Keywords: Africa, Gambia, political development, D. Jawara, Yaya Jammeh, military regimes, military coups, electoral processes

Gambia, which became independent on February 18, 1965, is the smallest country in mainland Africa (10,380 square kilometers), with a population of barely 2 million people. The territory of the country is a narrow strip of land with a width of 10 to 50 km and a length of about 350 km, surrounded on all sides by Senegal. Only in the west, about 60 km of coastline is washed by the waters of the Atlantic Ocean. The Gambia is characterized by weak economic development, dependence on foreign aid and, as a result, an active foreign policy.

From 1965 to 1994, the country was headed by the Prime Minister, and then-from 1970 - by President Daud Jawara. During his rule, the Gambia enjoyed a reputation as one of the continent's most stable States, committed to the principles of respect for human rights and political pluralism. The situation changed in 1994, when Yaya Jammeh, the current head of State, came to power in a military coup.

During the colonial period, a small population, poor natural resources, and an underdeveloped monocultural (peanut) economy caused doubts in both the Gambia itself and the authorities of the British metropolis about the country's ability to survive independently.

Indeed, by the time of political sovereignty, the Gambia was almost completely devoid of industry and an irrigation system, without which agriculture was dependent on rainfall. However, despite warnings from the colonial authorities that an independent Gambia could only remain viable in an alliance with Senegal, Jawara insisted on maintaining territorial integrity and developing the local economy.

However, during the entire period of Jawara's rule, the idea of uniting the two countries was fueled by three considerations: doubts, as already mentioned, about the Gambian economic viability; the inconvenience for both countries of the borders drawn by the colonizers (for Senegal, this meant partial isolation of the southern province of Casamance from the main territory of the country and the inability to fully use the water resources of Finally, there were concerns that the Gambia could become a base and refuge for the Casamanian rebels, ¹ and a springboard for their invasion of Senegal.

As a result, on February 18, 1965, i.e. on the day of independence of the Gambia, the two countries signed: the Agreement on Cooperation in Foreign Policy, the Agreement on Cooperation in Security and Defense Affairs, and the Convention on the Joint Development of the Gambia River Basin.²

Economic development and security concerns were the driving forces of Gambian foreign policy, which focused primarily on finding sources of financial assistance and establishing friendly relations with those who could protect the Gambian regime. The main donors to the Gambia, along with the United Kingdom, were China and oil-producing Arab states, primarily Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. At the same time, Jawara successfully created a favorable image of the Gambia in the international arena: the African Center for the Study of Democracy and Human Rights and the African Commission on Human and Peoples ' Rights were located in Banjul, the country's capital.

POLITICAL CRISIS AND THE CREATION OF SENEGAMBIA

In the early 1980s, widespread corruption, economic decline, and restrictions on the right to strike led to growing dissatisfaction with the regime's policies. Cases of vandalism have become more frequent in the country, for example, the presidential yacht and a ship that was at the disposal of the government were set on fire. Anti-government slogans appeared on the walls of houses.

Jawara asked for help from Senegalese President Leopold S. Senghor, who sent 150 soldiers to the Gambia. Senegalese troops took up positions around the presidential residence in Banjul, the military barracks in Bakau, and the airport, and remained in the country for two weeks.³ An event that played a major role in relations between the two countries at that time was the attempted coup d'etat in the Gambia on July 30, 1981, organized by the so-called Marxist revolutionaries.⁴

These events were one of the first tests of the attitude of the new President of Senegal, A. Diouf, towards the Gambia and its leader. Diouf apparently saw the situation this way: the hotbed of instability is located in the heart of Senegal (in a geographical sense, this is exactly what it is) and can destabilize the entire region, so at all costs it was necessary to prevent the "leftist" government from coming to power in Banjul. As a result, he sent about 2 thousand soldiers to the territory of his neighbor, and within eight days all the centers of rebellion were suppressed, the number of victims of armed clashes exceeded 5005.

