11.6

Indonesia

25.1

5.1

4.9

8.7

15.6

Vietnam

36.4

7.2

5.1

7.5

10.0

Thailand

26.0

3.9

6.7

2.5

6.6

Republic of Korea

29.4

3.9

7.5

3.2

6.4

Malaysia

21.2

4.3

4.9

2.3

6.4

Составлено по: Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2010 // www.adb.org/statistics

China is often accused of sacrificing consumption to accumulation. Indeed, the relative share of households in China's GDP has declined over the past decade. This figure is currently about 36% compared to 45% at the beginning of the century. Nevertheless, the decline in the share of consumption in GDP does not prevent consumption from growing dynamically in absolute terms due to high economic growth rates. The simplest calculations (tab. 3) show a decrease in the incremental capital intensity of 7% of Chinese GDP in 2001-2007, which is again favorable for consumption growth.

It is this circumstance that allows us to speak about the beginning of" intensive " growth in China, realizing that the process of transition to it for the whole country will take a very long time. By "intensity" we mean simply maintaining the incremental capital intensity in the range of 4-6, accompanied by an improvement in the quality of productive forces. "Digitalize" this improvement in China is not necessary due to the evidence of the phenomenon itself. The deterioration of the capital intensity index in 2009 to 5.2% does not seem to be a serious failure, and the indicator may improve in the coming years, remaining better than in other competing countries with low inflation and cheap credit (Table 4).
7 Ratio of the rate of accumulation to the GDP growth rate. The higher this indicator, the more expensive the growth. In developed countries, it is close to 7-10.

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Table 5

Budget deficits ( - ), surpluses ( + ) (% of GDP) and inflation ( % ) in Asia in 2000-2006

A country

Indicator

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

China

deficit

-2.8

-2.5

-2.6

-2.2

-1.3

-1.2

-0.8

inflation rate

0.4

0.7

-0.8

1.2

3.9

1.8

1.5

India

deficit

-5.7

-6.2

-5.9

-4.5

-3.9

-4.0

-3.3

inflation rate

4.0

3.9

4.1

4.0

5.8

5.0

6.5

Philippines

deficit

-4.0

-4.0

-5.3

-4.6

-3.8

-2.1

-1.1

inflation rate

4.0

6.8

3.0

3.5

6.0

7.6

6.2

Malaysia

deficit

-5.5

-5.2

-5.3

-4.6

-3.8

-2.7

-1.1

inflation rate

1.5

1.4

1.8

1.2

1.4

3.1

3.6

Thailand

deficit

-2.8

-2.7

-8.1

+0.1

-0.4

+0.1

-0.3

inflation rate

1.6

1.6

0.7

1.8

2.7

4.5

4.7

Источник: Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2010 // www.adb.org/statistics

Some characteristics of the Chinese development model (tab. 4) convince of the fundamental possibility of achieving high rates of economic growth, provided that the financial sector is subordinated to the tasks of industrial modernization. You can have very low inflation with a very high rate of accumulation, again, only if the interest rate is low, the "banker's limit". It is worth adding that in China (in contrast to the other countries shown in Table 1), the number of people living in the United States is higher than in the United States. 4) the share of budget expenditures in GDP increased from 16% to 22% in 2001-2009.

At its core, the Chinese approach to inflation is almost the opposite of monetarism: prices for goods and services are maintained not by limiting monetary demand, but by increasing the supply of goods and services. To this is added the state regulation of prices - not only their administrative regulation, but also commodity interventions, serious investments in the exchange infrastructure, etc.

Reducing the budget deficit, as we are taught, is necessary to fight inflation. Meanwhile, the link between inflation and deficit financing is not so simple. It is enough to compare data for five Asian countries in 2000-2006, dividing them into two segments: 2000-2003 and 2004-2006. (Table 5). For all five countries, the same trend is visible - a reduction in budget deficits in the second segment, while inflation increases in the same second segment.

In other words, the relationship between these two parameters was negative.

The mass of accumulation is also important. In a very large economy, due to the mass of accumulation, you can expect to get not only a "scale effect", but also access to a comprehensive, almost full-scale industrial development. Of course, Mainstream does not set such tasks. In China, the industrialization and diversification of industry is planned to continue until 2020.

This does not mean that the service sector is forgotten. Already in the second half of the last decade, during the 11th five-year plan, the volume of investment in the service sector exceeded that in industry. This borderline state again confirms the transition of the PRC to an" intensive " path of development. Capital becomes relatively redundant, at first, naturally, in large-scale industry, and its flow to other areas and beyond China is inevitable.