Most importantly, the rebellion brought the Gambia and Senegal closer together, and on December 17, 1981, an Agreement was signed in Dakar on the creation of the Senegambia Confederation, which provided for the integration of security forces, the protection of the territorial integrity and independence of the association, the formation of an economic and monetary union, the coordination of foreign policy, etc. ⁶

As expected, it was most difficult to negotiate on financial and economic issues - the most important for Dakar. They remained too difficult to solve due to different economic systems and belonging to different currency zones. As a result, Senegambia ceased to exist in ^{October 1989.7}

FALL OF THE JAWARA GOVERNMENT

Under Jawara, the Gambia had all the necessary attributes of a formal "democracy": multi-party elections; a parliament that allowed open political debate; an independent judiciary; a press that was free to criticize the Government; and respect for the rule of law.

However, despite all these achievements, a few semi-educated junior army officers were able to overthrow a democratically elected government and a leader who had led the country continuously for almost 30 years, without any resistance from the population. The main reasons for this were the loss of popular support by the regime (mainly due to the high level of corruption) and the growing dissatisfaction of soldiers and officers with their position.

On July 22, 1994, a bloodless military coup took place in the Gambia, carried out by a group of junior officers who created the Interim Ruling Council of the Armed Forces (UPAF), led by Lieutenants Yaya Jammeh, Sana Sabally, Edward Singate and Sadibu Hidara.

The coup was timed to coincide with military exercises conducted by the Gambian military together with American Marines who arrived on the US Navy ship La Moure County. It was the exercise that allowed the conspirators to gain access to weapons and vehicles that they normally did not have, since Jawara did not trust his army, preferring it to Senegalese or Nigerian military personnel.

Gambians reacted to the coup in silence. One way or another, the military's rise to power did not cause public discontent, even religious leaders and leaders of some political parties "blessed" the military regime.

How can this "change of priorities"be explained? After all, under Jawara, the country was a "model of democracy" for all of Africa!

Indeed, from 1965 until the coup of 1994, the country regularly held presidential and parliamentary elections. However, if you look closely at their results, it becomes clear that, despite the multi-party system, the Gambian regime actually remained one-party. The Javara People's Progressive Party (NPP) has consistently dominated the political scene and has never won less than 24 of the 34 seats in Parliament. Although the Gambian opposition was able to participate in the elections, it was unable to break the NPP's monopoly on power.

Therefore, the Gambia, in fact, turned out to be an example of "democratic disenfranchisement" and had a political system,

within the framework of which it was impossible to rotate individual groups of the political elite. Jawara has used the image of a stable, democratic Government with a high human rights record to gain international recognition and assistance, while ignoring the plight of the population.

The Gambians, who subsisted on the proceeds of smuggling peanuts and imported goods into the country, were generally loyal to the Government, which not only turned a blind eye to various violations, but also encouraged them, thus relieving itself of responsibility for improving the lives of citizens. At first glance, the Gambian economy and politics even looked successful, but a narrow group of elites used any achievements to their advantage, which inevitably had to cause discontent among the most "advanced" Gambians, including the military.

In the mid-1980s, the Gambian economy was experiencing a severe crisis, partly due to the drought and falling prices for peanuts, the main export product. The Government adopted a program of structural adjustment of the economy (SPE), which included reducing state control over some enterprises and transferring it to private entrepreneurs, creating a favorable climate for attracting investment by eliminating the fixed currency exchange rate, etc. Despite some positive developments, EIT has generally had a negative impact on the economy, and has failed to improve the standard of living of most Gambians.

The Government's reform efforts have also been undermined by the large influx of refugees from neighbouring countries in the Gambia. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, when civil wars broke out in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Gambia found itself an island of stability in a turbulent region, and this led to a sharp increase in immigration. The conflict in Casamance also complicated the situation. In 1993, the number of refugees from this Senegalese region exceeded 10,000 and continued to grow, which put pressure on the economy and social sphere - health, education, employment - and caused discontent among Gambians.⁸

YAYA JAMMEH MILITARY REGIME

At the time of the coup, the Gambian army had an extremely low level of professional training, which was both a result and a consequence of the distrust of the Jawara Government. Even before independence, it was considered too expensive to maintain an army in a small and poor country like the Gambia.