Here, perhaps, it should also be said that the average figures for the country in the Chinese case, due to significant gaps in the levels of economic development of the regions, hide significant differences in provincial growth models. This " depth

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development", its nuances, as well as the "manufacturing of the village" (A. S. and V. T.), the mainstream again does not catch.

So, in Shanghai, the rate of accumulation is decreasing, it is about 30% (against the national figure of 48% in 2009). The economy of Shanghai is already mainly service. In other regions, however, the accumulation rate is stable or growing. This indicator is lower than the national average in Guangdong, Beijing , and Zhejiang-the most developed regions. It is close to the national average in Jiangsu, Shandong, and the Northeast. High - in Chongqing, Jilin, Anhui, Jiangxi, as well as in the western regions, where the share of the extractive industry is high and significant infrastructure investments are made.

Foreign direct investment in recent years, catching the "depth" of the Chinese economy, is increasingly directed to the inner and western regions of the PRC. The share of these areas in FDI inflows has increased from 10% at the beginning of the century to about 32% today. But generally speaking, the role of foreign capital in China's economy is declining.

Regional imbalances are not only an acute problem for large countries, but also a resource for future development-following the installation of a national infrastructure (requiring an investment model). Problems are being mitigated to some extent in modern China, not only by faster investment growth in the interior, but also by more dynamic growth in domestic commodity and fuel prices. Modernization for China is not so much a matter of interaction with the global economy, but rather a problem of shifting financial and technological flows from the east of the country to the center and west of China. This modernization is just unfolding, but there are already very prosperous oases in the inner and western regions.

In addition, as individual provinces grow in wealth, the income gap between rural and urban populations narrows. The situation is worst where the share of the rural population is still high. At the same time, urbanization in China is proceeding very rapidly. It is important to note the growing influx of qualified and young specialists from the east of the country to the central provinces, which is a good sign. Given the rapid development of infrastructure, we can say that China is "shrinking", and labor mobility is increasing in the country. This is very important for the development of the national market. These problems, and especially opportunities, are ignored by many researchers.

While qualifying the PRC as an agrarian society, many economists put into this concept a certain shade of insufficiency of China, its poverty, backwardness, etc. Meanwhile, in our opinion, one of the secrets of the success of Beijing's strategy lies precisely in the native Chinese-peasant view of economic development as a process that needs planning and calculation, relative stability a collective approach to solving major problems, including disaster prevention and dealing with their consequences. One should not discount the universalism of the peasant worldview, as opposed to the narrowly professional urban one. Let's not forget the Chinese habit of reasonably limiting labor expendments8 and needs - what the Confucian world calls "xiaokang". This view may be associated with the future contribution of China to the actual improvement of the planet - not only as a post-industrial or agro-industrial world, but also as a rational-economical and therefore eco-friendly world.

Very often and very vigorously, China is presented as a monster " devouring the resources of the planet." Let's look at the figures (Tables 6, 7).
8 Here it is appropriate to recall two types of economic behavior in N. D. Kondratiev: maximizing the result and saving costs.

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Table 6

GDP (calculated by PPP) per unit of energy consumed, USD United States dollars per 1 kg of oil equivalent in Asia and Oceania, 1990-2007

Country/Year

1990

2000

2007

China

1.4

3.1

3.4

India

3.2

3.8

4.9

Republic of Korea

5.2

4.7

5.5

Indonesia

3.6

3.7

4.1

Vietnam

2.5

3.3

3.7

Kazakhstan

1.6

2.0

2.4

Australia

4.8

5.4

6.0

Japan

7.3

7.0

7.9

Source: Key Indicators..., 2010, p. 249.

Let us clarify that the authors of the ABR mixed up oil equivalent and conventional fuel in the data for the PRC (Table 6). Nevertheless, these series show a very significant improvement in the energy efficiency situation in China over the past 20 years.

And most importantly, let's not forget that the share of industry in GDP in China is the highest among all the countries shown in the tables. And if you calculate energy costs per unit of added value in industry, then China will be next to India and Japan. And according to this indicator, the economy of the PRC is quite "intensive"and"modern".

Among the postulates of the "mainstream", which are especially vigorously imposed on its hapless fans, is the idea of "innovative breakthroughs" as the basis of modern development. Here it is appropriate to recall the newly popular classic: "... the costs required to run an enterprise that uses new inventions for the first time are always significantly higher than the costs of later enterprises that have emerged on its ruins, ex suis ossibus (from their own bones. - A. S. and V. T.). This point is so significant that entrepreneurs"the majority of pioneers go bankrupt, and only their followers thrive" [Marx, 1958, p. 116].

The embarrassment of the US pharmaceutical industry is indicative. With undisputed leadership in R & D spending, the number of Nobel Laureates in chemistry, the volume of patents, etc., the United States had a drug trade deficit of $ 20 billion in 2007. [Sokolsky, 2010, pp. 315-316].

In the course of modernization and market reforms, China borrowed a lot, critically and fruitfully from abroad, quickly spreading the acquired experience throughout the economy without much regard for "private intellectual property". It is currently imported in patent form for about $ 10 billion a year , which is a huge fanfare for Beijing. Much more important for a huge country was the rapid spread of even if not tomorrow's, but good technologies, but at the same time-throughout the entire depth of the economy - with constant economies of scale. At the same time, the Chinese are well aware that the best things on the market are not sold - they can only be stolen or invented by themselves. In addition, we are not sufficiently informed about what is actually available in China-after all, the country has been spending a lot of money on R & D for several years, and the number of registered patents and licenses is growing very rapidly. Chinese "improved" technologies, often obtained on the basis of "reverse engineering", are much cheaper than the original Western samples. This naturally leads to practical conclusions for Russia's foreign economic policy.

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Table 7

Specific consumption of primary energy resources and CO2 (per 1000 USD) GDP( PPP) in 2008

A country/Indicator

Energy consumption, tons of oil equivalent.

CO2 emissions, kg

USA

0.20

0.50

Japan

0.14

0.34

India

0.15

0.33

China

0.20

0.61

Germany

0.14

0.34

Great Britain

0.12

0.29

Republic of Korea

0.21

0.46

* In 2000 prices.

Source: Key World..., 2009, p. 48-57.

By removing the concepts of productive forces and the national economy (national economy) from the theory, the "mainstream", among other things, deprived "economic science" of the most valuable psychological factor for real modernization. To believe that modernization can be carried out based on market-consumer ideology and "expansion of demand" is the same as considering the solution of the housing problem of the population as a whole to be the function of realtors. Neither the market itself, nor globalization, nor the strenuous attempts to create a "favorable investment climate" through legislative measures, 9 nor "high-tech clusters of the new economy" solve the problems of modernization. It ultimately means subordinating all activities of the superstructure and the financial sector to the development of the productive forces. High growth rates and investment rates are the only way to "make capital" and / or attract it. Here we need fundamental developments on the typology of capital represented in the modern world economy by various national farms and offshore companies. It is worth recalling the concept of "anti-capital" - by analogy with" antimatter " [Salitsky, 1997, p.232].

In connection with the above considerations, it seems very likely that a new economic center will be formed in the PRC in a certain perspective, which will mainly be closed to the trade and financial flows of the surrounding countries, as well as the western coast of the Americas. The North Atlantic periphery of this center is likely to stagnate, while in semi-peripheral countries (Russia, Iran, India, ASEAN, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Africa, and the BSW countries), we can expect to maintain economic dynamics.

The PRC forms zones of stability in the economy of closely cooperating countries and territories: the " six " countries (Table 8) are doing better than other exporters. During the recent crisis, China's imports declined much less than global trade as a whole. Thus, his partners were given the opportunity to improve things somewhat during a difficult period. In addition, we emphasize the constant desire of the regulator in China to reduce the range of fluctuations in the market environment, to prevent overheating and hypothermia of the economy. This also applies to a certain extent to the stock market, which, gradually gaining "depth", becomes less volatile. Finally, it is also important that the PRC is trying in every possible way to make smooth changes in the yuan exchange rate. This is done by

9 It is precisely the selective use of foreign capital and money by a growing economy in the context of their growing surplus in the global economy that may be more profitable in terms of the price and volume of funds raised.