After the founding of Senegambia in 1982, the Gambian armed units of the security forces (police, so-called field forces, etc.) became part of the Confederate Army, which was dominated by Senegalese. Disintegration in 1989 Senegambia meant both the end of the Confederate army and the withdrawal of Senegalese troops from the Gambia. For the first time, the Gambian army became an independent force, and Jawara invited Nigeria, which had one of the largest and most trained armies on the continent, to assume command of the Gambian armed forces. By the time of the 1994 coup, the Gambian National Army (GNA) had 800 soldiers and officers, but the senior commanders were Nigerians.⁹

In the first days after the coup, Jammeh gave many speeches, trying to present the actions of the officers as necessary to protect the national interests ignored by the previous regime, which he accused of "rampant corruption". In return, he promised "a new era of freedom, progress, democracy and responsibility." ¹⁰

Of course, such altruistic motives for a coup as saving the country should be considered critically. Internal army factors should also be taken into account. Thus, Jawara's appointment of Nigerian officers to top command posts provoked the indignation of Gambian soldiers and became one of the motives for the coup. But the army's discontent was not limited to this.

In 1991 and 1992, soldiers demonstrated against delays in the payment of special allowances to Gambian military personnel who participated in operations of the Economic Community of West African Countries (ECOWAS) military contingents in Liberia. There was also dissatisfaction with the living conditions in barracks ¹¹.

When Jammeh came to power, there were sharp disagreements and power struggles within the army, the UPF, and the officer corps, which were manifested, for example, in 1994-1995, when the government "uncovered" one conspiracy after another. Thus, on November 14, 1994, there was a shootout in the barracks, which killed several junior officers and about 20 soldiers, but none of the Jammeh supporters were injured. There was no evidence of a conspiracy, i.e. the regime leader used the version of the coup that was being prepared as a pretext for destroying possible rivals.

Although Jammeh was no more oblivious to the issue of human rights than other African military and often civilian leaders, his rule was in stark contrast to Jawara's relatively liberal and tolerant leadership style.

An important indicator of the restriction of civil liberties was the relationship between the government and the press. Despite the great challenges posed by mass illiteracy, poverty and the lack of modern press technologies, under Jawara, the Gambian press made extensive use of the freedom of speech it was granted. Many publications were of poor quality, often consisting of several hand-stitched pages, but they contributed to the free discussion of political issues. Under Jawar, the government's attitude to the press was characterized by laissez-faire: independent publishing was discouraged, but it was not discouraged.

Immediately after the coup, the military's hostility to the media became apparent. Journalists were arrested for the slightest criticism of the Government's actions. First of all, it affected the newspaper "Foroya" ("Freedom") - the organ of the small radical party People's Democratic Organization for Independence and Socialism (NDONS), which was previously among the sharpest critics of the Javara government. In a remarkable show of unity, in 1994 Foroya employees rejected their proposed posts in the military government, were arrested and charged with illegally publishing the newspaper.¹²

Representatives of other professional groups, such as lawyers who denounced the military's usurpation of power, were also harassed. All this created an atmosphere of uncertainty and fear, which increased in 1995 after the adoption of Decree No. 45 on the creation of a secret police - the National Intelligence Agency (NRA) and Decree No. 52 on the introduction of the death penalty.

The NRA's unlimited surveillance powers and arrests on the first suspicion of disloyalty to the regime have had a major impact on Gambian society. The NRA has strongly influenced the political climate in the country, which under Javar was characterized by a noticeable democratic character.

Having seized power, Jammeh was faced with the need to create at least a semblance of legality. This is a problem for all military regimes, but it was especially important for the Gambia, because the previous Government respected human rights and the law, and the people of the country were proud of it.

Jammeh began to solve the problem of legitimizing his regime in the most trivial way - by compromising the previous regime: numerous commissions were created to investigate the abuses of the Jawara administration. These commissions targeted individuals associated with the previous regime, often in exile and unable to answer charges. This also applied to Javara himself.

It should be noted that the commissions presented a lot of evidence of violations committed under Jawara, mainly by members of the group that became known as the Banjul Mafia, which included ministers, high-ranking officials and businessmen, and Jawara's image noticeably dimmed in the eyes of Gambians. But if accountability mechanisms did not work well under the previous regime, they disappeared altogether under Jammeh.

In foreign policy, the situation for Jammeh was complicated by new trends that emerged after the end of the cold war. The West reacted negatively to the coup, as a result of which EU aid, for example, was halved, although funding for individual projects (airport, bridges, roads) continued. Only the Gulf states were not concerned about the turn of events in the Gambia and kept the same amount of aid.