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Table 8

Share of individual countries and groups of countries in world exports of goods in 1948-2009, %

Country/Year

1948

1953

1963

1973

1983

1993

2003

2009

China

0.9

1.2

1.3

1.0

1.2

2.5

5.9

9.9

The Six*

3.4

3.0

2.5

3.6

5.8

9.7

9.6

9.6

Japan

0.4

1.5

3.5

6.4

8.0

9.9

6.4

4.8

India

2.2

1.3

1.0

0.5

0.5

0.6

0.8

1.3

USA

21.7

18.8

14.9

12.3

11.2

12.6

9.8

8.7

Germany

1.4

5.3

9.3

11.7

9.2

10.3

10.2

9.2

Great Britain

11.3

9.0

7.8

5.1

5.0

4.9

4.1

2.9

USSR / CIS

2.2

3.5

4.6

3.7

5.0

1.5

2.6

3.7

* Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand, Republic of Korea.

Source: International Trade..., 2010, p. 14.

It is in the interests of Chinese producers and exporters, but objectively, such a course is also beneficial for China's partners.

China seems to be returning the planet to the good old days of growth and development, which preceded the" financial revolution " of the 1970s. At that time, relations between developed and developing countries could become more constructive, then the expression "new international economic order"was born, in particular.

The question of it is now becoming open again, and already China is becoming the initiator of programs on a global scale - for example, in African states that have been forgotten by decades of financial globalization.

In connection with the deplorable state of the American financial system, we can cite one historical analogy. The formation of the IMF at the end of World War II sparked heated discussions between the US and the UK. The former then represented a "young" economic superpower with a powerful industry and agriculture, but a relatively weak foreign financial network. London had large foreign investments and banks. Money, however, was not enough, and I had to ask the United States for a loan. As a result, the contract for the construction of a new global architecture and control of the IMF, located in Washington (and not in London), went to the United States. And the British pound sterling began to slowly "deflate", which, among other things, of course, brought considerable losses to the owners of sterling holdings. In our opinion, however, the analogy is somewhat conditional, since Beijing is not yet showing itself as the heir to the financial hegemon (and why would it need a dilapidated structure?)10. Things are probably moving towards regionalization of the global economy. This course of events is probably preferable for the majority, since, among other things, it reduces the likelihood of truly global crises synchronized by finansomics.

We should add that the US national debt is close to 100% of GDP, while in China it is about 20%. According to the rules of the IMF, this means that American T-bills are high-risk securities and the income on them must be at least 7-8% per annum. It is becoming unsafe to keep them in the current situation. One of the ways out is to pay off the debts of state-owned fuel and energy corporations from the reserves, with the condition that domestic tariffs are frozen.

Let's go back to the beginning of our article. The current rating system is unreliable. In the near future, it will be significantly reformatted by a growing China in accordance with a more adequate theory and policy.

10 It is characteristic that after acquiring a large stake in South African Standard Bank, China did not make large investments in foreign financial structures.

page 82
world economic problems, than the "mainstream". It is important that in the neighborhood of the usual "global" economy and its agencies, there is already something comparable in size and different in ideology. There is some reason to expect that Russia's potential will look higher in the updated value system than it does now. And the "mainstream" can change significantly. At the same time, the improvement of our country's rating will be influenced by those features of its economic policy that will be close and understandable to Chinese regulators, financiers and businessmen.

list of literature

Kondratiev N. D. Osnovnye problemy ekonomicheskoi statiki i dinamiki: predvaritel'nyi eskiz [Basic problems of economic statics and dynamics: a preliminary sketch].
K. Marx. Capital. Critique of political economy / / K. Marx, F. Engels. Essays, Vol. 25, Part 1, Moscow, 1958.

Salitsky A. I. On the theoretical insufficiency of modern social knowledge // Bulletin of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 1997, No. 3.
Sokolsky V. M. Mezhdunarodnoe razdelenie truda v khimicheskoi promyshlennosti poz prismu tsentro-periphericheskoi paradigmy [International division of Labor in the chemical industry through the prism of the center-peripheral paradigm] / Edited by L. M. Sintserov, Moscow: Comradeship of Scientific Publications of KMC, 2010.

Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao 2006. Beijing: 2006.

Shirokov G. K. Zapadno-vostochnye paralleli: izmeneniya v strukture ekonomiki, potrebitelei i problema investitsii [West-East Parallels: Changes in the Structure of the Economy, Consumption and the Problem of Investment]. 2002. N 4.

customs.gov.cn

International Trade Statistics 2010. Geneva: WTO, 2010.

Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2008. Manila: ADB, 2008.

Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2010 // www.adb.org/statistics

Key World Energy Statistics 2009. Paris: OECD/IEA, 2009.

World Development Indicators. WB database.

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