However, the military regime has had to find new external donors and investors. In the mid-1990s, the software industry began to develop rapidly.-

political and economic ties with Taiwan, which, due to difficulties in relations with China, sought to expand international contacts. However, Banjul's development of friendly ties with Taipei has led to a deterioration in relations with China and the termination of all its aid.¹³

With regard to the economic policy of the UPWU, the Council did not propose anything new, but only emphasized its commitment to the principles of a market economy. However, the military's rise to power has had a negative impact on the tourism sector, which is the most profitable sector of the economy after the export of peanuts. In light of the economic problems facing the Gambia, the decision of the UPWU in December 1995 to build a huge arch in Banjul (at a cost, according to various sources, from $ 1 to $6 million) in memory of the 1994 coup looked ridiculous. Jammeh stated that the arch will become the main tourist attraction of the country and will attract crowds of ¹⁴ tourists.

TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN RULE

In September 1994. Jammeh announced that the military would remain in power for four years. At the end of October, the UPSU presented a document entitled "A Program for the transition to democratic Constitutional Rule", which outlined the stages of the transition period up to 1998.The program was strongly criticized both domestically and internationally, primarily due to the length of the transition period. In response, Jammeh established a National Consultative Committee (NCC) to address the issue of time limits, and in December 1994, a five-week national consultation period began, with NCC members meeting with residents of various parts of the country.

In January 1995, the NCC recommended that the transition period be shortened to two years (from the time of the coup, i.e. until July 1996) ^.15 In February, Jammeh accepted the reduction, but rejected the idea of creating an interim civilian Government for the remainder. Although many Gambians considered the two-year deadline too long, the proposal was generally accepted by the population.

An important issue was the minimum age of a presidential candidate, because it was assumed that Jammeh would want to run for office. Finally, we decided on the minimum age of 30 years ¹⁶.

The provisions of the new constitution regarding the elections were formulated in such a way as to make it as difficult as possible for many potential candidates to participate in them. The pre-election fee required for a parliamentary candidate was increased from 200 to 2500 dalasi ($85), and for a presidential candidate - 10 thousand (approximately $340) ¹⁷. To return the deposit after the election, you had to get at least 40% of the votes in your district, i.e. many candidates by definition these funds were lost in districts with more than two candidates.

There was also no provision in the Constitution to limit the terms of the presidency, although in the previous debate, the only issue on which general agreement was reached was the limitation of one person's term of office to two terms.

In compliance with the provisions of the new Constitution, Jammeh retired from the armed forces. In the presidential election held on September 26, 1996, he won with 55.76% of the vote. Two days after the election, he disbanded the UPSUF, and his party, the Alliance for Political Reorientation and Reconstruction, won an impressive victory in the 1997 parliamentary elections.

In 1999. Jammeh mediated between the Casamance rebels and the Senegalese government, which raised the country's international profile and helped it receive a number of loans from the African Development Bank, OPEC and the Islamic Development Bank.

In 2001, the country held regular presidential elections, in which Jammeh received 52.9% of the vote, ¹⁸ in 2006-67.3%, in 2011-72%. ¹⁹ International observers who monitored the elections noted numerous technical irregularities, but generally accepted the results of the elections, which showed support for the regime and its leader by the majority of Gambians. In other words, the people of the country support a ruler who has established a dictatorial regime in the country, brutally suppresses any dissent, heads one of the most "effective" security services in Africa and is famous for his eccentric antics. Thus, Jammeh has gained international fame for his intolerance of people of "non-traditional" orientation: homosexuality in the Gambia is punishable by life imprisonment. In 2010, he expressed a desire to become the king of his country, which, however, can be considered as a subtle political move - there will be no need to hold elections.

The Gambian leader is extremely pious, never letting go of the rosary. In 2011, he stated in an interview with the BBC that

He will rule for a billion years, if Allah wills it. Although a Muslim, he claims to have the magical ability to cure AIDS, asthma, and other diseases. In June 2015, Jammeh took on the additional title of "Babili Mansa" - "outstanding bridge builder", or"river conqueror". Now his full title is His Excellency Sheikh Professor Alhaji Dr. Yaya aj Jammeh Wabili Mansa ²⁰.

To be fair, Jammeh's achievements in the social sphere should be noted. Under his rule, the Gambia had its own university (under Jawara, few Gambians were educated in neighboring African countries or in England). From 1965 to 1994, there were only a few dozen doctors in the country, mostly serving Banjul residents. By the beginning of this decade, their number had reached several hundred, and each large village had its own group of health workers. Health care centers have been established to perform complex surgeries, the mortality rate has been reduced, including in children, free education for children aged 6-12 years has been introduced, and so on. ²¹

However, the economy developed very slowly: GDP grew from $2.6 billion in 1991,221 to only $3 billion. in 2014 ²³. GDP growth has even declined in recent years: from 5.6% in 2012 to -0.2% in 2014, more than ⁴⁸% of the population lives below the poverty line24.

The deterioration of the political and economic situation in the 2010s led to increased migration from the country. In 2014, the Gambia was among the top six (Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Niger, Ghana, and Gambia). countries of Tropical Africa by the scale of illegal migration to Europe by sea (via North Africa)²⁵.

However, accustomed to relying on their own resources and fearing reprisals, Gambians generally do not oppose the regime. Therefore, the attempt to overthrow the government, made on December 30, 2014, was prepared by Gambian immigrants who lived comfortably in the United States and have long become citizens of this country. Three of them served in the US army, two were veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The coup was triggered by the events that accompanied Jammeh's visit to Washington for the summit of African leaders and the United States in August 2014. It must be said that the State Department has been accusing the Gambian leadership of human rights violations for years, and suddenly on August 5, Jammeh was invited to the White House for a reception organized by Barack Obama in honor of African leaders.

This invitation angered not only the Gambian exiles, but also the most hardened American politicians: after all, for many years Jammeh irritated Americans by flirting with Iran, Venezuela and Cuba, did not tolerate dissent not only at home but also abroad - even during this visit, his bodyguards staged a brawl with Gambian dissidents gathered outside the hotel on the island a protest action.

As a result, the conspirators finally confirmed their intention to overthrow the dictator. The necessary funds ($221,000) were collected, weapons were purchased, and routes of movement of the coup organizers to Banjul were agreed. However, the activities of Gambian emigrants had already come to the attention of the FBI, which informed the Gambian leadership about the planned action. The coup was crushed, several conspirators were killed, and some managed to escape to the United States, where they were tried.²⁶

Arrests of Gambians allegedly involved in the coup attempt continued throughout 2015. Persons suspected of disloyalty to the regime and their family members - women, children and the elderly-were detained. Prisoners were tortured, and many simply disappeared. Preventive arrests of journalists and human rights defenders have begun ²⁷.

Back in 2014, a 27-year moratorium on the use of the death penalty was lifted. July 17, 2015 Jammeh announced the expansion of the range of crimes requiring capital punishment. While only murderers were previously sentenced to death, on March 30, 2015, 3 soldiers were sentenced to death for participating in the December 2014 events.

Despite the fact that Jammeh ignored all calls from the international community to conduct a thorough investigation, abolish death sentences, and stop torture and murder in prison, the IMF allocated $10.8 million to the Gambia to compensate for the country's reduced tourism revenues as a result of the spread of Ebola in several West African countries in ^2014.28

As a military ruler, Jammeh has repeatedly stated that the nature of his leadership is markedly different from that of other African military leaders. Given the notoriety of many military regimes, Jammeh and his associates sought to distance themselves from them in the eyes of Gambians, realizing that those times when the military's rise to power could indeed contribute to political stabilization and eco-stability.-

economic development (for example, in Ghana under J. R. R. Tolkien).Rawlings), remained in the past. In practice, however, Jammeh copied the most odious African leaders. Moreover, even when becoming civilian presidents, military leaders tend to retain their military habits, tend to rely more on the army in their activities than on civilian structures, and prefer force-based methods of solving acute problems to administrative and legal ones. Neither did Jammeh, who tried to enlist the support of the army by providing various material benefits to the military, while ruthlessly cracking down on real and fictional opponents in the officer corps: both tactics were intended to prevent a coup.

Despite his use of radical rhetoric, Jammeh was characterized by conservatism in the economic sphere. He promised to turn the Gambia into one of the "most developed countries in the world", but did not form a policy aimed at economic growth or any fair distribution of the country's scarce resources. By supporting "free enterprise," the regime's leaders have extended the principles of this doctrine to only a small number of citizens, while the majority are engaged in cultivating small plots of land for everyday consumption.

Reduced external funding has prompted the regime's leaders to seek alternative sources of financial aid rather than reform the local economy. It must be said that the weak Gambian economy and the scarcity of natural resources impose certain restrictions on its development opportunities, but the growth of military spending and the construction of triumphal arches seem to be the least appropriate responses to the challenges of economic backwardness.

An important feature of Jammeh's rule is the permanent use of coercive and oppressive measures. This is evidenced by the repression of journalists and other representatives of the radical intelligentsia, and the return to the death penalty.

* * *

Under Yaya Jammeh, the Gambia lost its image as one of the most stable and democratic States in Africa and took its "worthy" place among the continent's most repressive regimes.

¹ For more information, see: Sadovskaya L. M. Net mira v Kazamanse // Asia and Africa today, 2012, N 2 (Sadovskaya L. M. 2012. Net mira v Kazamanse / / Azia i Afrika segodnya, N 2) (in Russian)

^{Robson P.} 2 Problem of Integration between Senegal and Gambia // African Integration and Disintegration: Case Studies in Economic and Political Union. L., 1967, p. 126.

^{Smirnov E. G.} 3 The Gambia. Guide. ML, 1996, p. 33. (Smirnov E. G. 1996. Gambia. Reference book. M.) (in Russian)

^{Loum M.} 4 Bad Governance and Democratic Failure: A Look at Gambia's 1994 Coup // Civil Wars. Vol. 5, N 1 (Spring 2002). L., p. 163.

⁵ http://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0106/010652.html

⁶ Agreement Between The Republic of The Gambia and The Republic of Senegal Concerning The Establishment of The Senegambia Confederation - http://www.gambia.dk/senegambia_confederation.html

⁷ For more information about Senegambia, see: Denisova T. S. Senegambia: uroki afrikanskogo konferalizma [Senegambia: Lessons of African Confederalism]. Federalizm v Afrika: problemy i perspektivy [Federalism in Africa: Problems and Prospects], Moscow, IAfr RAS, 2015, pp. 43-75. Senegambiya: uroki afrikanskogo konfederalizma // Federalizm v Afrike: problemy i perspektivy. M.) (in Russian)

^{Loum M.} 8 Op. cit., p. 163.

^{Onwumechili C.} 9 African Democratization and Military Coups. N.Y., 1998, p. 39.

^{Wiseman J.A.} 10 Military Rule in The Gambia: an Interim Assessment // Third World Quarterly. Vol. 17, N 5, p. 919.

¹¹ Ibidem.

¹² Daily Observer (Banjul), 7 December 1994.

^{Wiseman J.A.} 13 Op. cit., p. 933.

¹⁴ Ibidem.

¹⁵ Report of the National Consultative Committee on the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council's Programme of Rectification and Timetable for the Transition to Democratic Constitutional Rule in The Gambia. Banjul, 1995.

^{Wiseman J.A.} 16 Op. cit., p. 934.

¹⁷ http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/news-items/documents/TheGambiaPresidential Election2011Final.pdf

¹⁸ http://www.africana.ru/presidents/Gambai_Jammeh.htm

¹⁹ http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/news-items/documents/TheGambiaPresidential Election2011Final.pdf

²⁰ http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33180471

²¹ http://thegambiaecho.com/xp/in-annual-country-report-usa-alleges-its-friend-gambia-routinel y-tortures-disappears-jails-citizens-with-impunity/

^{Smirnov E. G.} 22 Decree. op., p. 57.

²³ https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ga.html

²⁴ Ibidem.

²⁵ http://thegambiaecho.com/xp/in-annual-country-report-usa-alleges-its-friend-gambia-routinel y-tortures-disappears-jails-citizens-with-impunity/

²⁶ https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-a-reviled-african-ruler-survive d-a-coup-hatched-in-the-united-states/2015/05/31/a9fc1772 - 0485 - 11e5 - 8bda-c7b4e9a8f7ac_story.html

²⁷ https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/07/gambiasharpdeteriorationofhuman/

^{Melnikov V. A.} 28 "Death by the name of Ebola" / / Asia and Africa today. 2014, N 11 (Melnikov V. A. 2014. "Smert ro imeni Ebola" / / Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 11) (in Russian)

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